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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an examination of the similarities and differences between ex- 
President Alberto Fujimori of Peru and President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela using 
the literature on populism to provide a comparative framework. It compares both 
presidents, in a qualitative manner, by examining the socio-political context in 
both countries, the causes for the emergence of both regimes, their ideological 
and programmatic characteristics, and the consequences they have or might 
have for their respective countries. The thesis is divided up into six chapters, 
with an Introduction and Conclusion.
In the first chapter, the thesis examines the literature on populism in order to 
construct an analytic framework. The thesis then goes on, in the following 
chapter, to analyse the historical context from which both presidents emerged. 
In Chapter 3, the economic and social performance of each presidency is 
investigated and examined, assessing the extent to which each provides the 
popular classes of their respective countries with a means to participate in these 
areas of national life. The fourth chapter presents the strategies used by both 
presidents to gain and maintain power in their respective countries. The relative 
authoritarianism and democratic characteristics of each president in analysed and 
assessed in the following chapter, measuring also the extent to which the people 
of each country participate politically in their country's affairs. In the final chapter 
the impact and consequences of each president on the respective case countries 
is examined.
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INTRODUCTION
Introduction
The present thesis is an examination of two new populist regimes which 
emerged in the 1990s in Latin America. These regimes emerged as responses to 
the uncertainties, in development and democracy, found in the continent after 
the 'lost decade' of the 1980s. In the 1980s Latin America faced a sustained 
period of negative economic growth which reversed many of the social and 
economic gains of the previous two decades. It also faced the task of installing 
new or reconstituting old, liberal democratic regimes after the authoritarian 
dictatorships that held power in many countries in the region during much of the 
1970s and early 1980s. The regimes of Fujimori and Chavez tried to reconcile the 
demands for increased popular economic and social participation with an 
'acceptable' level of democracy. Furthermore, they were responses to the 
worldwide structural changes favouring the market referred to most commonly 
as globalisation. This thesis is therefore a comparative examination of the 
emergence of both these regimes as responses to the challenges of 
development, democracy and globalisation which were developing in the region 
in the 1990s.
Fujimori and Chavez: Populist Presidents
Although Fujimori and Chavez coincided in power only for a brief period 
(between 1998 and 2000) there seemed to be, on the surface at least, a number 
of important similarities between the two presidents. Both were different from 
the normal run of politicians in their seemingly authoritarian manner of doing 
politics. Both leaders furthermore were reviled by 'respectable' liberal democrats, 
and it was not unusual to read about or hear negative comparisons of the two 
men from those quarters. The presidents were seen as charismatic, authoritarian 
'outsiders', who aimed to destroy the old political orders and install personalist
14
authoritarian hegemonies. Their policies it was argued could result in the "de­
institutionalisation" and polarisation of both countries, despite the fact that both 
were elected democratically (See for example Tanaka, 2002).
Yet Chavez, despite showing some signs of authoritarianism, such as a 
centralisation of powers in the executive (see Chapter 4), had nonetheless 
effected a transition to a new Constitutional model democratically, unlike 
Fujimori who executed a "self-coup" in April 1992 to sweep away the old order 
(See Chapter 5). Furthermore, there were wide divergences in discourse and 
ideology between the two presidents, most notably on the question of 
neoliberalism, which gave the Chavez regime a very different flavour to that of 
Fujimori.
Further comparisons situate both presidents within debates on populism 
and "neopopulism". Tanaka (ibid.), for example, notes that the similarities 
between the profiles of both presidents match similar profiles of leaders found in 
the literature on populism and "neopopulism".1 He characterises both presidents 
as "personalist leaders, with neopopulist and anti-systemic discourses" (ibid. pi). 
More recently, however, Ellner (2003) rejects simplistic comparisons between 
Fujimori and Chavez on the basis of authoritarianism and points instead towards 
a more considered examination of the relationship between these leaders and 
the popular classes, which he identifies as the principal common characteristic 
between both presidents (p34).
A review of the literature on each individual president further reinforces 
the perception that theory on populism is a key tool for understanding these
hTiere is much debate about the use of these terms and if indeed there is a distinction between 
the two. There is no definitive definition of "Populism" but one definition applicable to Latin 
America is as follows: a form of government with a personalist, and paternatistic pattern of 
political leadership; a heterogeneous, polyclass political coalition based on subalterna sectors of 
society; a top-down process of political mobilization; an amorphous or eclectic ideology; and an 
economic project that utilizes widespread redistributive or clientelistic methods. See Roberts 
1995, p.88. For "Neopopulism" see Weyland, 1996. For a discussion on the relevance of the term 
Neopopulism see Lynch, 2000 pp. 153-179.
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leaders.2 Fujimori has been clearly identified by many analysts as 'neopopulist', 
that is that there is a convergence between his political 'style', which is seen as 
populist, and his socio-economic policies, which are seen as neoliberal (See 
Roberts, 1995 and Kay, 1995 for example). Chavez also has been placed within 
this line of analysis, but he has presented difficulties for analysts due to his 
rejection of neoliberalism, (See Ellner, 2001 and Ellner, 2003 for example) 
though Cammack (2000) sees hima as potentially neoliberal.3 These analyses, 
furthermore, are part of a general revival of interest in populism as an analytical 
tool for examining Latin American leadership since the 1990's.4 In general 
populism is seen by analysts as a useful analytical framework with which to 
examine both presidencies.
Populism and Globalisation
Nonetheless, much of the literature on populism needs to be revisited or 
supplemented in the light of globalisation and neoliberalism. Populism has been 
traditionally associated with state interventionism and distributivist policies, with 
high tariff barriers, state ownership of strategic industries, and state subvention 
of much private industry (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1996). With the advent of 
globalisation and neoliberalism, populism was recast as 'neopopulism' (Weyland, 
1996) due to perceived close affinities between it and neoliberalism. 'Classic' 
populism was deemed to be 'dead', never to return.
With the emergence of Chavez, however, in the late 1990s this was 
proven not to be the case as he railed against neoliberalism and embarked on a 
massive spending programme on education and health, with firmer state control 
of the all important oil industry in Venezuela. This seeming revival of 'old' 
populism in the age of globalisation seem to contradict earlier claims of its death
2 For Fujimori see also Sanborn and Panfinchi, 1996; Grompone, 1998; Crabtree, 1998 amongst 
others.
3 For Chavez see García 1999; Cammack, 2000; Ellner, 2001. For Fujimori see for example ; 
Roberts, 1995; Kay, 1995; Sanborn and Panfinchi, 1996; Grompone, 1998; Crabtree, 1998 
amongst others.
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and reincarnation as 'neopopulism'. Clearly, populism needed to be reappraised 
and reassessed, particularly given the apparent affinities in many aspects of 
Fujimori's and Chávez's presidencies, especially in terms of presidential style, and 
stark divergences in terms of policy content. This reappraisal seemed to be 
particularly needed around three central concepts - legitimation, democracy and 
ideology.
Democracy is the principal form of government in Latin America today, 
with only Cuba as an exception. Furthermore, Latin American governments, 
through the Organisation of American States (OAS) have taken measures to 
safeguard liberal democracies survival, such as the Interamerican Democratic 
Charter.5 Globalisation processes in Latin America, however, have placed strains 
on Latin American democracies. Calvert (2002), points out that globalisation has 
manifested itself in the region primarily through neoliberalism, and in 'boundary 
blurring1, that is a reduction of state sovereignty in favour of international 
organisations and transnational corporations (pp 76-85).6 Both these phenomena 
have had a negative impact on the quality and effectiveness of Latin American 
democracy.
The neoliberal model implemented in Latin America, outlined by the so- 
called 'Washington Consensus' formulated by Williamson (1990), led to a 
reduction in the role of the state in favour of the market, which was to become 
"the principal mechanism for regulating society, resolving conflicts, and 
determining directions of change" (Weaver, 2000 pl81 cited in Kirby, 2003 p56). 
Yet the achievements of the reforms, now going into their third decade, have 
been sparse. Growth has benefited mostly multinational companies and large 
economic groups (Kirby, 2003 pp65-66). Overall growth has not been as high as
4 See for example the Special Issue on Populism of the Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol 
19, No.2, 2000.
5 The InterAmerican Democratic Charter was approved by the OAS in Lima in 2001. The Charter 
states that if any member country experiences an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic 
order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime norms they can be suspended 
from the OAS (Article 19 see .
http://www.oas.orq/main/main.asp?sLanq=E&sLink=../../documents/ena/oasissues.asD
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under the previous Import Substitution Industrialisation policy of the previous 
few decades. Furthermore a large proportion of the income from this growth 
ends up being sent to the developed countries in the form of interest payments 
on the debt, or as repatriated profits (Veltmeyer et al. 1997 p24).
Reforms have had a negative effect on job quality, with the informal 
sector increasing substantially (ibid. pl4; op. cit. p60; Gwynne and Kay, 1999 
p22). Social provision has also been reduced, in favour of debt repayment, and 
much of it transferred into the private/NGO sector, increasing inequality of 
access (Gwynne and Kay, 1999 p24). The percentage of those living in poverty in 
Latin America rose from 40.5 % in 1980 to 44.0 % in 2002. Not once did the 
poverty level go below the 1980 figure during those twenty-two years and 
income inequality increased (ECLAC, 2003 p50-75).
This poor socio-economic showing has had a knock on effect on 
democracy's credibility. As Tedesco (1999) puts it Latin Americans have to live 
with "the paradox of a democratic system seeking the political inclusion of all and 
an economic system characterised by the economic exclusion of the majority" 
(cited in Kirby, 2003 p76). As Kirby (2003 p79) maintains, an elitist political 
system is being consolidated in Latin America that, if anything limits popular 
influence on decision making. The system has more to do with social control by 
wealthy elites, than different projects of social transformation, leading to high 
levels of disenchantment and apathy with politics.
This situation has led to a decline in support for democracy. A recent 
report on democracy published by the UNDP (2004) shows that Latin Americans 
have little faith in democracy's ability to improve living standards or in the 
institutions of democracy (ibid. pp.24-25). Political parties and the judicial 
system score particularly low levels of trust with Latin Americans according to the 
report. Most Latin Americans (57% in 2002) express support for democracy, but 
of those that do so, almost half (48.1%) value economic development more
6 For a fuller discussion on globalisation and its effects on developing countries see Chapter 5.
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highly, and would support an authoritarian government if it solved the country's 
problems (44.9%) (ibid. p52). Furthermore, those who show the least faith in 
democracy are those who live in countries with higher levels of inequality, 
illustrating graphically the link between lack of confidence in democracy as it 
currently exists and inequality (ibid. p58) (See also Chapter 4). These 
dichotomies and dualities in Latin America are strengthened, along with poverty 
and inequality, rather than lessened by globalisation.
Implications for research
The genesis of the Fujimori and Chávez governments were strongly 
influenced by these processes and effects of globalisation. Both presidencies 
emerged from economic crisis, and the rejection of reform along neoliberal lines. 
Both men ran for their respective presidencies on anti-neoliberal tickets (See 
Chapter 2). However, on winning office Fujimori enthusiastically embraced 
neoliberalism while Chávez urged a more cautious, anti-neoliberal insertion into 
globalisation processes. Clearly therefore Peru and Venezuela, and Fujimori and 
Chávez are not simply isolated entities, but are caught up in a greater movement 
within the region, and the world, to radically restructure economic, political and 
social relations along neoliberal lines.
This underlines the need to examine populism from a much wider 
perspective than a simple political science approach. It points to an examination 
of both presidents as populists within a wider international political economy 
framework, recognising the strong influence of globalisation on the economic, 
social and political spheres in both countries. It also has to take account of 
democratising processes which were limited and held up by the constraints of 
the globalised international political economy. In this way any discussion of 
Chávez and Fujimori needs to be placed not just in a context of populism, but in 
wider discussions about legitimacy, ideology and democracy.
A review of the literature on populism shows that it can provide a basic 
analytical framework with which to examine both presidencies (See Chapter 1).
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The literature can provide us with relevant information on the context, causes, 
characteristics and consequences of populism which can structure and inform 
investigation into these regimes. Yet while the existing literature on populism can 
provide a basic framework it has a number of shortcomings as an analytical tool 
which need to be augmented by other literatures to create a new framework. In 
general, I argue that the literature on populism is too firmly rooted in a narrow 
conception of political science which overemphasises the political to the neglect 
of the economic and the social. For that reason, it was necessary in this thesis to 
go beyond the literature on populism to other literatures, in the areas mentioned 
above, which could provide a more ample framework to examine specific 
research questions.
Aims and objectives of the study
The preceding sections of this introduction therefore identify four main 
areas of study. Firstly there is a perceived need for an examination of the 
similarities and differences between both presidents, within the context of the 
role of populism in contemporary politics in the region. This would necessitate 
detailed studies of both presidents in the light of their influence and impact on 
their respective societies. Finally the influence of globalisation on both 
presidencies presents a further strand of research.
Consequently the main aim of the study is to analyse, by using the 
theoretical literature on populism as a comparative framework, within the 
context of globalisation, the similarities and differences between the presidencies 
of Chavez and Fujimori, why these exist and what effect each presidency has 
had on the states and societies of their respective countries. From this main aim 
a number of further aims are laid out below with their respective objectives:
1. To analyse the nature of both presidencies using populism as an analytical 
framework, as well as contributing to the debate on the role of populism in 
contemporary Latin American politics. Objectives under this aim would be to:
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■ Design a methodological strategy to research study;
■ Construct an analytic framework from the literature on populism;
■ Investigate the origins, causes, characteristics, and consequences of both 
governments;
■ Compare both presidencies within the theoretical framework on populism to 
analyse the extent to which they can be interpreted by populism and;
■ Assess implications of findings with respect to the usefulness of populism as 
an analytical category to examine contemporary politics in the region.
2. To examine the presidency of Alberto Fujimori in the context of his continued 
influence on Peruvian politics and society. Objectives here would be to:
■ Analyse the political, social and economic literature on Fujimori with relation 
to theoretical framework;
■ Analyse the relation of the Fujimori presidency to globalisation processes;
■ Place the analysis within the contemporary Peruvian political context, and;
■ Assess the continuing impact of the Fujimori regime in Peru, and the possible 
evolution of the political situation there, based on the evidence presented.
3. To investigate, in comparative perspective, the nature and possible evolution 
of the presidency of Hugo Chavez, and so shed more light on this regime 
which has been subject to highly polarised debate amongst analysts and 
political commentators, as well as amongst the Venezuelan public. Objectives 
which arise from this aim are to:
■ Analyse the political, social and economic literature on Chavez in relation to 
the theoretical framework;
« Analyse the relation of the Chavez presidency to globalisation processes;
■ Place the analysis within the contemporary Venezuelan political context, and;
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■ Assess the possible evolution of the Chavez government in Venezuela based 
on the evidence presented.
4. To analyse the position of both presidencies within the globalisation 
processes taking place in the region in order to trace the political effects of 
these processes and their possible evolution in both countries and in the 
region as a whole. This gives rise to the following objectives:
* Research the nature and impact of globalisation in Latin America;
■ Analyse the relation of both presidents to globalisation processes, and;
■ Assess the implications of both presidencies for globalisation processes in 
Latin America.
Little comparative work has been done on these presidents, and the study's 
focus on them within a framework of populism, in the context of globalisation 
will, it is hoped, provide an original and substantial contribution to the knowledge 
of both presidencies, and as such contribute to wider debates about populism 
and globalisation in the region as a whole. Whilst this section has covered the 
aims and objectives of the study, the next section will look at how I intend to 
realise those aims and objectives.
Methodological considerations
This study is methodologically situated within comparative politics, using 
qualitative techniques. Comparative methodology is useful because it is the best 
way to obtain the raw data on which to base informed judgements (Lijphart, 
1971 cited in Calvert, 2002 p9). It shows up regular patterns in the behaviour of 
both individuals and groups (ibid.). It allows us to describe in detail political 
phenomena and events in the case countries; to classify, reducing the complexity 
of the world and so allowing us to understand it more deeply; to test
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hypotheses, that is "explain what has been described and classified" (Landman, 
2000 p6); and to help us predict about future political outcomes (ibid. plO).
In this case comparison is done with a 'whole unit' approach, that is some 
of the relevant structures in two states are compared that have important 
aspects in common. This approach is best suited to the comparison of two 
countries, what Calvert calls a 'pair-wise comparison1 (Calvert, 2002 p23). Thus 
the present study examines the social, economic and political contexts in each of 
the countries, characteristics of the presidency, such as its relative 
authoritarianism or democracy, its organisational nature, and the nature of its 
leadership. I also examine discourse, ideology and the economic and social 
policies of each president. And finally I examine their impact on each country, in 
terms of their political structures and popular participation. In this way the thesis 
will provide a systematic and comprehensive comparison of both countries and 
regimes in order to fulfil the aims and objectives outlined.
The study was designed with Przeworski and Teune's (1970) "most similar 
systems design" (MSSD) in mind. MSSD seeks to identify the key features that 
are different among similar countries and which account for the observed 
political outcome. MSSD is, according to these authors, particularly well suited 
for area studies, in this case Latin American studies.
This particular study suggests a qualitative approach as such an approach 
is more suitable for exploring each actor's interpretation of events, through close 
personal contact with the subject's [in this case President's Chavez and 
Fujimori's] environments, something which is absent from quantitative 
methodology (Bryman, 1988 p95). Polarisation around the figure of the president 
is a feature in both societies, and is especially notable in Venezuela, where there 
have been repeated attempts to dislodge the President from power. In such 
circumstances qualitative research is more appropriate to understand the 
motivations behind this situation than quantitative methodology.
The study is informed by a number of schools of interpretation. Firstly it 
seeks to provide an historical/descriptive interpretation of events in both
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countries both before and during the time span of both presidencies. I 
consistently use historical material to analyse the different aspects inherent in 
the aims and objectives of the study. An historical interpretation provides 
essential data, as the Chavez and Fujimori presidencies are not only responses to 
the challenges of globalisation, but are also responses conditioned by the unique 
historical trajectories of each country and its peoples.
Furthermore there is a strong influence of Marxist thinking in the study, 
firstly in terms of its emphasis on social cleavages, particularly, although not 
exclusively, class (see Chapter 2), but also through influences from dependency 
theory as elaborated most famously by Cardoso and Faletto (1979).7 Whilst there 
has been some debate as to the continued relevance of dependency theory (see 
Calvert, 2002 pp77-78), it continues to exercise an important influence on 
analysis of the region (Kirby, 2003 p7). An important viewpoint in this study is 
that the political, economic and social are inextricably interlinked and the 
inclusion of a Marxist perspective goes someway towards recognising that fact. 
Having discussed the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of the study 
I will now go on to discuss the methods used to carry it out in the following 
section.
Research methods
An extended fieldwork visit to both countries was a central
qualitative research method for this study, providing an important means to
understand how both presidents interacted with the societies they emerged
from. In other words, it was necessary to experience them from within, in order
to theorise effectively. Furthermore, this technique would allow the study depth
rather than breadth - immersion into these societies so as to observe and
7 Dependency theory holds that developing countries cannot follow the development route of 
advanced industrial countries, as developing countries need core country investment for 
development. Developing countries are therefore dependent on the core countries, which, 
however, insist on terms of trade which are unfavourable for Third World development. "The 
effect of these conditions is that capital is drained out of the periphery into the core" (Calvert, 
2002), preventing the former's development (p77).
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analyse the every-day realities of politics on a micro-level. This would allow me 
to achieve a more holistic understanding of the appeal, or lack of appeal, of such 
leaders, thus providing me with a thorough knowledge of the subjects studied. 
Direct observation would further be complimented by a theoretical and empirical 
underpinning gleaned from extensive investigation of primary and secondary 
sources.8
Naples (1996) warns that fieldworkers have to negotiate relationships in 
unfamiliar surroundings, within a context of change. Resources such as 
reflexivity, as recommended by Steier (1991), which recognises that research is 
an interactive process, that it is a form of participation in the subject being 
studied, can go someway to dealing with such contingencies. These 
observations were often borne out by my experience of fieldwork as events 
forced me to develop a repertoire of coping mechanisms for problems that arose.
In Venezuela (January 2002-May 2002) there was evident polarisation 
between the opposition and government side which tested severely my powers 
of impartiality as one or the other side attempted to persuade me of their case. 
Coping mechanisms that I developed were ensuring that my research included 
people from both sides of the divide and those that professed to be in the 
middle. Furthermore, while I was in Venezuela the April coup against President 
Chavez took place, an event which presented me with dilemmas on the bounds 
of my participation in, and witnessing of events, and also opportunities in terms 
of piercing through the discourse and seeing the true intent of participants. Since 
then the coup has become an area of dispute between government and 
opposition, as the latter refers to it as a 'constitutional rebellion' while the former 
simply as a golpe de estado (coup d'etat) (See Cannon, 2004). Being present 
and witnessing these events allowed me to see through such arguments and 
make up my own mind with regard to their nature,
g
Primary sources such as government publications, political writings and speeches of both 
presidents, interviews with key figures, and secondary sources, such as academic writings and 
analysis on both presidents and their respective societies.
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In Peru as well, events presented themselves which I could not have 
foreseen but which were defining moments in my understanding of the context 
and nature of the Fujimori regime. In June 2002 there was a popular rebellion in 
the southern city of Arequipa against President Toledo's privatisation policies. 
The reaction of the government to this rebellion, in declaring a state of 
emergency and sending in tanks to quell it, raised many questions for me with 
regard to the nature of democracy, and the sometimes fine line between 
democracy and authoritarianism, particularly in the context of the charges of 
authoritarianism made against Fujimori and Chavez. Who, I asked myself, was 
more authoritarian; Toledo or Fujimori, or indeed Toledo or Chavez, given the 
repression of popular revolt by the Toledo government?9
In both cases therefore the research process was often shaped by the 
context, and by events, as well as any planning I had done in preparation for the 
trip. Furthermore these events and others like them suggested different 
personalities to interview, and different sources to study, and sometimes, such 
as the coup in Venezuela, became in themselves separate areas of research. 
Ultimately these experiences and the sources studied helped shape the 
questions, content and structure of the thesis itself which I shall go on to discuss 
in the next section.
Research questions and structure of the thesis
My study is guided by a number of essential questions grouped around 
what I called the 'four C's', that is context, causes, characteristics, and 
consequences, namely: what were the contexts from which these leaders arose, 
why they emerged, what were their policies, and what consequences these 
presidencies have for the countries they rule. These four pillars therefore became
9 In May 2004, to give another example, Toledo announced severe penalties against road 
blocking protests, being held by the coca growers union in protest at government policy in the 
coca growing regions. See BBC Mundo 'Peru: medidas antibloqueos' at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin america/newsid 3752000/3752133.stm>.
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the essential guiding structure for the study, giving it both a logical and narrative 
flow.
From these guiding questions an essential question began to emerge with 
relation to the globalisation processes described above: If populism was 
considered dead as a result of the failure of ISI, and its abandonment by most 
governments in the region, how and why did it re-emerge in the 1990s, under 
neoliberalism, and continue on into the twenty-first century? One explanation 
was offered by Kurt Weyland (1996) in the coining of the term 'neopopulism', 
based on the perceived similarities between populism and neoliberalism. 
However, the emergence of Chávez, as I've noted above, has upset the 
applicability of this formulation due to his rejection of neoliberalism. This 
suggests that populism continues to be a key analytical category in 
contemporary Latin American politics. However, it also suggests that the 
literature on populism is limited in its ability to explain both presidents' political 
appeal and programmes. Chapter 1 will analyse and examine the literature of 
populism, to show that while providing an effective overall structure, other 
literatures, specifically on ideology, democracy and legitimacy must be used to 
augment its explanatory power. In turn other analysts from these literatures will 
be suggested and reviewed.
A further question that arises is how it is that, in an international context 
extremely hostile to non-neoliberal models, a phenomenon such as chavismo can 
emerge. What differences and similarities are there between the historical 
contexts of Peru and Venezuela, which contributed to the coming to power of 
these particular leaders in the specific conjunctures in which they emerged? 
Chapter 2 therefore will look at the historical contexts of both countries, using 
historical and sociological material to help explain the deeply rooted social 
cleavages which have remained unresolved despite, or indeed as a result of, 
modernisation processes in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Recent 
globalisation processes have heightened further those cleavages. However, the 
distinct historical trajectories of each country contributed greatly, I argue, to the
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emergence of leaders who, while they have substantial similarities, also have 
notable differences in terms of ideology, discourse, and popular organisation. 
The chapter bases its theoretical discussion on the role of crisis in the emergence 
of populism, but uses Habermas' (1977) theory of legitimacy crisis to prove that 
such crises emerge due to a lack of legitimacy on three basic levels of national 
life - the political, the social and the economic.
As noted previously, populism was particularly linked with ISI policies and 
neopopulism with neoliberalism. However, as we've noted Chavez upset this by 
pursuing state led policies of high spending on social goods and state control of 
resources. In chapter 3 I've adopted a broad international political economy 
approach rooted in Habermas' (1976) concept of legitimacy focusing specifically 
on both presidents' social and economic policies to explain how they used link it 
to their projects to gain political legitimacy.
In Chapter 4 I focus on how both presidents emerged. What strategies did 
they use to get into and maintain themselves in power, what influence did the 
macro-structures of the region have on their ability to maintain power, and what 
influence do their strategies bring to bear on the nature of the respective 
presidencies? The literature on populism shows the heterogeneity of populist 
ideologies but fails to explain the reason for this. Laclau (1977), Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001) help provide reasons through their theorising on antagonism and 
ideology. In particular Gramsci's (1971) theory of hegemony gives greater weight 
and explanatory power to Laclau's and Laclau and Mouffe's theories and thus 
provide a broader framework in which to explain how these populist leaders 
came to power.
Relating back to the démocratisation processes referred to above, and 
linking into debates on hegemony, a further question which emerges is the 
relative democratic or authoritarian nature of each president. This question is 
particularly imperative considering the repeated charges of authoritarianism 
against both presidents. Chapter 5 therefore will examine more closely the 
relative democracy and authoritarianism of each president based on a framework
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drawn from the literature on democracy and populism. In particular it is 
necessary to examine the literature on democracy and popular participation 
(Dahl, 1989; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; O' Donnell, 1994) to seek an adequate 
framework to investigate this dichotomy further.
In the penultimate chapter, Chapter 6, I will turn to the question of the 
impact of both presidents on their respective polities. Most analysts maintain that 
populism's impact is overwhelmingly negative. This negativity is located 
specifically it is said, in the effects on the region's democratic institutions and the 
prospects for democracy itself. However, the socio-economic and psychological 
impact of populism on the popular classes in particular is not always taken into 
account by many of these analysts, who instead concentrate on institutional and 
procedural concerns of the democratic system, and not its effect on ordinary 
people. Such concerns furthermore take little note of the context of weak 
institutions and the global dangers to democracy found in our globalised age. In 
Chapter 6 therefore, returning to literature on democracy to augment the 
literature on populism, I attempt to explain why populists can claim democratic 
legitimacy, despite sometimes stepping out of democratic procedures. I also 
assess to what extent these presidents affected the sense of inclusion and 
participation of the popular classes in their respective countries, and weakened 
or strengthened democratic institutions.
Finally, the conclusion brings together the central arguments of the thesis 
for discussion and points to future directions for research. It will look particularly 
at the role of globalisation in the political processes of both countries, and the 
possible effects that this may have on their future political trajectories.
Conclusion
This introductory chapter has offered an overview of the context of the 
research and the main questions asked. I review the principal reasons for 
adopting the literature on populism as an analytical framework and also point to 
its limitations in that role. While the research is highly qualitative in nature, it
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provides an in-depth examination of both presidents' regimes, based on 
fieldwork and a review of published literatures, and as such can be useful to 
draw comparisons with other experiences and to reach broader conclusions 
about the concept of populism and the political situation in the region as a 
whole,
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1 CHAPTER 1: Populism and Latin America: Context, Causes, 
Characteristics, and Consequences
1.1 Introduction
The concept of populism is essential for the understanding of many of the 
regimes which emerged in Latin America in the twentieth century. Populism 
dominated the region for most of that century, from the 1930's to the 1980's 
specifically. Its characteristics reflected the historical legacies of the past, from 
colonisation to the modernisation processes of the twentieth century. Populism, 
indeed, has continued to be an important reference in analysis on Latin American 
politics, with recent governments, including of course Fujimori and Chavez, being 
referred to as 'neopopulist' or simply 'populist'.
Latin American populism is, however, far from homogeneous. Populist 
movements, are extremely heterogeneous; geographically, historically, and in 
terms of their nature and characteristics. Populism is not just a Latin American 
phenomenon, nor confined to developing countries, but has appeared in 
developed countries as well10. The different levels of development and historical 
legacies among Latin American countries has affected how populism manifested 
itself in the region. Some countries have had more authoritarian populist 
regimes, and others more democratic ones, some populist governments have 
been more to the right, others to the left; many have shown a mixture of all 
these characteristics. It is this very adaptability and heterogeneity which is one 
of the features distinguishing it from more conventional political categories, such 
as socialism or democracy.
There are a number of reasons for this. The heterogeneity described 
reveals contradictions and conflicts in the literature on populism which it does
10 See Canovan, 1999 for an examination of the emergence of right-wing populism in Western 
Europe in the latter part of the twentieth-century. An example she gives of this phenomenon is 
Jean-Marie le Pen, of the Front Nationa/e, in France.
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not always resolve. Literature on populism is more subject to the whims of the 
analyst and the academic Zeitgeist of the time than other literatures on say 
socialism or democracy (Worsley in Ionescu and Gellner 1969 p218; Canovan, 
1981 p5 and pl2). As Wiles puts it: "To each his own definition of populism 
according to the academic axe he grinds" (Wiles in Ionescu and Gellner, 1969 
pl66).
Moreover, the literature on populism is profoundly influenced by a 
statistical and institutionally fixated form of political science, predominant in the 
US, which often misses the broader social, economic, cultural and geopolitical 
picture. These features in the literature can leave large analytical gaps which 
need to be filled with theory from other more comprehensive literatures. This 
becomes particularly apparent in the context of the present study. Presidents 
Fujimori and Chavez have many similarities, yet there are many differences in 
terms of key areas such as legitimacy, ideology and democracy, which require us 
to step outside the literature on populism to other literatures looking at these 
specific areas.
The structure of this chapter is dictated by the search for answers to four 
basic questions: 1) Why does populism emerge?; 2) What is populism and what 
are its characteristics?; 3) What kinds of policies do populist governments 
pursue?; and 4) What consequences does populism have on polities which have 
had populist experiences? The answers to these four questions provide us with a 
broad overall structure suitable for the present study. They lead us, however, to 
other questions, the answers for which need to be sought in other, more 
universal, literatures.
In sum, while the literature on populism can provide a broad analytical 
framework to examine both presidencies, gaps are left in a number of important 
areas. This chapter seeks to pinpoint the weaknesses and strengths in the 
literature on populism for the purposes of this thesis, and identify other 
literatures and analysts which can add explanatory power to it.
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1.2 Context and Causes of Populism
Let us begin by looking at our first question: Why does populism emerge? 
The literature on populism provides us with a seemingly clear answer: Populism 
emerges as a result of crisis. This naturally leads us to another broader question, 
however: Why do these crises emerge?
Germani (1965) argues that the process of modernisation creates a 
situation of permanent change which can produce a 'disposable mass' of people, 
usually from the newly urbanised popular classes which will be prone to support 
authoritarian leaders and/or movements. These political leaders then facilitate 
and encourage the mobilisation and participation of the popular classes in the 
exercise of power. The social changes wrought by modernisation, and the 
challenges that it posed, created new social difficulties for Latin American 
society. This made the integration of the marginalised a central feature of 
populism, whereas their exclusion or subjection was fundamental to authoritarian 
responses to these challenges (cf O'Donnell, 1979).
A problem with Germani's theories, however, is that while they 
acknowledge the differences between Latin America and Europe or North 
America on the one hand, they presuppose that Latin America is aiming towards 
a similar model of modernity as those developed regions. Laclau (1977) 
therefore strongly disputes Germani's findings and argues that they are 
fundamentally flawed due to their being based on the teleological assumptions of 
modernisation theory. Modernisation theorists, such as Easton (1965), Kuznets 
(1976) and Rostow (1960) assume that Latin American societies will follow the 
same evolutionary patterns as the economically advanced nations; a transition 
from traditional culture, social organisation and political authority to more 
modern versions (Silva, 1999 p40). Laclau (1977), however, argues that the 
causes of populism have little to do with a determinate stage of development but 
rather are linked to a "crisis of the dominant discourse which is in turn part of a 
more general social crisis" (pl75).
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A principal reason for the emergence of such crises, according to the 
literature, is the extreme weakness and ineffectiveness of Latin American 
democratic institutions. Roberts (1995) for example states that "populism is a 
perpetual tendency where political institutions are chronically weak"(p.H2) and 
Crabtree (2000) states that populism "is more likely to be found in circumstances 
where democratic institutions are weak or perform poorly..."(p. 164). Furthermore 
with unstable political environments, exposed dependent economies and abrupt 
changes in economic policies, Latin America offers a context of structural 
precariousness prone to crises. Crises therefore regularly occur in the region and 
can take various forms: economic and social crises; some type of national 
emergency, such as a war; an institutional or representational failing to deal with 
such wider crises; or a crisis in the ideological façade of the ruing class brought 
about by wider crises. Most probably any given crisis will be a combination of 
most or all of these. Nonetheless, the key element, and the weakest link, in this 
context of instability, is the role and function of institutions.
What is the role and function of institutions, according to analysts? For 
Cammack (2000) it is the role of mediation between government and people: 
when institutions fail to fulfil their function as mediators, we have what he calls 
"a crisis of institutional mediation", or as Laclau (1977 pl75) would have it "a 
crisis of transformism". Philip (1998) and Roberts (1995) all agree in some way 
with Cammack's assessment. Philip (1998) states that democratic institutions are 
often seen by the population as hopelessly corrupt and unable to deal with 
economic crisis and the breakdown of order, leading the electorate to seek 
strong executive leadership (p96). Roberts (1995) agrees, stating that populism 
"surges most strongly in contexts of crisis or profound social transformation, 
when- pre-existing patterns of authority or institutional referents lose their 
capacity to structure the political behaviour and identities of popular sectors" 
(pi 13). Furthermore, Crabtree (2000) asserts that while crises are the immediate 
causes of individual populist experiences, each instance of populism reinforces 
the original context of institutional weakness (pl65). Thus populism is not "solely
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the consequence of periods of economic and political breakdown...rather 
populism can live on and indeed become a defining characteristic of a political 
culture" (ibid.).
What links most of these theories is the acceptance of the centrality of 
crisis itself in the emergence of populism, and the inability of democratic 
institutions to withstand crisis. The literature on populism, however, fails to 
satisfactorily explain why these crises occur beyond these references to recurrent 
economic crises and weak institutions. There is a failure here to place these 
reasons within a broader context on both the national and international plane. 
There seems to be conflict over which takes precedence in the creation and 
handling of these crises: do crises arise primarily and inevitably due to structural 
changes and inequalities, or do crises arise simply due to human error and 
mismanagement? In other words the discussion revolves around the precedence 
of structure or agency in the emergence of populism.
The literature on populism then, fails to provide satisfactory answers to 
these questions. What it does identify - institutional weaknesses, failures of 
democracy, economic weaknesses, modernisation processes - point us to wider 
areas of analysis - to history, international political economy, and theory on 
democracy. For these reasons it is necessary to go beyond the literature on 
populism and find further answers in literature relevant to these areas.
1.3 Characteristics of Populism
Our second question then is in effect two questions: What is populism and 
what are its characteristics? Before attempting to answer them it is important to 
clarify that in the context of this thesis populism refers specifically and 
exclusively to Latin American populism. While it has been present in other 
regions and countries, and while efforts have been made by some analysts, 
notably Canovan (1981) and Laclau (1977), to synthesise all forms of populism
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into a unified concept, this study is only concerned with populism as it manifests 
itself in Latin America.
Having stated that, the study follows Roberts (1995) in recognising 
populism as a term which encapsulates a variety of different perspectives. The 
difficulty with most definitions of populism is that they are either too specific to 
be universally applicable or too general to have any real explanatory use. 
Roberts instead provides us with a synthetic definition of populism which unites 
the different strands of analysis, recognising the validity of each. He identifies 
four analytical perspectives in the study of populism in the region: 1) the 
historical/sociological perspective, referring to the works of Germani (1965) and 
Di Telia (1965), and emphasising the coalitional developmentalist approach; 2) 
the economic perspective, represented by Dornbusch and Edwards (1991), which 
identifies populism with expansionist and redistributive economic policies; 3) the 
ideological perspective, referring to the work of Laclau (1977) specifically 
referring to ideological discourse based on the 'people'/power bloc dichotomy 
and; 4) the political perspective, citing Mouzelis (1986) amongst others, which 
equates populism with vertical mobilisation and bypassing of institutions. Roberts 
concludes that each of these perspectives on their own cannot adequately 
describe populism as it is a multidimensional phenomenon, and thus he 
recommends a synthetic framework based on all four perspectives11. This is the 
approach adopted in this study, as it is the most comprehensive and inclusive, 
and is more suitable for examining the wider context of populism as outlined 
above.
In answer to the second part of the question, rather than populism having 
characteristics, it could be said to have two main actors, the people and the 
leader with the resulting relationship between the two being the ultimate 
defining characteristic of populism.
11 See Roberts (1995) pps.84-89.
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The people' are the source of goodness, possessing the virtues of justice 
and morality, yet they also suffer, are deprived and oppressed12 ('the pathos of 
the little man' as Canovan [1982] terms it). Yet this vision of the people-as-one 
hides the multiplicity of identities that make up the 'people'. The real identity of 
the 'people' is unclear, as the term can both be specific and vague, inclusive and 
exclusive, "empty of precise meaning and full of rhetorical resonance" (Canovan, 
1981 p. 286).
The people could be said to be those who support populist leaders. Most 
analysts Identify populist support coming from within the 'masses'. This normally 
includes working class groups, such as organised labour associations and 
marginalised rural-urban migrants, often unintegrated into the labour force13. 
Recent studies of populism particularly emphasise the support of marginalised 
groups14. Yet currently in many Latin American countries the 'marginalised' are in 
fact the majority in the country. In sum, there is an "internal diversity of 
populism's 'disposable mass' and...cross-national variations in its composition" 
(Dix, 1985 p.38).
In effect the 'people' are defined through the discourse of the leader. 
Populist leaders are often drawn by analysts as strong, charismatic, and 
paternalistic macho men, with an autocratic, authoritarian bent, who present 
themselves as honest and wilful, determined to guarantee the fulfilment of the 
people's wishes15. These men, according to this view, are more interested in the 
ends, in results, and not too concerned about procedures or rules which may 
inhibit their being able to achieve them. They are seen as 'outsiders', part of, but 
estranged from elites but unhappy with elite policies and customs. Of course as
12 See Torres Ballesteros, (1987 p. 171) and Wiles in Ionescu and Gellner (1969 p. 166).
13 Di Telia (1965); Germani (1965); Stein (1980) amongst others. .Hennessey (1969) notes this 
phenomenon as of crucial importance to the development of populism (p.31)
14 Weyland (1996) for example, states that the main source of support for 'neopopulist' 
movements come from marginalised non-organised groups.
15 See Stein (1980). Canovan (1981) cites a quote from Peron illustrating this point: "If my 
government is to have merit it must interpret completely the wishes of my people. I am no more 
than the servant. My virtue lies in carrying out honestly and correctly the popular will" (p. 145)
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with many aspects of populism, the leadership can vary depending on the social 
and political environment from which it's drawn.
Populist leaders main strategic weapon for a populist politician to gain 
power is to appeal to the people, over the heads of established institutions and 
intermediary organisations in an antagonistic, direct, personalised manner. These 
appeals invariably occur, as we have seen above, at times of crises, be that a 
general social/economic crisis and/or a related institutional crisis16. Their 
objective is to isolate the established institutions in order to establish a direct 
unmediated relationship between the populist leader and the people.
Analysts are unclear as to what content an appeal to the people may 
have. Laclau (1977) for example emphasises the popular democratic element, 
consisting of popular traditions of rebellion, giving these appeals a simultaneous 
class and democratic character ("the double articulation of political discourse" 
ppl66-173). The appeals are presented in an antagonistic manner, against the 
status quo17. Cammack (2000) places appeals to the people firmly within a 
context of discourse, institutions and structure (see previous section). Panizza
(2000) states that the content of an appeal to the people is determined by the 
definition of the antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'Other' 
identified by the populist movement (p. 188).
Generally speaking, however, information in the literature on how these 
appeals are made, their content and what relation they may have to other 
elements in the populist movement is uncertain. What defines them ultimately, 
however, is ideology but this ideology, like so much in populism can vary.
Up until relatively recently populism was generally accepted as linked to a 
set of economic policies of a specific nature and orientation. Populism, according
16 See Cammack (2000 p. 154) where he states that appeals to the people arise when there is a 
crisis of political institutions and political and institutional mediation. See above for a discussion 
on crises and its role in populism.
17 Laclau's (1977) definition of populism is "the presentation of popular-democratic interpellations 
as a synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology" (pps. 172-173). 
Mouzelis (1978) argues that Laclau does not refer to the organizational implications of his 
theories on populism See Mouzelis (1978 p. 10) and see below.
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to this school of thought, emphasised growth and redistribution to the detriment 
of fiscal rectitude, thus ignoring risks of inflation. It followed a policy of Import 
Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), supporting national industries through high 
tariff regimes and subsidies, thus protecting internal markets from external 
competition. It had a nationalist industrial and economic strategy, protecting 
jobs in local industry and through nationalisation, the control of local raw 
materials and key industries. By prioritising local industrial growth and social 
welfare it built cross-class alliances between the domestic industrial classes, the 
industrial working classes and the bureaucratic and mercantile middle classes. It 
was interventionist, state-led, and distributivist18. By following such a strategy, 
populists sought to advance a Third Way' to national development, between 
capitalism and communism, in order to satisfy demands for social equity and 
head off threats of socialist revolution (Drake,1982 p233).
Some, such as Dornbusch and Edwards (1991) or Sachs (1990) 
condemned these policies as 'fiscally irresponsible', blaming them for the 
economic crises of the 1980s. Castañeda (1993), however, argues that this point 
of view is guided more by a prejudice against such policies, which leads critics to 
group them together despite the widely differing "historical, political and 
ideological contexts in which those policies were implemented" (p40). Wide 
variations existed between distinct national populist regimes and populism 
changed and adapted to local and international demands and trends. Varying 
policy emphases were to be found depending on the nature of the coalition, the 
national political culture, and the socio-economic situation of the country with 
regard to levels of urbanisation and industrialisation. Different currents could be 
found within the same movement, be they corporatist, redistributive, democratic, 
authoritarian, technocratic etc., and naturally this could vary from country to 
country (Drake, 1982 p234).
In effect many of these measures were not unusual in the international
18 See Dornbusch and Edwards (eds.) (1991); Cardoso and Faletto (1979); O'Donnell (1979)
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context of the time, where apparently successful state-centred development was 
to be found in Italy and Germany in the 1930's and in the Soviet Union right up 
to the 1960's, and in Western Europe there was a general post-war consensus 
on the benefits of state intervention and the corporatist, dirigiste state 
(Cammack, 2000 p. 156). Socio-economic policies were not uniform therefore, 
nor were these particular policies specific to populist regimes, and as such 
cannot be taken in isolation as indicative of populism, nor as the sole cause of 
the crises of the 1980's.
Furthermore, the re-emergence of populist, or neopopulist, regimes in the 
late 1980's and in the 1990's, often in tandem with neoliberal restructuring 
policies, forced analysts to reconsider this orthodox view of populism. Neoliberal 
restructuring policies were, it was said, incompatible with traditional or classical 
populist economic policy, yet it was clear that this new breed of leader in Latin 
America, such as Fujimori in Peru, Collor in Brazil, and Menem in Argentina, 
amongst others, were using populist strategies to achieve and maintain power. 
Weyland (1996) argued that populism, or 'neopopulism' as he termed this new 
phase, had certain underlying affinities with neoliberalism19.
It can also be argued that as 'classical' populism was as much a product 
of a conducive state-led international political economy context, so contemporary 
populism is a product of a globalised neoliberal age. Populism as a political 
system cannot be identified with a specific set of economic policies but must be 
seen in the context of international economic norms, and must be set within a 
wider socio-political and geopolitical context. As Roberts (1995) points out 
"[populism's] multiple expressions allow it to survive, and even thrive, in a
19 These were: a reliance on unorganized largely poor informal groups and an adversarial relation 
to organized groups, such as unions and the political class; a strongly top-down approach and 
strong state to effect economic reform and boost the position of a strong leader; and distribution 
of costs through restructuring to organized sectors and benefits, and benefits to informal sectors 
through the end of hyperinflation and targeted welfare programmes. See Weyland (1996).
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variety of economic and political situations (...) [it] is a recurrent feature of Latin 
American politics"20.
Nonetheless, populism must also be seen within the context of the 
consistent demands from the population, and those who vote for populist 
leaders, for increased economic, social and political participation. Both these 
constants are the parameters within which populist leaders must design and 
execute their policies.
It is these central facts which can determine the characteristics of specific 
populist regimes. Differing ideological outlooks can give distinctly different 
flavours to different populist regimes, as is the case with Fujimori and Chavez as 
we will see. For this reason it is necessary to go beyond the literature on 
populism to analyse the influence and effect of ideology on specific regimes.
Furthermore, populist regimes are often accused of being authoritarian, 
because of their supposed disregard for institutions, and often the rule of law, 
and their emphasis on personalism, centred on the figure of the president. 
Populist emphasis on elections, and the absence of explicit curtailments on 
democratic rights, such as of association and expression, however, cannot serve 
to disqualify it as entirely authoritarian. As Canovan (1999) warns "we need to 
think seriously about the populist claim to democratic legitimacy" (pps.6-7). 
Simply dismissing some populist regimes as 'dictatorial' cannot annul these 
governments' popular mandate. Power, ultimately, is dependent on people's 
needs and expectations being satisfied, and this can be both on a material and 
on an ideological level; on social goods being received and on an 'experience of 
participation', as Germani (1965) puts it, being felt by the followers of the leader. 
For these reasons this study goes beyond the literature on populism to explore 
writings on legitimacy, ideology and democracy, to attempt to characterise both
20 Roberts (1995, p. 112). Roberts identifies as a core property of populism: "an economic 
project that utilizes widespread redistributive or clientelistic methods to create a material 
foundation for popular sector support" (p.88).
41
regimes and seek explanations for the similarities and differences found between 
the two.
1.4 Consequences of Populism
As noted earlier, there is little investigation into the consequences and
impact of populism on the societies that have experienced it. Generally speaking 
analysts identify some positive aspects, namely popular participation and, more 
commonly, negative impacts such as a failure to tackle structural inequalities, 
thus failing to implement real change, and on institutions and institutionalisation.
On the positive side a number of analysts note that at the very least 
populism encourages the participation of the popular sectors in societies' 
structures and institutions, thus dissipating the meekness of those classes and 
encouraging their assertiveness (See for example Germani, 1965; Lynch, 2000; 
Stein 1980 pl4; Torres Ballesteros ,1987 pl77). Amongst the gains made by 
these sectors were increased democratic rights, unionisation, industrialisation 
and welfare reform, the latter primarily benefiting the industrial working class 
and middle classes (Drake, 1982 p241). Furthermore, Conniff (1982) argues that 
populism particularly encouraged a new cultural awareness among the masses, 
and a revival of interest in indigenous cultures (p20).
On the whole, however, analysts see populism as a negative 
phenomenon. Although some recognise that populism brought the masses into 
the political life of Latin America, this participation is not seen as genuine or 
thorough, but rather a pseudo-participation which ultimately perpetuates the 
inequality and exploitation characteristic of the region. Real structural change is 
shied away from and deferred, so that the root causes of populism (social 
inequality, poverty and political exclusion) remain intact. Representative 
institutions are weakened, thus exerting central control over popular 
participation, discouraging group autonomy, and reinforcing the political context 
which can lead to a re-emergence of new populist movements and regimes. 
Thus a consequence of populism is populism itself (ibid., pp 14-15; Crabtree,
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2000 pl76). Brasser Pereira et al. (1993, cited in Philip, 1998, p94) argues that 
this institutional weakening personalises politics and generates a climate where 
politics is reduced to fixes; the political culture therefore becomes one of short- 
termism and politicians of all persuasions are expected to deliver quick-fix 
solutions to complex problems. This, it is argued, can only damage even further 
the chances for democratic development and long term economic improvement.
In assessing these arguments, however, one must return to previous 
discussions in this chapter about the origins and causes of populism. If for 
example, weak institutions are a structural feature of Latin American political and 
social life, how much can populism be blamed for weakening institutions? Philip 
(1998 p94) comments for example, with reference to Brasser Pereira's 
observation on the short-termism of populist policies cited above, that the latter 
does not take account of the general state of politics in Latin America which 
generally tends towards short-termism. Furthermore with regard to populism's 
inability to deliver on structural reform, is this due to the inability of populist 
leaders, or to strong resistance on the part of vested interests against such 
reform, or both? Structural change in Latin America has been fiercely resisted on 
a number of occasions by a variety of groups, often receiving outside support. 
One need look no further than the coup against President Allende in Chile in 
1973, or the long war against the Sandinistas of Nicaragua in the 1980's, for 
proof of resistance to structural change on the part of powerful national and 
international interests. Finally institutional weakness not only can give rise to 
populism, but also to authoritarianism in Latin America. Ultimately in order to 
shed further light on these questions it is necessary to go beyond the literature 
on populism to areas such as international political economy, democracy, 
legitimacy and ideology to discuss it properly.
1.5 Populism as an analytic framework
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The above discussion can provide us therefore with the following basic 
framework based on the four guiding questions to structure this study's 
enquiries.
Table 1.1: Analytic Framework
Context and Causes a. context of institutional weakness
b. generalised crises
Characteristics a. authoritarian, charismatic leaders
b. the 'people'
c. appeals to the people
Consequences a. increased participation of popular 
sectors in social, economic and political 
life of country
b. deinstitutionalisation of state and 
society
Populism, however, is a multi-dimensional phenomenon subject to 
transnational and transtemporal variations. While the literature on populism can 
provide a basic analytical framework from which to investigate the presidencies 
of Fujimori and Chavez, the multi-dimensional nature of the subject matter 
requires further study in other literatures in the following key areas.
The literature on populism identifies the context for populism's emergence 
in the process of modernisation and urbanisation which has been taking place in 
the region almost continuously throughout the last century until the present day. 
It helps us locate the more immediate causes for populism in crises and a weak 
institutionality. The literature, however, fails to explain adequately why these 
institutions are so weak and vulnerable to crises and why crises occur so 
frequently in the region. For the purposes of this study therefore it is necessary 
to study literature in the areas of legitimacy, history, and international political 
economy to find answers to these questions.
The literature on populism also helps us identify the chief actors in most 
populist movements: a large amorphous mass of supporters identified generically
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as the 'people' and strong, charismatic leaders. The relationship between these 
two actors is the basis of the populist experience. This relationship is established 
primarily through direct unmediated appeals to the people bypassing established 
institutions and using antagonistic rhetoric. The specific identity of the 'people', 
however, is subject to variables dictated by the peculiar socio-economic and 
political situation of individual countries, and the ideology of the populist 
movements being studied. The nature, content, and object of populist discourse 
are subject to similar variables. Populism, therefore, cannot be identified with 
one specific ideology. While the literature, specifically Laclau, (1977) provides us 
with clues as to why this is so it generally fails to provide a more comprehensive 
answer to this problem. Once again it is necessary to go further to seek those 
answers, most specifically in literature on ideology and hegemony.
A further question stems from the fact that many populist regimes are 
dismissed by most analysts writing on populism as authoritarian, despite having 
sought political legitimacy at the ballot box, and having high levels of credibility 
amongst the majority of the population. Consequently, for the purposes of the 
present study it is necessary to seek answers in literatures on democracy and 
democratic legitimacy to explain and compare more thoroughly the 
characteristics of the Fujimori and Chávez regime.
Finally with regard to the consequences of populism while the literature 
identifies as a positive impact increased participation for the popular sectors, in 
general the effects of populism are negative in terms of institutionality and the 
furtherance of democracy. These assertions, however, need to be placed in a 
wider context of the meaning of democracy and the role of ideology in order to 
adequately answer the question. The next section will examine in more detail 
which analysts and literatures will help us find those answers and why.
The role of Democracy, Legitimacy and International Political Economy 
in the concept of populism
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In this section we will look once again at the four C's, recapping on the gaps left 
by the literature on populism in providing answers to these questions and 
identifying specific analysts or literatures to fill those gaps.
Context and Causes of Populism
In our previous discussion we identified the direct context of populism in the 
processes of modernisation which took place in Latin America in the twentieth 
century. Crises emerged from these processes which created the conditions from 
which populist leaders and movements came to power. The literature left 
identified modernisation processes (Germani, 1965), and weak institutions 
(Roberts, 1995; Crabtree, 2000) as the reasons for the emergence of these 
crises. It failed, however, to provide answers to deeper questions such as the 
reasons for the failure of democracy in the region, and its attendant institutions. 
There is a marked failure to examine closely the historical context, on a national 
and international level, in which populist experiences emerge. Yet these contexts 
are crucial to understanding that process, but also populist regimes' nature and 
ideological tenor.
In this study's two cases we find two populist governments emerging 
almost contemporaneously, using quite similar methods to gain and maintain 
power, with strong personalist leaders at the core of each movement, but with 
almost diametrically opposed ideological make-ups. It is a central argument in 
the thesis that the reasons for this apparent dichotomy are found in the historical 
contexts of both countries interacting with the broader international context. For 
this reason I review a broad variety of historical and sociological writings on both 
countries to help place these leaders firmly within their historical contexts, to 
draw out differences and similarities between each national experience and thus 
the broader contextual reasons for their emergence. By doing so we can seek 
the deeper structural reasons for the weaknesses in the national polities, 
particularly around the key issues of class and race, which lead to crises and thus
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creating the conditions for the emergence of each leader. Furthermore I place 
both governments firmly within the context of globalisation, identifying it as an 
ever present subtext to each governments policies.
The literature on populism does show that crises in the region are linked 
to global economic crises or structural change, but their manifestations are local 
and particular to the region, its states, and their particular historical trajectories. 
Functionalist theories in particular, such as those of Germani (1965), Di Telia 
(1965) and Ianni (1976) show us how in the context of Latin America the 
historical exclusion of the dominated sectors, based on class, the dependent 
capitalist situations of states in the region, and the fractures and instabilities 
which result from these conditions contribute to a situation conducive to crises. 
It is important therefore to pay attention to this historical context.
When we examine Latin American history we see that democracy has had 
great difficulty in establishing itself, despite Latin America being considered by 
elites in the region as firmly within western political and cultural traditions. This 
points to a failure on the part of these elites to acknowledge the peculiar 
historical trajectory of the region which has created a unique environment which 
may not be conducive to a traditional western style liberal democracy. Liberal 
Democracy in Latin America as it has been practised over the twentieth century, 
could be said indeed to lack legitimacy, despite the idea of democracy finding 
qualified favour with most Latin Americans (UNDP, 2004).
Habermas (1976) argues that advanced capitalist democracies, although 
based on class exploitation, maintain legitimacy as there is sufficient spreading of 
material and motivational rewards to achieve mass loyalty. Crises in this way are 
avoided by spreading costs throughout a plethora of weaker groups. This 
balancing act, and access to sufficient resources, ensures the survival of 
democracy despite its deficiencies in terms of participation. It is further bolstered 
by a widely diffused ideological outlook based on privatism - that is private 
pursuit of public goods, such as careers, leisure etc. - and competition.
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Habermas' model used comparatively can help show us why Latin 
American democracies fail. Essentially, while mass political participation is, 
nowadays at least, the norm in Latin America, these democracies fail to provide 
the sufficient material resources for an adequate number of people to ensure the 
mass loyalty which democracy requires to survive. For this reason, while Latin 
Americans may favour democracy in theory they are nonetheless prepared to 
abandon it in order to have their material needs satisfied. Participation therefore 
must go beyond the political sphere and include also the economic, social and 
cultural levels in any democratic society.
Here Latin America faces a number of further barriers. Looking specifically 
at the cases of Peru and Venezuela we find historically rooted social fractures 
based on the intertwined fissures of class and race. These fundamental 
cleavages are the deciding factors on access to employment, for instance. The 
lack of employment, and huge underemployment, leaves large groups - mostly 
indigenous or black in the cases of Peru and Venezuela - outside the formal 
economy. Inequitable and inefficient tax systems prevent the formulation and 
execution of policies to benefit the majority. Cultural differences, coupled with 
the lack of material rewards discourage the spreading of capitalist social norms 
of competition and private endeavour, causing a 'motivation crisis'. The absence 
of these factors leaves these democracies prone to a greater degree of systemic 
crises, as was seen in the 1980s in both states, and hence to the emergence of 
strong personalist leaders in the form of Fujimori and Chavez in the 1990s.
Habermas' theory of legitimation crises therefore provides us with a 
pertinent comparative model by which we can compare our two case studies 
with advanced capitalist democracies found in Europe. It also provides the study 
with a structure by which we can examine the level of participation in each 
sphere of society - social, economic, cultural - to seek reasons as to why Fujimori 
and Chavez achieved the legitimacy denied their 'democratic' predecessors.
Dependency theory can also aid us in our examination of this lack of 
legitimacy. Cardoso and Faletto (1979) characterised the economy of the Latin
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American region as being basically dependent on the export of raw materials to 
the advanced, or core capitalist economies in exchange for capital and 
manufactured goods. This economic dependence coupled with the social 
cleavages identified above on class and race provide the basic context in both 
countries in which decision-making on access to economic, social, political and 
cultural participation is made. Modernisation processes brought improvements in 
these areas for many but also sharpened inequalities, particularly economic 
inequality in many societies. This prompted demands for a deepening of this 
move to greater participation to eradicate these inequalities. Yet structural 
change on a global level led to debt crises and retraction rather than expansion 
of such participation. The result was crises in both countries - systemic crises 
leading to legitimation crises and the emergence of anti-systemic leaders who 
capitalised on the historical cleavages in both societies and the stagnation and 
lack of legitimacy of the existing political regimes.
Characteristics of Populism
The literature on populism identifies the chief characteristics of populist regimes 
as authoritarian, charismatic leaders who use the concept of the 'people' as 
central to their strategies to gain and maintain power. There is, however, a lack 
of clarity around these essential elements of populism. There is no decisive 
definition of the people, the nature and content of the appeals to the people is 
not sufficiently explained, and the role of ideology is unclear given the wide 
heterogeneity of populist projects.
Laclau (1977) identifies discourse as central to the appeals to the people 
used by populist leaders to gain and maintain power. He identifies these appeals 
as essentially antagonistic to the status quo, and explains the diversity of 
populist regimes by populism's ability to articulate itself to a variety of ideologies 
or hybrids thereof. This conception, however, is either contradictory to much 
other thinking on populism (Mouzelis, 1978), or remains unexplored as few
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analysts on populism provide adequate alternative explanations to these 
questions.
It was Laclau himself, along with Chantal Mouffe (2001) who explored 
these concepts more deeply in their discussions on the nature of modern 
democracy. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) expand on the concept of antagonism as a 
strategy to achieve power, by unifying through discourse the different negative 
currents against the status quo. Furthermore they base their discussions on 
Gramsci's (1977) theories of hegemony.
Populist literature shows us that populists gain power through the legal 
(e.g. elections), the barely legal (ruling by decree) and the illegal (coups). These 
strategies can be conceptualised effectively by Gramsci's theories of 'war of 
manoeuvre' and 'war of position' as two parts of an overall strategy to achieve 
hegemony. The 'war of manoeuvre' is a strategy to capture the institutions of 
state by a swift campaign of almost military precision. The 'war of position' is a 
more subtle, and longer, strategy establishing consent from the people by 
winning their hearts and minds. Gramsci thus can provide the study with a 
comprehensive and universal theoretical structure to help explain how Chavez 
and Fujimori gained and maintained power.
Laclau and Mouffe (2001), however, point to a further dimension of 
populism which is at the core of questioning around it. Many if not most analysts 
recognise that populism and democracy are deeply intertwined. Laclau and 
Mouffe point out that the power strategies discussed above can lead to a 'logic of 
democracy' or a 'logic of totalitarianism' - to democracy or authoritarianism. 
Analysts on populism point out, however, that populism can sometimes lead to 
an uneasy balance between the two. Dix (1985), Germani (1965), Roberts
(2001), amongst others, point to these conflicting currents of authoritarianism 
and democracy within populism. Canovan (1999) indeed claims that populism is 
democracy's shadow. Moreover, most analysis in the literature on populism 
agrees that populism is ultimately harmful for democracy. Conniff (1982), 
Crabtree (2000), Roberts (2000) amongst others argue that populism damages
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democratic institutions and inhibits or retards democratic development in Latin 
America, precisely because of the authoritarian personalism of populist leaders. 
This dictates a widening of the debate to embrace conceptions of democracy 
which will be discussed more fully in the following section.
Consequences of populism
A difficulty in the argument outlined above, however, is that it is not 
entirey clear as to what is considered to be democracy. There is a generally 
agreed recognition that genuine democracy must have popular participation and 
strong institutions. Popular participation in populism is regarded as being mere 
"pseudo-participation" (Conniff, 1982: 14-15) although it is also found to be 
weak in actually existing democracies. Democratic institutions, while recognised 
as weak are rarely analysed critically - despite their extremely low credibility 
amongst Latin Americans (Ellner, 2002; UNDP, 2004). Yet contradictorily many 
populist regimes bequeathed strong lasting institutions with strong levels of 
popular participation, such as trade unions and political parties.
Clearly then in any discussion on populism the nature of democracy and 
the effectiveness of democratic institutions are fundamental questions. For this 
reason this thesis considers in various chapters these two questions, using classic 
conceptions of democracy such as Dahl (1989) and more radical viewpoints such 
as Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) to measure the relative democratic and 
authoritarian balance within both case studies. I also examine more generally the 
global state of present day democracy referring to Nabulsi (2004) and Jacques 
(2004) and in Latin America itself (UNDP, 2004) to assess both case studies 
within a broader international and regional context. By providing this broader 
context these studies help us compare both cases within the current global 
situation.
Conclusion
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The main aim of this chapter was to review the literature on populism in 
order to create a theoretical framework for an examination of the two case 
studies. By identifying through the literature the causes, characteristics and 
consequence of populism, I've attempted to fulfil this aim. This review, however, 
has also served to highlight a number of failings in the analysis of populism.
Firstly, much has been made of the difficulties in reaching agreement on 
conceptual definitions of populism, and the quest for this definition has resulted 
in studies which, while offering many similarities, have also given us a rich and 
varied discursive literature from which to draw on. These disagreements centre 
mostly on the relationship of populism to ideology and to democracy.
One failing in the literature is the emphasis on defining populism to the 
neglect of researching its origins, causes, and impact. By concentrating on the 
nature of populism, analysts sometimes lose sight of the bigger picture, blaming 
populism for many ills afflicting the region, which have their origins in more 
permanent structural difficulties affecting the region's economies and societies. A 
review of the wider geopolitical context, specifically on globalisation, and on the 
specific historical context of each country of our case studies will help us to 
remedy that failing in the literature. Furthermore, Habermas (1976) can aid us 
by explaining through his theory of legitimation crisis how it is that advanced 
democracies can maintain mass loyalty. By studying Habermas (1976) we learn 
the importance of limited participation on all levels of national life - political, 
social, economic and cultural - for the survival of democracy, and thus its failure 
in Latin America and the consequent emergence of populism.
In general there is a lack of clarity in the literature on the reasons for 
populism's heterogeneity. Whilst this diversity is recognised there is puzzlement 
as to how this came about. Only Laclau (1977) offers a credible solution to this 
problem through his theory on articulation, but this solution is not discussed 
further within the literature on populism. It is necessary therefore to step outside 
the literature of populism to examine Laclau's source literature in the writings on
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Gramsci (1971), and further explorations on the subject of ideological articulation 
and antagonism in those of Laclau and Mouffe (2001) and Laclau (2002).
Another central factor in explaining populism is its relation to democracy. 
This is explored, mostly negatively, by the literature on populism, but there is an 
over concentration on the centrality of institutions to the detriment of 
participation. Many populist regimes, such as those of Fujimori and Chavez, 
compromise democratic institutionality to a greater or less degree but gain 
legitimacy through the provision of an 'experience of participation' as Germani 
(1965) puts it, in most of the sphere's presented by Habermas (1976). In the 
case of this study therefore there is a placing of this discussion within a broader 
discussion on the nature of democracy itself.
Finally, the literature on populism, by concentrating on specific regimes or 
on comparative studies within the region, often neglects the wider international 
context to help explain why some populist regimes adopt specific ideologies or 
policies. It is for this reason that this thesis is framed within a wider discussion 
on globalisation to help explain why it is that at the end of the twentieth century 
two regimes of undeniable similarities could differ so widely in their attitudes to 
neoliberalism
In sum, though both Fujimori and Chavez have been widely described as 
populists, the existing literature on populism is inadequate to provide a 
convincing analysis of their emergence as political leaders, the differences in 
their ideologies and their styles of governing. A closer examination of these two 
presidents, using a framework provided by a synthesis of the framework on 
populism and of these other literatures discussed above, should allow a better 
explanation of the emergence, ideology and mode of governance of Presidents 
Fujimori and Chavez. Therefore taking this into account a revised version of the 
framework in Table A would look somewhat like this.
Table 1.2: Populism in a wider theoretical context
Question Literature on Other literatures
populism
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Context and Causes • context of institutional 
weakness
• generalised crises
• historical context 
(various)
• legitimacy (Habermas, 
1976)
Characteristics • authoritarian, 
charismatic leaders
• the 'people'
• appeals to the people
• ideology (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001)
• hegemony (Gramsci, 
1977)
• democracy (various)
Consequences • increased popular 
participation
• globalisation (various)
• democracy (various)
• deinstitutionalisation 
of state and society
In the following chapter therefore I will begin this process by looking at 
the regional and national structural contexts and causes for the emergence of 
Fujimori and Chavez.
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2 CHAPTER 2: Structural fractures, Crises, the State and the 
Emergence of Fujimori and Chavez
2.1 Introduction
One of the main elements identified as a cause of populism in the 
previous chapter was crisis. In this chapter I will examine not just the role of 
crisis in the emergence of populism, but also the wider context in which crisis 
emerges. The central argument put forward here is that historical structural 
fractures create the conditions which favour the occurrence of crises, leading to 
gaps between people and government which can then be filled by populist-type 
leaders, such as Presidents Fujimori and Chavez. These structural fractures have 
developed particularly along racial and/or ethnic and class lines, providing the 
underlying patterns which define social inequality, and influence access to State 
power and resources. Despite a common origin for these fractures in the colonial 
and early republican experiences of both countries, they have manifested 
themselves in distinct ways due to their differing historical trajectories, with 
Venezuela showing greater levels of cultural, economic and political integration 
than Peru. Nonetheless the results have been similar insofar as both societies 
have been unable to develop sufficiently robust democratic institutions to avoid 
and withstand crises.
In the chapter I will firstly provide an analysis of crisis in the literature on 
populism, referring to writers such as Germani (1965), Di Telia (1965), Ianni 
(1973), Laclau (1977), Canovan (1981) and Cammack (2000). I will then briefly 
summarise Habermas' theory of "legitimation crisis", using it as a comparative 
framework to show how the Peruvian and Venezuelan states failed to secure 
legitimation as required by the Habermas model. I will then analyse the 
historical construction and nature of the fractures identified in both countries, 
paying particular attention to those in the socio-cultural area. I will show in this 
section how ultimately the Peruvian and Venezuelan States could not execute the 
policies needed to avoid crises, leading to the emergence of the two leaders in
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their respective countries. It will illustrate the inability of successive governments 
in both countries to avoid chaos and thus ensure legitimacy for their respective 
systems.
2.2 The role of crisis in the emergence of populism
Most analysts are agreed that crisis plays a leading role in the emergence
of populist regimes. Crises in global capitalism make demands on individual 
states to introduce new systems of capitalist accumulation which are in line with 
changes in the global capitalist system. 'Classic' populism was said to be the 
result of the global crisis in capitalism which began with the Wall Street Crash of 
1929, leading to a greater emphasis on national industrialisation and substitution 
of imports in Latin America. 'Neopopulism' is seen as a type of populism more 
congruent with neoliberalism, brought on by the crisis in Keynsian economics. 
These crises provide the context in which new systems of capital accumulation 
can be introduced into national economies.
Two schools of thought, however, exist to explain the effect of these 
crises. On the one hand the 'functionalist' theory of populism, as represented by 
Germani (1965), Di Telia (1965) and Ianni (1973), argue that crisis leads to a 
process of accelerated modernisation, with industrialisation and massification of 
a previously rural population leading to increased demands for participation, and 
thus to populism. On the other hand Laclau (1977/2002) argues that crisis leads 
to difficulties for existing systems to cope with popular demands, leading to a 
hegemonic power strategy based on discourse of a class or class fraction against 
the status quo. Differences between the two perspectives, however, seem less to 
do with the role of crisis in the emergence of populism, and more with their 
particular conceptions of populism, as both perspectives concentrate on different 
elements which help explain the emergence of populism.
"Functionalists" see these crises as part of a process of transition from 
dependent capitalism to an "advanced" capitalism. Ianni (1973) for example 
locates the emergence of populism in Latin America at the point when oligarchic
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liberalism failed to reconcile the demands of international capitalism with those 
of the national societies of countries in the region for more participation and 
economic and social equity in their countries. Germani (1965) saw this process 
as a transition from traditional to "modern" societies and as such inherently 
conflictive: "Our epoch is essentially one of transition...Typical of transition is the 
coexistence of social forms which belong to different epochs, giving a particularly 
conflictive character to the process which is inevitably experienced as a crisis, as 
it implies a continuous rupture with the past" (pp69-70). The functionalist view 
sees this process as linked to the expansion of rights and participation of the 
popular classes in the affairs of the state, and modernisation to increased 
industrialisation and expanded national markets.
Other analysts object to this thesis because it is too dependent on 
paradigmatic models and teleological processes which explain more about the 
models than the actual phenomenon of populism. Populism is not linked to one 
particular development model nor is it confined to one particular historical 
conjuncture. Laclau (1977) locates the emergence of populism within class 
structures, and specifically links it "to the emergence of [...] a crisis of the 
dominant ideological discourse which is in turn part of a more general social 
crisis" (pl75). This crisis can be a hegemonic struggle between classes or class 
fractions or what he terms a "crisis of transformism", that is an inability of the 
system to neutralise the dominated sectors. Most probably a true historical crisis 
would have elements of both. "What should be clear, however, " he warns, "is 
that the 'causes' of populism have little to do with a determinate stage of 
development, as functionalist theses suppose" (ibid.).
Cammack (2000) further reinforces Laclau's arguments by identifying the 
moment of populist emergence as "when significant deep structural change is 
taking place in patterns of accumulation (at a global and local level) and existing 
social and political institutions are failing [...] to cope" in other words Laclau's 
"crisis of transformism" (pl54). The emergence of populism is therefore, 
according to this view, linked to crises in capitalism and "capitalist accumulation"
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but is not identified with one type of political or economic project, be it neoliberal 
or state-led development models.
Mouzelis (1978), however, qualifies Laclau's dismissal of "functionalist" 
theories as a bit "harsh" (p54). While he agrees with Laclau that these analysts' 
'tradition-modernity' dichotomy is misleading in general, and that populism 
should not be linked only to an ISI model or third world underdevelopment, he 
nonetheless affirms the great value of their theories within the context of Latin 
American populism as a distinct area of study in it's own right. Indeed it is their 
very contextual insertion which makes them "less vacuous than Laclau's own" 
theories (ibid.).
Germani and Di Telia ask a very pertinent question, Mouzelis asserts: Why 
does populism occur more frequently in peripheral capitalist social formations? 
He argues that "functionalist" theories can be taken independently from their 
teleological context. The rapid entry of rural and urban working people into 
politics in Latin America can be explained by the different ways capitalism 
developed in Europe and Latin America. The form of political mobilisation 
brought about by capitalism in Latin America can account for the 
paternalistic/'plebicitary' leadership, rather than the highly developed party 
administration found in Western European countries. Indeed Mouzelis argues 
that Laclau "manages the remarkable feat of developing a theory of populism 
without dealing at all seriously with the concept of political mobilisation" (ibid. 
p55). Nonetheless, Mouzelis himself fails to supply reasons as to why capitalism 
has developed in this manner in Latin America. We need to seek reasons for this 
within the historical context of the region specifically the failure of successive 
governments to provide the majorities of the region with the participation 
necessary to achieve legitimacy.
Laclau includes fascism and Nazism as political ideologies with populist 
content, but Canovan (1981 pl50) and Germani (1965 pl59) both reject these 
movements as populist due to their essentially anti-democratic nature. Cammack 
(2000) and others identify Fujimori as "neopopulist" but he too is deemed
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authoritarian by a number of analysts due to his essentially anti-democratic 
nature (Cotier and Grompone, 2000; Lynch 2000). Populism, even sometimes at 
its most authoritarian, can have a democratic orientation in that it attempts to 
provide at some level an "experience of participation" for the popular classes as 
identified by Germani (1965 ppl59-161). The historical exclusion of the 
dominated sectors from Latin American societies, which has become a central 
element of struggle in the region, the dependent capitalist situation of Latin 
American states, and the resultant fractures and instabilities which characterise 
the region's political economies, are precisely the elements which differentiate 
crises and the demands that they create in the region from those in Western 
Europe and North America, which are governed by the logic of advanced 
capitalism.
The main lesson of functionalist theory is its attention to social, economic 
and political contexts from which populist regimes emerge, which can be 
examined independently of the telelogical aspects of the theory. Mouzelis 
criticises Laclau because his argument is deductive rather than contextual, and 
therefore 'vacuous' and argues that "functionalist theory can be 'disarticulated' 
from the tradition/modernity neo-evolutionist discourse and 're-articulated' into a 
mode-of-production discourse"(Mouzelis, 1978 p54). However, Laclau (1977) by 
drawing our attention to ideological discourse in the context of hegemony gives 
us valuable tools to help understand the rise and establishment of populist 
regimes.
This chapter will take a functionalist approach in examining the role of 
crises of modernisation strategies in the emergence of the Chavez and Fujimori 
in their respective countries. Chapter 3 will follow a more 'ideological discourse' 
approach in examining the establishment of hegemony by both presidents. 
Overall, however, the study has found Laclau's theory most useful in explaining 
how populism can show such wide variations in ideology, through the process of
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articulation. Chapter 3 and the Conclusion will elaborate on these issues further.
The next section will look firstly, however, at the role of legitimacy in 
democracies, by using Habermas' theory of legitimation crisis to compare 
advanced capitalist countries and Latin American states. The section will show 
that some Latin American states, in this case Peru and Venezuela, failed to 
secure legitimacy due to the deep social faultlines in the region which reinforce 
inequality, and which remain unhealed by democracy.
2.3 Habermas' Theory of Advanced Capitalism and Legitimation Crisis
Why is it that advanced capitalist countries can successfully withstand
crises without losing mass support whereas developing countries such as Peru 
and Venezuela can face comprehensive systems crises as a result of external 
economic shocks? According to Habermas (1976), advanced capitalist societies 
are characterised by economic, administrative and legitimation systems. The 
State not only guarantees the general conditions of production but also is 
actively engaged in it and so must seek legitimation. It does this through a 
system of "formal democracy" which ensures "diffuse mass loyalty" (ibid.). This 
is achieved essentially through a class compromise in wages and in the 
scattering of the negative effects of capitalism over quasi-groups, such as 
consumers, schoolchildren, the sick and so on: "Everyone at the same time is 
both a participant and a victim" (ibid. p39). Formal democracy is therefore 
crucial in advanced capitalist societies as the mechanism by which class- 
consciousness is diffused, legitimation from the population is achieved and crises 
are either avoided or displaced.
Advanced capitalist societies, according to Habermas may face crisis in 
certain specified situations on three levels: economic, administrative (political) 
and socio-cultural. On an economic level they may face crisis if they fail to 
provide the requisite quantity of consumable values, that is by failing to raise 
productivity, regulate wage levels and ensure mass loyalty to the system. On an 
administrative level an advanced capitalist state may face crisis, if it fails to raise
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taxes and distribute them effectively to benefit the majority of citizens in such a 
way as to ensure mass loyalty, in other words to produce the requisite quantity 
of rational decisions. A legitimation crisis may take place when the system does 
not provide enough "generalised motivations". The chief motivation in advanced 
capitalist societies is that relating to civil and familial-vocational privatism - that is 
interests in consumption, leisure and careers which correspond to the concepts 
of competition and achievement. The provision of the wherewithal to satisfy 
these interests is sufficient to avoid a serious motivation crisis amongst the bulk 
of the population. If the system cannot provide these rewards, however, this 
motivation crisis can then lead to a legitimation crisis. "A legitimation crisis arises 
as soon as demands for such rewards rise faster than the available quantity of 
value, or when expectations arise that cannot be satisfied with such rewards" 
(ibid. p73).
Advanced capitalist societies are based on a pseudo-consensus formed 
from rationally discussed "generalisable interests" or "needs that can be 
communicatively shared" but are not separate argumentatively from those "that 
are and remain particular" (ibid. pl08). They are ruled by "justifiable norms", 
that is norms that are communicable and based on a "rational consensus" rather 
than on force (ibid. p ill) . Ultimately the citizen expects the political system to 
prevent chaos and thus meaninglessness (ibid. pi 18). In general Habermas 
maintains that advanced capitalist societies provide this security thus allowing 
him to assert that "a system crisis is not to be expected in advanced capitalism" 
(ibid. p92). Crises will occur but they can normally be dealt with by spreading 
the costs, adjusting them in one area to compensate for deficiencies in another 
area. Advanced capitalist societies are still based on the "exploitation of one 
class to the advantage of another" but this is ameliorated by an ideologically 
secured and effective class compromise which ensures the spreading of sufficient 
material and motivational rewards to achieve mass loyalty (ibid.).
In this chapter I will show that both in Peru and Venezuela historically 
formed social structures have created severe fractures in the body politic of
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these countries. These fractures inhibit the generation of "generalisable 
interests" and the "pseudo-consensus" necessary to provide the stability to 
develop efficient legitimation systems. They affect the economic, administrative 
(political) and socio-cultural levels fundamental to Habermas' theory, negating 
the possibility of Peru and Venezuela developing along advanced capitalist lines. 
On an economic level Peru and to a lesser extent Venezuela failed to integrate 
the majorities into the system, leaving large groups of people outside formal 
employment as unemployed or underemployed. Similarly on an administrative 
level only a minority is integrated into the taxation system, which is largely 
inequitable, thus limiting the State's ability to raise sufficient revenue to finance 
rational policies which could benefit the majority of citizens. Finally on a socio­
cultural level the required material rewards and motivations, such as 
consumption, leisure and career motivations, cannot be provided by the State for 
the majority of its citizens, partially due to a lack of resources, but also because 
of communicational difficulties due to cultural difference. The result of all these 
factors is the greater exposure and vulnerability of these states to system crises.
Despite important differences both countries have had more, and longer, 
periods of mostly military authoritarian government since independence than 
democratic government, thus inhibiting the possibility of the realisation of 
"justifiable norms" that require "rational consensus" rather than force21. More 
recently, in the 1980's and 1990's both countries faced large-scale system crises 
which resulted in mass alienation rather than the mass loyalty required in the 
Habermasian model. The result of this mass alienation was the emergence of 
strong personalist leaders with a discourse based on the extension of democracy 
to the popular sectors, and parts of the middle sectors, which had felt
21 In Peru, since Independence until 1995, 60 % of the country's presidents have been military, 
ruling for about 100 of it's 170 years of independence (Me Clintock, 1999 p311). In Venezuela 
according to Myers (1996 p 229) the country had experienced only eight months of civilian 
elected government during its first century and a quarter of independence (1830-1958). Since 
1945 alone there have been around 10 military interventions into political life in Venezuela, the 
latest being the April, 2002 coup against the Chavez government.
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themselves excluded from the economic, social, political and/or cultural life of 
the country.
To conclude, while Habermas' theory refers exclusively to advanced 
capitalist societies, it is a useful matrix from which to examine Peruvian and 
Venezuelan societies; firstly as a comparative model, and secondly as it has 
relevance for the substantial sectors of society that are integrated into these 
societies along advanced capitalist lines. The following section will look at the 
historical conditions of Peru and Venezuela, using the Habermasian model as a 
framework, to examine and explain the economic and social fractures in both 
countries which differentiate it from the advanced capitalist society model 
developed by Habermas. The final two sections will examine more specifically the 
more immediate historical context which gave rise to both presidents in their 
respective countries.
2.4 Structural Fractures in Peru and Venezuela
2.4.1 Dependency and social cleavages
The economies of Peru and Venezuela are dependent on outside markets
for the sale of primary goods and the purchase of manufactured goods and 
capital equipment with local manufacturing capacity being generally weak.22 This 
is not to say that there are not differences between both economies, but these 
are more of scale than substance. For example, the Venezuelan economy is 
dominated by oil to a much greater degree than one single product dominates 
the Peruvian economy. As a result the Peruvian economy is much more 
diversified than the Venezuelan economy although overall the latter economy is 
richer. Peru has a more diversified and more developed agricultural industry,
22 In 2001, primary products accounted for 81.4 % of the total value of Peru's FOB exports, while 
the corresponding figure for Venezuela was 88.8 % (ECLAC, 2003 p81). The US supplies more 
than one-third of Venezuela's food imports, and Venezuela is the fourth largest supplier of oil to 
the US (US Department of State, Venezuela, 2004, no page no.). In 2001, Peru exported 27 % of 
its goods to the US and imported 30 %. Between 1990-2001 it received US$1.4 billion in bilateral 
aid from the US (ibid. Peru).
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than Venezuela, for example. Peru exported US$551 million worth of agricultural, 
game, forestry and fishing goods in 2000 compared to Venezuela's US$226.1 
million (ECLAC, 2002 p537). However, such dependence on the export of primary 
products can have a distorting effect on the local economy and society; while 
products such as asparagus, avocados, coffee and cotton were being exported to 
the first world, in Peru in 2000 8 % of children were suffering chronic 
malnutrition and 26.6 % severe malnutrition (PNUD, 2002 p227). Enclave 
production still exists with the ownership of most mining operations in the hands 
of foreign multi-nationals, thus providing little added on value to the local 
economy due to the direct exportation of those products for processing abroad. 
Gold in its unrefined state for example accounted for 17.1 % of Peruvian exports 
in 2001 (ECLAC, 2002 pl51).
In Venezuela oil has a preponderant role in the country's economy with 
crude oil or petroleum products accounting for 82 % of all exports from that 
country in 2001 (ibid. pl57). This leaves the country particularly exposed to the 
vagaries of market pricing, affecting its ability to plan its growth. Furthermore 
the role of oil in Venezuela has had a distorting effect on the local economy, with 
great emphasis placed on the import of consumer goods including foodstuffs 
(US$3,884 million in 2001: ECLAC, 2002), and the agricultural sector receiving 
little investment as a result (only 1.1% of exports in 2001; ibid. p541). Moreover, 
dependence on oil revenues obviated the necessity to implement progressive tax 
regimes, and private industry became dependent on state grants to survive.
In both cases structured employment, wealth, taxation and the 
distribution of social goods are subject to influence by the structural factors of 
race/class and economic relations with the core capitalist countries rather than 
societal needs. An essential difficulty Is that a substantial proportion of the 
earnings from exports cannot be reinvested in the economy but instead go to 
pay off each country's crippling international debts, instead of reinvestment in
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social programmes or in the establishment of new industries23. Economic 
dependence preserves underdevelopment, perpetuating the existing class/race 
bifurcation and the inequalities stemming from that basic societal cleavage, 
which in turn itself further perpetuates economic dependence.
Both these factors have resulted in stratified societies based on race with 
non-white majorities having limited access to the scant formal employment 
opportunities available. The white or 'near-white' elite on the other hand acts as 
the mediator between local markets and capitalist centres, with local capitalists 
playing a reduced role in the local market, providing basic consumer goods (such 
as beer, wine, flour etc.) to it and few high value manufactured products. This 
race/class stratification is reflected in local politics, which has traditionally 
excluded the demands of the majority either through authoritarianism or through 
forms of liberal democracy limited by restrictive franchises, such as property 
and/or literacy requirements. The result therefore is a society based on the 
exclusion of large sectors of the population rather than integration as in the 
advanced capitalist model outlined by Habermas.
Venezuela, however, has developed a greater level of cultural 
homogeneity than Peru and a stronger democratic tradition. Its relatively 
abundant oil rents facilitated the creation of more stable democratic institutions 
in the latter part of the twentieth century, which ultimately, however, proved 
ineffective in the face of economic crisis, leading to political polarisation based on 
the inherent race/class bifurcation in that society.
2.4.2 Colonial and Republican Contexts
Peru and Venezuela were both Spanish colonies but their colonial
development differed greatly in many respects. Peru was a conquered land and 
people and the Spanish erected a complex colonial edifice over the ruins of what
23 In 2001 20.8 % of Peru's export earnings went to the payment of the total debt service, while 
in Venezuela this figure amounted to 20.9 %. Venezuela pays 10.3 % of its GDP on debt 
servicing as opposed to 4.1 % for Peru. To give some perspective to these figures, Peru spent 
3.3 % of GDP on education in the period 1998-2000. Venezuela spent 2.7 % on public healthcare 
in 2000 (UNDP, 2003).
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was a relatively unified indigenous society organised under the Incas in a 
hierarchical social and political system. Venezuela on the other hand was 
sparsely populated, with small isolated tribes distributed throughout the territory. 
Peru therefore had large pools of labour already organised by the Incas into 
easily accessible population centres, which were utilised by the Spanish for their 
colonial project. Venezuela had no such labour pools available and had to import 
from Africa, at considerable cost, the majority of its labour through slavery. 
Furthermore the Peruvian indigenous peoples were required to work the 
extensive silver and gold mines which were essential to the Spanish crown. 
Venezuela had no such deposits and with a small Indigenous population, with 
their labour and their tributes, remained a poor and peripheral frontier post, with 
a small and relatively poor elite dedicated to plantation farming, commerce or 
smuggling (Ewell, 1984 p3).
Important differences developed in the elites and masses in both 
countries as a result of these different colonial enterprises. The Peruvian elite 
was much closer to the Spanish, Lima being the centre of the South American 
Empire, well integrated into the mercantilist economy, and as a consequence 
more concerned with the preservation of the status quo. Work patterns in Peru 
were essentially feudal, If not based on outright slavery, reinforcing a regime 
"founded only on conquest and force" (Cotier, [1978] 1992 p24; Mariategui, 
[1928] 2002 p58). The entire regime was underpinned by the use of violence to 
ensure its dominance: "Violence was a structural component of colonial 
domination (...) which also had a place in the family space (...).Violence invaded 
the streets, squares and homes; all daily life" (Flores Galindo, 1999 pp41-42).
In Venezuela the elites were more isolated, less numerous, poorer and 
less powerful, and were more exposed to other European powers in the melting 
pot of the Caribbean (Wright, 1990 pl5). The local Venezuelan elite was 
therefore more independent of the Spanish crown and more receptive to 
different ideas and organisational concepts. While similar laws and restrictions as 
those applied in Peru were enforced on blacks and pardos (mixed race) in
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Venezuela, forcing them to work, that country was more racially mixed than 
Peru. Slaves often ran away and peons often preferred banditry to work despite 
these laws (Carrera Damas, 1980 p42). Venezuela had fewer African slaves, 
fewer Indigenous and fewer Spanish hidalgos (nobles) and was consequently a 
more diversified society, with a social pyramid with relatively less distance 
between the top and the base (Ewell, 1984 p3-4). This freer structure of 
Venezuelan colonial society lent itself therefore to a more intimate relationship 
between the various racial groups (Wright, 1980 pl8-21). By the end of the 
colonial era 60 % of Venezuelans had African origins and of the 25 % classified 
as white probably some 90 % had some African ancestry (ibid. pl4).
Thus the majority of the population of Venezuela was descended from 
non-natives, and blacks and pardos were integrated to some degree into a 
largely European oriented Creole culture. Nevertheless, a "racial dualism" still 
existed in Venezuela, where on the one hand a process of miscegenation was 
taking place, and on the other hand blacks, and to a lesser extent pardos were 
subject to social and economic exploitation (ibid. pl4). Peruvian society on the 
other hand was marked by a more complete excision between two societies, 
Creole and Indigenous, which seemed to function in parallel and independently, 
the former subjugating the latter majority (Manrique, 2002 p59)24. Corporate 
independence was jealously guarded: "Common values, interests and objectives 
didn't exist. There were Indigenous, castes, nobles, soldiers, priests, merchants 
and jurists, but there were no citizens" (Cotier, [1978] 1994 p40 citing Mac 
Alister, 1963). In sum, both Venezuelan and Peruvian societies were based on 
the use of forced labour drawn from black, mixed race and indigenous 
populations and as a result were subject to similar social cleavages. Nonetheless 
these social cleavages in Peru were deeper, more numerous and more enduring 
than those of Venezuela, due to less racial mixing and the greater ethnic and
24 In the 1812 census of Peru, out of a population of 1,509,551 only 11.8 % of inhabitants were 
Spanish; 63.3 Indigenous; 19 Mestizo and 5.9 black or pardo (Contreras and Cueto, 2000 p39). 
By 1876 the percentage of Indigenous had reduced only marginally to 58 % (ibid, pl44).
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linguistic barriers found in the former. Venezuela as a result was more culturally 
cohesive, less hierarchical and more change receptive than Peru, although blacks 
represented the lowest caste in a still stratified society.
Independence brought little practical change in this situation for the 
masses as a whole, but did usher in changes in the nature and composition of 
the elites. Spanish domination, and with it the upper layer of Spanish born 
peninsu/ares in the elite were removed forever. The caudillo wars that broke out 
in both countries after independence, the guano boom in Peru (1841-1878) and 
the Federal War in Venezuela (1859-1863) led to increased mestizoIpardo 
presence amongst elite groups. The principle of equality was enshrined in 
successive constitutions but was more legal aspiration than social fact. In effect 
Creole domination of both countries became complete, and as both countries 
developed economically the new Creole elites aligned themselves commercially 
and diplomatically with outside powers particularly Great Britain, but increasingly 
the United States. Repressive labour systems remained in both countries under 
new guises, although these were less successful in Venezuela than in Peru 
(Contreras and Cueto, 2000 ppl30-132; Wright, 1990 p49). As the twentieth 
century approached positivist theory became fashionable, and the elite looked to 
white immigration to bolster their numbers or "whiten" their populations.
In sum, the essential social and economic fractures of the colonial era 
continued on into the republican era in Peru and Venezuela. The new Republics 
were founded under the dichotomy of legal equality and practical exploitation. 
While the old colonial order crumbled under the force of the independence wars, 
elites were reconstituted and regenerated through the partial acceptance and 
alliance with individuals from previously excluded sectors, thus maintaining an 
elite/masses division of the social apparatus. A number of strategies were used 
to enforce pernicious labour regimes on the majorities. These regimes were 
founded on profoundly rooted racist bias, which found new life and form under 
supposedly "scientific" positivist rhetoric. Elites sought to regenerate themselves 
and transform the racial makeup of their nations by encouraging white European
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immigration, with little success. The social models aspired to, remained 
primarily European and increasingly North American in their inspiration, rejecting 
the other cultural influences in the region (i.e. the Indigenous and the African), 
as a source for new social models.
While Peru and Venezuela shared these essential continuities, notable 
differences were also perceptible. Levels of racial mixing were more elevated in 
Venezuela than in Peru particularly amongst the dominated sectors, but also 
within the elites. Official Venezuelan discourse paid more attention to egalitarian 
rhetoric, to the extent that the Federal War (1859-1863) was ostensibly fought 
over the issue, although the winning of this war by the Federal side did not result 
in any appreciable improvement for the dominated sectors (Carrera Damas, 1980 
pl06). Nonetheless popular involvement in the war of Independence and the 
Federal War ensured the politicisation of the majorities, and their presence in the 
political life of the country from the beginning. This was not the case in Peru 
where the dominated sectors did not make an entry onto the national stage until 
the early twentieth century, and the indigenous majority shunned the Peruvian 
State. Racism in Venezuela did not have the same levels of severity and rigidity 
as in Peru, further contributing to the formation of a more cohesive national 
social body in the former country. The greater solidity and openness of 
Venezuelan society would prepare its elite to respond more imaginatively than its 
Peruvian counterpart, to the changes awaiting it in the twentieth century. 
Nevertheless, in both countries the majority of governments were authoritarian, 
and more often than not military; representative democracy, however, would 
come sooner, and become more stable, in Venezuela than in Peru.
2.4.3 Peru and Venezuela in the modern period
By the twentieth century both countries began to experience increased
foreign commercial influence, increased economic development, and increased 
demands for participation from the dominated sectors. In Peru a nascent working 
and middle class developed, unions were formed and strikes were held in 1895
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and in 1919. Middle class sectors developed due to increasing State involvement 
in social provision and economic planning. In Venezuela due to increased oil 
production and revenue, these sectors developed more rapidly than working 
class groups. Mass parties began to be formed such as APRA in Peru (1924) and 
AD in Venezuela (1941). In both countries there was resistance and oppression 
against these and other progressive parties, including Socialist and Communist 
parties, from authoritarian governments, be they civilian or military. Electoral 
suffrage was severely restricted by literacy and property requirements in both 
countries until universal suffrage was introduced by AD in Venezuela in 1947 and 
in Peru in 1979, when the literacy requirement was removed. The role of the 
State grew in both countries, especially in Venezuela due to the dominance of oil 
in its economy, but also in Peru particularly under the progressive Armed Forces 
government of General Velasco (1968-1975) (see below).
Foreign investment and dominance of the local economy, especially of the 
US, became increasingly prominent during the first half of the twentieth century. 
In Peru, international capitalism developed rapidly in the early twentieth century, 
providing it, through state concessions, with a greater role than national capital. 
For example, foreign, as opposed to local control of mining went from 49 % in 
1950 to 73 % in 1960 (Klaren, 2000 p304). Mining interests began to outweigh 
the value of the more nationally controlled agricultural interests (Cotier, [1978] 
1992 pl93). The value of most exports stayed in the hands of foreign capital, 
rather than the Peruvian state or national capital. National capital, instead of 
playing an expansionist role in the internal market, became subordinate to the 
needs of international capital in association with the Peruvian State. "In this way, 
the dominant sector of Peruvian society organised itself in a series of clients 
which depended on the State and foreign companies" (Cotier, ibid. pl60). Even 
under Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) policy,, foreign capital played a 
predominant role (ibid. p386). A confluence of interests between international 
capital and the Peruvian State, with national capital playing a dependent role, 
worked against the prospect of change.
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In Venezuela a similar if not more dependent situation developed. There, 
foreign oil companies controlled 98 % of national production by 1945, the US 
giant Standard Oil controlling half of that (Ewell, 1984 p63). However, President 
Medina Angarita (1941-1945) imposed tighter regulations on these companies, 
increasing substantially the government's share of oil revenues. His Oil Law of 
1943 became the basis of Venezuelan oil policy right up to nationalisation in 
1976, laying the financial foundations for the Punto Fijo populist system (ibid. 
p68). Yet, according to Betancourt oil multinationals continued to benefit more 
from Venezuelan oil than did the Venezuelan people (Betancourt, [1956] 2001 
pl21). Industrial manufacturing did develop in Venezuela "controlled from the 
core (capitalist countries) but managed more and more by members of the 
expanding local elites" (Lombardi, 1977 pl8).
In both cases increased foreign penetration of local economies 
strengthened the alliances between local white or "near white" elites and foreign 
elites, reinforcing native elite identification with US/European cultural and 
economic tenets. Economic decision making by elite groups tended to prioritise 
and reinforce the economic, cultural and political relationship between the native 
and core country elites. Indigenous and Black identities were associated with 
poverty, and these groups remained the poorest in a mutually reinforcing 
dilemma: they were poor because of perceived deficiencies of their race, and 
their poverty reinforced this negative stereotyping. The perceived solution 
therefore, both of the authorities and of many individuals amongst these groups, 
was to "whiten" the population, or oneself, both racially and/or culturally.
Undoubtedly great strides were made towards improvement of living 
standards for large sectors of the population during the twentieth century, some 
of them due to the demands of self-organised class groupings, particularly in 
Peru, some of them due to governmental modernisation policy, more prominent 
in Venezuela. Yet the race/class bifurcation inherent in both societies ultimately 
stemmed moves towards full social integration in these societies, providing the 
stability needed for successful economic development.
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To return to Habermas' framework, we can see structural difficulties which 
inhibit the development of the capacities of the State on the economic, 
administrative and socio-cultural levels preventing the Venezuelan and Peruvian 
states achieving legitimacy. On the economic level, the condition of economic 
dependency of Venezuela and Peru on the core capitalist countries prevented 
both states from evolving sovereign economic systems. This worked against their 
economies adequately responding to the needs of their people in terms of formal 
employment and adequate wage levels. This situation obviously had a knock on 
effect on the administrative level; with reduced economic activity, low 
employment levels, and much of the national economy owned by foreign 
companies, State revenue was low, and distribution of the resources raised often 
inefficient and inequitable25. Neither country has achieved sufficient nor 
equitable tax raising capabilities to allow them to make the necessary political 
decisions benefiting the bulk of the population and therefore ensuring mass 
loyalty. Furthermore on a socio-cultural level, class systems have remained 
extremely bifurcated due to profound cleavages such as race and ethnicity, 
making it difficult to communicate cultural values of consumption, careers, and 
leisure (i.e privatism). Even overcoming such shortcomings, as was the case in 
Venezuela to an extent, the difficulties on the economic and administrative 
planes limit the states' abilities to satisfy expectations raised, in other words a 
motivation crisis.
Nonetheless there are divergences from the Habermasian model in both 
countries situations. While both countries have dependent economies, 
Venezuela's economy is less diversified than that of Peru due to its dependence 
on oil, but is much richer because of the higher revenue from that natural 
resource. Venezuela succeeded for a substantial period of time, as we shall see, 
in providing employment opportunities for the majority of its people as a result of 
its oil wealth. Both countries remained, however, with unequal and inefficient tax
25 See Table 3 for income inequality statistics
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systems, with knock-on effects on the quality of their democracies. As Cameron 
points out, "there is a direct connection between the poor quality of democracy 
and poor tax administration, as well as between low taxation and low levels of 
development" (2001 p22).
Peru faced difficulties in surmounting the dominant barriers of ethnicity 
and race sufficiently to communicate the operative ideology of the elite groups to 
the masses, whilst in Venezuela these barriers were surmounted substantially but 
only to raise expectations which ultimately could not be satisfied26. Nevertheless, 
despite these differences, the result is similar as both countries now have a 
majority of the population in a situation of marginalisation from the dominant 
political, economic, social and, certainly in the case of Peru, cultural structures. 
Peruvian and Venezuelan societies are therefore not sufficiently integrated to 
enable effective legitimation systems to evolve, in the Habermasian sense, and 
this integration is primarily blocked by the fractures wrought by a colonial 
heritage perpetuated through a racist societal structure and a condition of 
external economic dependence. The conflict between the demands of the 
majorities to participate in their societies in a meaningful way and the demands 
of the dominant groups to perpetuate a radically inequitable system weakens 
these societies in such a way as to make them more prone to crises. Much of 
the population of both countries did achieve a certain degree of economic 
participation through formal employment and the paying of taxes, especially 
during the 1960s and 1970s, which began to facilitate wider political and social 
participation. Yet, eventually, as a result of economic crises, these successes 
were retracted, and sufficient integration of the majorities was not achieved, 
thus destabilising the advances made which could have achieved the legitimation 
needed to prevent or manage crises effectively. And when these advances were 
retracted, it primarily affected those who, throughout the histories of both
26 Ellner (2003a citing Bergquist 1986) states that the Venezuelan working class had historically a 
pro-system mentality, and a widespread sense of optimism based on the idea of the country's oil 
wealth being invulnerable to market fluctuations (pp.7-8).
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countries, consistently bore the major burdens of the system; the Poor, the 
Indigenous, the Black. The next few sections will show how these essential social 
cleavages played a crucial role in creating the context in which Fujimori and 
Chavez emerged in their respective countries.
2.5 Crises in Peru and Venezuela
2.5.1 Punto Fijo Venezuela
The installation of liberal democracy in power, first in 1945 and again, 
definitively, in 1958, gave birth to what Rey (1991) denominated as "a populist 
system of conciliation", based on a number of explicit and implicit pacts. The 
foundation of the system was the Punto Fijo pact where each party promised to 
abide by the electoral rules, and relinquish power when required by electoral 
outcomes of the popular vote27. Significantly the left was excluded from 
participating, despite the important role played by the Partido Comunista 
Venezoiano (Communist Party of Venezuela; PCV) in the struggle against the 
Peréz Jimenez dictatorship (1948-1958).
The Punto Fijo regime was set up in order to reconcile the complex 
dichotic tendencies in Venezuelan society and politics: between elite domination 
and popular demands for equality, the military and civilians, "barbarism" and 
"civilisation", the private and public economies etc. It developed a "complex 
system of negotiation and accommodation of heterogeneous interests, in which 
mechanisms of a utilitarian type played a central role in the generation of 
support for the regime and furthermore, its maintenance in power" (ibid. p543). 
This meant in practice the observance of specific pacts based on practical 
mechanics of power-sharing which were central to the Punto Fijo state; 
alternation in power, distribution of institutional offices, the role of the media etc. 
The system was a delicate balancing act between the interests of powerful
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minority sectors and maintaining the confidence of the majority in the system, as 
the best means to achieve "liberty, justice and wellbeing" (ibid. p543). It was 
based on two fundamental factors: a central role for the state as principal actor 
and promoter of the development process and the distribution of its benefits, 
and the acting of political parties and a few organised groups as mediators 
between the State and the totality of society (ibid. p544). This process was 
achieved by the distribution of oil rents through state funded oil industrial 
projects, direct assistance to private industry, state employment and welfare 
assistance. The main semi-corporate groupings who participated in the regime 
were the political parties namely AD and COPEI, the Confederación de 
Trabajadores de Venezuela (Workers Confederation of Venezuela, CTV) 
representing the trade unions, the Federación de Camaras de Comercio y 
Produción (Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production: 
FEDECAMARAS), the Armed Forces, and the Church any one of which had in 
effect the right to veto major decisions of government (ibid.p554). Collusion 
between these groupings was not unusual, even amongst groups which in the 
Marxist sense should have been considered as antagonistic such as the CTV and 
FEDECAMARAS (ibid. p549)28.
The Punto Fijo regime according to Rey was built on three fundamental 
pillars: relative abundance of economic resources, a low level of demands from 
the different sectors of society thus allowing their easy satisfaction and the 
success of the political parties and interest groups and their leaders in mediating 
those demands. Under normal circumstances a deficit in one could be 
compensated by the relative functioning of the others, but a failure in all three, 
Rey warned, would lead to a crisis "which represents a limit for the system, as it 
can no longer continue functioning satisfactorily" (ibid. pp565-566). In many
27 Named after Rafael Caldera's (leader and founder member of Copei, the Christian Democratic 
party) house in Caracas where the pact was formulated and signed by Caldera, Betancourt (AD) 
and Villalba (URD) on 31st October, 1958.
28 According to Diaz (2000), the CTV "acted objectively as the guarantors of business 
prerogatives" (pl54).
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ways therefore the Punto Fijo regime resembled Habermas' model of advanced 
capitalist society except in one crucial respect: mechanisms designed to ensure 
mass loyalty and the loyalty of the bourgeois capitalists and international 
investors were paid for through the oil rent and not through taxation, evading 
one of the principal mechanisms of integration in advanced capitalist societies.
The Punto Fijo regime was designed to avoid conflict and antagonism, 
encourage conciliation and negate the polarisation of Venezuelan society along 
class lines (Carvallo and López Maya, 1989 p48). As time went by and the 
system consolidated itself, and as the economic model began to be exhausted 
under the weight of a slump in oil prices and increased external borrowing, "a 
false image of consensus was created leading to a mistrust and subsequent 
exclusion of dissent "(Civit and España, 1989 p39). From Black Friday in 
February 1983, when the government of Luis Herrera Campins dramatically 
devalued the bolivar in the face of a slump in oil prices and massive capital flight, 
the three pillars supporting the regime began to crumble (Lander, 1996 p50). On 
the economic level Venezuelans saw their standard of living plummet: between
1990 and 1997, according to the UN, per capita income fell from US$5192 to 
US$2858, and Venezuela's human development index from 0.8210 to 0.7046 
(PNUD/OCEI, 2001 p92). Income inequalities remained high with the highest 20 
% of earners receiving 53.1 % of income, and the lowest 3.4 % (World Bank,
2001 p283). Meanwhile Venezuela's tax take fell from 18.4 % in 1990 to 12.8 % 
in 1998 (ibid. p301). In 1997 50.6% of workers were found in the informal 
sector, and by 1996 around 36.4 % of the population were living on less than 
US$2 dollars a day (Provea, 2002 p281). Public spending contracted from a high 
of 37 % of GDP in 1982 to 16 % in 1998 (Me Coy and Smith, 1995 pl27/World 
Bank, 2001 p301). The bolivar devalued about 100 % between 1988 and 1993, 
and inflation remained relatively high by Venezuelan standards at around 31 % 
annually during the same period (Malavé Mata, 1996 ppl30-131). The economic 
crisis was fundamentally due to the dependence of the Venezuelan economy on 
oil rent. In 1965 oil accounted for 97 % of Venezuela's exports, and by the
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beginning of the 1990's that figure had only been reduced to 91 % (Cartaya, 
Magallanes, Dominguez, 1997; Chapter 2). This left Venezuela particularly 
vulnerable to world oil market conditions, prices falling abruptly in 1986 and
1988 causing critical balance of payments deficits which were financed by 
borrowing (Malavé Mata, 1996 p32). In 1988 public external debt had reached 
US$26.6 billion, and by 1998 it was around US$37billion (Lander, 1996 
p51/World Bank, 2001 p315)29.
The regime, however, had a number of important achievements, 
principally political stability, confidence of the population in the democratic 
regime and its leadership and relative economic growth, not to mention 
improved educational, health and general living standards for the majority of 
Venezuelans (Kornblith, 1994 pl45)30. Industrialisation and urbanisation 
increased substantially during the Punto Fijo period, and popular demands for 
inclusion were primarily satisfied by increased provision of social goods and 
increased possibilities for advancement, in other words motivational awards (See 
Table II. 1). Nonetheless the regime's main deficits were "an excessive 
centralisation, socio-economic inequality, clientelism between State, citizens and 
organisation, the party domination of institutions and decisions [and] 
administrative corruption" (ibid.). The fundamental flaw in the Punto Fijo design 
was the contradiction between the liberal democratic order on the juridical 
constitutional level and the reform of a socialist character of the social and 
economic order (Carrera Damas, 1980 pl87). Once the pillar of a limitless oil 
income fell and the addiction to indebtedness took hold the contradiction 
between these two parts became manifest and the model became unsustainable. 
Both parts of the Punto Fijo equation became irreconcilable, and with it the 
fragile system of consensus became divided once again along class lines. The
29 For more statistics see Tables 1 and 2.
30 "From the 1960s until well into the 1970s, indicators of social well-being made a considerable 
jump forward. Between 1961 and 19 81, levels of illiteracy fell from 50 %  to 1 1  % , the infant 
mortality rate ranged between 46.4 per thousand and 35.2 per thousand, and life expectancy at
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decline in oil prices and the increases in debt led to the economic foundations of 
the Punto Fijo state being undermined, prohibiting the distribution of rents to all 
sectors, and forcing the state to break the populist social pact which had worked 
in favour of system legitimation up until that time. No longer was it possible to 
give to one sector without taking from the other. In the context of the increased 
global hegemony of neoliberal ideology, the Venezuelan economic elite began to 
press more urgently for reform, while the systemic defenders of the popular 
classes actively collaborated or stood on the sidelines, leaving the majority of the 
population without effective representation (Civit and España, 1989 p39). It was 
no longer possible to conceal the multiple social fractures in the social body of 
Venezuela with the profits from oil, the product of its physical body.
2.5.2 Protest and Neoliberalism
Barely having entered his second presidency in February 1989, on a
populist ticket similar to that which brought him to power in 1974-1979,
President Carlos Andrés Peréz attempted to implement a neoliberal package
through a hastily introduced, IMF sponsored programme called El Gran Viraje
(The Great Turnaround). The policies introduced had three conceptually distinct
aspects: an adjustment to achieve short-term economic equilibrium, structural
reform to transform the economy from a state directed and oil dependent
economy to a market led one, and the transformation of Venezuela from a
'populist' system to a 'modern' market system (Lander, 1996 p51). The
measures introduced were wide-ranging and radical in the Venezuelan context;
restrictions in public expenditure and wages, abandonment of currency controls,
interest rate adjustments, the reduction of price controls and subsidies, the
introduction of a sales tax, pricing on state services etc (ibid. p52). Despite
government orders to raise transport costs by 30%, transport companies raised
them by 100% thus sparking off the greatest public disorders seen in modern
Venezuelan history, which came to be known as the Caracazo (27 - 28 February,
birth rose from 61 years to 69 years [Freije,1995]" (Cartaya, Magallanes, Dominguez, 1997;
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1989). Residents of Caracas' teeming shantytowns, and those in many other 
Venezuelan cities, came down from the cerros (hills) and proceeded to loot 
shops and warehouses, initially for food, but as the disturbances developed for 
all sorts of consumer goods. As shops were looted so residents found vast 
quantities of foodstuffs hoarded by shopkeepers to sell later at a speculative 
profit. Government reaction was initially tame but eventually President Pérez 
called a state of emergency and left it to the Army and Police to quell the 
disturbances. The result was the use of "massive violence" and an official death 
toll of 277, an unofficial one running into the thousands (Coronil and Skurski,
1991 p326).
Establishment presentations of the Caracazo was of the eruption of 
barbarism, of primitivism pitted against civilisation (ibid. p327). The 'puebld 
(people) were a source of barbarism, the government and the elite a force for 
reason and civilisation; "[t]he nation was split in two" (ibid. p328). After the 
Caracazo, Venezuela would not be the same again as protest became the norm, 
increasing both in incidence, violence and variety and extending to almost all 
sectors of society (López Maya, 2002). The Caracazo also symbolised the 
eruption of the class factor once again into the national political arena (Carvallo 
and López Maya, 1989 p48). Even the President acknowledged this in his speech 
to the nation on the 28th February, a notion violently rejected by FEDECAMARAS 
(ibid. pp50-51). The CTV, due to its position both within the power structure, 
and as representatives of working people, also avoided the inescapable class 
nature of the Caracazo and the neoliberal measures which sparked it off (ibid. 
51). Indeed there was little consensus around Peréz's neoliberal economic 
package, as it didn't use the usual consensus-seeking mechanisms characteristic 
of the Venezuelan democratic system (Kornblith, 1989 pp24-25). In such a 
heavily state oriented economy and society it was difficult for the different 
institutions of the Punto Fijo pact to accept the neoliberal measures, but at the
Chapter 2)(See Table II. 1  also for other indicators)
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same time, due to their very state dependence and involvement in the system, it 
was equally difficult for them to resist them. Business sectors, trades unions, the 
Church, the parties (including Perez's own party AD) the Armed Forces and other 
institutions essential to the Punto Fijo pact all became divided around the issue 
of the introduction of market reforms.
Despite the President's admittance of the class nature of the disturbances 
and the economic measures, and the divisions caused by them, he persisted in 
their implementation, leading initially to some macroeconomic success, but by
1992 unemployment, informalisation of employment and poverty had all 
increased (Lander, 1996). Meanwhile as the Venezuelan population in general 
and the popular classes in particular paid the price of economic reform, the 
governmental and business elites were seen to enrich themselves even further 
through financial speculation and/or corruption. Perez's government was rocked 
by two unsuccessful coups in 1992, the first on February 4 led by Lt. Col. Hugo 
Chavez, the second in November led by a number of Air Force officers, and by
1993 Perez was impeached and under house arrest for corruption, finally going 
into exile.
The government of President Rafael Caldera (1993-1998) tried to 
implement piecemeal neoliberal reform under his Agenda Venezuela programme, 
but Venezuela's crisis continued to deepen and widen. Reforms led to a shift 
from the state to private capital with large oligopolistic companies, such as the 
Cisneros group, gaining more centralised power as they positioned themselves 
for the global market. Politicians once seen as anti-neoliberal such as Perez and 
Caldera, and erstwhile antl-systemic actors and alternative politicians such as 
Caldera's Planning Minister, Teodoro Petkoff, became the staunchest defenders 
of neoliberal reform (Coronil, 1997 p384). In such a scenario, where both old 
and new politicians were seen as untrustworthy and corrupt, an increased breach 
between the political establishment and many sectors of society grew, and a 
search for political alternatives and new political and economic models was under 
way.
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The Punto Fijo State had begun an attempt to reform itself through the 
Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado (Presidential Commission for 
the Reform of the State/COPRE). This commission inaugurated in 1984 
eventually bore fruits in 1989 with the passing by Congress of laws leading to the 
popular election of governors and mayors. The deepening crisis of state led to 
the forming and consolidation of movements representing the popular sectors, 
such as the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement to Socialism/ MAS) and La 
Causa Radical (Radical Cause/ La Causa R). It also led to the emergence of 
Chávez's Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200 (Bolivarian Revolutionary 
Movement-200/MBR-200) in the army31. Decentralisation provided some of these 
movements with local power bases as some began to achieve representation in 
governorships, mayorships and in Congress. Rafael Caldera, having abandoned 
the party he founded, Copei, became president in 1993 through an alliance with 
MAS, other smaller parties, and his own electoral vehicle Convergencia (Common 
Direction), breaking to an extent the once firm hold the traditional parties, AD 
and Copei had over national politics. Yet the COPRE reforms did not re-establish 
people's faith in Venezuelan democratic institutions. In 1982, for example, almost 
60 % of the population had a positive image of political parties, but by 1992 
around 60 % had a negative image of those parties (Njaim, Combellas and 
Alvarez, 1998 pl7). Furthermore almost 40 % of those surveyed had a negative 
opinion on the constitutional system as it existed, especially amongst lower class 
sectors (ibid. pp99-100). Causes for the crisis were attributed to corruption, the 
parties, the economic situation and the lack of participation in the political 
process (ibid. pl06). Voting patterns showed increasing abstentionism from a 
low of 3.5 % in 1973 to a high of 39.8 in 1993, a tendency which has remained 
ever since (Me Coy and Smith, 1995 pl37 see also chapter 4). The system had 
lost its legitimacy with the electorate, the Punto Fijo attempt at modernisation
31 See Ellner, 1986 on MAS; Lopez Maya, 1996 on La Causa R and MBR-200. MBR-200 was given 
the name in honour of the 200th anniversary of Bolivar's birth.
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resulted finally in mass alienation rather than the mass loyalty so nearly gained 
through the policy of "sowing the oil".
In 1997 the MBR-200 became a new electoral movement, the Movimiento 
Quinta República (Fifth Republic Movement/ MVR) and began to prepare for the 
1998 elections32. The MVR quickly became an electoral grouping for the original 
military core of the movement, the vanguardist left, and many members of the 
established parties disenchanted with their policies. The MVR forged alliances 
with a number of parties on the left, such as Patria Para Todos (Motherland for 
Everyone/PPT) a more radical excision of La Causa R; MAS, which had been in 
alliance with Caldera's Convergencia movement; and smaller parties such as the 
Partido Comunista Venezolano (Communist Party of Venezuela/PCV) amongst 
others, to create the Polo Patriotico (Patriotic Pole/PP). Chávez won the 
presidential elections with 56% of the votes, the PP winning 33% of the seats in 
both houses of Congress (Lingenthal, 1999 pp222-223). While the Chávez vote 
had strong penetration at all levels, polls suggested that his appeal was 
particularly strong amongst the popular classes, whereas his chief rival Henrique 
Salas Rómer's appeal was amongst the middle and upper sectors (Roberts, 2003 
p66). Chávez's rise therefore "signified a repoliticisation of social inequality in 
Venezuela" with mostly the popular sectors identifying with Chávez and the 
middle and upper sectors with opponents of the president (Roberts 2003 p55). 
Moreover, as Wright (1990) explains, while the "seamier side" of racism, violence 
and segregation, have been eradicated in Venezuela, black skin is still associated 
with poverty, and the darker the skin the more likely that that person will belong 
to the poorer sections of society. Thus race and class remain associated in 
Venezuela despite the advancement in eradicating some elements of racism. 
Chávez and the MVR therefore recognise, and capitalise on the fundamental
32 It was illegal to use the name of the Liberator, Bolivar, for political parties in Venezuela. By 
using V, the roman numeral for five, the movement's name remained unchanged verbally due to 
the similarity in Spanish pronunciation of the ¿?and /consonants.
82
class/race polarisation of Venezuelan society, as the pardo Chavez's repeated 
references to the Venezuelan elites as 'oligarchs' signify.
To sum up, modernisation, urbanisation and industrialisation led to 
economic and social advancement during the Punto Fijo years. As increased 
numbers of Venezuelans received social and financial rewards during the boom 
years so expectations rose. The boom came to an abrupt halt, as economic and 
social crisis set in leading to the withdrawal by Venezuelans of legitimacy in their 
political system and demands for greater popular participation. An external crisis, 
the oil price boom and its subsequent decline, and the debt crisis of the 1980s, 
led to severe disadjustments in the local economy resulting eventually in the 
inability of the Venezuelan oil industry to provide the State and private capital 
with the means to make the system function. Neollberal attempts to redress this 
situation by prioritising the market instead of the state, and making the popular 
classes pay for these reforms, resulted in failure as those classes revolted against 
these measures either on the streets (the Caracazo and subsequent 
demonstrations) or at the polls. The Venezuelan crisis preceding the emergence 
of Chavez was therefore based on an externally produced general system crisis 
which generated popular demands for increased popular participation and which 
failed, for the moment at least, to produce a consolidated effective neoliberal 
response from the dominant classes. The election of Chavez was based on his 
promise of state-led responses to the challenges of a globalised era, along with 
increased democracy through popular participation and 'protagonism'. 
Venezuelans therefore installed a populist government promising more 
participation for the popular classes and restricting participation of the capitalist 
and much of the middle classes, who either as collective institutions (such as 
Fedecamaras) or as class sectors (such as professionals of state companies and 
bureaucracies) were instrumental parts of the Punto Fijo pact.
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2.6.1 Introduction: Postwar Pendulums (1945-1968)
In Peru, In the post World War II period, we similarly find a process of
system breakdown taking place at the economic, social and political level, with 
the emergence of both civilian and military populism. Civilian populism 
manifested itself in APRA, representing the new social forces such as labour, 
students and the marginalised middle sectors, while military populism first 
emerged in the form of President General Manuel Odria (1948-1956) with his 
policies of public spending and political authoritarianism. Both forms were 
characterised by clientelism33 and favourable treatment of foreign investors, 
maintaining long-standing external dependent relationships (Contreras and 
Cueto, 2000 p206). Industrialisation and urbanisation, and along with them 
middle and working class sectors, as well as growing marginalised groups, grew 
substantially. This growth caused increased pressure for representation of these 
growing popular sectors. APRA, the most notable party representing popular and 
middle sectors were nonetheless consistently barred from office by the elites and 
the Armed Forces, except for a brief period during the Bustamente and Rivera 
government (1945-1948) and again during the Convivencia (Co-existence) 
between APRA and the ruling elite (1956-1962).
2.6.2 The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (1968-1980)
With the global political climate increasingly pro-democratic after the
Second World War, the success of the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and the 
repeated failure of democratic and authoritarian governments in Peru to satisfy 
the demand of the burgeoning popular, middle and marginalised sectors, the 
Armed Forces once again intervened, overthrowing the Belaunde government in 
1968. This time, however, the Armed Forces took the political initiative and set 
up a progressive leftist nationalist government, the Gobierno Revolucionario de
33 Clientelism is taken in its broadest sense as "an exchange of selective benefits for political 
loyalty" (Roberts, 2000 p7).
2.6 Peru: Populist authoritarianism and democracy
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las Fuerzas Armadas (GRFA/ The Revolutionary Government of the Armed 
Forces) led by General Velasco. The aim of the GRFA was to democratise society 
through authoritarian means, selectively integrating popular social sectors, aiding 
the national bourgeois capitalist sectors, but effectively excluding the urban and 
rural marginalised (Cotier, 1992 p80-83). The GRFA implemented wide ranging 
reforms favouring national development, nationalising the oil, mining, fishing, air 
transport, communication and steel industries, amongst others. Ministries 
flourished and multiplied, and the public sector represented 50 % of the Gross 
National Product by 1977 (Contreras and Cueto, 2000 p313). An impressive land 
reform programme was implemented, benefiting 369,000 peasant families, 
however, most of these were from the better off sections of the peasantry (ibid. 
p316). Growth was strong, especially in the manufacturing sector, but remained 
about the same for the period 1971-75 as it had for 1961-70 (Kláren, 2000 
p357). The left and popular sectors supported the government whom it tried to 
mobilise through state sponsored popular organisations, represented most 
comprehensively in SINAMOS (Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización 
A?/?¿y/5/>1Mational System of Support for Popular Mobilisation)34. This 
organisation's stated aim was "to achieve conscious and active participation of 
the national population in the tasks demanded by economic and social 
development" in other words to harness popular energies in making the 
revolution a reality (ibid. p349).
Yet the GRFA was unsustainable in the long run for two reasons. Firstly 
the government attempted to resolve the conflict between business efficiency 
and social justice in favour of the latter, without taking into sufficient account the 
economic sustainability of the project (Contreras and Cueto, 2000 p313). Foreign 
debt, for example, quadrupled from US$945 million in 1970 to US$4,127 million 
in 1976 (Kláren, 2000 pp357-358). Secondly the government's popular 
mobilisation policy gave those sectors sufficient political empowerment and
34 Sinamos literally means in Spanish "without masters".
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organisational capacity to challenge it. As the economic situation worsened the 
government of general Bermudez Morales (1975-1980) introduced restrictive 
budgetary measures, causing protests which were repressed, sometimes 
violently (Cotier, 1994 p97)35. The distancing of the popular sectors from the 
government's authoritarian policies led those sectors to become increasingly 
autonomously organised, after SINAMOS and Velasco's reformist regime 
collapsed in 1975 (op. cit. p351). As the economic crisis worsened, the 
revolution had become a victim of its central contradiction: its politically 
authoritarian form and its socially democratising content (Lynch, 2000 p87). In 
the face of this central contradiction, President Bermudez Morales saw no option 
but to return Peru to civilian democratic rule through a Constituent Assembly and 
new elections in 1980 under the new 1979 Constitution.
The military government brought a number of positive benefits to Peru. 
Manufacturing capacity between 1965 and 1980 grew at a compound annual rate 
of 3.8 %, and in general the government's emphasis on peasants, industrial 
workers and State employees had positive effects on income distribution (Me 
Clintock, 1999 p323 and pp350-351;). Furthermore literacy increased from 
approximately 61 % of those fifteen-years old and over in 1960 to 73 % in 1970, 
and enrolment In secondary schools and universities was above the Latin 
American average (Ibid. p324). On the negative side, however, the military 
government reversed agrarian production, reduced private investment and 
increased foreign debt. Agrarian reforms benefited mostly coastal plantation 
workers, and there was little transfer of resources into the agricultural sector, as 
the government concentrated its development efforts on the industrial sectors. 
"[T]he historic gap [in the redistribution of wealth and income] between the 
traditional and modern sectors - the coast and the sierra - which characterised 
the dual structure of Peru, was not closed in any appreciable manner" (Klâren,
35 Riots in February 19 75 left 86 dead and 15 5  wounded, and more riots in 1976 after an IMF 
inspired "shock therapy" package was introduced, including a currency devaluation of 44 %, 
public spending cuts, price rises in petrol and other basics. There were also very successful 
general strikes in 1977 and 1978 in response to similar measures (Klaren, 2000).
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2000 p357). Massive public investment due to the drying up of private 
investment led to massive foreign debt (Klaren, 2000 p357). Under the 
Bermudez Morales regime, wages were reduced by nearly one-half, while the 
cost of living quintupled between 1973 and 1979 (Mauceri, 1997 p27).
Nonetheless, the GRFA had practically liquidated the landed oligarchy 
which had blocked reform up until then. The encouragement of social 
mobilisation developed inadvertently a kind of "cultural revolution" which 
questioned racism, allowing a certain homogenisation of social relations in the 
country. In 1978 for example no one seriously questioned the introduction of 
universal suffrage, including for the first time illiterates (Contreras and Cueto,
2000 p325). Furthermore the GRFA's emphasis on popular mobilisation 
stimulated a revived and diversified Left bringing the newly organised popular 
sectors with them, which went on to win 34 of the 100 seats in the Constituent 
Assembly in 1978 (Klaren, 2000 p363). Lynch (2000 p88) maintains that the 
"most significant consequence of the velasquista process was not the actual 
reforms but rather the social démocratisation that they set in motion". However, 
Flores Galindo (1999 p49) points out that "Velasquismo was, like Independence 
in 1821, a political revolution; a revolution from the State apparatus, without the 
direct intervention of the popular classes and with the proposal to reform rather 
than transform society". Peru had changed, and changed greatly, as a result of 
the GRFA, setting in motion processes of mobilisation and giving its citizens an 
"experience of participation" without precedent in the country's history. Despite 
these advances, however, Peru's basic structural fractures although seriously 
challenged, remained relatively intact. The difference, however, was that this 
"experience of participation" had produced a "revolution of rising expectations" 
(Di Telia, 1965 p49), which the popular classes were reluctant to abandon, had 
destroyed the landed oligarchy, and placed the right and business sectors in 
abeyance as they sought new ideological strategies.
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2.6.3 The return to democracy and the emergence of Fujimori (1980-1990)
Peru's transition to democracy was an elite controlled process which
lacked a broad consensus behind the new Institutions, by and large ignoring the
calls for social participation from the popular classes. It restored an authoritarian
centralised system, and left both conservatives and radicals dissatisfied with the
new institutional mechanisms (Mauceri, 1997 pp28-29). The election of
Belaunde in 1980 was a vote for familiarity in an increasingly uncertain economic
and social atmosphere. Belaunde faced two major problems on assuming the
presidency: the escalating threat of Sendero Luminoso and the region-wide debt
crisis and he "appeared at a loss to resolve either problem" (Me Clintock, 1999
p326). He tried to restore the pre-1968 model of economic liberalism, but due to
Constitutional provisions inserted by the military had to leave the State
structures inherited from the GRFA largely intact (Klaren, 2000 p374/Mauceri,
1997 p23). As a result of this and a number of grandiose infrastructural
projects, public expenditure increased (op. cit. p327). The government
attempted to attract foreign investment, while following a policy of fiscal
austerity already set in motion by the preceding Bermudez government.
Nonetheless the budget deficit soared to 9.7 % of GDP, real salaries in
manufacturing fell by 14 % in 1983 and by over 20 per cent the following year
and the IMF was called in (ibid./ Mauceri, 1997 p30). The government did
nothing for the first two years about the Shining Path, and then it endorsed
wholesale repressive actions by the Peruvian military (Me Clintock, 1999 pp327-
328). Deaths due to the Sendero war increased from 219 in 1980 to 2,050 in
1985, the last year of the Belaunde presidency. In 1984 alone, 1,785 of those
killed or injured were civilians, out of a total of 3,588 attacks by Sendero or the
Security Forces (Reyna, 2000 p201). Peru's people, disappointed by the poor
performance of the Belaunde administration, with a disapproval rating of over 60
% in the polls in his final month in office, turned to the youthful Alan García of
APRA in the hope of finding radical solutions to Peru's mounting problems
(Grompone, 1990 pl84).
Garcia's presidency was characterised by a personalist, centralist, 
authoritarian decision making process, a strongly clientelistic form of governing, 
and growing polarisation between the social classes (Mauceri, 1997 p30-31). 
García proposed "to undertake social change and reform for the poor majority 
without alienating the business elites that were crucial for economic progress" 
(Klaren, 2000 p387). He pursued a policy of direct assistance to poorer sectors, 
supports to business and limits on external debt repayment, in an attempt to 
revive the internal economy. Initially the policy met with substantial success: "in 
1986 GDP per capita grew by almost 6 %, real wages increased by more than 40 
%, employment rose and inflation slowed. However, these achievements were 
based on an unsustainable increase in public spending and depletion of 
international reserves" (Me Cllntock, 1999 p328). When the reserves ran out 
"the government had little choice but to abandon its expansionary policies" but 
was unwilling to implement IMF required austerity measures in exchange for new 
loans (ibid.). The result was "one of the worst economic performances in 
modern history" (ibid. p329). By the end of the García administration, real per 
capita GDP was estimated to be less than in 1960, and accumulated inflation 
over the five years was more than 2 million percent! (ibid.). In 1988 the balance 
of payments deficit reached -12.5 % of GNP and the cost of servicing the debt 
reached 94 % of exports (Gonzales de Olarte, 1998 pl5). Despite Garcia's 
attempts to revive the internal market, Peru remained dependent on exports in 
order to pay the debt. Poverty grew rapidly: in 1986 37.9 % of the population 
were in poverty, with 14.9 % of those in extreme poverty36. By 1991, one year 
after Garcia's departure from government, that figure had risen to 55.3 % and
24.2 % respectively (Ibid. p86). Real wages were half their 1980 value by 1989 
and labour's share of national income declined from 37.7 % in 1980 to 28.8 % in
1989 (Cameron, 1997 p41).
36 "The five years of Apra government produced the most brutally regressive redistribution of 
income in Peruvian history" (Degregori, 1991)
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Garcia's record on the other great problem facing Peru, the Sendero war, 
was equally abysmal. Initially the government placed an emphasis on economic 
development programmes and human rights. The first strategy floundered 
through Sendero attacks on State officials, lack of resources after 1987, and 
corruption, the latter on army hostility and government collusion with army 
human rights abuses. "By 1989, Sendero Luminoso numbered approximately 
10,000 combatants, had the support of roughly 15 % of Peru's citizens, and 
controlled 28 % of the country's municipalities" (Contreras and Cueto,2000 
p329). "The García government did not provide solutions or demonstrate 
consistent achievements neither in the face of Sendero and MRTA37 terrorism nor 
paramilitary activity, nor did it exhibit a greater respect for human rights (...). 
Without a doubt, for reasons such as these, between 1989 and 1990 even more 
violence was brought to the political sphere of the country" (Reyna, 2000 p206). 
Annual subversive actions had doubled from 1,437 in 1985 to 2,877 in 1989 
(ibid. p201). That year "(...) Peru seemed to be on the edge of the abyss. 
Terrorism, inflation, drug running, and extreme poverty were like the four 
horsemen of the biblical apocalypse" (op. cit. p339).
By 1990 the Peruvian liberal democratic State had failed dramatically on 
all three levels of the Habermas model: economic, political and socio-cultural. 
Economically, after promising improvements before and during the Velasco 
regime, the Peruvian people faced a continuous decline In income and a rise in 
income inequality. International debt stood at US$32,229 billion, or 55 % of GDP 
(World Bank, 2001 p315). The tax burden had shifted from direct to indirect 
taxes, placing most of it on the shoulders of the poor. In 1990 8.6 % of the GDP 
was collected in taxes of which 7.9 % were indirect taxes (Gonzales de Olarte, 
1998 p63). 15.8 % of GDP was public spending of which only 3.4 % went on 
social spending, as opposed to 5.1 % in debt repayments (ibid.)38. In the same
37 Movimiento Revolucionario Tupuc Amarua guevarista style guerrilla group.
38 While these figures reflect Fujimori's policies from assuming power in July 1990, they reflect 
tendencies already apparent in the previous three years.
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year unemployment stood at 8.3 %, and of the 61.3 % of the population 
economically active, it is estimated that 59 % of those were informal workers 
(ibid. pl6/Grompone, 1990 pl92). Most of these informals were recent migrants 
to the cities: in 1963 5 % of the electoral population lived in the shantytowns of 
Lima, by 1980 this figure had risen to 26.73 % and in 1986 it stood at 43.74 % 
(Grompone, 1990 pl88).
Politically the party system which developed after the transition to civilian 
rule in 1980 never "managed to constitute itself' (ibid. pl81). Disenchantment 
with García was not simply with the President himself, but with "the entire group 
of the political elite" (ibid. pl83). Few democratic institutions retained popular 
legitimacy. In a survey done in 1989 only the Church, some professional 
associations, and the media had any credibility with the Peruvian public. Of 
those interviewed 73 % did not trust the Presidency, 75 % the judiciary, 76 % 
Congress, and 77 % the political parties (Reyna, 2000 p243). Popular 
organisation such as the unions, the student movements, and neighbourhood 
associations were losing their appeal in the face of the severe economic crisis, 
which created an increasingly atomised, family oriented and individualistic social 
context. New social organisation were concerned more with survival strategies 
and often served as clientellst vehicles for the political parties (ibid. ppl86-187).
As the socio-cultural landscape of Peru was changing beyond recognition, 
becoming increasingly urbanised, modernised, informalised and racially mixed, 
much of this due to the economic policies of successive governments, the 
political system was failing to adjust to those changes. While Peru remained a 
mostly rural country it was possible to maintain the historical duality between 
Sierra and Costa, Creole and Indigenous, without that interfering too 
dramatically on the political level. In this way Issues of race could be comfortably 
ignored working on the axiom of "out of sight, out of mind". Even as the Sendero 
war raged in the countryside, bringing thousands of mostly Indigenous Peruvian 
citizens to their deaths, the cities and Lima especially, carried on with their daily 
life unaffected for the most part, underlining the duality of the country. Yet the
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violence was according to Manrique an "expression of a very profound social 
crisis (...) a product of the superimposition of multiple crises, generated at 
distinct moments in Peruvian history, which exploded simultaneously (...)" 
(Manrique, 2002 pp48-49). An important basis of these crises is the nature of 
the Peruvian State itself, which Manrique asserts, not only governs in support of 
the elite but against the majorities: "A minority State which governs for the 
minority, excluding the exercising of political power for the great majorities (...) 
minoritizing the majority" (ibid. pp57-58). Furthermore he continues, this power 
is exercised on the basis of a racist society "which nonetheless denies it, and 
colonial racist ideology has a fundamental importance in the organisation of 
domination, exploitation [...]" (ibid. p60).
Modernisation, however, began to upset the efficacy of this racist societal 
structure. In the first part of the twentieth century most Peruvian cities were 
Creole bastions little influenced by Indigenous customs. As Peru modernised, 
however, the Indigenous and mestizo, in effect the Sierra, began to move to the 
cities, changing their physiognomy and culture forever, the so-called process of 
choificacion3g. In 1960 46 % of Peruvians lived in cities, whereas 30 years later 
in the year of Fujimori's first election triumph, that number had increased to 70 
%, much of these living in Lima (See Table 11:1). Furthermore the majority of 
these migrants constructed their dwelling in new shantytowns which to this day 
ring the main cities. As urbanisation increased so the Indigenous and 'cholo£ 
(mixed race) became increasingly hard to ignore. Furthermore it was not long 
until Sendero brought the war to these shantytowns and to the heart of the 
capital itself.
Fujimori, a second generation Peruvian-Japanese (nisei), a university dean 
with no political background, capitalised on the new Peruvians which emerged 
from this process, taking advantage of what Di Telia (1965) termed a "disposable
39 "The affirmation of new identities - not Indigenous but neither criolio or misti - in which ethnic, 
regional, class and citizen elements are inter-related.[...]  a national articulation which respects 
ethnic-cultural and linguistic plurality; or alternative modernities , not necessarily equivalents to 
the dominant North Atlantic model" (Degregori in Grompone and Degregori, 1991 ppl05-106).
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mass" ripe for organisation. As the Left imploded, the Right galvanised and 
radicalised itself and APRA stood demoralised after the disaster of García, 
Fujimori quickly adopted these new Peruvians by filling the centre-left ground left 
vacant by APRA. The 1990 elections "brought to the fore previously ignored 
questions of ethnicity and race" (ibid. pl91). Mounting an effective campaign at 
low cost directly aimed at the poor informal citizen, lambasting the white creole 
elite, and playing on his Japanese racial identity, all of this neatly summed up in 
his campaign slogan "Honour, Technology and Work", Fujimori won over the new 
Peruvians hungry for change and tired of war and poverty. As the election 
progressed so voting intentions became polarised along class and racial lines. 
Those who voted for Fujimori's movement, Cambio 90 were in the majority 
"peasants from the poorer provinces of the Andes, migrants who made Lima's 
peripheral barrios grow, labourers, street sellers, workers, workshop owners, 
teachers and other sectors of the impoverished middle class" (Grompone, 1990 
pl87). In other words "[...t]he vote for Fujimori came overwhelmingly from the 
most battered pole of modernisation: the poor, provincial, Andean, cho/os(mixed 
race) and Indigenous" (ibid. citing Degregori). The voters for the main opposition 
candidate, white, elitist and a famed writer, Mario Vargas Llosa, however, came 
primarily from "white collar workers (...) owners of medium to large businesses, 
taxi drivers who owned their own vehicles, and provincial notables [...]"(ibid.)4°- 
As in Venezuela, race and class became intertwined factors in Peruvian society 
which came to the fore as economic crisis set in, influencing the outcome of the 
election.
Modernisation processes in the twentieth century had brought about 
profound changes which highlighted and indeed enhanced the structural 
fractures inherited from the colonial era while at the same time encouraging
40 At one stage in the campaign Vargas Llosa was to suggest that "it wouldn't be bad if Peru were 
like Switzerland" (Degregori in Grompone and Degregori, 1991, quoting Vargas Llosa p74) 
revealing the extent of elite fascination for European models of modernity and the gulf between 
the elite which he represented and the vast majorities of the country in their imaginings of 
possible futures for Peru.
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struggles for their eradication. Education, industrialisation, and démocratisation 
increased demands, expectations, and mobilisations from the popular sectors in 
support of inclusion and the granting of citizenry, which were only to be dashed 
and transformed with the onset of the crisis41. The crisis brought a massive 
surging of the informal economy creating a new social sector of informâtes into 
the economy, society and the electorate, which continued to seek recognition of 
their citizenship and could not be ignored. These developments created new 
demands, new cultures, new identities, while also exacerbating differences. As 
Grompone explains: "[Especially In [the eighties] modernisation advanced 
deepening the differences between rich and poor, between Lima and the 
province, between the coast and the highlands and between light-skinned 
creoles on the one hand and 'choloâ and Indigenous on the other"(ibid.) The 
attempts at modernisation by successive governments had exacerbated rather 
than healed Peru's historical structural fissures, baring its bones, creating 
demands for equality and citizenry from the popular classes, demands which 
were resisted or left unsatisfied by successive governments, ultimately 
preventing integration and the mass loyalty necessary for system survival.
These multiple breaches and fissures in the Peruvian body politic, 
emphasised and made more glaring by the situation of social and economic 
crisis, and the dire security emergency due to the Sendero War, opened the way 
for the emergence of a populist leader who could return the country to some 
approximation of normality, while encapsulating and capitalising on the social 
changes which had taken place in Peruvian society over the previous two 
decades. The inability of traditional politicians to provide answers to these 
dilemmas and keep up with these changes, worsened rather than improved the
41 Degregori (1991) sums up these mobilisations as follows: "the great social movements which 
transformed the face of Peru in the decades 1950-1980: the land confiscations, the struggle for 
education, the great migrations and the multiplication of residents associations, the trade union 
struggles, the regional movements, the great strikes of 1977-78, the movements of agricultural 
producers and the peasant militia grondas campesinas), the massification of womens' 
organisations and not forgetting the emergence and development of the informal 
economy"(p77).
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situation, opening a gap between what Canovan (1999) called the 'politics of 
redemption' and the 'politics of pragmatism', allowing for the emergence of a 
new form of populism which could offer salvation to a country in desperate need 
of the return of hope.
2.7 Comparative discussion
To sum up, I've attempted to prove three essential points in this chapter.
Firstly that the Peruvian and Venezuelan states failed to secure legitimation 
according to the Habermasian model, and that this was due to the race/class 
cleavages in both societies preventing these states developing the abilities 
needed to secure that legitimation. Secondly, that this lack of legitimation left 
these states vulnerable to crises, preventing them from avoiding or managing 
crisis successfully. Finally it was crisis, brought about by the failure of 
modernisation processes, which provided the opening through which Fujimori 
and Chavez emerged.
In support of these arguments I've shown that both countries have 
underlying structural fractures which have been further complicated by 
transformations brought on by modernisation processes. Structurally both 
countries have bifurcated class systems based primarily on race, and dependent 
economies based primarily on the export of raw materials to core capitalist 
countries in exchange for capital and manufactured goods. The two factors of 
race and economic dependence provide the basic context in both countries in 
which decision-making on access to economic, social and political privilege is 
made. Whilst there are important differences in terms of racial homogeneity and 
cultural assimilation in both countries, and whilst patterns of economic 
dependency differ substantially due to the nature of their raw materials, 
nevertheless both countries broadly display these characteristics.
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In Peru structural divisions are complicated by deeper racial and ethnic 
differences due to the presence of important ethnic groups of Quechua and 
Aymara speakers. Such differences are not so apparent in Venezuela with its 
levels of greater mixing and relative lack of linguistic and cultural barriers. Yet 
despite the relaxed racial barriers in Venezuela, it is the blacks and pardos who 
are disproportionately poor; in Peru the Indigenous and cho/os. These lower 
income, darker skinned sectors in both countries were those hit hardest by the 
economic crisis of the 1980s and were the main electorates for Fujimori and 
Chavez. The higher income groups are mostly white and closely identified 
culturally, economically and politically with core country elites.
I have also illustrated in this chapter how Peru and Venezuela both 
embarked on rapid modernisation programmes in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, which led to greater wealth but did not impact sufficiently on social 
inequality to encourage integration (See Tables 1 and 2). Both societies became 
more urban, more industrialised, more educated and more dependent on the 
outside world. Yet paradoxically, as Germani, Ianni and Di Telia noted such 
advances caused a rising of expectations, greater awareness of social 
differentiation and a greater pace of social change In selected groups as other 
groups remain in more traditional contexts, in other words asynchronism. 
Change is experienced as conflict, and demands increase on the State to provide 
paths to modernity for larger groups of people.
In Venezuela this process was to an important extent satisfied by the 
State under the oil revenue based Punto Fijo regime, until the fall in oil prices in 
the early eighties (see Table 1). As the political architecture of Punto Fijo 
collapsed under the weight of economic crisis, inequality increased and the 
country became polarised first socially and then politically, between the mostly 
white privileged elite and the growing ranks of the mostly darker skinned non­
privileged. Similar processes were apparent in Peru, although time scales were 
shorter. The GRFA accelerated modernisation and promoted social 
démocratisation with popular sectors benefiting substantially, only to find that
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these advancements were to be clawed back by succeeding governments. In 
both cases the result was mobilisation of popular sectors, with increased 
demonstrations led by the Left in Peru and more spontaneously organised in 
Venezuela. Despite this, living standards continued to decline as politicians failed 
to find solutions to the economic crises, which were largely driven by outside 
events, such as the oil shock and the debt crisis.
It was these crises, systems crises leading to 'legitimation crises' which 
paved the way for the emergence of Fujimori and Chavez. Reyes (1998) argues 
that Habermas' theory of legitimation crisis is only applicable to those sectors of 
society in a developing country that are integrated into the reigning social, 
economic, political and cultural system, that is those who pay taxes, benefit from 
State services, vote and accept cultural values of competition and social 
advancement etc. However, in this chapter I've shown firstly how in Peru and 
Venezuela large groups are permanently marginalised from societal structures, 
based on the historical fissures already described, but secondly that further large 
groups were integrated but were then excluded due to the economic crises 
experienced in both countries. For example the Venezuelan middle class 
constituted around 40 % of the population in 1989; by 1999 it has shrunk in size 
to around 10 % (Hellinger, 2003 p38). GNP per capita fell substantially in both 
countries in the eighties, after gains in the sixties and seventies (See Table 1). 
The informal sector now encompasses the majority of workers in both countries, 
many of whom once had jobs in the formal sector.
In this sense, Habermas' theory of legitimation crisis is applicable because 
politicians were seen by these groups to fail on all three levels. On the economic 
level both States eventually failed to provide the necessary measures that would 
encourage growth and so ensure mass loyalty to the system. On an 
administrative level the State failed to raise sufficient taxes to provide services 
benefiting the majority of citizens, such as health, education etc. and thus again 
ensuring the requisite mass loyalty. Finally while the State did provide material 
rewards (motivations) for many groups therefore giving it legitimation, this led
97
to increasing expectations which as economic crisis set in, could not be fulfilled in 
the end. The combination of the failure of integration of large sections of the 
population due to the historical fissures inherent in the socio-economic systems 
in both countries and the marginalisation of many of those integrated into those 
systems due to multiple crises, resulted in societies which could not develop 
comprehensive robust systems to withstand crises, leaving both Venezuela and 
Peru divided, fragile and vulnerable to external shocks.
These shocks caused crises which were characterised by radicalisation and 
social and political polarisation of the population, an increase in support for 
alternatives to established political elites, a decline in support for "traditional" 
parties, and an increased mobilisation of popular and middle sectors, which in 
Peru broke out into armed struggle. As elite politicians in both countries sought 
to pragmatically reform the system, with the 1979 Constitution in Peru and 
COPRE in Venezuela, the population eventually sought redemption in outsiders 
who would not reform but transform the system and restore the land of 
promise42. Furthermore the choice facing the Peruvian and Venezuelan 
populations was not just between "outsiders" and political elites, "movements" 
and established parties, radical or gradual change; it was also between economic 
and political models. In these cases preferences broke down along class lines. 
The majority of people showed ambivalent preferences for democracy over 
authoritarianism, and change over continuity. Popular sectors, however, 
preferred State intervention over neoliberalism, but within the context of political 
change. In other words popular sectors in both countries wished for continued 
popular economic and political participation, but that change should further 
rather than hinder that aim. On the other hand, middle and upper sectors 
favoured change as well but tended more towards liberal democratic models 
within neoliberal economic projects: in Peru with Vargas Llosa's FREDEMO and in
42 By 1998 63 %  of the Venezuelan population sought "radical changes" to the system rather 
than "partial reforms". Amongst models admired by Venezuelan people Fidel Castro was popular 
amongst lower income sectors, while Alberto Fujimori was preferred by middle and upper middle 
sectors (Hellinger, 2003 p35 and p38).
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Venezuela In 1998 with candidates such as Irene Saez and later Henrique Salas 
Romer43. Social polarisation was therefore broken down along class lines with 
political representations representing differing, though not entirely defined, 
economic and political models.
Chavez and Fujimori reflected an awareness of this crisis of legitimacy in 
the existing models by offering both change and continuity to the electorate and 
both won their respective elections for that reason. On an economic level both 
men in their discourse played on the respective economic crises in their countries 
and recognised the challenges of globalisation. In the face of uncertainly and 
chaos both men offered economic continuity with the state playing a 
fundamental role within the context of a greater engagement with modernity but 
one guided by national, not international, needs. Fujimori offered a centrist 
option with little change in the economic model, with continuities in State 
supports. Chavez too offered continued State support and ownership of key 
industries, particularly the all-important oil industry. Globalisation would be 
engaged with but from a position of strength.
Socially, culturally and politically there was a recognition from both men 
that the present social elites did not reflect the racial make up or social values of 
the majorities. Instead Fujimori and Chavez came from outside the traditional 
elites both racially and culturally, and gave a more central role in their discourse 
to the knowledge and values of the 'pueblo'. Politically they promised greater 
inclusion of the majorities in decision making processes and substantial change 
on the political front, by the replacement of the political class. By being non­
white and offering a racially inclusive vision and an antagonistic view of the 
current political class, both offered the possibility of a regeneration of the 
political system which reflected better the social make up of their respective
43 Ex-Miss Universe transformed into 'successful' mayoress of wealthy Chacao district of Caracas. 
Saez topped the opinion polls for a substantial period on an independent ticket but her popularity 
waned rapidly as she was endorsed by COPEI. Salas Römer, also an independent and governor of 
Carabobo state, launched his presidential bid on a market reformist, technocratic ticket, but lost 
to Chavez's anti-neoliberal programme.
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countries. Both men recognised that their respective electorates had no further 
respect for the existing democratic institutions as they were seen as un­
representative of their interests. Both therefore offered more "democracy" but 
with a central strong figure offering more security in an uncertain national 
context suffering violence and chaos. Both men offered more efficient and 
authoritative "steering mechanisms" in the face of a discredited ruling elite and a 
political system lacking legitimacy that had shown itself incapable of reform.
Conclusion
The language of crisis was therefore central to the discourse of both 
presidents, and through their actions they offered quick and decisive solutions. 
The following three chapters will examine that discourse and those actions more 
closely, using Habermas' structure, to show how both leaders offered more 
inclusiveness and participation in order to seek the legitimacy which the regimes 
they replaced so clearly had failed to achieve. The next chapter, Chapter 3, will 
examine and assess how both men recognised the economic exclusion of the 
many exacerbated by the previous regime and attempted to remedy that by 
furthering the economic and social participation of the popular classes. In 
Chapter 4 we examine how both men used the illegitimacy of the preceding 
regimes in their discourse to gain power, and the strategies they used to attempt 
to establish political and cultural hegemony in their respective countries. In 
Chapter 5 we will assess both regimes' relationship with democracy, comparing it 
to classic conceptions of liberal democracy supposedly embodied in the regimes 
replaced by them, and the influence of authoritarianism within them, thus 
furthering our examination of the political sphere. The theme of popular 
participation cuts across all three chapters and how both men achieved this if at 
all. In doing so elements from all three levels are present in all three chapters, 
but with an especial emphasis in Chapter 3 on the economic and social, in 
Chapter 4 on the cultural and the political and in Chapter 5 on the political. In 
this way I aim to show how far both leaders were conscious of the crisis of
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legitimacy of the democratic regimes previous to their rule and to what extent 
they presented an alternative to them in order to achieve legitimacy.
101
Table II.l: Selected Development Indicators Peru/Venezuela 1960-1999
Indicator Country 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-1999
GDP (Av. Annual 
Growth Rate %)
Peru 4.9 3.0 -0.3 5.4
Venezuela 6.0 5.0 1.0 1.7
G N P (per capita. Av. 
Ann. Growth Rate %)*
Peru N /A (1960-1980)
1.1
(1980-1992)
-2 .8
1.7
Venezuela N /A (1960-1980)
2.6
(1980-1992)
-0.8
- 6.8
Inflation (Av.Ann. Rate
%)
Peru 10.4 30.7 233.9 28.7
Venezuela 1.3 12.1 19.3 47.6
D ebt (Millions USUS$) Peru (1970)
856
(1980)
6,204
(1990)
21,105
(1998)
32,397
Venezuela (1970)
728
(1980)
10,867
(1990)
33,305
(1998)
37,003
Health Expenditure 
(% Tot Govt Exp.)
Peru N /A (1972)
6.2
(1981)
5.3
(1990)
5.1
(1990-1998)
2.2
Venezuela N /A (1972)
11.7
(1981)
7.3
N /A (1990-1998)
3.0
Education  
Expenditure (% Tot 
Govt. Exp)
Peru N /A (1972)
22.7
(1981)
11.3
(1990)
16.2
(1997)
2.9
Venezuela N /A (1972)
22.7
(1981)
18.3
N /A (1997) 
5.2
Industrialisation (Av 
Ann. Growth Rate % 
GDP.)
Peru 5.0 3.7 -1 .2 6.7
Venezuela 4.6 3.0 1.5 2.6
Urbanisation (Av. Ann. 
Growth Rate %)
Peru (1960:46%) 
4.9
(1980: 67%) 
4 2
(1990: 70%) 
3.1
(1999:72%)
N /A
Venezuela (1960: 67%) 
4.7
(1980:83%)
4.2
(1990: 84%) 
2.8
(1999: 87%) 
N /A
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Sources: World Bank W orldDevelopment Reports: W orld D e id o p rm i Indicators 1983/1992/1994 Oxford University Press: Oxford 
And World Bank (2001) W orld D e id o p m n t Report 2000-2001 Oxford University Press: Oxford. Downloaded 22.08.03 at 
http://-www.-worldbank.oiY/ poverty/ wdrpovertv/ report/index.htm
* According to UNDP/OCEI Venezuelan Average Income fell from US$5192 in 1990 to US$2,858 in 1997.
Table II.2: Distribution of Income Peru Venezuela 1970-1999: Selected Statistics
Peru Venezuela
Year Lowe
st
20%
2nd
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1972 1.9 5.1 11.0 21.0 61.0 42.9 1970 3.0 7.3 12.9 22.8 54.0 35.7
1985-
86
4.4 3.5 13.7 21.5 51.9 35.8 1987 4.7 9.2 14.0 21.5 50.6 34.2
1996 4.4 9.1 14.1 21.3 51.2 35.4 46.2 1996 3.7 8.4 13.6 21.2 53.1 37.0 48.8
1999
*
54.5 48.6 22.4 1999
*
49.8 49.4 21.7
Statistics compiled from World Development Report Indicators in World Bank W orldD ezdopnent R ep o rtsl9 7 9 /1 9 9 1 /1 9 9 5 /1 9 9 6 /1 9 9 8 -9 9 /1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 0  Oxford 
University Press: Oxford and World Bank (2001) W orld D eudopnvnt Report 2000-2001  Oxford University Press: Oxford. Downloaded 22.08.03 at 
http://www.worldbank.org/ poverty/ wdrpovertv/ report/index.htm
* Statistics for 1999 from ECLAC (2002) P am rarm  Social deAm erica L a tim  2001-2002  Anexo Estadistico downloaded on 28/08/03 at 
http:// www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/DesarrolloSocial/3/LOG2183P/ Anexos_2002.pdf
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3 CHAPTER 3: Populism, globalisation and the socio­
economic policies of Fujimori and Chavez
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the lack of legitimacy of democracy and 
democratic institutions, due to social divisions along race/class lines and 
economic dependency, was identified as a key aspect in the emergence of 
populism. Habermas' theory of legitimacy crisis was used as a comparative 
model to show how the democratic regimes in Peru and Venezuela, preceding 
the emergence of Fujimori and Chavez, failed to achieve popular legitimacy. 
Fujimori and Chavez exploited this lack of legitimacy and presented alternative 
models seeking to further participation of the popular classes and thus gain the 
legitimacy denied the democratic regimes they replaced. This chapter will 
examine these projects in order to analyse and assess to what extent this 
legitimacy was gained on the socio-economic level. I will use Susan Strange's 
four structures - finance, production, security and knowledge - as the basis of 
this chapter. In this way I aim to place this discussion within the wider context of 
globalisation. Discussions on the politico-cultural and political spheres of 
Habermas' (1976) theory will be reserved for Chapters 4 and 5.
3.2 Populism in a globalised age
3.2.1 Introduction
Populism is usually associated with specific policies based around State 
interventionism and distributivism. So-called 'classic' populist governments, of 
the period 1930-1970, implemented policies of ISI, state ownership of key 
industries, and distributivist policies towards key popular sectors, especially the 
urban working class. In this way, the leaders of these governments built up 
strong relationships with the people, as well as fostering cross-class coalitions 
closely linked to the model. The emergence of globalisation and neoliberalism
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ostensibly condemned such policies to the dustbin of history, as analysts such as 
Dornbusch and Edwards (1991) or Sachs (1990) complained of their fiscal 
irresponsibility and inflationary characteristics.
In Chapter 1, however, it was argued that such policies should not be 
specifically associated with populism, although they are often found within 
populist government policies. First, it was argued that the nature and intensity of 
such policies varied widely in governments identified as populists, depending on 
the type of government, be it more authoritarian or democratic, based primarily 
on rural or urban support, and/or depending on the level of development already 
reached (Dlx, 1985). Drake argues that even within individual populist 
movements different currents existed which emphasised some policies or 
ideologies more than others (1982 p234). Second, it was argued that State 
interventionist and distributive policies were not that unusual for the time, with 
the role of the State in the economy being prominent in both the developed and 
developing world, not to mention of course in Socialist countries.
As more states in Latin America began to adopt neoliberal policies it was 
thought that populism, specifically identified with State interventionism, ISI, and 
distributivism, had been eradicated from the region. Yet the State continued to 
have a strong, albeit changed role in Latin America, acting as a major agent in 
implementing Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), and as principal 
regulator of the economy, and promoter of private enterprise, rather than as a 
primary Investor, as in the previous model. And within this context the leader 
emerged in a number of countries at the apex of the State, implementing 
neoliberal policies in a radical fashion, while forging strong links to the people 
partially through limited distributionist or assistentialist policies aimed at 
ameliorating the negative effects of the new model, in what Weyland (1996) 
called 'neopopulism'. Populism, at least as a political strategy for ensuring 
continued support for the leader, was seen to continue even under neoliberalism.
Therefore, it would seem that some form of distributive policy is a 
characteristic of populist governments, although these policies are not specific to
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populism, but are Instead framed by the International political economy of the 
time. Populism rather adapts itself to the new circumstances, articulating itself to 
different ideologies or mix of ideologies, as Laclau (1977) argues. Populist 
leaders try to reconcile the demands of the international economy with the 
demands of their social base for more participation. As evidence of increasing 
inequality mounts after a decade of neoliberal reform, the pendulum seems to be 
swinging back as some populist leaders emerge lambasting neoliberalism and 
seeking to implement more equitable social and economic policies, with more 
emphasis on State Intervention and distribution of wealth.
Populism, therefore, needs to be studied within a framework of 
international political economy, as well as in its national and regional contexts, in 
order to understand its genesis and manifestations. In this chapter I use an 
international political economy approach for an examination of the policies of 
both presidents. Such an approach allows us to place the object of study within 
wider structures and frameworks (Kirby, 2003 pl2). One of the best-known and 
most accessible IPE frameworks is found in Susan Strange's (1994) States and 
Markets.
Susan Strange's (1994) framework of analysis for international political 
economy is based on four basic values: (i) wealth; (ii) security; (ili) freedom; and 
(iv) justice. Each society, she maintains, gives different weighting to each of 
these values, which in turn affects the balance between the State (authority) and 
the market in that society. Strange's analytical framework is based around a 
number of key questions, which can be summed up in the question: Cui bono? 
Who gets what? Who benefits? Who loses? In order to answer this question 
Strange encourages us to investigate who has power and what the source of that 
power is. Power, she argues, may not necessarily lie within the State, but in 
other structures such as international organisations (IOs), transnational 
corporations (TNCs), NGOs, and the media, amongst others. It is necessary 
therefore to abandon State-bound views of power and concentrate instead on its 
distribution in the four essential structures in which the values of wealth,
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security, freedom and justice are constructed: finance, production, security and 
knowledge. We must ask ourselves who has control over these four structures 
when seeking out the ownership and source of power.
What does Strange mean by each of these four structures? The 
production structure is, according to Strange, "...the sum of all the arrangements 
determining what is produced, by whom and for whom, by which method and on 
what terms" (ibid. p64). Thus, under this heading what is examined is labour, 
industrial production and wealth, In other words "...what creates wealth in a 
political economy" (ibid.). This structure has been influenced by two great 
changes which now affect most of the States of the world: a change to a 
demand-led market economy, In other words capitalism, and more recently, a 
change from production geared to national markets to one geared to global 
markets.
The financial structure is, in a nutshell, credit availability and currency 
values (ibid. p90). This structure has the power to "...allow or deny [...] people 
the possibility of spending today and paying back tomorrow, the power to let 
them exercise purchasing power and thus Influence markets for production, and 
also the power to manage or mismanage the currency in which credit is 
denominated, thus affecting rates of exchange with credit denominated in other 
currencies" (ibid.). Governments and banks share these powers, and the 
structure Is both local, because of currencies being local in origin, and global, 
due to the technologisation of transactions and financial markets.
The security structure in political economy, she asserts, "...is the 
framework of power created by the provision of security by some human beings 
for others" and is usually built around the institution of the State in each country, 
and globally in association or in competition with other states (ibid. p45-46). The 
security structure, however, does not simply entail protection from "...sudden 
unnatural death", but also from hunger, disease, disablement and other hazards, 
and involves the distribution of security amongst the different groups in society 
(ibid. p47).
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Finally, "...[the knowledge structure] comprehends what is believed (and 
the moral conclusions and principles derived from those beliefs); what is known 
and perceived as understood; and the channels by which beliefs, ideas and 
knowledge are communicated -  including some people and excluding others" 
(ibid. p ll7 ). Furthermore, "...[it] determines what knowledge is discovered, how 
it is stored, and who communicates it by what means to whom and on what 
terms" (ibid. pl21). This power is diffused and unquantifiable, and has been 
subject to changes in the provision and control over information and 
communication systems, in the use of language, and in the fundamental 
perceptions of and beliefs about the human condition which influence value 
judgements, and consequently political and economic decisions and policies (ibid. 
pl20). The next two sections will use Strange's four structures to examine both 
our case studies more closely.
3.3 Globalisation processes and populist distributivism in Fujimori's Peru
3.3.1 Introduction
In 1990, on coming to power, the new government led by Alberto Fujimori 
began the implementation of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), despite 
election promises to the contrary. This programme was adopted at the insistence 
of the International Financial Institution's (IFIs), as Fujimori did not have an 
alternative programme. The Peruvian SAP implemented by the Fujimori 
government was what Gonzales refers to as "an extreme model of adjustment 
for efficiency" (1998 p41). According to Gonzales, such a programme is based 
around two primary objectives: the reduction of inflation and the maximisation of 
production and international debt repayment. These objectives were realised 
with a minimum of state intervention and with a maximum bias towards the 
market as the institution that assigns resources (ibid.). The programme was 
implemented in four main stages:
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1) August 1990-January 1991: The so-called 'Fujishock'. It Involved drastic price 
stabilisation measures: inflation reduction, restoring fiscal health and the 
health of the international reserves, and commercial and financial 
liberalisation;
2) February 1991-December 1992: This stage was dominated by an economic 
reform 'package' implemented by Carlos Bolona, Minister of Finance, through 
923 decree laws;44
3) January 1993-March 1996: During this period the inflation rate came down, 
as did the fiscal deficit, the privatisation process was put into effect, and 
there was spectacular growth right up to 1995. However, there was also an 
appreciation of the exchange rate, a current account deficit in the balance of 
payments, a deficit in savings In relation to investment, as well as 
unemployment and under-employment, and a failure to modernise public 
institutions (ibid. p45);45
4) April 1996 to 2000: This period was dominated by an orthodox readjustment 
and its effects. During this period the SAP began to suffer from various 
blockages and to show signs of crisis. The readjustments, however, brought 
little growth, and a renegotiated restructuring of the international debt ended 
up favouring creditors, as it raised the amount of debt and the level of 
payments, due to the institutional weakness of the State in defending 
Peruvian interests (ibid. p46).
In the following four sections I will examine the principal measures taken by the
Fujimori government from the perspective of Strange's four structures: finance,
production, security and knowledge.
44 This period included the so-called "self-coup" of April, 1992. Bolona's continued support for the 
government through the coup was vital for keeping the international financial community and 
foreign governments on board (ibid. p43).
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3.3.2 Finance
The Fujimori government liberalised the financial sectors in a number of 
ways. In January 1991 it reformed the national currency, creating the nuevo sol. 
It liberalised the currency markets, allowing the Peruvian currency to float freely 
against the dollar. The Central Reserve Bank of Peru (Banco Central de Reserva 
del Peru [CRBP]) was allowed to intervene to ensure monetary stability, but only 
by using market mechanisms to inject or take out liquidity.
The removal of restrictions on banking In dollars, along with the above 
measures, contributed to a greater dollarisation of the economy.46 This helped 
minimise the exchange rate risk, but reduced the central bank's room for 
manoeuvre In regulating the money supply or influencing problems in local 
industry which arose as a result of competition with the external market (Iguiniz, 
1998 pp.31-32). The result was a stable, but overvalued national currency, 
which favoured multinational and privatised companies, foreign creditors and 
imports, but worked against local industry and agriculture, and helped form a 
current account deficit (Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 2001 p64).
Monetary policy was eventually framed within the Constitution of 1993, 
which established the CRBP as autonomous within its own Organic Law with a 
purpose to preserve monetary stability. The CRBP is constitutionally prohibited 
from financing the public sector, to give guarantees, or sectoral credits, or to 
establish multiple exchange rate regimes (Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 2001 p57).
Ownership of banks was almost entirely privatised, and while this move 
and other reforms helped prevent a banking crisis, it did not result in any marked 
diversification in institutions or instruments.47 Furthermore, the privatisation and 
liberalisation of the banking system, along with the closure of state-run sectoral 
banks, led to a greater concentration of financial services among (especially
45 This period, although led by Jorge Carnet as Minister of Economy and Finance, was, according 
to Gonzales, essentially directed from Washington through foreign-trained Peruvian officials who 
sometimes came directly from the IMF and World Bank (ibid. p44, note 5).
46 By 1996 75%  of bank deposits were in dollars, and 74%  of loans (Iguiniz, 1998 pp.3 1-3 2 ) .
47 The privatisation of banks tended to promote concentration, and between 1990 and 1993 the 
number of banks fell from 23 to 17  (Iguiniz, 1998 p31).
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richer) urban areas, directed at the top decile of earners. For the majority of 
Peruvians, credit facilities remained out of reach and schemes run by NGOs to 
attempt to compensate for this remained limited in coverage (ibid. p201).
There was also a full liberalisation of capital flows abroad, the free 
opening of bank accounts in the country by national and foreign agents, as well 
as accounts abroad by Peruvian nationals, and the free holding of accounts in 
foreign currency. Exporters and importers no longer had to notify the Central 
Bank of currency movements, and movements in the Stock Exchange were 
liberalised (ibid. p73). It was hoped that from these and other reforms that 
financial markets would become freer and more efficient, and growth would 
ensue. Part of that hope was to promote foreign investment and domestic 
savings (ibid. p74). However, while foreign investment grew, savings fell: 
between 1993-1997 savings were an average of 23% of GIMP, while In 1999 they 
were 18.3%, and in 2000 17.7%. This, according to Francke, stops the 
generation of autonomous, sustainable growth (2001 p ll) .  Furthermore most 
savings were In effect forced savings, as Peruvians were not allowed to cash 
their CTS (Compensación Temporal de ServiciofTme of Service Compensation)48 
or privatised pensions until retirement (Gonzales, 1998 p52).
All subsidies, and many tax breaks to industry and agriculture were 
removed. Instead, the government concentrated on lowering tax levels while 
widening the base of tax contributors, and modernising collection procedures 
(Pascó-Font and Saavedra, 2001 pp.64-65). IGV (Impuesto General a la 
l/e/7/a/General Sales Tax) rates were raised, collection increased, and a series of 
exonerations and special regimes in that tax were removed. There was an 
attempt also to incorporate the informal sector into the tax base. Tax bands were 
simplified: businesses and high earners paid 30%, and low earners 15% (ibid. 
p66). The policy apparently paid off as collection went up from 7% at the end of
48 This is a form of unemployment benefit, consisting of one salary per year paid in by the 
employer to a special bank account in the employee's name.
i l l
the 1980s to 14% in 1997, and contributors went up from 558,570 in 1993 to
1,877,858 in Dec 1997 (ibid.).
However, tax coverage remains low as sectors where investment is 
encouraged, such as privatised companies, enjoy many tax breaks.49 Francke 
maintains that this discriminates against industry and small and medium 
businesses, and against workers who, in 2000, paid more than businesses in tax. 
In sum, employment-creating businesses have had their growth limited and state 
funds for public spending have been reduced (2001 pl2). Iguiniz points out too 
that, while the numbers of registered taxpayers increased, the numbers who 
actually pay remain small.50 Tax take remains low in comparison with other 
countries in the region and globally, and there is a greater reliance on sales tax 
and foreign trade for tax income.51 "The forms of income which are least stable 
in developed countries are precisely those which are the most important in Peru" 
(1998 p38).
The implementation of reforms allowed Peru to re-enter the International 
financial community and restructure Its international debt. Deals with the Paris 
Club (1992/1996) and the Brady Deal (1997), brought greater financial stability 
to the economy as its risk indicator dropped and foreign financial investment felt 
more secure. However, debt went up, from US$19,996 million in 1990 to 
US$28,279 million in 1997, and average repayments were high at US$1,841 
million per annum, or a quarter of exports, from 1997 onwards (Gonzales, 1998 
pp.77-78). "[Gjrowth therefore depends almost exclusively on private 
investment, above all on foreign investment...as public investment will be
49 Such as the elimination of export taxes, paying only half of income tax (15% ), and stability 
agreements, which prevent these exemptions being removed or new taxes being placed on them. 
Furthermore, the financial sector does not pay IGV on interest and the Stock Market profits are 
not subject to any tax at all. There is no tax on personal inheritance and people on high income 
are taxed at 30% , half of what it was previously.
50 For example in 1997, there were 1,637,000 registered taxpayers, or 20%  of the labour force, 
but only 8%  of the labour force, or 448,500 taxpayers, actually paid tax.
51 Income tax in Peru in 1994 generated 20%  of total revenue, as opposed to 32 .5%  in Latin 
America and 33.9%  in OECD countries. Sales tax and selective consumption tax raised 65.3%  of 
tax income in the same year and foreign trade accounted for 12 .3%  of tax income as opposed to 
an OECD figure of 0.89% (Iguiniz 1998 pp.37-38 ).
112
relatively reduced due to the compromise of reducing the external debt" (ibid. 
p87). Furthermore, Iguiniz (1998) maintains that the government couldn't cut 
debt repayments because of its dependence on international credit and the good 
will of the IFIs, "...[t]he rigidity with regard to debt payment was thus structural" 
(1998 p38). The only adjustment options open, therefore, are to decrease capital 
spending, increase direct taxation and/or reduce taxes on foreign trade (ibid. 
P38).
3.3.3 Production
The measures implemented in the production structure created a State 
dedicated to the encouragement of the market, rather than State protagonism in 
the economic system. These new tendencies were institutionalised in the 
Constitution of 1993, which defined the State as subsidiary to the private sector 
and as a promoter of private initiative. This change in the role of the State was 
achieved through three processes: privatisation of public companies; the 
development of an institutional framework of regulation and the promotion of 
free competition (Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 2001 p85).
The privatisation process in Peru was put in place by February 1992, 
through various decree laws. Public companies were sold off to the value of 
US$8,917.1 million by 1999, with projected investment of US$7,203 million 
(Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 2001 pp.90-91).52 Furthermore private companies 
were increasingly involved in electricity and water provision and distribution, 
either through ownership of companies or through contracts. As the State 
withdrew from production, it began to institute a number of regulatory agencies 
for the newly privatised or semi-privatised services.53
52 By 1997 private capital flow into Peru represented 5 .1%  of GNP, 1%  below the regional 
average (Pascó-Font and Saavedra, 2001 pp.90-91).
53 Some to the best known of these regulatory services are: INDECOPI (Instituto Nacional de 
Defensa de la Competencia y de la Proteción de la Propiedad Intelectual/Nat\ona\ Institute for the 
Defence of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property), OSIPTEL (Organismo 
Supervisor de ia Inversión Privada en TelecomunicacioneslSupewsoiy Organism of Private 
Investment in Telecommunications), with sister organisations in Energy (OSINERG) (which was 
complimented by the energy price regulator CTE - Comisión de Tarifas f/árfr/c^í/Electricity
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From the initial measures in the Fujishock of 1990, tariffs had reached an 
average level of 13% by 1997. As a result, imports of consumer goods increased 
fivefold from US$338.3 million in 1990 to US$1.85 billion in 1996, an annual rate 
of increase of 27.4% -  well above the average increase in the growth of 
domestic production (Abugattas, 1998 p65). Most restrictions on exports were 
removed and an agency was set up to promote them (Prompex) in 1996; 
however, the results of these efforts were modest (Pascó-Font and Saavedra, 
2001 p82).
A flexibilisation of the job market was Implemented, with a reduction in 
personnel in the public sector, which was further reduced by privatisation, 
deregulation of the minimum wage, and wages being linked to productivity. 
Availability of temporary contracts was increased, their variety widened, and, 
after 1995, costs of inscription were reduced to zero. Businesses were allowed to 
hire young adults (under 26) as 'apprentices' with lower rates of pay. The 
Constitution of 1993 abolished labour security completely, replacing it with 
protection norms against unjustified dismissal for salaried workers and 
compensation was reduced. Dismissal procedures for 'just cause' were simplified 
and reduced (Pascó-Font and Saavedra, 2001 pp. 100-101). Restrictions on union 
activity were introduced which, along with increased use of temporary contracts, 
led the numbers in unions to reduce even further from their already declining 
levels.54
All sectoral development banks such as the Agriculture, Mining, and 
Industrial banks were liquidated and the banking system was almost totally 
privatised. Indeed, in effect there was no sectoral support policy, as the 1996
Pricing Commission), Transport (OSITRAN), and the SBS (Superintendencia de Banca y 
Segwras/Su peri n tendency for Banking and Insurance).
54 Such as allowing more than one union to organise in each workplace, changing wage 
bargaining from sectoral to company based bargaining, and removing the right to strike pay. The 
percentage of private sector salaried employees who worked in businesses with union 
representation went from 30%  in 1987 to 6%  in 1997. In the public sector it declined from 75%  
in 1990 to 34%  in 1997. Underemployment and attacks on trade unionists by both Sendero 
Luminoso and the security forces further discouraged trade union membership (Pascó-Font and 
Saavedra, 2001 pl03).
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budget dedicated only 0.69% of GNP in total to the ministries of Agriculture, 
Fishing, Energy and Mines and Industry representing 45% of GNP. This was 
barely 5.8% of the total of public spending and indeed Industry alone received 
only 0.06% of GNP (Gonzales, 1998 p67). In agriculture a market In land was 
encouraged and restrictions on land ownership were removed.
These measures had a number of effects on industry, agriculture, services 
and employment. National products became more expensive than imports due to 
tariff reductions, domestic prices rises, raised production costs, and a tighter 
domestic market due to reduced family resources (Abugattas, 1998 p65). 
Production did increase to levels above the late 1980s, but by the end of the 
decade there was little variation in the participation of industry in the economy, 
as it went from 15.6% of GNP in 1990 to 14.9% in 2000 (Pasco-Font and 
Saavedra, 2001 pl20). While this stagnation did reflect historical trends, and 
whilst industry retained its share of GNP, it cannot be said that the reforms led to 
a revival of industry in Peru.
Indeed, Abugattas points out that manufacturing passed to having a 
subsidiary role in the economy, dependent on the performance of other sectors 
such as construction, fishing, non-tradables and the production of primary goods. 
Industries such as electric appliances, radios and televisions, fertilisers and crop 
sprays disappeared, for example, as construction, food, textile and knitwear 
industries grew (1998 pp.76-77).55 Furthermore, there was a tendency towards 
mergers and acquisitions, with 100 of these between 1993 and 1997. FDI 
increased, but often towards existing firms rather than new projects, and 
industry received little of it.56 Therefore, in sum, while Pasco-Font and Saavedra 
can rightly insist that manufacturing's share of the economy remained constant, 
the nature and much of the ownership of industry had changed to one based 
increasingly on primary products, and increasingly owned by foreigners.
55 While the industrial sector grew as a whole by an average of 5%  between 1990 and 1997, 
growth was more notable in the food processing industry at 6.4%  (Abugattas, 1998 pp.76-77).
56 FDI was mostly in the areas of petroleum, fats and oils, and confectionery, which took up 
almost half of all FDI in this period, most of that being through acquisitions.
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In agriculture, government land reforms sought to open up the market in 
land in order that it could provide guarantees for credit. However, there was little 
movement in the land market, due to structural difficulties such as the lack of 
land titles for many owners, a lack of credit from private banks, and cheaper 
imports (Gonzales, 1998 p54). There were some notable successes In agricultural 
production and exports, such as in asparagus or mangoes, but by and large 
agriculture remained stagnant during this period (Pasco Font and Saavedra, 2001 
P83).
Privatisation policies led to great changes in the structure of ownership 
and cost of services. By the end of the 1990s much of what were once public 
services, namely telecommunications, water and electricity had been privatised 
or had strong private sector involvement. According to Pasco-Font and Saavedra 
(2001), privatised companies grew more rapidly, Improved the quality of their 
services more, and extended their coverage more than State companies. 
Gonzales points out, however, that privatisation mostly benefited foreign capital 
and the government. Mostly foreign firms bought up privatised companies, while 
the government kept the proceeds as a reserve fund. As Gonzales emphasises, 
"...[f]or the moment, privatisation is reduced to the privatisation of profits 
without a corresponding rise in social benefits" (1998 p57). While the poorest did 
gain through privatisation in terms of access to services, those who already had 
these services found themselves losing due to higher tariffs57 (Pasco-Font and 
Saavedra, 2000 p208).
Employment in Peru during the Fujimori years was characterised 
principally by underemployment, casualisation and informalisation of the 
workforce, lower pay and more precarious conditions for the bulk of Peruvian 
workers. Unemployment and underemployment increased slightly, with the latter
57 Services such as telephones, electricity, and gas went from a public to a private monopoly, 
leading to substantial price increases. Prices increased in electricity from 100 in 1989 to 183.3%  
in 1996 and telephones from 100 to 200% for the same period (Gonzales, 1998 p57).
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affecting around three-quarters of the workforce.58 Temporary contract work 
doubled during the decade, as formal employment decreased to over half the 
EAP.59 Strikes declined, as there was a notable movement of resources from 
workers to capital.60 Employment moved from larger manufacturing firms and 
agriculture to commerce, restaurants and hotels.61
In sum, as Gonzales puts it, there was "...a rise in independent workers, a 
reduction of public and industrial employment, and stagnation of rural 
employment...In general there is a stagnation of salaries for the labour force, 
and a tendency to inequality of remuneration and a greater uncertainty in labour 
stability" (Gonzales 1998 p i 17). Pascó-Font and Saavedra seem to agree with 
this assessment (2001 pl33). However, while Gonzalez insists that this situation 
has resulted in Peruvians not trusting the neoliberal model (op. clt.), Pascó-Font 
and Saavedra maintain that it is not the model that is at fault, but the application 
of the model (op. cit.). Francke, however, has no doubt where the blame lies: 
"Neoliberal economic policy has not managed to generate employment or 
incomes at the necessary rhythm to significantly reduce income poverty in 
Peru..." (2001 p25). The constant state of agitation amongst workers and 
ordinary citizens during the presidency of President Alejandro Toledo (2001- 
present) would tend to support Gonzales' view. Furthermore it is particular 
aspects of the model that have generated much of this protest, in particular the
58 The average level of unemployment in Peru from 1992-2000 was 8.5%  compared with an 
average between 1986 and 19 9 1 of 6.6%  (Pascó-Font and Saavedra, 2001 pl38). 
Underemployment increased from 7 3 .1%  in 1990 to 76 .3%  in 1995 (Gonzales, 1998 p ll7 )
59 In 1990 10 .4%  of the 54.4%  of employees in formal private employment were temporary, but 
by 2000 24.3%  were temporary out of the 45.5%  of the workforce in such employment (Pascó- 
Font and Saavedra, 2001 pl73)
60 Strikes decreased from 11.6 %  of total man-hours in 1990 to 8.9%  in 1995. In 1989/1990 
profits were 64.6%  of national income and pay 34.4%  but by 1996 profits increased to 77.8%  
while pay fell to 2 1 .2 %  (Gonzales, 1998 p ll3 ) . Furthermore between 1990 and 1996 the 
minimum wage was reduced by 30%.
61 Between 1990 and 1995 employment in larger manufacturing firms fell by 26% , losing around
25,000 jobs in 248 firms, contributing to the rise of underemployment (Abugattas, 1998 p71). 
Employment growth instead was in commerce, restaurants and hotels (Pascó-Font and Saavedra, 
2001 pl50), while employment in agriculture fell by 10%  (ibid. pl54). Pascó-Font and Saavedra, 
however, state that falls in industrial production and employment reflect historical tendencies
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attempted privatisations of some utility companies, such as electricity companies, 
and large enterprises such as the state oil company, Petroperu.62
3.3.4 Security
The Fujimori government's response to welfare security was shaped by a 
number of centralised state agencies set up specifically to tackle poverty. In 
1991 the Fujimori government established FONCODES (Fondo Nacional de 
Compensación y Desarrollo 5ocyá//Nat¡onal Fund for Compensation and Social 
Development) an autonomous organism of the Presidency of the Republic. Its 
aim was to respond to extreme poverty through social support programmes, 
infrastructure and productive development. In 1992, the government reactivated 
the Ministry of the Presidency (MIPRE) with the aims of providing direct 
assistance to the poor, social infrastructure and economic infrastructure.63 MIPRE 
came to control 25-35% of the total government budget; yet, while spending 
increased substantially, it still remained relatively low at US$13 for every poor 
person between 1991 and 1995 (Gonzales, 1998 p62).
The focalised nature of these programmes allowed the President high 
levels of discretion in prioritising spending over established ministries. Targeted 
populations were based on identified geographic areas with low levels of 
nutrition, education and access to basic services. These groups proposed 
projects and monitored them through participative structures. As a result, 
through these programmes, direct links were made between these populations 
and the president himself.
rather than being a direct result of the Fujimori economic model, an opinion supported by 
Abugattas (op. cit.).
62 See Carrasco, 2002 for details of nature and cause of protests in the first year of Toledo's 
government.
63 MIPRE also controlled local regional administrative units CTARs (Comités Transitorios de 
Administración RegionallReq¡\ona\ Transitory Administrative Committees), and other important 
programmes such as PRONAA {Programa Nacional de Asistencia Aiimentaria/National Programme 
of Food Assistance) (1992).
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Most social programmes were directed at improvements in three areas: 
education, health and housing, and sanitation. In total, programmes in these 
areas took up around one-third of total public spending in 1996. Education 
absorbed 50% of this spending (3.4% of GNP), health 25% (1.6%) and the rest 
through the presidential programmes (Gonzales, 1998 p62)64.
Francke (2001) assessed the governments' performance in the three areas 
in the following way. While there were improvements in education in terms of 
quantity, with large numbers of new schools built, there remained problems of 
quality. Teachers remained poorly paid, with materials of poor quality, despite 
some teaching training programmes and new materials being provided. 
Attendance was generally high, but this masked severe problems of desertion 
and repetition.65
Again in health there was a quantity/quality dichotomy. There were 
increases and improvement in infrastructure, equipment, personnel, and 
medicines as well as efforts at community participation. There were some 
successes in the lowering of the expansion of primary health coverage, infant 
mortality and maternal mortality. Nonetheless indices in these areas remained 
amongst the highest in the region, and access to health services remained 
unequal in terms of rural/urban and poor/rich cleavages, with the urban rich 
receiving the best services, and having the lowest indices in health problems.66
64 While these figures were historically high, similar amounts were spent on defence (2.9% ) and 
the paying of the international debt (2.0%) (Gonzales, 1998 p62). Furthermore, social spending 
remained low in regional terms as in 1997 it stood at 6 .3%  of GNP, as opposed to the Latin 
American average of 12 .4 %  (Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 2001 p ill) .
65 Almost 90% of those between 6 and 15  years attended school and 85.9%  of those between 12  
and 16 years by 1999. However, 48%  of young people did not finish secondary school and 23%  
didn't finish primary (Francke, 2001 p5).
66 Infant mortality was reduced between 1989 and 1997 from 55 per 1000 births to 44 per 1000. 
Between 1992 and 1996 the number of public health posts increased by 6 1%  and health centres 
almost by 100%  between 1990 and 2000 (Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 2001 pl92). However, Peru 
still has one of the highest infant mortality rates in the region, which is moreover distributed 
inequitably: infant mortality is 100 per 1000 births amongst the poorest Peruvians, and 20 per 
1000 amongst the richest. Furthermore nine out of ten of the poorest 20%  of Peruvians don't 
have health coverage. Such disparities are most notable between urban and rural areas (Francke 
(2001 pp. 6-8).
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The government made important efforts to extend service infrastructure in 
the 1990s, with 90% coverage in urban areas of potable water, sewage, 
electricity, telecommunications, and road access (Francke, 2002). However, once 
again there are wide disparities of access between urban and rural areas. In 
electricity for example there was 95% urban access, but In rural areas 43% and 
only 6% amongst the rural poor. By 2000 58% of all rural homes had access to 
running water but only 13% had sewage disposal (Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 
2001 p205).
Tanaka and Trivelli (2002) identify four serious deficiencies in the welfare 
programmes of the Fujimori government. First, they point out that they were 
always insufficient given the scale of poverty In Peru. Second, as these were 
'special' programmes they lacked co-ordination with the social ministries, often 
producing an overlapping of functions. Third, focalisation was concentrated in 
particular geographic areas, which were always insufficiently delineated, leaving 
plenty of room for clientelistic practices.67 Finally, as the programmes were 
demand driven they ended up being dominated by the most organised and 
articulate sections of the poor to the detriment of non-organised groups which 
were usually poorer (p6).
While there were Important advances In poverty eradication during the 
1990s, these were effectively insufficient to make a serious impact. Advances 
were made particularly in fighting extreme poverty, falling from 27% in 1991 to 
15% in 1997. However, these results were difficult to maintain, as indices began 
to rise again after 1997 when spending on them was reduced. This put into 
doubt the long-term sustainability of the programmes (Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 
2001 pl80). The level of poverty in 2000 still remained higher than that of 1985, 
and at the end of the 1990s, poverty levels were close to those of the beginning 
of the decade. Furthermore, while the Fujimori years saw a reduction in the GINI 
co-efficient, from 0.509 in 1991 to 0.423 in 2000, this, however, meant an
67 Indeed Schady (1999) shows how spending on social programmes rose according to the 
electoral cycle and in key electoral areas.
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"equalisation from below", meaning that those with lower incomes lost 
proportionally less buying power than those with relatively greater income. In 
other words, in reality, there was a "generalised impoverishment of the 
population as the inferior limit [of income] was at survival level" (Gamero, 2002 
pp.257-258).
3.3.5 Knowledge
How did these changes affect the knowledge structure? Throughout the 
reform process in Peru we see a gradual replacement of functions dominated 
previously by the state passing into the hands of the market. The financial sector 
passed almost entirely into the private sector and many previous state preserves, 
such as pensions, were opened up to the market. Furthermore, much of the day 
to day financial decisions previously made by the state, were precluded from the 
state by the Constitution, or effectively vetoed by agreements with the 
International Financial Institutions or the TNCs. Power passed from the State to 
the private sector in the production structure, with much of that power passing 
to foreign companies through privatisation, Including key sectors such as 
telecommunications, mining, and transport. In the (welfare) security structure, 
power was concentrated into the hands of the President, international 
organisations, and NGOs.
A net result of these changes is a weakening of internal institutions 
normally responsible for the running of the State. Thus Francke points out that 
state institutions went from an already weak existing institutionality, to a 
situation where ministries become very weak entities in the face of the power of 
the executive and specialised agencies, such as FONCODES. A result of this was 
a centralisation of power in the executive, with a lack of alternative sources of 
information to analyse the performance of organisms. Information flowed with 
difficulty, and Congress, the political parties and civil society did little to evaluate 
performance and provide information. Indeed, he continues, those entities which
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managed the best information were those areas financed by international 
organisms, opening questions on the influence of these organisms in the 
definition of internal policies (2001 pp.20-21).
With the passing of knowledge sources and control away from the State 
and towards the private sector, there was little compensatory effort on the part 
of the government to encourage alternative knowledge bases or sources. 
Investment in education remained primarily Infrastructural, with little effort 
placed on quality. The most successful universities were private, rather than 
state-funded, and there was increased privatisation of education. The media 
favoured government policy due to a combination of bribes, intimidation, and 
willing collusion on behalf of media businessmen (see Chapter 4). There was a 
concentration of capital in the hands of foreigners, particularly in finance, mining 
and telecommunication, leaving little of the knowledge structure of the most 
profitable sectors of the economy in national hands. Even when national capital 
had a controlling influence in some economic area, it was usually in the hands of 
large national capital whose interests were often similar to those of large foreign 
capital. The government by and large followed a policy of closed policymaking, 
where it acted first and discussed later, and then for only brief periods.
Gonzales points out that the State had been reorganised to achieve two 
objectives: facilitate and complement the economic policies in course and assure 
the control of the state apparatus and the government for president Fujimori and 
his political project (1998 p88). Both these objectives were beyond negotiation, 
and both were effectively codified into the Constitution. As a result Peruvian 
society faced what Schlrato and Webb Identify as "foreclosure", that is "...a 
process whereby certain feelings, desires, ideas, and positions are both 
unthinkable with regard to, and simultaneously constitutive of, identity" (2003 
p216). With a lack of structures and outlets for the formation of alternative 
proposals to neoliberal reform, and with an establishment and media consensus 
in favour of that reform, backed up by the supreme law of the land, debate on 
alternatives was in a manner 'foreclosed' before It could even begin. There was
122
little opportunity for constructive debate on the viability of the reforms, except 
within the context of neoliberal reform itself. Alternative socialist or even social- 
democratic visions were relegated to minority participation in debate. As such 
the knowledge structure was confined within, and controlled by, neoliberal 
ideology, and mostly privatised ownership, and this despite the fact that notable 
public unease existed with many of the reforms, particularly privatisation, as 
evidenced by the near rejection by the electorate of the 1993 Constitution.
3.3.6 Conclusion
The Fujimori government implanted a neoliberal model in Peru primarily 
through the actions of the State. Thus the State was the main instrument in the 
realisation of its own removal from economic protagonism in Peru and its 
replacement by the market. Furthermore, it was principally through the office of 
the President that this transformation was executed, as the President repeatedly 
used decree powers to enact legislation, not to mention the use of a coup to 
eradicate opposition to his neoliberal programme.
In every structure the balance between State and markets was altered in 
favour of the latter. In finance, banks were privatised, the currency tied to the 
dollar, financial markets entirely liberalised, and subsidies and tariffs removed or 
reduced considerably. Tax regimes were simplified in favour of higher earners 
and privatised enterprises, and collection procedures made more efficient. Peru 
inserted itself fully into international financial structures by a renegotiation of the 
external debt favouring creditors with increased repayments, which were 
rigorously adhered to.
In production, privatisation ensured the passing of key services and 
industries into private, often foreign, hands. The State was relegated 
constitutionally to the role of regulator and promoter of private business activity, 
and prohibited from acting as capitalist investor in the economy. State 
employment was reduced, as was the role of the State In the regulation of the
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employment market. In security, the State pursued a policy of poverty relief, 
increasing social spending. However, the private sector and not for profit sector 
was given a stronger role in welfare, health and education provision. All these 
measures ensured that larger parts of the knowledge structure also passed into 
private hands and/or remained centralised in the executive and with international 
agencies.
In sum, all four structures passed in large part into the control of the 
market, in alliance with the central executive and IFIs. Thus the State's role was 
considerably reduced but remained important as the principal interlocutor 
between the local economy and the demands of the international economy. 
Furthermore, the State was increasingly identified with President Fujimori, who 
ruled with ample national autonomy, in league with IFIs and TNCs. Fujimori's 
room for manoeuvre to distribute goods was limited, therefore, to welfare 
programmes, making his presidency essentially assistentialist and clientelistic. 
Furthermore, these programmes were controlled primarily by the markets and 
IFIs, as most of the revenue paying for them came from privatisation receipts 
and international credits.
3.4 Globalisation processes and populist distributivism in Fujimori’s Peru
3.4.1 Introduction
In 1990, on coming to power, the new government led by Alberto Fujimori 
began the implementation of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), despite 
election promises to the contrary. As Fujimori did not have an alternative 
programme, this programme was adopted at the Insistence and with the 
assistance of the International Financial Institution's (IFIs). The Peruvian SAP 
implemented by the Fujimori government was what Gonzales refers to as "an 
extreme model of adjustment for efficiency" (1998 p41). According to Gonzales, 
such a programme is based around two primary objectives: the reduction of
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inflation and the maximisation of production and international debt repayment. 
These objectives were realised with a minimum of state intervention and with a 
maximum bias towards the market as the institution that assigns resources 
(Ibid.). The programme was implemented In four main stages:
5) August 1990-January 1991: The so-called 'Fujishock'. It involved drastic price 
stabilisation measures: inflation reduction, restoring fiscal health and the 
health of the international reserves, and commercial and financial 
liberalisation;
6) February 1991-December 1992: This stage was dominated by an economic 
reform 'package' implemented by Carlos Bolona, Minister of Finance, through 
923 decree laws;68
7) January 1993-March 1996: During this period the inflation rate came down, 
as did the fiscal deficit, the privatisation process was put into effect, and 
there was spectacular growth right up to 1995. However, there was also an 
appreciation of the exchange rate, a current account deficit in the balance of 
payments, a deficit in savings In relation to investment, as well as 
unemployment and under-employment, and a failure to modernise public 
institutions (ibid. p45);69
8) April 1996 to 2000: This period was dominated by an orthodox readjustment 
and its effects. During this period the SAP began to suffer from various 
blockages and to show signs of crisis. The readjustments, however, brought 
little growth, and a renegotiated restructuring of the international debt ended 
up favouring creditors, as it raised the amount of debt and the level of 
payments, due to the institutional weakness of the State in defending 
Peruvian interests (ibid. p46).
68 This period included the so-called "self-coup" of April, 1992. Bolona's continued support for the 
government through the coup was vital for keeping the international financial community and 
foreign governments on board (ibid. p43).
125
In the following three sections I will examine the principal measures taken by the 
Fujimori government using Habermas' three spheres: the economic, the political 
and the socio-cultural.
3.4.2 Economic
a) Finance
The Fujimori government liberalised the financial sectors in a number of 
ways. In January 1991 it reformed the national currency, creating the nuevo sol. 
It liberalised the currency markets, allowing the Peruvian currency to float freely 
against the dollar. The Central Reserve Bank of Peru (Banco Central de Reserva 
del Perú [CRBP]) was allowed to intervene to ensure monetary stability, but only 
by using market mechanisms to inject or take out liquidity.
The removal of restrictions on banking in dollars, along with the above 
measures, contributed to a greater dollarisation of the economy.70 This helped 
minimise the exchange rate risk, but reduced the central bank's room for 
manoeuvre in regulating the money supply or influencing problems in local 
industry which arose as a result of competition with the external market (Iguiñiz,
1998 pp.31-32). The result was a stable, but overvalued national currency, 
which favoured multinational and privatised companies, foreign creditors and 
imports, but worked against local industry and agriculture, and helped form a 
current account deficit (Pascó-Font and Saavedra, 2001 p64).
Monetary policy was eventually framed within the Constitution of 1993, 
which established the CRBP as autonomous within its own Organic Law with a 
purpose to preserve monetary stability. The CRBP is constitutionally prohibited 
from financing the public sector, to give guarantees, or sectoral credits, or to 
establish multiple exchange rate regimes (Pascó-Font and Saavedra, 2001 p57).
69 This period, although led by Jorge Camet as Minister of Economy and Finance, was, according 
to Gonzales, essentially directed from Washington through foreign-trained Peruvian officials who 
sometimes came directly from the IMF and World Bank (ibid. p44, note 5).
70 By 1996 75%  of bank deposits were in dollars, and 74%  of loans (Iguiniz, 1998 pp.3 1-3 2 ) .
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Ownership of banks was almost entirely privatised, and while this move 
and other reforms helped prevent a banking crisis, It did not result in any marked 
diversification in institutions or instruments.71 Furthermore, the privatisation and 
liberalisation of the banking system, along with the closure of state-run sectoral 
banks, led to a greater concentration of financial services among (especially 
richer) urban areas, directed at the top decile of earners. For the majority of 
Peruvians, credit facilities remained out of reach and schemes run by NGOs to 
attempt to compensate for this remained limited in coverage (ibid. p201).
There was also a full liberalisation of capital flows abroad, the free 
opening of bank accounts in the country by national and foreign agents, as well 
as accounts abroad by Peruvian nationals, and the free holding of accounts in 
foreign currency. Exporters and importers no longer had to notify the Central 
Bank of currency movements, and movements in the Stock Exchange were 
liberalised (ibid. p73). It was hoped that from these and other reforms that 
financial markets would become freer and more efficient, and growth would 
ensue. Part of that hope was to promote foreign investment and domestic 
savings (ibid. p74). However, while foreign investment grew, savings fell: 
between 1993-1997 savings were an average of 23% of GNP, while in 1999 they 
were 18.3%, and in 2000 17.7%. This, according to Francke, stops the 
generation of autonomous, sustainable growth (2001 p ll) .  Furthermore most 
savings were in effect forced savings, as Peruvians were not allowed to cash 
their CIS (Compensación Temporal de Semc/o/Time of Service Compensation)72 
or privatised pensions until retirement (Gonzales, 1998 p52).
All subsidies, and many tax breaks to industry and agriculture were 
removed. Instead, the government concentrated on lowering tax levels while 
widening the base of tax contributors, and modernising collection procedures 
(Pascó-Font and Saavedra, 2001 pp.64-65). IGV (.Impuesto General a la
71 The privatisation of banks tended to promote concentration, and between 1990 and 1993 the 
number of banks fell from 23 to 17  (Iguiñiz, 1998 p31).
72 This is a form of unemployment benefit, consisting of one salary per year paid in by the 
employer to a special bank account in the employee’s name.
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l/<?flte/General Sales Tax) rates were raised, collection Increased, and a series of 
exonerations and special regimes in that tax were removed. There was an 
attempt also to incorporate the informal sector into the tax base. Tax bands were 
simplified: businesses and high earners paid 30%, and low earners 15% (ibid. 
p66). The policy apparently paid off as collection went up from 7% at the end of 
the 1980s to 14% in 1997, and contributors went up from 558,570 in 1993 to
1,877,858 in Dec 1997 (ibid.).
However, tax coverage remains low as sectors where investment is 
encouraged, such as privatised companies, enjoy many tax breaks.73 Francke 
maintains that this discriminates against industry and small and medium 
businesses, and against workers who, in 2000, paid more than businesses in tax. 
In sum, employment-creating businesses have had their growth limited and state 
funds for public spending have been reduced (2001 pl2). Iguiniz points out too 
that, while the numbers of registered taxpayers increased, the numbers who 
actually pay remain small.74 Tax take remains low in comparison with other 
countries in the region and globally, and there Is a greater reliance on sales tax 
and foreign trade for tax income.75 "The forms of income which are least stable 
in developed countries are precisely those which are the most important in Peru" 
(1998 p38).
The implementation of reforms allowed Peru to re-enter the international 
financial community and restructure its international debt. Deals with the Paris 
Club (1992/1996) and the Brady Deal (1997), brought greater financial stability 
to the economy as its risk indicator dropped and foreign financial investment felt
73 Such as the elimination of export taxes, paying only half of income tax (15% ), and stability 
agreements, which prevent these exemptions being removed or new taxes being placed on them, 
Furthermore, the financial sector does not pay IGV on interest and the Stock Market profits are 
not subject to any tax at all. There is no tax on personal inheritance and people on high income 
are taxed at 30% , half of what it was previously.
74 For example in 1997, there were 1,637,000 registered taxpayers, or 20%  of the labour force, 
but only 8%  of the labour force, or 448,500 taxpayers, actually paid tax.
75 Income tax in Peru in 1994 generated 20%  of total revenue, as opposed to 32.5%  in Latin 
America and 33.9%  in OECD countries. Sales tax and selective consumption tax raised 65.3%  of 
tax income in the same year and foreign trade accounted for 12 .3%  of tax income as opposed to 
an OECD figure of 0.89% (Iguiniz 1998 pp.37-38).
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more secure. However, debt went up, from US$19,996 million in 1990 to 
US$28,279 million in 1997, and average repayments were high at US$1,841 
million per annum, or a quarter of exports, from 1997 onwards (Gonzales, 1998 
pp.77-78). "[G]rowth therefore depends almost exclusively on private 
investment, above all on foreign investment...as public investment will be 
relatively reduced due to the compromise of reducing the external debt" (ibid. 
p87). Furthermore, Iguiniz (1998) maintains that the government couldn't cut 
debt repayments because of its dependence on international credit and the good 
will of the IFIs, "...[t]he rigidity with regard to debt payment was thus structural" 
(1998 p38). The only adjustment options open, therefore, are to decrease capital 
spending, increase direct taxation and/or reduce taxes on foreign trade (ibid. 
P38).
b) Production
The measures implemented in the production structure created a State 
dedicated to the encouragement of the market, rather than State protagonism in 
the economic system. These new tendencies were institutionalised in the 
Constitution of 1993, which defined the State as subsidiary to the private sector 
and as a promoter of private initiative. This change in the role of the State was 
achieved through three processes: privatisation of public companies; the 
development of an institutional framework of regulation and the promotion of 
free competition (Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 2001 p85).
The privatisation process in Peru was put in place by February 1992, 
through various decree laws. Public companies were sold off to the value of 
US$8,917.1 million by 1999, with projected investment of US$7,203 million 
(Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 2001 pp.90-91).76 Furthermore private companies 
were increasingly involved in electricity and water provision and distribution, 
either through ownership of companies or through contracts. As the State
76 By 1997 private capital flow into Peru represented 5 .1%  of GNP, 1%  below the regional 
average (Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 2001 pp.90-91).
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withdrew from production, it began to institute a number of regulatory agencies 
for the newly privatised or semi-privatised services.77
From the initial measures in the Fujishock of 1990, tariffs had reached an 
average level of 13% by 1997. As a result, imports of consumer goods increased 
fivefold from US$338.3 million in 1990 to US$1.85 billion in 1996, an annual rate 
of increase of 27.4% -  well above the average Increase in the growth of 
domestic production (Abugattas, 1998 p65). Most restrictions on exports were 
removed and an agency was set up to promote them (Prompex) in 1996; 
however, the results of these efforts were modest (Pascó-Font and Saavedra, 
2001 p82).
A flexibilisation of the job market was implemented, with a reduction in 
personnel in the public sector, which was further reduced by privatisation, 
deregulation of the minimum wage, and wages being linked to productivity. 
Availability of temporary contracts was increased, their variety widened, and, 
after 1995, costs of inscription were reduced to zero. Businesses were allowed to 
hire young adults (under 26) as 'apprentices' with lower rates of pay. The 
Constitution of 1993 abolished labour security completely, replacing it with 
protection norms against unjustified dismissal for salaried workers and 
compensation was reduced. Dismissal procedures for 'just cause' were simplified 
and reduced (Pascó-Font and Saavedra, 2001 pp. 100-101). Restrictions on union 
activity were introduced which, along with increased use of temporary contracts, 
led the numbers in unions to reduce even further from their already declining 
levels.78
77 Some to the best known of these regulatory services are: INDECOPI (Instituto Nacional de 
Defensa de la Competencia y de ia Proteción de la Propiedad Intelectual¡N&\om\ Institute for the 
Defence of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property), OSIPTEL (Organismo 
Supervisor de la Inversión Privada en TelecomunicacioneslSupewisovy Organism of Private 
Investment in Telecommunications), with sister organisations in Energy (OSINERG) (which was 
complimented by the energy price regulator CTE - Comisión de Tarifas £/átfr/cas/Electricity 
Pricing Commission), Transport (OSITRAN), and the SBS (Superintendencia de Banca y 
Seguras/Su peri ntendency for Banking and Insurance).
78 Such as allowing more than one union to organise in each workplace, changing wage 
bargaining from sectoral to company based bargaining, and removing the right to strike pay. The 
percentage of private sector salaried employees who worked in businesses with union
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All sectoral development banks such as the Agriculture, Mining, and 
Industrial banks were liquidated and the banking system was almost totally 
privatised. Indeed, in effect there was no sectoral support policy, as the 1996 
budget dedicated only 0.69% of GNP in total to the ministries of Agriculture, 
Fishing, Energy and Mines and Industry representing 45% of GNP. This was 
barely 5.8% of the total of public spending and indeed Industry alone received 
only 0.06% of GNP (Gonzales, 1998 p67). In agriculture a market in land was 
encouraged and restrictions on land ownership were removed.
These measures had a number of effects on Industry, agriculture, services 
and employment. National products became more expensive than imports due to 
tariff reductions, domestic prices rises, raised production costs, and a tighter 
domestic market due to reduced family resources (Abugattas, 1998 p65). 
Production did increase to levels above the late 1980s, but by the end of the 
decade there was little variation in the participation of industry in the economy, 
as it went from 15.6% of GNP in 1990 to 14.9% in 2000 (Pasco-Font and 
Saavedra, 2001 pl20). While this stagnation did reflect historical trends, and 
whilst Industry retained its share of GNP, it cannot be said that the reforms led to 
a revival of industry in Peru.
Indeed, Abugattas points out that manufacturing passed to having a 
subsidiary role in the economy, dependent on the performance of other sectors 
such as construction, fishing, non-tradables and the production of primary goods. 
Industries such as electric appliances, radios and televisions, fertilisers and crop 
sprays disappeared, for example, as construction, food, textile and knitwear 
industries grew (1998 pp.76-77).79 Furthermore, there was a tendency towards 
mergers and acquisitions, with 100 of these between 1993 and 1997. FDI 
increased, but often towards existing firms rather than new projects, and
representation went from 30%  in 1987 to 6%  in 1997. In the public sector it declined from 75%  
in 1990 to 34%  in 1997. Underemployment and attacks on trade unionists by both Sendero 
Luminoso and the security forces further discouraged trade union membership (Pasco-Font and 
Saavedra, 2001 pl03).
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industry received little of it.80 Therefore, in sum, while Pasco-Font and Saavedra 
can rightly insist that manufacturing's share of the economy remained constant, 
the nature and much of the ownership of industry had changed to one based 
increasingly on primary products, and increasingly owned by foreigners.
In agriculture, government land reforms sought to open up the market in 
land in order that it could provide guarantees for credit. However, there was little 
movement in the land market, due to structural difficulties such as the lack of 
land titles for many owners, a lack of credit from private banks, and cheaper 
imports (Gonzales, 1998 p54). There were some notable successes In agricultural 
production and exports, such as in asparagus or mangoes, but by and large 
agriculture remained stagnant during this period (Pasco Font and Saavedra, 2001 
p83).
Privatisation policies led to great changes in the structure of ownership 
and cost of services. By the end of the 1990s much of what were once public 
services, namely telecommunications, water and electricity had been privatised 
or had strong private sector involvement. According to Pasco-Font and Saavedra 
(2001), privatised companies grew more rapidly, improved the quality of their 
services more, and extended their coverage more than State companies. 
Gonzales points out, however, that privatisation mostly benefited foreign capital 
and the government. Mostly foreign firms bought up privatised companies, while 
the government kept the proceeds as a reserve fund. As Gonzales emphasises, 
"...[f]or the moment, privatisation is reduced to the privatisation of profits 
without a corresponding rise in social benefits" (1998 p57). While the poorest did 
gain through privatisation in terms of access to services, those who already had
79 While the industrial sector grew as a whole by an average of 5%  between 1990 and 1997, 
growth was more notable in the food processing industry at 6.4%  (Abugattas, 1998 pp.76-77).
80 FDI was mostly in the areas of petroleum, fats and oils, and confectionery, which took up 
almost half of all FDI in this period, most of that being through acquisitions.
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these services found themselves losing due to higher tariffs81 (Pascó-Font and 
Saavedra, 2000 p208).
Employment in Peru during the Fujimori years was characterised 
principally by underemployment, casuallsation and informalisation of the 
workforce, lower pay and more precarious conditions for the bulk of Peruvian 
workers. Unemployment and underemployment increased slightly, with the latter 
affecting around three-quarters of the workforce.82 Temporary contract work 
doubled during the decade, as formal employment decreased to over half the 
EAP.83 Strikes declined, as there was a notable movement of resources from 
workers to capital.84 Employment moved from larger manufacturing firms and 
agriculture to commerce, restaurants and hotels.85
In sum, as Gonzales puts it, there was "...a rise in independent workers, a 
reduction of public and industrial employment, and stagnation of rural 
employment...In general there Is a stagnation of salaries for the labour force, 
and a tendency to inequality of remuneration and a greater uncertainty in labour 
stability" (Gonzales 1998 p i 17). Pascó-Font and Saavedra seem to agree with 
this assessment (2001 pl33). However, while Gonzalez insists that this situation 
has resulted in Peruvians not trusting the neoliberal model (op. cit.), Pascó-Font
81 Services such as telephones, electricity, and gas went from a public to a private monopoly, 
leading to substantial price increases. Prices increased in electricity from 100 in 1989 to 183.3%  
in 1996 and telephones from 100 to 200% for the same period (Gonzales, 1998 p57).
82 The average level of unemployment in Peru from 1992-2000 was 8.5%  compared with an 
average between 1986 and 19 9 1 of 6.6%  (Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 2001 pl38). 
Underemployment increased from 7 3 .1%  in 1990 to 76 .3%  in 1995 (Gonzales, 1998 pi 17)
83 In 1990 10.4%  of the 54.4%  of employees in formal private employment were temporary, but 
by 2000 24.3%  were temporary out of the 45.5%  of the workforce in such employment (Pasco- 
Font and Saavedra, 2001 p l73)
84 Strikes decreased from 11.6 %  of total man-hours in 1990 to 8.9% in 1995. In 1989/1990 
profits were 64.6% of national income and pay 34.4%  but by 1996 profits increased to 77.8%  
while pay fell to 2 1 .2 %  (Gonzales, 1998 p ll3 ) . Furthermore between 1990 and 1996 the 
minimum wage was reduced by 30% .
85 Between 1990 and 1995 employment in larger manufacturing firms fell by 26% , losing around
25,000 jobs in 248 firms, contributing to the rise of underemployment (Abugattas, 1998 p71). 
Employment growth instead was in commerce, restaurants and hotels (Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 
2001 pl50), while employment in agriculture fell by 10 %  (ibid. pl54). Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 
however, state that falls in industrial production and employment reflect historical tendencies 
rather than being a direct result of the Fujimori economic model, an opinion supported by 
Abugattas (op. cit.).
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and Saavedra maintain that it is not the model that is at fault, but the application 
of the model (op. cit.). Francke, however, has no doubt where the blame lies: 
"Neoliberal economic policy has not managed to generate employment or 
incomes at the necessary rhythm to significantly reduce income poverty in 
Peru..." (2001 p25). The constant state of agitation amongst workers and 
ordinary citizens during the presidency of President Alejandro Toledo (2001- 
present) would tend to support Gonzales' view. Furthermore it Is particular 
aspects of the model that have generated much of this protest, in particular the 
attempted privatisations of some utility companies, such as electricity companies, 
and large enterprises such as the state oil company, Petroperu.86
3.4.3 Social
The Fujimori government's response to welfare security was shaped by a 
number of centralised state agencies set up specifically to tackle poverty. In
1991 the Fujimori government established FONCODES (Fondo Nacional de 
Compensación y Desarrollo 5oc/5//National Fund for Compensation and Social 
Development) an autonomous organism of the Presidency of the Republic. Its 
aim was to respond to extreme poverty through social support programmes, 
infrastructure and productive development. In 1992, the government reactivated 
the Ministry of the Presidency (MIPRE) with the aims of providing direct 
assistance to the poor, social infrastructure and economic infrastructure.87 MIPRE 
came to control 25-35% of the total government budget; yet, while spending 
increased substantially, it still remained relatively low at US$13 for every poor 
person between 1991 and 1995 (Gonzales, 1998 p62).
86 See Carrasco, 2002 for details of nature and cause of protests in the first year of Toledo's 
government.
87 MIPRE also controlled local regional administrative units CTARs (Comités Transitorios de 
Administración /?eçràra//Regional Transitory Administrative Committees), and other important 
programmes such as PRONAA (Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentari'a/Nation^  Programme 
of Food Assistance) (1992).
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The focalised nature of these programmes allowed the President high 
levels of discretion in prioritising spending over established ministries. Targeted 
populations were based on identified geographic areas with low levels of 
nutrition, education and access to basic services. These groups proposed 
projects and monitored them through participative structures. As a result, 
through these programmes, direct links were made between these populations 
and the president himself.
Most social programmes were directed at improvements in three areas: 
education, health and housing, and sanitation. In total, programmes In these 
areas took up around one-third of total public spending in 1996. Education 
absorbed 50% of this spending (3.4% of GNP), health 25% (1.6%) and the rest 
through the presidential programmes (Gonzales, 1998 p62)88.
Francke (2001) assessed the governments' performance in the three areas 
in the following way. While there were improvements in education in terms of 
quantity, with large numbers of new schools built, there remained problems of 
quality. Teachers remained poorly paid, with materials of poor quality, despite 
some teaching training programmes and new materials being provided. 
Attendance was generally high, but this masked severe problems of desertion 
and repetition.89
Again in health there was a quantity/quality dichotomy. There were 
increases and improvement in infrastructure, equipment, personnel, and 
medicines as well as efforts at community participation. There were some 
successes in the lowering of the expansion of primary health coverage, infant 
mortality and maternal mortality. Nonetheless Indices in these areas remained 
amongst the highest in the region, and access to health services remained
08 While these figures were historically high, similar amounts were spent on defence (2.9% ) and 
the paying of the international debt (2.0%) (Gonzales, 1998 p62). Furthermore, social spending 
remained low in regional terms as in 1997 it stood at 6 .3%  of GNP, as opposed to the Latin 
American average of 12 .4 %  (Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 2001 p ill) .
89 Almost 90% of those between 6 and 15  years attended school and 85.9%  of those between 12  
and 16 years by 1999. However, 48%  of young people did not finish secondary school and 23%  
didn't finish primary (Francke, 2001 p5).
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unequal in terms of rural/urban and poor/rich cleavages, with the urban rich 
receiving the best services, and having the lowest Indices in health problems.90
The government made Important efforts to extend service infrastructure in 
the 1990s, with 90% coverage in urban areas of potable water, sewage, 
electricity, telecommunications, and road access (Francke, 2002). However, once 
again there are wide disparities of access between urban and rural areas. In 
electricity for example there was 95% urban access, but in rural areas 43% and 
only 6% amongst the rural poor. By 2000 58% of all rural homes had access to 
running water but only 13% had sewage disposal (Pasco-Font and Saavedra,
2001 p205).
Tanaka and Trivelli (2002) identify four serious deficiencies in the welfare 
programmes of the Fujimori government. First, they point out that they were 
always insufficient given the scale of poverty In Peru. Second, as these were 
'special' programmes they lacked co-ordination with the social ministries, often 
producing an overlapping of functions. Third, focalisation was concentrated In 
particular geographic areas, which were always insufficiently delineated, leaving 
plenty of room for cllentelistic practices.91 Finally, as the programmes were 
demand driven they ended up being dominated by the most organised and 
articulate sections of the poor to the detriment of non-organised groups which 
were usually poorer (p6).
While there were important advances in poverty eradication during the 
1990s, these were effectively insufficient to make a serious impact. Advances 
were made particularly in fighting extreme poverty, falling from 27% in 1991 to 
15% in 1997. However, these results were difficult to maintain, as indices began
90 Infant mortality was reduced between 1989 and 1997 from 55 per 1000 births to 44 per 1000. 
Between 1992 and 1996 the number of public health posts increased by 6 1%  and health centres 
almost by 100%  between 1990 and 2000 (Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 2001 pl92). However, Peru 
still has one of the highest infant mortality rates in the region, which is moreover distributed 
inequitably: infant mortality is 100 per 1000 births amongst the poorest Peruvians, and 20 per 
1000 amongst the richest. Furthermore nine out of ten of the poorest 20%  of Peruvians don't 
have health coverage. Such disparities are most notable between urban and rural areas (Francke 
(2001 pp.6-8).
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to rise again after 1997 when spending on them was reduced. This put into 
doubt the long-term sustainability of the programmes (Pasco-Font and Saavedra,
2001 pl80). The level of poverty in 2000 still remained higher than that of 1985, 
and at the end of the 1990s, poverty levels were close to those of the beginning 
of the decade. Furthermore, while the Fujimori years saw a reduction in the GINI 
co-efficient, from 0.509 in 1991 to 0.423 in 2000, this, however, meant an 
"equalisation from below", meaning that those with lower incomes lost 
proportionally less buying power than those with relatively greater income. In 
other words, in reality, there was a "generalised impoverishment of the 
population as the inferior limit [of income] was at survival level" (Gamero, 2002 
pp.257-258).
3.4.4 Cultural
How did these changes affect Peruvian society culturally? To what extent 
did notions of competitiveness and privatism enter into the Peruvian cultural 
mainstream. This section will look specifically at areas in what Strange (1996) 
refers to as the knowledge structure - specifically information management, 
education and the media.
Throughout the reform process in Peru we see a gradual replacement of 
functions dominated previously by the state passing into the hands of the 
market. The financial sector passed almost entirely into the private sector and 
many previous state preserves, such as pensions, were opened up to the market. 
Furthermore, much of the day to day financial decisions previously made by the 
state, were precluded from the state by the Constitution, or effectively vetoed by 
agreements with the International Financial Institutions or the TNCs. Power 
passed from the State to the private sector in the production structure, with 
much of that power passing to foreign companies through privatisation, including 
key sectors such as telecommunications, mining, and transport. In the social
91 Indeed Schady (1999) shows how spending on social programmes rose according to the
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sphere power was concentrated into the hands of the President, international 
organisations, and NGOs.
A net result of these changes is a weakening of internal institutions 
normally responsible for the running of the State. Thus Francke points out that 
state institutions went from an already weak existing institutionality, to a 
situation where ministries become very weak entities in the face of the power of 
the executive and specialised agencies, such as FONCODES. A result of this was 
a centralisation of power in the executive, with a lack of alternative sources of 
information to analyse the performance of organisms. Information flowed with 
difficulty, and Congress, the political parties and civil society did little to evaluate 
performance and provide information. Indeed, he continues, those entities which 
managed the best information were those areas financed by international 
organisms, opening questions on the influence of these organisms in the 
definition of internal policies (2001 pp.20-21).
With the passing of knowledge sources and control away from the State 
and towards the private sector, there was little compensatory effort on the part 
of the government to encourage alternative knowledge bases or sources. 
Investment In education remained primarily infrastructural, with little effort 
placed on quality. The most successful universities were private, rather than 
state-funded, and there was increased privatisation of education. The media 
favoured government policy due to a combination of bribes, intimidation, and 
willing collusion on behalf of media businessmen (see Chapter 5). There was a 
concentration of capital in the hands of foreigners, particularly in finance, mining 
and telecommunication, leaving little of the knowledge structure of the most 
profitable sectors of the economy in national hands. Even when national capital 
had a controlling influence in some economic area, it was usually in the hands of 
large national capital whose interests were often similar to those of large foreign 
capital. The government by and large followed a policy of closed policymaking 
where it acted first and discussed later, and then for only brief periods.
electoral cycle and in key electoral areas.
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Gonzales points out that the State had been reorganised to achieve two 
objectives: facilitate and complement the economic policies in course and assure 
the control of the state apparatus and the government for president Fujimori and 
his political project (1998 p88). Both these objectives were beyond negotiation, 
and both were effectively codified into the Constitution. As a result Peruvian 
society faced what Schirato and Webb identify as "foreclosure", that is "...a 
process whereby certain feelings, desires, ideas, and positions are both 
unthinkable with regard to, and simultaneously constitutive of, identity" (2003 
p216). With a lack of structures and outlets for the formation of alternative 
proposals to neoliberal reform, and with an establishment and media consensus 
in favour of that reform, backed up by the supreme law of the land, debate on 
alternatives was in a manner 'foreclosed' before it could even begin. There was 
little opportunity for constructive debate on the viability of the reforms, except 
within the context of neoliberal reform itself. Alternative socialist or even social- 
democratic visions were relegated to minority participation in debate. As such 
the knowledge structure was confined within, and controlled by, neoliberal 
ideology, and mostly privatised ownership, and this despite the fact that notable 
public unease existed with many of the reforms, particularly privatisation, as 
evidenced by the near rejection by the electorate of the 1993 Constitution. With 
a firm consensus in place regarding the 'naturalness' of neoliberalism, and with a 
policy emphasis on competition as the sole manner in which distribution can take 
place, there was little room for debate on alternatives. In this way government 
and the economic elite attempted to inculcate values of privatism and 
competition into the social fabric of Peruvian life. Nevertheless, the lack of 
economic advancement of the majorities in the short to medium term, and the 
continued cultural estrangement of large groups within Peruvian national life, 
particularly the indigenous population continued to block this process, and most 
Peruvians still looked to the State and the community to find solutions to their 
economic precariousness.
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3.4.5 Conclusion
The Fujimori government implanted a neoliberal model In Peru primarily 
through the actions of the State. Thus the State was the main instrument in the 
realisation of its own removal from economic protagonism in Peru and its 
replacement by the market. Furthermore, it was principally through the office of 
the President that this transformation was executed, as the President repeatedly 
used decree powers to enact legislation, not to mention the use of a coup to 
eradicate opposition to his neoliberal programme.
In every sphere the balance between State and markets was altered in 
favour of the latter. In the economic sphere banks were privatised, the currency 
tied to the dollar, financial markets entirely liberalised, and subsidies and tariffs 
removed or reduced considerably. Tax regimes were simplified in favour of 
higher earners and privatised enterprises, and collection procedures made more 
efficient. Peru Inserted itself fully into international financial structures by a 
renegotiation of the external debt favouring creditors with increased repayments, 
which were rigorously adhered to. Privatisation ensured the passing of key 
services and industries into private, often foreign, hands. The State was 
relegated constitutionally to the role of regulator and promoter of private 
business activity, and prohibited from acting as capitalist investor in the 
economy. State employment was reduced, as was the role of the State in the 
regulation of the employment market. In the social sphere, the State pursued a 
policy of poverty relief, increasing social spending. However, the private sector 
and not for profit sector was given a stronger role in welfare, health and 
education provision. All these measures ensured that larger parts of the 
knowledge structure passed into private hands and/or remained centralised in 
the executive and with international agencies. The media provided consensus 
opinions on the benefits of the markets which did not seriously question the new 
orthodoxy, and education was also increasingly privatised. In this way, culturally 
Peruvians were being trained to accept the primacy of the market as the 'natural' 
order of things.
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In sum, all three spheres passed in large part into the control of the 
market, in alliance with the central executive and IFIs. Thus the State's role was 
considerably reduced but remained important as the principal interlocutor 
between the local economy and the demands of the International economy. 
Furthermore, the State was Increasingly identified with President Fujimori, who 
ruled with ample national autonomy, in league with IFIs and TNCs. Fujimori's 
room for manoeuvre to distribute goods was limited, therefore, to welfare 
programmes, making his presidency essentially assistentiallst and clientelistic. 
Furthermore, these programmes were controlled primarily by the markets and 
IFIs, as most of the revenue paying for them came from privatisation receipts 
and international credits.
3.5 Globalisation processes and populist distributivism  in Chavez's 
Venezuela
3.5.1 The Chavez programme
When Chavez came to power, after five years of government under ex-
COPEI patriarch, Rafael Caldera, Venezuelans were worse off than ever. Poverty
had Increased, land remained in the hands of a tiny minority, and unemployment
and underemployment had increased, with almost half the EAP in the informal
sector.92 Inflation remained high, minimum salaries did not cover basic needs,
and per capita income had fallen dramatically.93
The Caldera government also had left a legacy of some timid neoliberal
reform. It implemented some privatisations, in the banking, telecommunications,
92 In 1998, two-thirds of the population lived below the poverty line, half of these in extreme 
poverty. There was an extreme concentration of landownership, with 70% of agricultural land in 
the hands of just 3% of proprietors and the country was not self-sufficient in food production. 
Unemployment stood at 11% and an estimated 49%, or 4.3 million of the economically active 
population, was employed in the informal sector, where wages were on average 45% of the 
salaries of formal sector workers (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998).
93 Inflation stood at 99.9% in 1996 and at an average of 58% throughout the entire Caldera 
presidency (1993-1998) (Source BCV, 2004). In 1997, the minimum salary was Bs.75,000 while 
the value of the basic basket of goods was Bs. 168,778 (PNUD/OCEI, 2001 pl65). Per capita
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Steel and transport sector. It removed price and exchange controls In 1996, but 
then had to apply a banded system of exchange rate control on the bolívar (Bs.) 
in order to attempt to control capital flight brought on by a severe banking 
crisis.94 It removed pro-employee legislation, such as retroactive severance 
payments, and in the social security sector. It pursued a double strategy on oil, 
of high output and increased private foreign investment, the so-called apertura 
or opening, leaving oil prices at around US$10 a barrel In 1997-1998 
(Buxton, 2003).
Chávez saw the source of Venezuela's problems as political and not 
economic: "Inflation, hunger, insecurity, education, poverty, all that forms a 
problematic mass, the cause of which is...the exhaustion of the political model..." 
(Blanco Muñoz, 1998 p625). The answer, therefore, was to be found first in the 
implementation of profound political change, through a Constituent Assembly 
(Constituyente), and then through the restoration of an interventionist State 
working alongside the market; that is, to paraphrase Adam Smith, the visible 
hand of the state and the invisible hand of the market.
The Bolivarian economic model is, according to Chávez, "...humanist, self- 
managing, and competitive". Humanist first, because the human being would be 
central to policy, while the State "...regulates, stimulates, and promotes the 
economic process", and the market fulfil Is "the laws of supply and demand, [but 
is] not...monopolised or oligopolised" (ibid. p612). In this way, Chávez declares, 
the Bolivarian economic model is closer to the Third Way model of Tony Blair, or 
Bill Clinton, than a socialist or capitalist state (Ibid. pl9).
Second, the Bolivarian project envisages an economy which is self- 
managing, that is that it Is a democratised economy, with alternative 
organisational forms flourishing, such as co-operatives and other types of
income stood in 1997 at US$2885, as opposed to US$4910 in 1993, the year before Caldera 
came to power (ibid. p92).
94 Forty-one per-cent of Venezuelan banks had passed into foreign hands by 1997, the State 
telecommunications company CANTV, the steel industry, and VIASA the State airline (which has 
since disappeared) were all privatised.
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association. Finally, it is to be a competitive economy, insofar as it can reach 
high levels of productivity and so compete with foreign products. As Rodriguez 
summarises it, the Bolilvarian economic system is one "...in which there would be 
an active intervention of the State, co-existing with the forces of the market, 
within which there is an important place for non-traditional forms of economic 
association such as co-operatives, and which is capable of achieving a high level 
of competitivness and productivity" (2003 p6).
Rodriguez stresses that It is not, as many in the Opposition contend, a 
Marxist proposal, despite much of the leftist discourse and symbolism of Chávez 
and others in the Poio Patriótico. Rather it is "...a quite general and not very new 
general proposal" (ibid.), which "distances itself from the traditional economic 
proposals of the extreme left" (ibid. p7).
3.5.2 Main Phases
Following Wilpert (2003), there are four phases in the Chávez
government's economic and social policy strategy:
1. 1999: a period of severe economic recession, constitutional reform, and 
natural disaster.95 The government followed a policy of relative continuity 
with the previous government's economic policies, and introduced little by 
way of social policies other than the short-term Plan Bolivar 2000;
2. 2000-2001: a relatively successful period, in which the Chávez government 
consolidated its political power and began implementing its long- and 
medium-term social and economic programmes, and in which the benevolent 
effects of its oil policy were beginning to be felt;
3. December 2001-May 2003: the most difficult phase, in which the government 
had to cope with several employer-led general strikes, a coup attempt, and 
the shutdown of the country's all-important oil industry. During this phase,
95 The Vargas disaster occurred that year, when heavy rains caused massive mudslides in the 
overpopulated coastal area of Vargas north of Caracas. Over ten thousand people were killed and
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unemployment and inflation increased, causing a rise In poverty and 
reversing many of the gains made in the previous period; and
4. Beginning May 2003: when the country's oil industry recovered from the 
strike and the opposition began focusing on political rather than economic or 
military strategies for ousting the president. During this phase the 
government once again had more resources, especially given the relatively 
high price of oil, to implement short-term anti-poverty measures and to 
refocus on its medium term strategies, placing particular emphasis on land 
reform and higher education.
The following four sections will assess the gains and losses made during these 
four phases in the finance, production, security and knowledge structures.
3.5.3 Finance
On gaining power in 1998, Chavez sent a strong signal of continuity to the 
international financial community by retaining in the Finance portfolio Caldera's 
Minister, Maritza Izaguirre. As a result there was little change in finance 
management. The currency exchange arrangements were maintained, even as 
public spending was increased. In the new Constitution of 1999 there was no 
great change in fiscal policy regulations, which Kelly (2000) affirms remained 
consistent with the capitalist principles of the 1961 Constitution.96 Indeed, she 
concludes that while there is a strong emphasis on social rights and entitlements 
(see 'Security' below), the Constitution also includes Important orthodox 
economic principles "...that could even signal a shift somewhat to the right" 
(2000, no page no.).97
over a hundred thousand were made homeless, with nearly US$4 billion in estimated property 
damage (Wilpert, 2004, no page no.).
96 The Central Bank, for example, remains independent and rules are included to ensure fiscal 
responsibility and monetary control.
97 Article 299, for example, established the socio-economic system of Venezuela as based on 
"...social justice, démocratisation, efficiency, free competition, protection of the environment, 
productivity and solidarity". Article 311, insists that ordinary income must cover ordinary
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No great changes were announced in taxation policy, although the 
government did pursue a policy of modernisation of the tax-collecting agency, 
the SENIAT, with the hope of increasing tax income. Total tax revenue went up 
from almost Bs.7 billion in 2000 to almost Bs.ll billion In 2002, and down again 
to Bs.7,320 billion In 2003, due mostly to the strike/lockout of December and 
January 2002/2003 (Seniat, 2003). Some of the initial rise can be attributed to 
the re-introduction of the Banking Debit Tax (Impuesto Debito Bancario [IDB]) in
2002, a tax of 0.5% on financial transactions, which collected over Bs.l billion in
2003. Furthermore there is a pronounced reliance on sales taxes (16% rate) at 
61.6% of non-oil internal revenue in June 2004 (Seniat, 2004). However, there 
does not seem to have been an improvement in overall tax take as a percentage 
of GNP. In 1998, the last year of the Caldera government, tax take was 11.6% of 
GNP, and in 2001 11.1%. Furthermore, non-oil tax revenue decreased slightly 
from 10.4% In 1998, to 8.6% in 2001 (Ministerio de Finanzas, 1998/2001). 
Moreover, the non-oil sector tax contribution remains below the Latin American 
average of 18.5% (1999-2003) (Rodriguez, 2003 p30).
The government took a number of steps to ensure greater state control of 
oil revenue. First, it pursued a policy of renewed co-ordination with other OPEC 
countries, and large non-OPEC oil producers such as Mexico and Russia, to 
establish production quotas. The purpose of this policy was to maintain stable 
prices and thus stable revenue from oil. Oil prices remained around the US$30 
per barrel rate in the first semester of 2004, and earnings for the same period 
stood at US$13 billion (Minsterio de Finanzas, 2004 p2).98 The Constitution 
ensures that PDVSA remains in state hands, but does leave the door open for 
private sector involvement in its filial companies or strategic associates 
(Constitución Bolivariana, 1999, Article 303). The Organic Law of Hydrocarbons
2001 increased royalty rates, but lowered taxes, as well as ensuring greater
spending. Article 318 establishes Central Bank autonomy and 319 the norms that it must adhere 
to (Constitución Bolivariana, 1999).
98 The peak year of the Chávez presidency was 2000 when oil income reached US$29.3 billion 
(Mommer, 2003 pl40).
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control by the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) and more transparency in its 
accounting methods." Non-tax income from oil rose from 4.3% in 1998 to 6.7% 
of GNP in 2001 (Ministerio de Finanzas, 1998/2001), however, per capita oil 
revenue remains as low as that of the 1950s (Rodriguez, 2003 p28).
The Increased revenue helped finance increased social spending, rising 
from 36% to 39.3% of the national budget in the period 1999-2003 (see 
'Security'). The Chavez government, however, scrupulously maintained debt 
repayments and indeed increased them from 18.6% of total spending in 1993-
1998 to 22.0% in the period 1999-2003 (Rodriguez, 2003 Table 6, pp. 16-18). 
External debt has remained relatively constant throughout the Chavez 
presidency: In 1999 it stood at US$22,820 millions, rising to US$24,191 millions 
in 2003 (Ministerio de Finanzas, 2004). Average debt repayments 1999-2003 
were approximately US$3,480 million per year (own calculations based on BCV, 
2004). This policy is, however, in keeping with the government's intention to 
maintain Venezuelan sovereignty in economic decision-making, by removing 
cause for the International financial community to involve Itself In Venezuelan 
affairs. Venezuela has insistently rejected interference from the IMF for example, 
and Is one of the few Latin American countries which is free from IMF loans.100
Wide variations can be found in the main macroecnomic indicators, yet 
the government strived to keep these within internationally accepted limits, 
despite Opposition activity affecting them (See Pandaya and Podur, 2003). 
International reserves were maintained at reasonably high levels, except during
99 The minimum royalty rate was set at 30% for oil, tax rates were lowered from 59% to 50% for 
conventional crude and for extra-heavy oils to 32%. Transferring profits to PDVSA's overseas 
operations, as a ploy to evade revenue submission to the state, was standard practice up until 
then (ibid. pl43).
100 Wilpert (2004a). The article quotes Finance minister Tobias Nobrega, responding to IMF 
growth predictions for 2004: "Venezuela is overcoming its financial difficulties independently of 
the IMF and it is doing this by applying the opposite of what is recommended by the well-known 
but limited IMF recipes." Indeed the feeling was mutual: the IMF was one of the first 
organisations to welcome the coup-installed government of Pedro Carmona Estanga (See Union 
Radio, Friday, 12 April 2002 'FMI ofrece colaboración a nuevo gobierno venezolano).
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the coup and strikes of 2002, when they reached historic lows.101 The Bolivar 
was devalued from Bs.650/US$l In the first trimester of 2000 to Bs.l,920/US$l 
in the first trimester of 2004, when currency controls were put in place to stem 
capital flight (BCV, 2004). Country risk also oscillated according to the political 
situation, reaching a high of 1406 base points in February 2003, just after the 
strike, to be reduced to 596 on 22 December 2003, thus reducing Interest rates 
on new loans taken out by the state (Rivas, 2004). Inflation between 1999 and 
2003 was on average 20.8%, with a high of 31.2% in 2002, and a low of 12.3% 
In 2001 (op. cit.).102 Indicators then were at their worst when opposition activity 
was at its most seditious.
Finally, the government took steps to 'democratise' credit availability, by 
opening a variety of popular credit agencies, such as the People's Bank (Banco 
del Pueblo), providing small loans for small and medium size businesses, and the 
Women's Bank (Banco de la Mujer) providing a similar function, but this time 
exclusively for women. Between 2001 and 2003, The Women's Bank and the 
People's Bank gave out 70,000 micro-credits between them (Wilpert, 2003). 
However, there Is little evaluation of the effectiveness of these schemes, and 
some evidence of high default levels.103 An article in the Law of the 
Intergovernmental Decentralization Fund (FIDES), assigns at least 20% of the 
annual resources allotted to States and Municipalities to the financing of projects 
presented by organised communities, neighbourhood associations and NGOs 
(Gable, 2004). The government also discussed with private banks means to 
increase credit availability to small and medium businesses.
101 Reserves stood at US$14,849 million in 1998, the year before Chavez came to power, and 
fluctuated from a low of US$9,823 million in February 2002, reflecting a period of intense political 
activity which culminated in the April 2002 coup, to a high of US$23,453 million in May 2004, the 
latter figure primarily due to the currency controls implemented shortly after the ending of the 
strike/lockout of 2002/3, to stem capital flight (BCV, 2004).
102 Own calculation based on figures for Metropolitan area of Caracas, 1999-2003.
103 One report estimates bad debt in all the different government social banks to be in the region 
of 37% of all loans (O'Donoghue, 2004).
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3.5.4 Production
As previously stated, In the Initial years of the Chávez government there 
was little change to the basic production apparatus, other than In the oil 
industry, as the government set about implementing profound political change. 
The Constitution of 1999, the result of that process, has a number of important 
sections on production, some outlining the parameters of legislation on issues 
such as employment and social security rights, while others attempt to define the 
limits of the private and public spheres.
Chapter V of the Constitution outlines much of Venezuelans social and 
family rights. In particular, Articles 89 to 97 deal with workers rights, 
guaranteeing existing rights (Article 89) restricting the working day to a 
maximum of eight hours and the working week to 44 hours (Article 90), 
guaranteeing the worker a "...sufficient salary which will allow him or her to live 
with dignity" (Article 91) and the right to social provisions based on time served, 
overturning the removal of that right by the Caldera government (Article 92). Job 
security, protection against unfair dismissal, and trade union rights, including the 
right to strike, are also guaranteed (Article 93-97) (Constitución Bollvariana, 
1999).
Labour relations between the Chávez government and the main trade 
union confederation, the Confedración de Trabajadores de Venezuela, (CTV); 
however, have been tense, to say the least. The CTV, alongside the main 
business association, FEDECAMARAS, has been in the forefront of opposition 
campaigns to remove Chávez from office. Both these organisations led a series 
of work stopp.ages, most notably the 'Indefinite' strike of 8-11 April 2002, which 
culminated In a coup d'etat A further stoppage took place later that year lasting 
throughout December and into early February 2003, bringing the country's oil 
Industry to a virtual standstill (Pandaya and Podur, 2003). The confrontation 
between the CTV and the government, however, was not entirely surprising. The 
CTV had been declining as a potent force In Venezuelan politics due to many 
allegations of corruption, a patchy record in defending workers rights against
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various neoliberal attempts to curtail them, and declining trade union 
membership (See Ellner, 2003b). Chavez had repeatedly stressed the need to 
'democratise' the trade unions, as the Constitution required in Article 95, and 
eventually a referendum calling for such démocratisation was held in December
2000. While the government won the referendum, with a very low turnout 
(almost 77% abstention), the existing CTV leadership of Carlos Ortega as 
President and Manuel Cova as vicepresident won the subsequent elections, 
although under highly questioned circumstances (ibid. pl72).
Re-elected and revitalised the CTV leadership launched an all out 
campaign to discredit the government and remove it from office, in alliance with 
FEDECAMARAS, the media, opposition political parties, the Church, and an 
assortment of 'civil society' (I.e. middle and upper class) groupings. Whilst the 
CTV and its allies managed to mobilise substantial numbers of people to strike 
against the government, this was achieved through Intense media campaigns 
(see Chapter 4), the locking out of staff by company management, and 
promising to pay staff who went on strike -  promises that were not always 
upheld. Nor were these strikes unqualified successes: poorer areas of Caracas, 
informal workers, transport sectors, and electricity sectors, as well as many areas 
in the interior continued to work as normal. The strikes failed In their objective, 
specifically to remove Chavez from office, and indeed the government emerged 
from them revitalised while the opposition became exhausted and discredited. 
Nonetheless the economic impact of the strike was significant: almost US$8 
billion, US$3.661 million in the non-oil sector, or 3.77% of GDP, and US$2.865 
million in the oil sector was lost (Asamblea Nacional/OAEF, 2003 p3).
Meanwhile for the bulk of workers, employment, underemployment and 
pay remained at difficult levels, despite the protections afforded them by the 
Constitution. Between 1999 and 2001 unemployment hovered between 16% and 
10%, reaching by February 2003 20.7% of the economically active population 
(EAP), or 2,406,251 persons (553,515 more than in November 2002) before the 
general strike. By November 2003, unemployment had dropped again to 15.4%
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(Rivas, 2004). The proportion of workers in the informal sector remained for the 
most part over half of the working population: In 1999 52.4% of the EAP, and in 
2003 53% (Provea, 2003 pl22). To counteract this situation, the government 
announced eight different employment plans in its first four years of 
government, but with little effect on the figures (Ibid. pl23). In February 2004, 
the government Initiated the latest, Mission Vuelvan Caras, hoping to incorporate 
a million Venezuelans by July of that year Into training and reactivate idle 
business infrastructure to provide them with employment (MINCI, 2004).
Real growth in personal Income levels remained mostly negative.104 The 
minimum urban salary saw a steady and progressive rise from Bs. 120,000 in
1999 to Bs.296,525 in May 2004 (SISOV, 2004), and similarly real per capita 
income as a percentage of GNP, rose between 1999 and 2001 (1999: 
Bs.3,368,950; 2001: Bs.3,440,931), to fall substantially by end 2003 
(Bs.2,739,293) (Ibid.). However, the cost of the basic basket of food remained 
consistently above the minimum salary, and often above per capita income, 
standing at Bs.316,759 In May, 2004 (ibid.). Provea (2003) reports that 
according to official figures, on 31 August 2003 the minimum salary only covered 
80% of the basic food basket, and only 60% of the basic basket of goods. 
Private groups provided even more negative figures (pl25).
The Constitution has a number of articles that set out the type of 
productive system pertinent to Bolivarian Venezuela. These articles protect 
private property and activity, whilst forbidding monopolies and oligopolies and 
encouraging social-type business associations, such as small and medium sized 
businesses, cooperatives, family businesses, credit unions and other such 
economic units (Articles 112; 113; 115; 308). Article 113 allows the State to 
licence private contracts to exploit resources pertaining to the State. In Title VI, 
Chapter 1, the Constitution reserves the right of the State to use tariffs to protect
104 While in 2000 there was growth of 2.7% over the previous year, between the first trimesters 
of 2002 and 2003 pay levels fell by -20.6%, only to present a small rise again of 1.2% in the first 
trimesters of 2003 to 2004 (SISOV, 2004).
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national companies, and guarantees equal treatment for national and foreign 
capital. It places a duty on the State to ensure 'food sovereignty', giving 
protection and resources to national agriculture, and discouraging 'latifundismd 
or land concentration in favour of smaller productive units (Articles 305-307).
The government began to put some of these Constitutional duties into 
effect with the passing of 49 Enabling Laws (Presidential Decrees) In November
2001. These laws covered a wide range of areas but all were "...[¡Informed by 
the view that state intervention and redistributive measures were prerequisites 
for sustainable and equitable development" (Buxton, 2003 pl29). Chief among 
them, along with the Hydrocarbons Law mentioned above, was the Land Law, 
which set out to tackle the extreme concentration of land, and its under­
utilisation. Maximum hectarage was set at 5000, determined by the level of 
agricultural productivity. Proprietors who failed to utilise more than 80% of their 
land were to be subject to an inactivity tax and, in exceptional circumstances, 
land could be assumed by the State. A number of Institutions were set up to 
provide credit and technical support. The law also set out to redistribute land. A 
Fishing Law was also passed which allowed only traditional fishing near 
coastlines, and passed unclaimed coastal areas into state hands (ibid.). Although 
these laws were relatively modest In their aspirations, it was these three (and 
Education Decree 1011, requiring inspectors to review all schools, including 
private ones), which served to galvanise opposition leading to the April 2002 
coup and the December 2002 strike/lockout.
Under the Land Law, 1,171,925 hectares had been transferred up until the 
end of 2003, according to official sources, most of this from State-held land 
(Provea, 2003 p237).105 Another scheme, Plan Zamora, launched by President 
Chavez in February of 2003 benefited 17,000 farmers, and activated 21,000 new 
hectares of land by providing loans, tractors, ploughs and other farm machinery
105 The process however has not been without conflict, as much land deemed to be in public 
hands was claimed by private landholders. The result has been a number of court cases, and 
approximately 20 peasants murdered by unknown agents, presumed to be acting for landholders 
(Provea, 2003 p238).
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(Sánchez, 2004). Fondafa (Fondo de Desarrollo Agropecuario, Pesquero, Forestal 
y  Afínes) provided a total of Bs.332,817 million In loans to small farmers, 
peasants and cooperatives, between 1998 and 2003 (op. clt. p243). In mid 2004, 
Venezuela's Central Bank announced It would allocate US$900 million for 
agricultural loans through different financing instruments to private banks, while 
the Agriculture Minister agreed with local bankers to increase resources allocated 
for loans to help maintain and consolidate 1.6 million hectares of land currently 
In use. The government's plan Is to increase the number of hectares used to 2.8 
million In 2004 (op. cit.). Nonetheless these efforts have yet to bear fruit, as 
Provea reports that "...dependency on food imports has increased, whilst scarcity 
and price rises of food products are notorious" (2003 p77). In 2000, under 60% 
of national nutritional requirements were supplied by national agriculture (ibid. 
p75).
Private sector production has been severely affected by the political 
situation in Venezuela, especially considering that the major business 
organisation FEDECAMARAS and associate business groups, such as 
FEDECOMERCIO (representing major retailers) and to a lesser extent 
FEDEINDUSTRIA (representing national industrialists), were at the forefront of 
campaigns against the Chávez government. Industry maintains that the Chávez 
government has been detrimental to industrial activity. One report notes that in 
1997, two years before Chávez came to power there were 11,640 Industries 
which generated 467,000 jobs, while at the end of 2003 there were only 260,000 
jobs in industry. Furthermore, that industry which did continue producing did so 
at 50% of capacity. Reasons for recession given by businessmen were political 
instability and low demand (Acuerdo Social, 2004).
Most sectoral State policies are directed at the small and medium sized 
business sectors, by providing credits and following a policy of State buying of 
Venezuelan products and services. Cooperatives in particular are flourishing in 
areas such as security, cultivation, sanitation, and community media, to name a 
few. According to the National Superintendency of Cooperatives (SUNACOOP)
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cooperatives rose from 1,900 in 2001, to 10,000 by July 2003, mostly In the area 
of goods and services (34%), food production (31%), and transportation (23%) 
(Gable, 2004).
Economic growth, however, has been severely affected by political 
instability and some say, government policy. Total average GNP growth stood at 
3.2% In 1999/2000 to fall to -9.4% in 2002/2003.106 Goods production has also 
suffered, with manufacturing being particularly damaged, going from 3.9% 
growth in 1999/2000 to -10.6% in 2002/2003 and services from 3.4% to -4.9%, 
with commerce being particularly hit (BCV, 2004).107 Most of these figures show 
the Influence of the April 2002 coup and the later strike of the same year. The 
predictions of international organisations and of national analysts, however, are 
for sustained economic growth of over 6% per year for 2004-2007 thanks to an 
investment that is estimated to be around US$20 billion per year (20% of GNP) 
in oil, infrastructure, agriculture, and industries (both private and public) (Rivas, 
2004). Rodriguez shows, however, that the economy has not become less 
dependent on oil, with the role of oil In production varying little from 1998 to
2002, at over 25% of productive activity and consistently contributing over 70% 
of exports (2003 pp. 12-13).
Tariff regimes have remained relatively unchanged during the Chávez 
years, favouring national production, as the Constitution suggests. Chávez has 
consistently resisted the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), 
concentrating instead on trade agreements with other Latin American countries, 
such as the Andean Community (Comunidad Andina [CAN]) and the announced 
entry of Venezuela into Mercosur in July 2004,108 as well as seeking to fortify 
joint negotiating agreements on the FTAA with Brazil and Argentina. Venezuela 
has also entered into a number of cooperative trade agreements with other Latin
106 Of this oil activity went from 3.2% to -10.7% , and non-oil activity from 3.0% to -8.0% .
107 Taking 1984 as base year.
108 Mercado Comun delSur (Common Market of the South), a South American free trade area, 
comprising Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Paraguay.
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American states.109 Furthermore, Venezuela under Chavez has pursued a policy 
of diversification of trade, not only encouraging inter-Latin American trade, but 
also actively pursuing trade with Asia, particularly China and India, and the EU, 
Canada and Russia, in an attempt to lessen its reliance on trade with the US.110
On gaining power the new government set in motion reviews of the 
legislation on the privatisation of electricity, aluminium, telecommunications, 
petrochemicals, and gas In order to ensure that these deals complied with 
national goals (Buxton, 2003 pl24). Little privatisation has taken place in the 
Chavez era, as the government battles with private business in areas such as the 
media, and with transnational groupings, such as that owned by Cuban-born 
Venezuelan billionaire Gustavo Cisneros, most of whom supported the April coup 
and subsequent strike. Indeed the government announced the launching of new 
State-owned telecommunications and airline companies in 2004, in line with its 
policies of state ownership of strategic services.111
The production structure in Venezuela under Chavez, therefore, has 
suffered mostly setbacks and few gains. The question remains, however, if 
whether this is a direct result of government policy, or due to opposition 
wrecking tactics, including not only the coup and strikes, but also the 
consistently negative and highly publicised criticism of the government by 
Venezuelan business groups and the media, both at home and abroad. Rodriguez 
(2003) has no doubt that the government's economic policy was to blame for the
109 Oil agreements with Central American and Caribbean countries through the Pact of San José, 
an oil agreement with Cuba, with Argentina in 2004, and a projected Latin American oil company, 
Petrosur, with the State oil companies of Argentina, and it is hoped, Brazil. On Venezuela and the 
FTAA see Lebowitz, (2003); on Venezuela in Mercosur see Guerrero (2004); on Argentine deal 
see Sreeharsha, 2004; on Petrosur see Rigzone, 2004.
110 See article in http://www.aporrea.com "Presidente Chávez propone la Misión Mercosur" 
16/07/04. Rodriguez however points out that trade actually grew with the US from 17.38% of 
total trade in 1997-98 to 33.84% in 1999-2001 (2003 pl8).
111 See for example Union Radio report Wednesday 9 June, 2004 "Comisión de Finanzas aprueba 
suscripción del 100 por ciento de acciones de Conviasa" at
http://www.unionradio.com.ve/notidas/noticia.asDx?noticiaid=114001 and report on new 
Telecommunications enterprise 4 July 2004 "Venezuela activará nueva empresa de 
telecomunicaciones" at http://www.unionradio.com.ve/notidas/noticia.asDx?noticiaid=115794
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severe recession, which affected Venezuela from 2002 onwards. He argues 
furthermore that the government could have minimised opposition and disruption 
by a softer discourse showing the moderacy of its various proposals, such as the 
Land Law, the Education Law, and the Hydrocarbons Law. Indeed he points out 
that there is nothing in the government's programme that is Inherently 
antagonistic to the interests of the sectors that form the most strident parts of 
the opposition. Nevertheless, he maintains, the government used incendiary 
classist discourse highly influenced by left-wing language and symbols, alienating 
moderate elements In the opposition. The result he concludes Is one of the worst 
economic performances by any Venezuelan government in the last 40 years.
Rodriguez has a point. Parker (2002) also signals the government's 
discourse as one of the main reasons for the unification of the opposition around 
the slogan "Out with Chavez", giving them political grounds to seek the 
destruction of the government through a coup. A context of extreme political 
polarisation emerged where many of the main productive groups and the middle 
classes who manage much of the private productive apparatus, and much of the 
State bureaucracy as well, united against the government, if not exactly for an 
Identified alternative project. However, Rodriguez ignores the fact that sections 
of the opposition, notably the CTV and FEDECAMARAS were radically against the 
government from the very beginning, and with the aid of the media used the 
mild legislation in the Enabling Laws as a pretext to commence their wrecking 
campaign of the government programme. Furthermore, while he argues that It 
was government policy which led to recession in 2002 and beyond, he does not 
adequately Isolate the effects of this, the coup and strike, and exogenous factors 
such as the recession brought on by the September 11 attacks in the US, to 
effectively measure which of them caused the most harm. Moreover Rodriguez 
does not allow for the need for more time for some of the Government's plans to 
achieve fruition, such as the Land Law, which are of essence long-term 
strategies.
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While Rodriguez rightly points out that there was no threat to the main 
economic groups Interests he fails to ask the next logical question: why then did 
they oppose the government so strongly? It seems spurious to lay the blame 
solely at the door of the government's discourse, as he does. As González 
Plessmann (2002) points out, despite the moderacy of the Venezuelan 
government's programme the "great national and international" powers find in 
Chávez "a threat or obstacle to their objectives" (p21). Gibbs (2004) echoes this 
when he states that in the context of limited maneuverability for governments 
brought about by globalisation, even mildly nationalistic leaders are anathema. 
Thus, In this context "Nestor Klrchner looks quite radical, Evo Morales entirely 
unrealistic and Hugo Chavez Frias just all around problematic" (2004).112 
Rodriguez also Ignores the wider regional situation, whereby most Latin 
American countries which have applied neoliberal policy prescriptions to some 
extent or other, have also failed to significantly alter the dire living conditions of 
the majority of their peoples, despite more consistent, and sometimes 
spectacular, growth rates.
Essentially it can be argued that It is extremely difficult to measure to 
what extent the Chávez government is responsible for failing to achieve its 
economic objectives, due to the, often seditious, nature of the opposition 
campaign against it. In this way, rather than obstructing the government, the 
opposition has helped it to appear more embattled, obscuring the truth through 
anti-government misinformation campaigns leading to increased polarisation, and 
allowing the government to blame, often with reason, the Opposition for the 
continuation of Venezuela's difficulties.
3.5.5 Security
Wilpert (2003) Identifies four phases in government social policy strategy, 
the first during 1999, which was characterised by the implementation of the
112 Nestor Kirchner is President of Argentina (2003). Evo Morales is the main opposition leader in
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Armed Forces led Plan Bolivar 2000; the second during 2000-2001, which 
consisted of the launching of the government's long- and medium-term poverty 
reduction programs, of macro-economic reform, urban and rural land reform, the 
creation of Bolivarian schools, and support for micro-credits and cooperatives. 
The third lasted from December 2001 to May 2003, where due to the unsettled 
political and economic situation the government experienced many setbacks In 
implementing their policies. The latest phase, dating from May 2003 consists of 
an all-round offensive on the part of the government on poverty and exclusion 
through the vehicle of the various 'Missions'.
Plan Bolivar 2000 took as Its base line the notion that human security was 
synonymous with national security and that the Armed Forces could play an 
Important role in the provision of that welfare. As a result the military 
participated In providing transport, house-building and repair, policing, and food 
distribution, disaster relief, school construction, road building, and more. Twenty 
thousand homes were built, 10,000 rebuilt and soldier-aided Mega Markets sold
112,000 tons of food each month in poor regions at discount prices (Gable, 
2004). Over two million people received medical treatment. Nearly a thousand 
Inexpensive markets were opened, over two million children were vaccinated, 
and thousands of tons of rubbish were collected, just to name a few of the 
program's results (Wilpert, 2003). The Plan was criticised for being poorly 
managed and having little transparency, resulting in charges of corruption 
against the officers in charge of the programme. Wilpert argues, however, that 
given the context of recession and the major disaster at Vargas (see note 
above), the seriousness of the problems, the lack of resources, and the 
government's focus on reforming the constitution, Plan Bolivar 2000 still had an 
important positive impact on the poor of Venezuela.
In the second phase of social policy identified by Wilpert (2003), the 
government initiated its medium to long-term policies such as the Land Law, and 
the credit giving schemes (see above). However, not only did the government
Bolivia. Both espouse nationalistic policies.
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work to distribute land in the countryside, it also worked on urban land reform. 
By November 2003, according to Wilpert, throughout Venezuela about 45,000 
families (benefiting 225,000 individuals) had received titles to their homes, with 
another 65,000 families (or 330,000 individuals) planned to receive them in 
2003/2004.
The government took action on the Education front also, Implementing 
the Bolivarian Schools scheme In an attempt to raise the standards and variety of 
education and tackle scholarly desertion and even malnutrition. These schools 
provide day long tuition with more cultural and sports activities,113 and they 
provide children with breakfast, lunch, and a late afternoon snack, regular meals 
that many poor children often did not receive before. Wilpert (ibid.) states that 
by 2003, approximately 2,800 Bolivarian schools had been opened serving about
600,000 children, or 12% of all school-age children. In general, as a result of 
government educational policies, The percentage of children in school in 
Venezuela went from 83% In 1999 to 90% in 2002. Furthermore, under the so- 
called "Plan Simoncitd’ the availability of daycare places for younger children 
went up by 5% between 1998 and 2003. Finally the government launched the 
Bolivarian University to tackle the fall In working-class admission rates to 
universities, standing at only 19% in 1998 (which in 2003, however, passed the 
50% mark: see below). So far 2,400 students have enrolled in the university, 
which began its first classes In October 2003, and another 20,000 are pre­
registered. The university will have branches throughout the country and is 
eventually supposed to reach a total enrolment of 100,000 (MINCI, 2004).
In its latest phase, the government launched a number of 'Missions' to 
tackle inequalities in health and education. To improve access to health services 
for slum dwellers, the government launched Mission Barrio Adentro (Into the 
Neighbourhood). This mission Involves the construction of small community 
health clinics in the barrios, in areas that previously never had doctors, staffed
113 Most Venezuelan public schools, as indeed in many other Latin American countries, have 
turnos or two intakes of children, in the morning and afternoon.
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with Cuban doctors and Venezuelan nurses.114 Government figures estimate that 
in the first half of 2004, 29.8 million consultations were made and 9.9 million 
cases were seen (MINCI, 2004). Mission Robinson I and II was designed to 
tackle illiteracy In Venezuela, using over 100,000 literacy teachers from Cuba and 
Cuban methodology. According to government statistics, over 1 million 
Venezuelans are currently benefiting from the program. Mission Robinson II 
teaches people who benefited from the first phase of the programme to get to 
6th grade. The programme began on 28 October 2003, and intends to 
Incorporate over 629,000 students. Mission Ribas is designed for Individuals who 
dropped out of high school, to help them complete their studies and then place 
them in apprenticeships with state companies. Mission Sucre is a scholarship 
program for a university education, through which 100,000 poor Venezuelans 
can receive the Venezuelan equivalent of US$100 per month for their university 
education.115 Mission Ribas aims to incorporate those 5 million Venezuelans who 
failed to finish secondary school, using televisual methodologies and 17,000 
trained facilitators. According to the government a total of 507,322 students 
received tuition in the first stage of this Mission (MINCI, 2004). Other Missions 
are: Vuelvan Caras (see above) tackling employment, Mission Miranda, retraining 
ex-security personnel as a Military Reserve, Mission Mercal, providing cheap food 
to barrio dwellers through a network of state- and military-run supermarkets, 
shops and markets, and Mission Vivienda to provide housing and integrated 
communities. An Important point to note about the Missions is that most of 
them are managed by the relevant ministries. In total, the government provided 
Bs.6 billion to the Missions in the first half of the year 2004, of which about half, 
Bs.3.2 billion, was provided by PDVSA (Armas, 2004).
114 There is a plan to gradually replace the Cuban doctors with Venezuelan ones, as they can be 
found, after objections from the doctors association.
115 In September 2003 over 420,000 Venezuelans indicated an interest in the scholarships, 
however it is unclear where the places for these students will be found, within the existing 
system or the Bolivarian University (Wilpert, 2003). President Chavez however announced in July 
2004 funding of Bs.50,000 million for the building of 41 university establishments throughout the 
country (MINCI, 2004).
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Article 83 of the Constitution establishes that health Is a fundamental 
social right and that the State must guarantee it as part of the right to life. 
Provea (2003), however, finds that this right Is not fully provided for in 
Venezuela. While government policies are generally favourable to achieving that 
Constitutional aim, the government has not managed to solve the severe 
Infrastructural problems In the Venezuelan health system. Provea points out that 
part of the problem is the high rotation of ministers: in the four years of the 
present governmental term there have been three ministers (2003 pl53). The 
Venezuelan health service Is institutionally and financially fragmented, divided 
between five different entities.116 Furthermore, spending on health at 1.8% of 
GNP, in 2002, is way below the rate of 5% stipulated by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) (ibid. p43). Provea also notes that in the public system 
there are grave shortages of medicines, materials, and equipment, with frequent 
equipment breakdowns (Ibid. p47). Furthermore, the sector is beset with internal 
labour difficulties having suffered 21 stoppages throughout September 2002- 
2003 (ibid.). Thus, while through Mission Barrio Adentro the Venezuelan 
government has managed to widen access to health services, it has not 
managed to improve or rationalise existing services.
There have, however, been more notable improvements In access to 
education, according to Provea. The percentage of Increase of children going to 
school during the Chavez government's mandate is greater than during any other 
government in the last ten years. Average annual growth in school attendance 
from 1999-2002 has been around 5.5% per year. One of the reasons for this 
increase is the guarantee given by the State of free education. In 2002, 96.5% 
of children attended basic education school; however, of every one hundred 
children who attend first grade only 50 reach ninth grade (ibid. pp. 197-199). As 
a result millions remain excluded from the system, and most of those come from
116 These are: Ministry for Health and Social Development (MSDS), individual federal states, the 
Venezuelan Institute for Social Security (IVSS), Institute for the Provision of Social Assistance of 
the Ministry of Education (IPASME), and the Armed Forces.
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the poorer sections of society and rural areas. Elghty-nlne per cent of those 
children who don't attend school are from poor homes, and live in areas with less 
than 25,000 population, where 1 In 5 children don't attend school (ibid. p48). 
Provea also reports on deficiencies In teacher training and infrastructural 
problems In schools (Ibid. p209). However, they also point out that in 2002-
2003, for the first time in many years, more students from state schools are 
attending university (which is free in Venezuela) than those from fee-paying 
schools. The amount of resources as percentage of GNP dedicated to education 
in Venezuela grew by 7.9% in 2003 compared to 2002. In 1998, the last year of 
the Caldera government, Venezuela spent 3.2% of GNP on education, or 41.1% 
of social spending, while in 2002 the Chavez government spent 4.6% of GNP or 
43.3% of social spending (Ibid. p221).
In housing, Provea notes that while the State failed to build 75% of its 
planned units in 2002, there were significant advances in State-sponsored 
schemes of community self-organisation in regularising urban land title and 
accessing essential services, such as water, gas and electricity (Ibid. p223). 
Spending on housing as a percentage of GNP has varied, from 0.7% in 1999 to 
1.6% in 2000 (ibid. p226). Eighty per cent of dwellings have access to services, 
but those that don't are 99.9% within shanty towns (ibid. p234). To make up for 
this deficit, service companies, particularly of water and gas, have been training 
people in the shanty towns to organise communities to gain access to these 
services (Ibid. p236).
What effect have all these policies had on poverty and human 
development? According to government figures, poverty went from 44% in the 
first semester of 1999, to 39.8% in the second semester of 2001 to 49.4% in the 
second semester of 2002 (SISOV, 2004). Meanwhile, the national Human 
Development Index (HDI) rose from 0.7370 to 0.7785 between 1999 and 2002, 
moving up one place from 2001 (Ibid./UNDP, 2002/2003). This rise was achieved 
particularly through Increased spending on education, despite falls in GDP per 
capita (Gindin, 2004). Rodriguez reports that while the level of poverty has
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shown a marked reduction in comparison with the two previous governments, it 
is still the third-highest level of poverty since 1950. Furthermore, he claims that 
the high level of salaries caused by currency appreciation from 1999-2001 can 
account for much of this reduction (2003 plO). The government claims, 
however, that the reduction in poverty was due specifically to government 
policies, which, however, were affected negatively in 2002 by the coup and 
subsequent strike/lockout. In support of this thesis, Stinard (2004) shows how 
poverty grew as a direct result of the coup and strike.117 Poverty in 2004 showed 
a tendency to reduction once again.
In conclusion, the Chavez government has had mixed results in human 
security policy, the best of these being through the Missions and in the education 
system. The main difficulties seem to lie in spending, with low spending levels in 
health and housing and with infrastructural problems, particularly in health. 
However, policies did seem to be having a positive impact on reducing levels of 
poverty, except when they were interrupted by political events such as the April
2002 coup and the December 2002 to February 2003 lockout/strike.
3.5.6 Knowledge
The polarisation In Venezuelan society was also reflected In the knowledge 
structure. One of the difficulties the Chavez government faced was in recruiting 
trained personnel for government. Much of the university sector, a mostly 
middle-class bastion, remained implacably opposed to the government, and thus 
provided their expertise to opposition groups. Large parts of State bureaucracy 
were also staffed by sectors hostile to the government, especially In PDVSA 
where 18,000 management and senior staff took part In the December 2002 
strike/lockout. As was noted above, the private sector, particularly larger capital
117 Stinard (2004) shows that, according to National Statistics Office president Elias Eljuri, after 
the April 2002 coup the poverty rate grew slightly to 41.5%, but the effects of the coup were felt 
more severely by the end of the year during the petroleum strike, when poverty surged to 
48.6%. Unemployment reached 20.7% in February of 2003, and this undoubtedly resulted in the 
peak poverty level of 54% with extreme poverty reaching 25.1%.
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and transnationals were actively involved In opposition to the government in the 
form of strikes and other actions.118 The private media (see Chapter 4) was also 
at the forefront of the opposition. Finally much of the International community, 
lead by the US, was also active in supporting the opposition, and many foreign- 
owned transnationals took part in the strikes. Whilst the privatisation process 
had not been as thorough in Venezuela as In other Latin American countries, key 
sections of the productive apparatus with strategic significance, such as 
telecommunications, were already in private foreign hands. All these sectors 
possessed substantial parts of the knowledge structure In Venezuela, and were 
often actively using their access to it to bring down the government.
The government responded In a number of ways. First, it strengthened its 
hold over PDVSA, a process facilitated by the strike/lockout which allowed the 
government to sack striking employees for dereliction of duty and sabotage. 
Second, substantial numbers of personnel for the government were found 
amongst left-wing academic circles to staff upper management in State 
bureaucracies. Third, through the Missions, such as Ribas, Sucre, Vueivan Caras, 
and the Bolivarian University, the government began to train replacement 
personnel, more sympathetic to the Bolivarian project, to staff the bureaucracies. 
Fourth, through agreements with Cuba, the government used Cuban personnel 
to staff some Mission programmes, such as Barrio Adentro, where many 
Venezuelan medical personnel were unsympathetic and unwilling to work In it. 
Increased co-operation with other Latin American States, such as Argentina, and 
further afield in Asia, was used to replace the lost investment and technology 
traditionally sourced from the US. The government also used State radio and 
television, and funded and encouraged community based media to counteract 
negative coverage from the private media. It also used State security and 
intelligence to monitor opposition and private sector political activity. Finally, the 
government, as pointed out previously, looked to State investment In new State-
118 Most of the main private banks and transnationals, such as McDonalds, took part in the 
December 2002/February 2003 strike/lockout.
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owned enterprises, such as in telecommunications, to counteract foreign 
dominance of these sectors.119
3.5.7 Conclusion
The Chavez government sought to maintain State involvement in key 
elements of each of the four structures, and so maintain indigenous control of 
these elements, whilst simultaneously promoting private enterprise and foreign 
investment from non-traditlonal sources (i.e. non-US). The government looked to 
maximise the variety of forms of ownership, while not interfering dramatically In 
the existing ownership structures, financing the former with increased credits for 
previously excluded sectors. In this way, the Chavez government attempted to 
create equilibrium between the State and the markets, while favouring more 
participation of the popular classes.
In the finance structure, the Chavez government maintained tax rates, 
while attempting, like Fujimori to improve collection. It maximised its control of 
tax revenue from oil to finance social spending. Simultaneously, It attempted to 
improve macroeconomic indicators, and pursued a policy of maintaining high 
foreign reserve levels, and prompt payment of debt. In this way it hoped to keep 
international financial markets content as the government pursued its long-term 
strategies, and keep IFIs at arms length, particularly the IMF. In production, the 
government almost abandoned privatisation, keeping control of key production
119 CANTV the old State telephone company and principal provider of fixed telephone and 
Internet services, belongs to US company Verizon Communications VZ. Seventy-eight per-cent of 
Telcel, Venezuela's principal mobile phone operator passed to Telefonica, the Spanish 
telecommunications giant, from US firm Bell South in October 2004. The Venezuelan government 
expressed concerns about CANTV being involved in 'electronic fraud' with the Opposition in the 
Revocatory Referendum against President Chavez (See Radio Nacional de Venezuela "Informe 
Oficial Revela Complot Sumate-CANTV" at
http://www.rnv.aov.ve/noticias/index.phD?act=ST&f=2&t=7037 29 July 2004; see also El 
Universal "Vamos a extremar los controles sobre la Cantv"
http://www.eluniversal.com/20Q4/07/29/pol art 29108A.shtml 29 July, 2004). Pronouncements 
from Opposition sectors would seem to give credence to government fears, as Enrique Mendoza, 
opposition governor of Miranda state, claimed the opposition had a system, which he refused to 
explain, which would allow it to monitor voting "...every minute...in all the voting centres" (Irish 
Times, "Vote on Chavez will be closely tracked", Friday July 30 2004, p ll) .
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apparatuses, such as the oil industry, in the hands of the State. It promoted 
different ownership types, such as co-operatives, and put government business 
towards these newly created enterprises. It pursued a policy of diversification of 
foreign investment and trade towards Europe and other areas of the South, 
particularly within Latin America, as well as Asia.
In security, the Chávez government increased social spending 
significantly, especially In education, and on its so-called Missions, aimed at 
widening popular economic and social participation and access to social goods. It 
sought to reorder the balance In the knowledge structure, which was primarily in 
private, corporate hands, by encouraging alternative media outlets, and 
increasing access of the popular classes to third-level education.
Thus the Chávez government pursued an intensive populist distrlbutivist 
policy in all four structures, aimed at counteracting the growing dominance of 
the globalised market, particularly the transnational agents of that market. This 
was achieved by an increased protagonism of the State in association with 
indigenous producers and consumers, most of whom were drawn from the 
popular classes. The Chávez government, however, did not turn its back on 
globalisation, but rather rejected Its neoliberal variant in favour of a multi-polar 
model more attuned to Its social obligations.
3.6 Comparative im plications: sovereignty and inequality in Fujim ori's 
Peru and Chavez's Venezuela
We can see in both these cases the playing out of globalisation processes 
in often markedly different ways. In the Peruvian case, we see an implantation of 
globalisation tendencies, which overwhelmingly favour the market. In the 
Venezuelan case, a counter-reaction to globalisation tendencies is being fiercely 
resisted by the "information rich" in that country, in league with the "capital rich" 
outside it. In the Peruvian case, the financial structure was internationalised 
through increased dollarisation, privatisation of the banking system, liberalisation 
of capital markets, increased foreign investment, and increased debt and debt
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repayments. These results limited the flexibility of the Peruvian government to 
vary policy from neoliberal orthodoxy without being subjected to penalties from 
the international financial system.
In Venezuela, on the other hand, we see a concerted effort on behalf of 
the Chávez government to arrest that process Initiated by previous governments. 
There the government used policies based on a combination of distrlbutivist 
state-intervention, alongside the market, to achieve national goals in the finance 
structure. However, the Venezuelan case Is illustrative of the fierce penalties 
governments who attempt to oppose neoliberal hegemony can face. The 
Peruvian government achieved a high degree of domestic independence but at 
the price of dependence on the international financial structure. The Venezuelan 
government on the other hand sought to engage with globalisation on their own 
terms from a position of international autonomy, based on Internal support from 
the Armed Forces and the popular classes, in order to maintain sovereignty in 
policy making.
In the Peruvian production structure, manufacturing became secondary to 
the primary sector, which by its nature is more exposed to the international 
commodity markets. Firms became larger and more were foreign owned, 
especially in privatised companies.120 Local national capital was left defenceless 
In the face of imports and international competition. Peru became more 
dependent on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as domestic savings remained at 
levels insufficient to finance growth. In Venezuela, there was also a decline in 
manufacturing, although the government did pursue a sectoral policy which 
supported national capital, both state and privately owned, and especially small 
and medium sized businesses. Privatisation was detained, and in some cases the 
State sought to enter in competition with privatised companies. Tariffs were 
maintained and free trade with the developed world resisted, but encouraged on
120 The net productive value (NPV) of the 100 largest foreign firms in Peru amounted to half of 
the NPV of the hundred largest firms of the entire country (Gonzalez, 1998 p ll5 ). In other 
words, the larger firms of Peru are increasingly in the hands of foreigners.
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a regional level. Once again the Venezuelan government sought a high level of 
autonomy at the international level, both within and outside its borders, and its 
right to exercise sovereignty in its economic decision making processes. 
Nonetheless, It was prepared to compromise sovereignty with other Latin 
American States in order to further regional integration and strengthen its 
international position visa iz/sthe developed world.
In the security structure in Peru, most welfare provision was made 
available through centralised agencies controlled by the presidency, advised and 
often financed by International agencies, and directed at specific populations. 
These agencies used highly focalised strategies which often bypassed existing 
institutions. In Venezuela, on the other hand, the Chavez government sought to 
provide universal coverage, while focussing on the poor through the Missions. 
These programmes were financed by national resources, led by the national 
government, but often sidelined the relevant ministries. Furthermore they 
sought, unlike the Peruvian programmes, to rectify inequality rather than simply 
relieve poverty.
Finally, in Peru the transference of capital to large foreign concerns, 
especially in key areas such as telecommunications, finance and mining, and the 
involvement of large International agencies in welfare and institutional reform, 
dependent on international aid, ensured that the knowledge structure passed 
Increasingly into the power of foreigners. In Venezuela, the Chavez government 
and opposition sectors in the middle class, backed by transnational actors, fought 
for control of the knowledge structure.
In Peru, Inequality was exacerbated through the effect of reforms across 
the four structures. Changes in the financial structure led to increased 
concentration of ownership In the financial sector and a reduction in the 
availability of credit to the less well off and national capital. Increased 
dependence on Indirect taxes increased the tax burden on ordinary Peruvians, 
regardless of Income, and income tax restructuring favoured capital and the
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wealthy. Increased debt and debt repayments reduced the availability of 
resources for social distribution of wealth.
In Venezuela the Chavez government sought to increase credit provision 
to the poor and the national sector, and put more government business towards 
those sectors. Tax structures were kept intact, while the government attempted 
to modernise revenue infrastructure and improve efficiency. The government 
actually reduced sales tax In July 2004, although it still contributes a large share 
of tax revenue. It also maximised oil revenue in comparison with the previous 
government to provide more social spending while being careful to honour its 
international debt commitments.
In Peru, labour reforms favoured employers over workers, resulting in less 
job security, increased casuallsation and underemployment, more Informality, 
less union representation, and a transferral of wealth to capital from labour. 
Prospects for improvements in employment after a decade of reform remained 
bleak. In Venezuela, the government strengthened the rights of workers, 
Including those in the informal sector, though employment prospects remained 
poor for the majorities. Through the various Missions and Increased education 
spending, however, the government attempted to provide Increased training to 
the poor. Nonetheless, unemployment and underemployment remained high, 
although with a tendency to improvement in early 2005.
In the Peruvian security structure, whilst government had some success in 
reducing poverty, especially absolute poverty, these improvements proved 
unsustainable, and did not substantially alter income inequality in the country 
(Pasco-Font and Saavedra, 2001 p263). Access to social services remains skewed 
in favour of the better-off urban citizen, spending remains Inadequate, and 
quality remains poor. Similarly, In Venezuela the government had some success 
in reducing poverty Initially, and improvements in education and other measures 
such as land reform should, all going well, result in greater equality. However, 
government efforts have been hampered by poor economic management and
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massive opposition protest. Most spending was on social security, which 
favoured the better off worker (Rodriguez, 2003).
Finally, in Peru knowledge became increasingly centralised into the hands 
of central government and International agencies and companies, and little effort 
was made on the part of government to bolster alternative sources of 
knowledge. Knowledge was circumscribed within neoliberal discourse, due to an 
establishment consensus in favour of that ideology. In Venezuela, on the other 
hand, there was a genuine hegemonic struggle between a putative neoliberal 
discourse offered by the opposition, and the Chávez-led revolution which sought 
a more socially equitable, Third Way1 form of capitalism. The State took an 
active part in this contest of ideas, as did sections of civil society who became 
mobilised behind one band or the other.
In Chapter 2 we saw how a lack of legitimacy on the part of States to 
address structural Inequalities leaves a gap open In democracies between what 
Canovan (1999) called 'the politics of redemption' and 'the politics of scepticism'. 
Populist leaders enter through that gap to take power, using strong anti-status- 
quo discourses to attract support, especially from the popular classes. The failure 
of ISI policies linked to populism In the 1980s led to that gap being widened and 
Latin American populaces seeking forms of government which reflected more 
accurately their desire for participation. In Chapter 3 we saw how Fujimori and 
Chávez used anti-status-quo discourses to make direct links between themselves 
and the people.
In this chapter, I have suggested that globalisation processes, far from 
making populism redundant in Latin America, as previously thought, have 
contributed to the emergence of two radically different kinds of populist leaders. 
On the one hand, governments such as Fujimori's have emerged, attempting to 
articulate neoliberal globalisation to limited distributivist, Indeed asslstentialist, 
policies in order to offer solutions to the crisis brought about by the exhaustion 
of ISI. These policies nonetheless failed to tackle structural inequalities, although 
they did relieve the more immediate negative effects of the model, while
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simultaneously strengthening in a cllentellstic fashion the link between the 
President and the popular classes.
Indeed, as we saw In the Introduction to this thesis, neoliberal policies 
have led, In the majority of cases, to more inequality in Latin American countries 
and less sovereignty on the part of governments in the region to tackle this 
growing inequality. This, in turn, has widened the gap once again between 'the 
politics of redemption' and the 'politics of scepticism', leaving the way open for 
the emergence of other populists, ranged against the forces of neoliberalism, as 
the Chávez case shows.
In that case, however, we find a government attempting to widen 
participation in a more profound and comprehensive manner. Here there is a 
more concerted effort, through the State, to reassert national sovereignty in 
policy making, In order to reorder to some extent the structural Inequalities 
compounded by globalisation, without turning its back entirely on the 
opportunities globalisation presents. Once again there is a strong connection 
between the leader and the people brought about by these policies, but these 
links are motivated by ideology as well as through the economy as we shall see 
in Chapter 5.
In essence, the policies of both governments were framed to a degree by 
the context of neoliberal hegemony, with the Chávez government rejecting and 
contesting the validity of that hegemony, while the Fujimori government 
embraced and furthered it. Both governments, however, show a preoccupation 
to some extent with the rights to participation of the popular classes, which are 
translated Into fervent support and identification with the leader of both 
processes. Fujimori's, however, was an authoritarian personallst project 
articulated to a fully-fledged neoliberal ideology, masquerading as a liberal 
democracy, and concentrating solely on 'poverty relief. The Chávez government, 
on the other hand, strove to become a participative democracy where the 
political, the social and the economic were all areas requiring further popular 
participation. Chávez's economic and social policies reflected those concerns, and
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as such were wider and more comprehensively distributivlst. The Fujimori 
government, therefore, was much more akin to 'neopopulism', (i.e. Weyland, 
1996), while the Chavez government is closer to 'classic1 populism; that is, 
populism as a social-democratising political strategy (i.e. Lynch, 2000). Both 
presidencies, however, show the continuing relevance of populism to 
contemporary Latin American politics despite or perhaps because of, 
globalisation and neoliberalism, and the cleavages and contradictions that these 
policies have compounded.
As a result of a decade of neoliberal reform under President Fujimori, 
Peruvian sovereignty became more circumscribed by International conditions and 
demands, and inequality was increased to a substantial extent in all four 
structures, tipping the balance overwhelmingly in favour of the market, and 
against the State. Furthermore the new neoliberal model was non-negotiable as 
the Fujimori government doggedly defended It, despite its failure to achieve 
sufficient long-term growth. As Gonzales (1998) wrote:
The idea to firmly maintain the orthodox economic policy without variations for such a 
long period, under the supposition that the economic agents need to have a feeling of 
stability in the economic environment, is an idea biased in favour of the interests of the 
most modern and largest capitalists, foreign and national, and [the] [...] multilateral 
organisms, forgetting that the country also has workers, small businessmen, peasants 
and independent workers, that is economic agents who are also waiting for favourable 
results for themselves, so that they too can support the model (p70).
In such a scenario, Gonzales concludes that the principal problem of the model in 
Peru is an Imbalance between equity and efficiency, "...which does not provide 
the basis from which to enter the virtuous circle of development with democracy" 
(ibid. pl21). As such, "Peruvian neoliberalism [...] still doesn't show signs of 
political or social sustainability in an institutionalised manner" (ibid. pl27).
The Venezuelan government attempted to address these problems by 
putting inequality at the centre of its political discourse. The Venezuelan State, 
under the Chavez government actively operated in the market, of goods, 
services, and ideas, to tip the seesaw of market and state to a more balanced
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equilibrium. The Issue of national sovereignty was central to this strategy and it 
is here that we can understand the origin of the fierce resistance of the 
"knowledge rich" middle classes, many of which are already deeply integrated 
into transnational sectors closely linked to the core country economies, especially 
the US.121 The Chavez government, therefore, intervened on behalf of the 
"workers, small businessmen, peasants and independent workers", in order to 
further their interests, and therefore, it was thought, the national Interest, 
reinforcing Venezuela's sovereignty and economic independence in an 
increasingly globalised world. In this way, it sought to strike a balance not only 
between the State and the market within Venezuela, but also between the global 
market and the national market, and the global international structure and 
Venezuela's national strategic requirements as an independent sovereign nation.
Furthermore, the Chavez government, unlike the Fujimori government, 
sought to correct the imbalance between equity and efficiency by engaging these 
national sectors in the project through democratic inclusion which went beyond, 
but not excluding, elections, promising social and economic as well as political 
rights, and extending participation in all these areas to previously excluded 
sectors. In this way, the Venezuelan government attempted to achieve 
development with democracy, unlike the Fujimori government, which attempted 
to achieve development through a centralised, personalised, authoritarian 
"delegatlve democracy".
Whether the Chavez project is sustainable in the long term depends 
greatly on the evolution of the Venezuelan political crisis. So far the Opposition 
has only sought the destruction of the Chavez government and has refused to 
co-operate in a public-spirited manner with it, denying Its legitimacy. It is unlikely 
that this will change In the near future, as It is not perceived to be in the 
interests of the different opposition sectors, their social base and their foreign 
backers for the Venezuelan government to succeed. Only time will tell, therefore,
121 Blanco Munoz states for example that "the immense majority of our great team of Venezuelan 
economists today subscribe to neoliberalism" (1998 p618).
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if this particular attempt to contest neoliberal hegemony in Latin America wil 
survive or not.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have provided a comprehensive review of the political 
economy of both countries under their respective presidents, using a framework 
derived from Strange's States and Markets. I have highlighted several 
fundamental differences between both presidents on every level of the 
framework.
In both cases, It was shown that distributivlsm was an Important feature; 
but in Venezuela there is a much greater level of popular participation. In Peru 
on the other hand there was a much greater emphasis on the market as the 
deciding factor In distribution, whereas in Venezuela the state takes a much 
greater role. Through distributivlsm and participation both governments sought 
to secure the legitimacy of their regimes and in both there were attempts to 
confront the realities of globalisation. In these ways both attempted to achieve 
hegemony in their respective societies. By achieving hegemony they sought to 
secure their ideological viewpoint economically, socially and culturally. How they 
attempted to do this will be discussed in the next chapter.
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4 CHAPTER 4: The leader and the led: Hegemonic strategies 
in the leadership of Alberto Fujimori and Hugo Chavez
4.1 Introduction
Crisis, as we saw in Chapter 1 is a central concept in populism, as it is the 
opening through which strong personallst leaders seek to gain power. But what 
strategies do these leaders use to gain and maintain power? As we found in 
Chapter 1, the literature on populism leaves a number of gaps In the answer to 
this question. While the literature is quite emphatic on the central role of the 
people and the leader and the relationship between the two as a central hallmark 
of populism, Information on the nature of the people and the content of that 
relationship is unclear. The use of appeals to the people Is a fundamental 
strategy for the gaining and maintenance of power though once again their 
nature and content is not thoroughly explained. The varied ideological nature of 
populism provided further difficulties.
In our discussion in the second part of Chapter 1 we focussed particularly 
on the work on populism of Ladau (1977) as a plausible solution to these 
difficulties. Laclau pointed to the varied nature of the concept of the people, the 
variety of the content of appeals to the people, being based on national popular 
elements rather than class, and antagonism to the status quo. Finally he 
discussed the ability of populists to articulate those elements to varied ideologies 
or mixes of ideologies through discourse in order to achieve hegemony.
So the central question here is in effect, following Laclau, how these 
populist leaders and movements achieve, or indeed if they are able to achieve 
'hegemony'? This chapter will take as its starting point the concept of 
'hegemony' as developed by Gramsci (1971), and more recently Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001). I will look particularly at the Gramscian concepts of 'force' and 
'consent' and argue that both are needed in order for a particular social group or 
groups to achieve hegemony. Furthermore, as Laclau and Mouffe (2001) argue, 
hegemony Is achieved through 'antagonism', a concept central to Laclau's (1977)
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theory on populism. Following on from that, the literature on populism will be 
reviewed to construct a framework of strategic resources used by populist 
leaders to achieve hegemony. This framework will then be used to examine the 
strategies used by Fujimori and Chavez. Finally consideration will be given to 
whether these presidents used 'consent' or 'coercion' more forcefully in their 
hegemonic strategies, or rather I will assess, in Laclau and Mouffe's words, the 
relative balance between the 'logic of democracy' and 'totalitarianism' in each 
presidential regime.
In effect the purpose of the chapter is to examine critically the ideologies 
of both presidents and how they used these Ideologies to achieve hegemony. In 
this way we will be examining, following Habermas (1976) not only the political 
content of each president's discourse but also its cultural content and how that 
contributed to their gaining legitimacy with the majority of the population in both 
countries and thus moved towards achieving hegemony.
4.2 Hegemony and populism
4.2.1 'War of Position' and 'War of Manoeuvre'
According to Gramsci 'organic crises' (that is when social classes become
"detached from their traditional parties") create a vacuum of leadership leaving 
the way open for "charismatic 'men of destiny'" to take power often through 
"violent" means (Gramsci [1971 p210). However, to achieve true hegemony 
Gramsci insists that the duality of the political process must be taken into 
account. He uses Machiavelli's image of the centaur to illustrate this duality, 
representing "the levels of force and of consent, authority and hegemony, 
violence and civilisation, of the individual moment and of the universal moment 
(...)" within the political process (ibid. pl70). Hegemony is not simply the 
capturing of the Institutions and trappings of State power, but also as Millband 
states "to maintain control over the 'hearts and minds' of subordinate classes" 
(cited in Ransome, 1992 pl32). It is not simply sufficient to capture the State, in 
other words the apparatuses (police, courts, army etc.) used to ensure coercion;
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'private' civil society (the media, political parties, unions, the family etc.) must 
also be dominated through 'consent', as It is here "that hegemony Is exercised" 
(Hall et al, 1977 p47)122.
Gramsci developed two theoretical strategies to achieve this subtle and 
complex hegemonic task, the concepts of 'war of manoeuvre' and 'war of 
position'. The 'war of manoeuvre' is an all out frontal attack designed to take 
control of the apparatuses of the State In one move, by overthrowing the 
coercive agencies of the state and its military forces In particular. A 'war of 
position' on the other hand is a more gradual and subversive strategy to gain 
control of civil society, tackled on its own terms, through ideological and political 
'attack'. Gramsci writes, using the military metaphors to which he was partial: "A 
war of position Is not, in reality, constituted simply by the actual trenches, but by 
the whole organisational and industrial system of the territory, which lies at the 
rear of the army in the field (...). The superstructures of civil society are like the 
trench-systems of modern warfare" (Gramsci, 1971 pp234-235). In effect, as 
Ransome (1992) argues, a 'war of position' and frontal attack are within a single 
overall strategy.
While Gramsci envisaged that a 'war of position' strategy was particularly 
necessary in advanced capitalist countries as undeveloped societies lack the 
"political super-structures, created by the greater development of capital" 
(Gramsci 1971 p238; see also p243), he also believed that each country should 
be examined on its own circumstances as: "In every country the process (of 
crisis) is different, although the content Is the same"(ibid. p210). Leadership is 
crucial in the 'war of position' as it must provide the terms of "an intellectual and 
moral reform (...)[towards] a national-popular collective will (...) which has to be 
linked with a programme of economic reform" (ibid. pl33). In doing so this 
leadership forms an 'historical bloc' of groups and individuals who are linked by a 
common vision against that of the ancien regime.
122 There is some discussion about the actual meanings of these and other terms in Gramsci, 
which is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss. See Anderson, P (1976).
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4.2.2 The logic of democracy' and populist hegemonic strategies
Laclau and Mouffe (2001), however, reject the traditional Marxist position,
accepted by Gramsci, of the centrality of class and the existence of a hegemonic 
centre (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001 ppl37-138). For these two theoreticians it is 
impossible to achieve what they term "sutture", that Is permanent fixity or 
definition. Social formations are characterised not by equivalences but by 
differences which are united through "negativity, division and antagonism". It is 
antagonistic hegemonic practices, discourse being chief among them, which 
unites the mulitplicity of identities into a 'collective will' and 'historical bloc'. Only 
through the negativity of the 'Other' can differences constitute themselves as 
equivalences and unity become a reality amongst different subject positions, and 
it is through discourse that this is achieved123.
However, the boundary separating any two opposing forces is constantly 
changing and moving, and it is on this terrain that hegemonic practices are 
played out. Discursive concepts are "floating signlfiers" and can be articulated 
into a variety of discourses (ibid. ppl70-171) be it "right-wing populism and 
totalitarianism on the one hand, and a radical democracy on the other (...). The 
forms of articulation of an antagonism, therefore, far from being pre-determined, 
are the result of a hegemonic struggle" (ibid. pl68). Discourse Is an attempt to 
"dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a 
centre (in other words, a partial fixation)" (ibid. p lll) (m y  italics). No meaning is 
absolute and discourse can only give 'signifiers' or 'nodal points' a partial 
meaning which is thoroughly contestable from a different viewpoint (ibid. p i 13).
123 An example of this would be the concept of globalisation, which has been articulated into a 
neoliberal discourse by the Right. Yet the so-called 'anti-globalisation1 movement, coming as it 
does from a plurality of perspectives (ecological, pacifist, indigenous etc.) shows that the 
'signifier' 'globalisation' can be articulated into alternative discourses and given entirely different 
meanings. The neoliberal, hegemonic vision of globalisation acts as a unifying agent - the 'Other' 
- which equivalates the differences between these different perspectives. For a discussion on the 
meaning of globalisation see Introduction of the thesis.
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This unity of differences achieved through discursive, articulatory practices can 
therefore be subverted by other contradictory logics (ibid. pl45).
Laclau and Mouffe, like Gramscl, argue that the process of hegemony is 
more difficult in the West than "in the countries of the Third World [as there] 
Imperialist exploitation and the predominance of brutal and centralised forms of 
domination tend from the beginning to endow the popular struggle with a centre, 
with a single and clearly defined enemy. Here the division of the political space 
into two fields is present from the outset, but the diversity of democratic 
struggles is more reduced" (ibid. pl31). Nonetheless I would argue that in many 
developing countries, and in Latin America specifically this position is slightly 
naïve. While Laclau and Mouffe are correct in signalling the centrality and clearer 
visibility of domination In developing countries, there is still a plurality of 
democratic struggles due to the complexity of these societies in terms of 
ethnicity, race, class, and gender. Furthermore the glaring economic inequalities 
in the region usually affect particular race and/or ethnic groups, often 
constituting a demographic majority, and gender is in itself another 
discriminatory criteria throughout all groups.
Modernisation processes have led to greater demands for démocratisation 
and questioning of traditional power structures by these groups. Discourse 
therefore is of central importance in Latin American societies, increasingly so as 
the role of the media becomes greater. Therefore it is equally true of many of 
these societies as Laclau and Mouffe point out, quoting Lefort, with respect to 
the West, that "an unending process of questioning [with] no representation of a 
centre of society"(lbid. pl87) is taking place. Out of this vacuum a form of 
totalitarianism can emerge, "which assumes itself to be the representative of a 
unitary people [thus denying] the social division made visible by the logic of 
democracy" (ibid.). The State is central to this concept as it attempts to provide 
the centre and the "closure which will (...) restore unity" (ibid. pl88)124. Thus
124 Buci-Glucksmann (1982) elaborates on this danger by showing that in cases such as Jacobin 
France or Risorgimiento Italy, these movements, instead of resolving the historical task of
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there is seemingly a danger inherent to the logic of hegemony which can result 
in the forced closure of the social as the hegemonic force attempts to establish 
its Ideological vision of society as definitive, uncontestable and therefore 
'totalitarian'.
Gramsd's theory of hegemony, and Laclau and Mouffe's further 
development of It, offers us a theoretical structure by which we can examine 
populist hegemonic strategies. In the literature on populism we can see 
examples of how populist leaders displayed power strategies similar to those 
identified in Gramsci's theory. As we saw In the previous chapter populist theory 
gives crisis a central role, similar to that in Gramsci, in the founding of populist 
political projects. Furthermore populist leaders attempt all out frontal attacks on 
the State similar to Gramsci's concept of a 'war of manoeuvre'. However, while 
Gramsci envisaged this strategy in military terms (as in Russia in 1917) populist 
leaders use a variety of methods to capture the State and its institutions. Firstly 
populist leaders normally, though not exclusively, gain power through democratic 
means, specifically through elections (Conniff, 1982 pl6). The 'capturing of the 
State' therefore usually takes place from the position of the apex of the State, 
the Presidency. In a region where executives with extensive powers are 
common125, Latin American populist leaders in particular, due to their personallst 
anti-status quo popular appeal, have a quite privileged position from which they 
can reorder the institutions of the State as part of a wider hegemonic strategy. 
In this sense they can 'capture' the institutions of state to a similar degree as an 
'all out frontal attack' may do, but from within the State, sometimes through 
legal means (I.e. the drafting of a new constitution). However, populist leaders 
may also use extra-legal means to achieve this goal such as coups, so-called 
'self-coups' (autogoipes), or a combination of either of these with 'legal' means.
leadership by developing the democratic initiative of the masses, "relied primarily on the State, 
on domination, a 'dictatorship without hegemony1, the state is (stage by stage) substituted by the 
class (...) and leadership becomes an aspect of domination" (Buci-Glucksmann in Sasoon, A ed, 
1982 pl21).
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Ultimately, however, this 'capturing' of the State Is part of a wider strategy of 
"winning, securing and cementing the 'consent' of the dominated classes"(Hall et 
al. 1977 p69), especially in countries with electoral competition.
The control of and reordering of State institutions is vital in populist 
hegemonic strategies. In Latin American societies the coercive apparatus of the 
State, particularly the Armed Forces, has traditionally been stronger than Civil 
Society, resulting in a paucity of autonomous alternative actors. Nonetheless 
many of the institutions within the State (the justice system, parliaments, 
ministries) remain relatively weak and poorly perceived by the majority of Latin 
Americans (Latinobarometro 2002a; 2002b). These Institutions are particularly 
vulnerable during times of crisis, facilitating populist leaders' restructuring and 
reordering plans (Cammack 2000). Indeed this reordering is fundamental to the 
success of populist hegemony as It institutionalises the direct link established 
through populist 'appeals to the people' (Ibid.). Institutions thus become the 
conduit and the embodiment of the direct relationship between leader and led, 
functioning as the agencies responsible for the dispensation of the promised 
benefits to selected groups (Roberts, 1995;Weyland, 1996).
Indeed 'appeals to the people' and an antl-elitist discourse are the two 
principal elements defining populism according to many analysts (Canovan 1981 
p294; Laclau, 1977). According to Laclau populist leaders construct a discourse 
antagonistic to the status-quo, which "expresses the 'people'/power bloc 
contradiction as distinct from a class contradiction" (Laclau, 1977 pl67). Popular 
bias and popular struggle against authority, rather than class, becomes the 
unifying element ('signifier') in this discourse126. Thus populist leaders, 
Irrespective of their ideological leanings can construct an anti-status quo 
discourse which simultaneously unites the 'people', and divides the polity into 
two antagonistic camps: the 'people' against the dominant 'power bloc'. As
125 See Mainwaring and Shugart, (1997 pp 40-50) for the different levels of power in Latin 
American presidencies.
126 This corresponds to Gramsci's ideas on 'common sense'.(See Gramsci, 1971 pp272-275).
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Laclau formulates it, populism is "the presentation o f popular-democratic 
interpellations as a synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant 
ideology "(Laclau, 1977 ppl72-173). These popular democratic elements can 
then be articulated to an ideology or mix of ideologies ('nodal points'), according 
to the aims of the populist challenger but irrespective of the class composition of 
the coalition. Often such aims are determined by the conjunctural needs of 
capitalism to establish new systems of reproduction (Cammack, 2000 pl55).
However, populist discourses usually highlight the desire to further 
democratise the polity, as populism has as one of Its primary discursive motifs 
the inclusion of the popular classes into national life on an economic, political 
and/or cultural level (Germanl, 1965). From these discourses multi-class 
coalitions are formed around the populist leader. While as Canovan (1981) points 
out the term the 'people' has the benefit for the leader of being specific and 
vague at the same time (p286), it usually refers in effect to multiclass populist 
coalitions which inevitably exclude some sectors127. Indeed as Hennessey (cited 
in Canovan, 1981) maintains populism can be seen as "an organisational weapon 
to synchronise divergent group interests" (p275).
A further defining characteristic of populism according to Mouzells (1978) 
is its organisational element. Populist movements are based on a "plebiscitarían 
relationship between leader and led - a relationship which has important 
organisational consequences."(p90). Charisma, conveyed through speeches, 
political meetings and the use of distinctive national or religious symbols are 
fundamental to this relationship as they promote antagonism to the existing or 
past regime and reinforce the direct leader/people nexus. Local or intermediary 
cadres lack autonomy as "most of their power and legitimation is derived more 
or less directly from [the leader's] personal charisma"(Mouzelis, 1978 pp81-82). 
Clientelism, distributivlsm, and patrimoniallsm are all tactical elements which
127 Conniff (1982) explains "single class hegemony had become impossible" due to the changes 
brought about by rapid modernisation and the extension of democratic aspirations to the masses 
(p l6).
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further reinforce the leader/people nexus. Manipulation is therefore a dual 
process, each part of the power equation benefiting; the 'people' In terms of 
goods, services and perhaps an 'experience of participation' as Germani (1965) 
would have it, and the leader receiving in return allegiance and votes. Mediating 
institutions, or 'civil society' (Church, media, political parties, NGOs, trade unions) 
are co-opted, side-lined or eliminated as the new power bloc gains control of 
State institutions and resources.
In sum populist hegemonic strategies have close similarities to strategies 
outlined by Gramsci. Populists use tactics of 'manoeuvre' and 'position' to 
attempt to achieve hegemony, through a frontal attack on the State by legal 
and/or extra-legal means. Antagonistic discourse both prepares the way for this 
attack and follows it up, as populists seek to challenge and overthrow the 
dominant power bloc and then consolidate their power. Discourse helps form the 
'historical bloc' or coalition which will contest the dominant power bloc, providing 
it with the 'collective will' to carry out the challenge and sustain It. The taking 
over of the State ensures that the new populist government has the means at Its 
disposal to further its hegemony through both 'force' and 'consent'. With control 
of the coercive arms of the State the new power bloc can minimise opposition 
against its policies (force). Through institutional control the State can be used to 
implement policies of distrlbutivism, clientelism etc. as well as co-opting or 
eliminating intermediary institutions which may provide loci of opposition or 
alternative power bases (force/consent). Increasingly the new ideology is 
interwoven into daily life as 'civil society' adapts to the new rules of the political 
game (consent). The following table outlines the specific populist tactics used to 
achieve hegemony within the context of Gramsci's theory, and will serve as a 
framework for the following examinations of the specific strategies of firstly 
Fujimori and subsequently Chavez.
Table I I I :  Populist Hegemonic Strategies
Gramsci Populism
CRISIS
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War of Manoeuvre (Force) ■ Coup 
Elections
■ Autogolpe 
Repression
■ Constitution
War of Position (Consent) - Discourse/Antagonism
Leadership/Structure
• ■ Symbolism
■ Distributivism
■ Clientelism
'HEGEMONY'? /'TOTALITARIANISM'?
4.3 War of position' and 'war of manoeuvre' tactics in the hegemonic 
strategy of Alberto Fujimori: 'El Poder soy yo '128
4.3.1 Introduction
The period 1990 to 1995 was one in which Fujimori, and those involved 
with him, laid the foundations of a hegemonic regime which was intended to last 
until at least 2005129. Indeed despite the absence of its main progenitor in 'exile' 
in Japan, that hegemony presently survives on an economic and on a political 
level130. Fujimori achieved this hegemony by a combination strategy of 'war of 
position' and 'war of manoeuvre' tactics. 'War of position' tactics were mainly an 
antagonistic discourse against the political class and democratic institutions of 
Peru, the building and maintenance of a direct relationship with the popular
128 "I am power". The full quote reads: "Political parties don't exist in Peru [...]. I am power, it's 
true. But it is a power that was given to me by the people. I represent them" [Alberto Fujimori, 
21-06-93 quoted in Sanborn and Panfichi, 1996 p41).
129 Fujimori won the 2000 presidential elections and looked set to stay in power until 2005 having 
come to agreements with the international community and the local opposition. The release of 
the vladivideos, videos showing Montesinos offering money to a variety of politicians and 
businessmen, and so clearly demonstrating the corruption in the regime, led to Fujimori fleeing to 
Japan and being removed from the presidency.
130 The 1993 Constitution (see below) is still operative in Peru, and economic policies have 
changed little since Fujimori's departure. Furthermore, a poll held by Datum in December 2003, 
placed Fujimori second as preferred Presidential candidate with 18 % of expressed preferences of 
those surveyed, just behind Alán García Pérez with 20 %, even though Fujimori has been legally 
barred from standing for election in Peru (La República, 2003)
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classes, particularly informal workers and peasant communities, and the rapid 
building of power alliances with the military, international financial Institutions, 
core capitalist countries, and local elite capitalists. These alliances in turn 
facilitated the Implementation of 'war of manoeuvre' tactics of autocoup and 
comprehensive Constitutional change. Fujimori's landslide victory In the 1995 
general elections was the ultimate proof of his regime having achieved economic, 
political and social hegemony in Peru.
4.3.2 Antagonistic 'appeals to the people'
Presidential candidate Fujimori's discursive message for the 1990 election
campaign was centre-left, advocating a negotiated gradualist form of change,
based on national aspirations and dialogue. A 'Social Pact for Development' was
promised which Fujimori and Cambio 90 (Change 90) would be best placed to
negotiate due to their "equidistance in the political spectrum [and] absolute
Independence with respect to the great economic and party powers, and [...] our
roots in the popular sectors" (Cambio 90, 1990 p6). The change being
negotiated would be national and modern, implemented "not through the
mechanic and liberal imposition of imported lifestyles, but as a faithful reflection
of a conscious and concerted Peruvian strategy, which protects and strengthens
our national values and wealth [...]" (ibid.). Fujimori therefore constructs an
image of a concerned, independent, and nationalist Peruvian citizen, non-
Ideological but pragmatic, coming from the people, not apart from them and
their problems. The discursive invocation of national popular struggles
challenged the sometimes overtly racist overtones of opposing candidate Mario
Vargas Llosa's campaign (Degregori, 1991 ppll9-125). Fujimori won in the
second round with 57% of the vote against Vargas Llosa's 33.5% (Degregori and
Grompone 1991 pl6). Furthermore in Lima 66.3% of lower economic classes
voted for him, as opposed to 33.07% of the upper economic groups (Dietz and
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Dugan, 1996 p266). In the Andean trapezoid Fujimori's vote was 67% against 
Vargas Llosa's 14% (Degregori, 1991 pl03)131.
Yet the elements of dialogue and consultation In this discourse were 
effectively abandoned once Fujimori reached power. He quickly discarded his 
coalition of evangelicals and small business people from the shanty towns in 
favour of a high powered alliance with the Armed Forces, the international 
financial community, the elites of the core capitalist countries, especially the 
United States, and a close circle of advisors (Cameron, 1997; Rochabrun, 1996). 
Cambio 90, never a movement in the sense of having militants and an organic 
national structure, became a mere label under which the President constructed 
an electoral vehicle and a set of legislators who would owe their loyalty to him, 
and him alone. The changing of alliances was accompanied by the so-called 
fujishock, a draconian set of neoliberal economic measures announced in August 
1990 (see Chapter 5). As a result of these economic measures the number of 
people living In poverty jumped from 9 to 14 million, in a country of 22 million 
inhabitants (Rochabrun, 1996 pl7). The effect of these measures was felt not 
only in the increase in poverty and unemployment, but also In exacerbating the 
already advanced decomposition of civil society and its ability to resist such 
authoritarian impositions and articulate a coherent collective response (See 
previous chapter)132.
Cambio 90 pursued a policy of engagement and consensus building in 
Congress which was often contradicted by the President's discourse. Fujimori 
included Independents and persons from opposition parties in his first cabinet 
including members of the Left, received APRA support against former president
131 The Andean trapezoid consists of the high sierra provinces of Huancavelica, Ayacucho, 
Apurimac, Cusco and Puno, the poorest in Peru, those with the greatest number of Quechua and 
Aymara speakers and those (except for Cusco) most hit by terrorism (ibid.).
132 Balbi reports that two general strikes against these policies failed (Balbi,1992 p6). This is 
hardly surprising in a climate where the use of strikes became less and less frequent declining 
from 15 million man hours in 1990 to barely a million in 1995 due to the cumulative effects of 
successive economic shocks and economic crisis (Rochabrun, 1996 pp21-22).
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and APRA chief Alan Garcia, leading to his eventual exile133. He got support from 
the conservative PPC (Christian Popular Party) and Vargas Llosa's movement 
Libertad (Liberty) in support of his economic policy (Kenney, 1996 p90). Despite 
his movement being in a minority in both houses, Fujimori managed to get most 
of his legislative programme approved and was given extraordinary decree 
powers to facilitate the speed of legislative change. Yet this consensus and co­
operation was accompanied by an anti-system discourse attacking the very 
parties and institutions which were co-operating with him. In a number of 
speeches he attacked Congress members and the judiciary134.
While he reinforced negative images of the Peruvian political elite and 
democratic institutions, he built up a deeper rapport with the people. In the 
traditional State of the Union speech broadcast nation-wide on July 28 1991, 
Peru's national day and at the height of Sendero violence, he contrasted the 
'common sense' held by him and the people against the self-serving motivations 
of 'politicians':
Today, technical criteria is the only criteria which takes primacy in the running of the 
State and the management of Peru's interests, and millions of simple men and women of 
our country know that [ ...] . An authentic revolution is in the depths of this new attitude, 
this new style of government. The return (rédito), calculations and political dividends 
which result from a public work, aren't the reasons for doing them now. The people have 
something called common sense (Fujimori, 1991 cited in Sánchez, 2000 p209).
Fujimori thus presents his policies as pragmatic and technical, wedded and 
derived from the 'common sense' of the people against the self-serving interests 
of parties and traditional politicians135. As Sánchez comments: "The populist 
discourse seems to be reborn here, but not as an argument In favour of a
133 Garcia's fleeing eliminated one of the most serious threats to Fujimori's leadership and the 
neoliberal economic model being implanted by him (Cameron, 1997).
134 Early on in his administration he called the Palace of Justice the 'Palace of Injusticé and 
judges 'jackals' and 'swine' [ca/7a//<35](Burgos, 1992 p9). In August 1990 he attacked Congress 
members as 'loafers' receiving a 'juicy' salary while the people were starving (Planas, 1996 pl88).
135 Furthermore the use of this element links into the Gramscian notion of 'common sense' as the 
basis of 'spontaneous' action which needs to be educated and given 'conscious leadership' (See 
Gramsci, 1971 ppl96-200). It also could be inspired by the routine linking between neoliberal 
restructuring and popular 'common sense' first noted by Hall in his studies of Thatcherism (See 
Ransome,1998 pl24 and Hall and Jacques, 1983).
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popular, corporate and extensive State, but rather as anti-politics, as a 
suspension of competition for a reason of primordial Importance: the defence of 
the State" (ibid. p210).
As a result of this discourse, disagreements between legislature and 
executive increased, with Fujimori gaining credibility with the public while 
democratic institutions lost the little credibility they had. From his inauguration 
right up to the self-coup, there were numerous disagreements between 
legislature and executive: a censure of the Labour Minister Carlos Torres y Torres 
Lara by Congress; disagreements over extra-constitutional pardons granted by 
the President to convicted prisoners; a serious row over the 1991 budget; 
another one over an agreement on drug enforcement signed by the President 
with the US, without Congressional authorisation. The impression was one of a 
Congress which frustrated and blocked the President (Kenney, 1996).
The greatest row developed over the decree powers given to the 
President in June 1991. Fujimori promulgated 117 decrees between June and 
November, and Congress refused approval or changed 28 of those, mostly to do 
with pacification136. Financial decrees rejected or modified included privatisation 
of educational services and mining companies (Ibid. p94). Opposition in Congress 
rallied more as the President intimated a desire to rule for ten years, legally 
prohibited by the 1979 Constitution, and suggested that there were elements 
linked to drug trafficking in Congress (ibid.). A failed motion to disqualify the 
President as morally unfit for office, and Congress granting itself powers over the 
decree laws further heightened the tension (ibid. p95). Despite a comprehensive 
agreement being reached between Government and Congress, due to come into 
effect three days before the coup took place, many suspected that the decision 
to execute the coup had already been taken (Ibid. p96-97).
136 One example was a decree law demanding that everyone must provide information, economic 
or financial resources, goods and services whenever necessary to military personnel in 
emergency zones, or face penalties. Prominent Congress member Javier Diez Canseco described 
these security laws as a "white coup" (cited in Burgos, 1992 plO).
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Meanwhile these Incessant disagreements between institutions and 
executive, and the accompanying discourses, were having an effect on public 
opinion. While Fujimori had not won the battle for the hearts of the public 
entirely, he had managed to 'fix the agenda' (Grompone 1998 p22). Polls showed 
that faith in political parties had fallen from 21% in 1990 to 12% in March 1992, 
in the judicial system from 23% to 14% and in Congress from 45% to 17% (Me 
Clintock, 1996 p57). Fujimori's level of support oscillated at the beginning of his 
tenure, but by September 1991 approval had risen in February 1992 to 64% 
(Apoyo, 2000 p25). Furthermore support for authoritarianism was also rising, 
standing at 22% in September 1991 (Carrion, 1996 p297).
4.3.3 Antagonism and el autogolpe
On the evening of 5 April 1992, the President announced his autogolpe,
followed up by a statement of support from the joint command of the Armed
Forces. Tanks were placed outside the Palace of Justice and Congress,
legislatures were closed, key legislators detained, and key media outlets
occupied. The following day the government issued a decree establishing an
emergency government which would execute a ten point plan to pacify, rebuild
and develop the country (Cameron, 1997 p50)137. In his address to the nation on
April 5, Fujimori had no doubt who was to blame for blocking the march of
progress and reconstruction being carried out by his government: "The present
democratic formality is deceptive, false; its institutions too often serve the
interests of all privileged groups [...] Without a doubt neither the Parliament, nor
the Judicial Power are agents of change nowadays, but rather obstacles to
transformation and progress" (Fujimori, 1992a). It is for him Fujimori, backed by
"the great national majorities", to take up the challenge of the "profound
137 The ten points were: Modifying the present Constitution; Radically 'moralising' the Judicial 
Power1; modernising the public administration; pacifying the country; fighting against drug 
trafficking; punishing the immorality and corruption of public administration; promoting a market 
economy; reorganising the educational system; decentralising the faculties of the Central 
Government; raising living standards in the medium term (Fujimori 1992a).
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transformation of the State and its institutions, so that they may become true 
motors of development and social justice" (ibid.).
In his speech to the nation on 28 July of the same year, Fujimori expands 
on these themes in a more personal and direct manner.
More than once in my office, sitting in this seat from which politicians are capable of 
promising everything, I mean the presidential seat, I've reflected about how this crisis 
came about and in what way we could effectively eradicate all these problems which you 
know well and which are so rooted in this society. It's  a question which a ll Peruvians ask; 
even as President o f the Republic I can't free myself of it, quite the reverse. Who should 
take the decision and take a step forward and say enough to so much corruption, so 
much irresponsibility? Parliament? The Judicial Power? Should the reply so long awaited 
by the people come from them? If it had to be so then we'd be waiting, sitting here for 
five years for a response to the question, a response which the people and I  know will 
never arrive (Fujimori, 1992b cited in Sánchez, 2000 p210-211)(My italics)
In this extract Fujimori joins himself to the 'people' against 'politicians' in a 
simple, direct, homely style (see italics). Fujimori is like and of the people; 
simple, honest, independent, excluded by the elite and the powers-that-be, 
denied by them the right to citizenry, a citizenry granted, however, to the corrupt 
and the criminal:
Because just look at how odd this is: the president and the people can't use the 
Constitution for change, but the Constitution and the Law are used [...] so that 
delinquents of all types and sizes [ todopelaje ytamano\ make a fool of justice. And right 
in front of the noses of the people. Strange democracy this, broad for the sly [ vivos] and 
narrow for the honourable (ibid. p211).
Through this discourse the country Is split into two, the antagonistic polarised 
lines are clearly drawn. As Sánchez comments, on one side "...a reflexive 
president, unambitious, honest, hard working, responsible, just like other citizens 
and a people waiting, sacrificing, who know the truth; both waiting for a justice 
beyond the law. In the other bloc [...] are the politicians and the institutions 
mired in corruption and irresponsibility, who self-lnterestedly use the Constitution 
and the law to evade justice" (ibid. p.211). Sanborn and Panfichl (1996) observe 
that Fujimori created an 'us', a sentiment of closeness, confidence, and
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identification between the leader and the masses which served to support the 
new government, reinforcing it with attacks against the parties and Institutions of 
the democratic regime, blaming them for all the bad that had happened. "[He] 
looked to deinstitutlonalise the norms of political co-existence and personalise 
the expectations of the masses in his person" (p42).
Fujimori, however, did not just use discourse to reinforce this 
leader/people nexus against the power bloc. He was adept at utilising the 
symbols, traditions, and ingenuity of Peru, the forgotten Perus of the sierra and 
the barrio, to further this link. In his original election campaign Fujimori 
displayed all the nous and energy of the informales in achieving on a shoestring
the seemingly Impossible. Fujimori's 1990 election campaign cost US$197,916
compared to FREDEMO's US$12,234,386 (Grompone, 1991). Instead of Vargas 
Llosa's expensive television advertisements created by top publicity firms, 
Fujimori relied on homespun propaganda to popularise his candidacy:
I had my slogan. I myself began to design a poster. Then I started to make almanacs 
[...] with all the calendar of 1990. They just said Cambio 90 and Honesty, Technology, 
Work [the campaign slogan]. I got ten lads together and got them to distribute the 
almanacs in the microbuses [local public transport]. I said to them: give the big almanac 
to the bus driver and a small quantity of the others so they can stick them in the
windows of the bus [...] (Fujimori cited in Salcedo, 1990 p37).
With such strategies Fujimori tapped into the alternative networks identified by 
Grompone (1991) "responding to traditional forms of exchange which followed 
the model of contagion linking together rumour, conversation in markets, streets 
and squares" (p57).
On the campaign trail Fujimori used a makeshift cart pulled by a tractor 
(fujimobilé). On visiting remote areas he'd frequently dress in ponchos and 
chullos (hats with earflaps worn in the Andes), and dance with the locals to 
regional music. His speeches were short, he talked and dressed simply, and 
interacted informally with ordinary people. His use of electronic media was 
equally casual using colloquial language and cracking jokes. He had a talent for
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creating media events: when during the 1991 cholera epidemic 'weeping virgins' 
were appearing in parts of Lima, Fujimori visited one to pray. His style was 
personal and direct: while visiting shantytowns he would throw water at the 
crowd, jump on a bike, or mount a donkey. He would make lightning visits to 
remote villages, which would be broadcast almost nightly on the evening news, 
to supervise construction projects (Oliart, 1996). While there he would ask 
community members what their needs were and promise to send the materials if 
they provided the labour. On the way back to Lima he would instruct his advisers 
to provide those materials immediately138.
Naturally all these events were designed to doubly enforce the 
leader/people relationship, through personal contact and to the wider public 
through the media. "During the first few years of his presidency, when Shining 
Path insurgency was at Its peak, the media portrayed an active president 
travelling throughout the country, supervising public works projects, and 
speaking directly to the people" (ibid. pl9). Fujimori had a hands-on approach, 
he had "done away with cocktail parties" he boasted, he was a 'doer' and asked 
that in return people only trust and support him. His bypassing of the law was 
also reflective of the reality of Peruvian people's lives, where most live in 
informality and bribing is a common and accepted practice (Ibid.).
Jochamowitz portrays a young Fujimori who was distant from, if not 
disdainful of the Creole culture in which this young nisei (Peruvian born 
Japanese) had been brought up: "The national was deceitful, weak, inconstant. 
Yet it was the world In which he had to live, and if he did not learn to know it 
and dominate it, there would be no future" (Jochamowitz 1997 pl45). As Oliart 
points out Fujimori did exactly this: "His style revealed [his] profound, if intuitive, 
understanding of Peruvian political culture" (op. cit. pl8). While he was an 
outsider ethnically, culturally and politically he had nonetheless learnt to know 
and dominate Peru better than many white Creole Peruvians who had
138 Interview Rosa Maria Alfaro. Conducted in Lima 28.06.02
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complained of his 'not being born to a mother who could speak Spanish'139. 
President Fujimori showed that he was neither afraid of Peru, nor had Peruvians 
reason to be afraid of him. By visiting marginalised areas Fujimori reassured poor 
Peruvians with two convincing messages: "I am where you are" and "I am a 
president like you" (Grompone, 1998 p21). Fujimori became Peru, became the 
Peruvian people, linked together through the greatness of God and the Patriar.
For God, in whom the majority of men and women in this country believe, I swear to 
work to take it out of stagnation [...] and guide it to superior destinies. But I do not wish 
for the loneliness of a leader who thinks himself a Messiah, but rather the powerful 
company of my people, their closeness, because only that will remind me that I am just 
another Peruvian who has, as his only privilege, the responsibility to govern. God 
illuminate the people of Peru and illuminate me to take on this great but beautiful task 
[...]. (Fujimori, 1990: paragraphs 85-88 cited in Sánchez, 2000 p215).
However, Oliart warns that: "[I]n general, Fujimori symbolically fulfils the 
strong desire of Peru's historically excluded majorities to be included in the 
political system. He does not, however, pretend to incorporate the poor in 
governmental decision-making, or even to encourage them to strengthen their 
own self-help organisations. The style of his presidency - coupled with the 
substance of his economic and social policies - reassures the upper classes that 
his government will protect their interests. At no time does Fujimori's relationship 
with his country's impoverished majority threaten the status quo" (Oliart, 1996 
pl9).
4.3.4 Codifying hegemony
With Inflation now down at manageable figures and an element of
economic stability beginning to be felt in the country140, the decision to launch
the autogolpe, on April 5 1992, was met with resounding approval from the
139 Enrique Chirinos Soto, member of Fredemo (cited in Degregori, 1991 p89). Indeed in being 
such an outsider Fujimori had more in common with the Indigenous of the Sierra and the choios 
of the barrios than white Creoles. Furthermore like Fujimori, many members of these groups also 
had mothers who did not speak Spanish, but rather Quechua or Aymara or any of the plethora of 
native tongues found in the jungles of Peru.
140 Inflation was reduced from 7,650% In 1990 to 139% in 1991 and 56.7% in 1992 (Gonzales de 
Olarte, 1998 pl4).
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population. Fujimori's approval rating in one poll soared from 53% in March to 
81% in April, 1992 and would remain above 60% for the rest of the year (Apoyo,
2000 p25). Fujimori took advantage of his position and began to implement his 
ten-point plan, ruling by decree with the full support of the Armed Forces, 
concentrating all the powers of the state in his hands. In the following weeks he 
dismantled the judiciary, sacking thirteen Supreme Court judges and more than 
100 lower-court judges and prosecutors, and he moved ahead to establish secret 
military tribunals to try suspected terrorists (Klaren, 2000 p414). Neoliberal 
policies of privatisation, structural reforms and the reduction of the State under 
Carlos Bolona as Minister of Finance (1991-1993) were implemented more 
speedily and, due to the autogolpe w th virtually no opposition141.
Opposition to the coup did come, however, from the international 
community, including the United States, who threatened to withdraw economic 
co-operation. Fujimori nonetheless managed to dispel that opposition at an OEA 
meeting in the Bahamas in May 1992, by promising elections for a Constituent 
Assembly for the following November. "This seemed to satisfy the international 
community, which seemed to be more concerned over the threat of the Shining 
Path, the progress of drug trafficking, and the prospects of economic 
liberalisation than over the setback to democracy"(ibid.). Meanwhile Fujimori had 
carte blanche to rule as he saw fit and design the elections in such a way as to 
assure his continued power.
While discourse had set the context in which the autogolpe received 
popular approval, It was the autogolpe, the war of manoeuvre tactic par 
excellence, which sealed the primacy of Fujimori as hegemonic ruler of Peru. The 
organisation of the elections (Tuesta Soldevllla,1996; McCllntock, 1996), the 
main parties boycott of them, and the president's undoubted popularity ensured 
a generous majority for the government benches, and consequently a
141 This reinforced the perception that it was the implementation of structural reform in a speedy 
manner was the real reason for the autogolpe and not a result of Fujimori's inherent 
authoritarianism (Conaghan, 1996) (Ellner, 2003).
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Constitution designed according to the needs and vision of the President. The 
government bloc, this time called Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría (Change 90/New 
Majority) had few links with the grassroots and the previous fujimorista electoral 
grouping consisting of ex-ministers, ministerial assessors, and associated 
businessmen and women (Planas, 1996 pl95). In effect Fujimori's real 'party' 
became the State itself and a number of key often unelected assessors. The 
Armed Forces, the Army's national intelligence agency (SIN), led by the 
unelected Vladimir Montesinos, and the President's brother Santiago Fujimori 
became the bulwarks of the regime (ibid.).
The 1993 Constitution definitively codified the centralisation of the State 
into the hands of the executive and its socio-economic nature from a Statist 
model, based on the reforms carried out during the Velasco regime (1968-1973) 
to one based on the market. Adrianzén described the 1993 Constitution as 
"conservative, privatist, authoritarian and ideological" (Adrianzén, 1993 plO). 
According to this analyst It was conservative due its eradication of explicit 
paragraphs guaranteeing solidarity and egalitarian principles for all groups142. It 
was privatist due to the elimination or relativisation of social rights in health, 
housing, education, and work, it's explicit prohibition of State participation in 
economic activity, and in its granting of greater rights to business than to 
workers. It was authoritarian in its accentuation of presidential and military 
prerogatives, the President being allowed to dissolve parliament, control senior 
Armed Forces promotions, decide exclusively on public spending, and crucially 
allowing presidential re-election. Representation was drastically curtailed, and 
centralisation in the executive even further advanced, with the reduction of 
Parliament to one chamber and the practical elimination of régionalisation143. 
Finally Adrianzén argues the Constitution was Ideological in that it provided a
142 The 1993 Constitution does sanction discrimination on the basis of religion, race, sex, etc but 
it is not "clear, precise and even repetitive to prevent interpretations which ran devalue the spirit 
of the norm" (ibid plO).
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model of society entirely based on the ideology of the market and private 
interest, giving for example free competition full constitutional guarantees and 
thus "legitimising and legalising the implantation of a savage capitalism" 
(Adrlanzen, 1992)144.
Nonetheless while Fujimori had undoubtedly secured full control of the 
State apparatus, and eliminated or neutralised opposition, such as the parties, 
the trade unions and sectors of the media, the Peruvian population still 
demonstrated a qualified approval for the President and his plans. The vote 
approving the referendum was won by a slight margin in favour of 52.2% 
against a no vote of 47.5%, amidst accusations of fraud (Me Clintock, 1996 p72). 
Furthermore in a poll taken In 1994 47% of those polled and only 34% of those 
on low Income said they supported the government's privatisation policy 
(Grompone, 1998 p22)145. Nonetheless the capturing of Abimael Guzman leader 
of Sendero Luminoso in September 1992, and the subsequent decline in terrorist 
activity boosted the President's popularity146. In the same poll mentioned above 
the President's personal approval rating stood at 61%. Furthermore, Fujimori 
ensured his popularity by launching an intensive, highly personalised welfare and 
infrastructural campaign targeting the poorest areas to ensure support. Central 
government took control of local spending creating a situation of cllentelism 
dependent on the president himself, further personalising local politics around 
the presidential figure (Degregorl, Coronel and del Pino, 1998). Local politics
143 The Peruvian parliament became a unicameral legislature with 120 seats, reducing 
representation from 1 seat per 26,963 electors to a ratio of 1:102,537 (Tuesta Soldevilla, 1996 
pl40).
144 The Constitution also had elements which strengthened popular democracy such as 
referendums, legislative initiatives for citizens, revocatory referendums, the right to information 
from the State, and a People's Defender. A Constitutional Court was also provided for. However 
most of these provisions were never acted on, were delayed in their implementation, and then 
destroyed when delivering against presidential decisions such as the Constitutional Court or, as in 
the case of the referendum against a third term for Fujimori in 1996, were quashed. Only the 
People's Defender's Office managed to be implemented, albeit only in 1996, and it became one 
of the few effective independent State institutions (See Chapter 4 for more details).
145 A trend which has became stronger as time went by and which at present is one of the 
principal difficulties of the present democratic regime in Peru, under President Alejandro Toledo.
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thus became a battle not for ideas but for who had best access to the 
government and centralised funds, with deleterious effects on electoral plurality 
(Planas, 1996).
Nevertheless, despite this centralisation and the degradation and 
atomisation of politics to personalisation and labelling, Fujimori had essentially 
delivered what he had promised. From 1992 until 1995, with inflation and 
terrorist attacks diminishing rapidly, and economic growth rates rising 
spectacularly (see Chapter 5), Fujimori could justifiably boast, by the time he 
was re-elected in 1995 (see Chapter 4), that he had achieved his objectives, but 
in his own style which was nonetheless a ¡a peruansr.
[...] every time I visit [a shanty town or remote village], the people there, who want a 
president like themselves, put a chullo and a poncho on me. Some people think that this 
is corny [huachafo], a Chink with a poncho on! But that's my style.
The new nationalism of Peru is the nationalism of peace reconquered, of integration and 
opportunity for all and the recognition of one of the most forgotten axis of our 
nationality: the Andean. That is the nationalism of no-exclusion.
[...] We want to be modern without sacrificing our own, universal and autochthonous at 
the same time. This is the modernity and the true democracy to which all Peruvians 
aspire (Fujimori, 1995: paras 12, 14, 18 cited in Sánchez, 2000 p219).
Thus curiously Fujimori's discourse went full circle to his original electoral
discourse of 1990, emphasising the national and the ethnic, in a context of 
modernity and universality.
4.3.5 Conclusion
To sum up Fujimori's power strategy displays all the elements identified in
the framework of hegemonic strategies derived from Gramsci's theory on
hegemony and theory on populism. 'War of position' and 'war of manoeuvre' 
tactics were Interwoven to achieve hegemonic domination by Fujimori and his
146 Subversive actions declined from a peak of approximately 3000 in 1992 to just over 1000 in 
mid 1995 (Tanaka, 2002 p49).
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associates. As Laclau (1977) termed it the people/power bloc dichotomy was 
fully exploited through an antagonistic discourse forming a leader/people nexus 
against the dominant power bloc, devoid of organisational structures 
encouraging participation. Nationalism and modernity were articulated to a 
neoliberal ideology through symbolism and language. This discourse was 
delivered through media and direct personal contact, wedded to policy initiatives 
favouring the poorest sections of Peruvian society, thus achieving hegemonic 
domination of these sectors. Antagonistic opposition was neutralised or 
eradicated through policy agreements with some sectors, repression of others, 
and clientellsm and distrlbutivlsm. Macro and micro control of the State 
apparatus was achieved through both legal and illegal methods, legislative 
decrees, the self-coup and the 1993 Constitution, corresponding to Gramsd's 
concept of 'war of manoeuvre'. By 1995 Fujimori's hegemony was fully 
established. Not only did the president win the election handsomely with 64% of 
the vote, with the traditional parties APRA, AP, PPC and IU receiving less than 
10% of the vote between them (Tanaka, 2002 pl39), but support for the 
president had spread across all social sectors (Dietz and Dugan, 1996 p266). The 
next section will examine similar tactics in the hegemonic strategy of Hugo 
Chávez in Venezuela, however, as we shall see, there are important 
organisational, discursive and ideological differences between both presidents.
4.4 War of position' and 'war of manoeuvre' tactics in the hegemonic 
strategy of Hugo Chávez: "Con Chávez Manda el Pueblo" 147
4.4.1 Introduction
Fujimori and Chávez have both been identified as 'outsiders' in the sense 
of extra-systemic actors who achieve power from outside the traditional party
147 "With Chavez the People Rule". Campaign slogan for 2000 Election Campaign.
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system148. However, as Buxton (2000) points out Chávez does not fit that 
description as accurately as Fujimori, as the former was linked to the old regime 
- albeit from a position of opposition, whereas the latter emerged onto the 
national stage only with the 1990 elections (p32). While Chávez initially came to 
public prominence with the 1992 coup attempt, his association with politics goes 
beyond this date. I will look firstly therefore at the origins of Chávez and the 
Bolivarian Movement. I will then go on to examine the coup of February 1992, 
the emergence and construction of Chávez's discourse and symbolism, and the 
subsequent transformation of the military Movimiento Boiivariano Republicano 
200/MBR-200 (Bolivarian Republican Movement) into the electoral and popular 
civic-military Movimiento Quinta Republica/MVR Fifth Republic Movement), which 
allied to other leftist movements and parties in the Polo Patriótico -  PP (Patriotic 
Pole) led to Chávez's electoral victory of 1998. In the final part of this section I 
will examine how Chávez set about reordering and refounding the Venezuelan 
Republic through the mechanism of the Assamblea Nacional Constituyente/ANC 
(National Constituent Assembly) and the resulting Bolivarian Constitution of 
1999, codifying the leader/people nexus and establishing an incipient hegemony 
over the Venezuelan state and much of civil society. This hegemony was 
strengthened amongst the popular classes as the Chávez discourse became 
centred on attacking the better-off sectors, but alienated some middle groups 
who abandoned the Chávez coalition and allied themselves with the elites in 
outright opposition and eventual sedition. The bones of the multiple fractures 
and dualisms of Venezuelan society have thus been laid bare by the Chávez 
discourse, creating an antagonistic political polarisation in the country centring 
on the figure of the president.
148 See for example Tanaka (2002). Ellner (2003 pl8) points out however that socio-economically 
Chavez was more of an outsider than Fujimori, the latter pertaining to the middle and upper- 
classes, whilst Chavez is ethnically and socio-economically more akin to the pardo majority in 
Venezuela.
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4.4.2 Clandestine genesis
The return to power of AD in 1958 as part of a civilian/military coup
against the Peréz Jimenez regime left the Venezuelan left in the political 
wilderness as Betancourt achieved its exclusion from politics through the Punto 
Fijo pact. The aggressive Betancourt anti-communist policy149led to many on the 
left, civilians and military, to revolt against the government150. Chávez emerged 
from this revolutionary leftist tradition, and some members of the Chávez 
government participated in these movements and insurrections, such as All 
Rodrigúez Araque151. Furthermore other important leftist figures from this era 
would join up with Chávez, such as Luis Miquilena erstwhile right hand man of 
Chávez and vice-president José Vincente Rangel. Contacts were made over the 
years with various leftist leaders such as famed guerrilla leader Douglas Bravo, 
and senior members of leftist trade union party La Causa R, such as Pablo 
Medina, both of whom now firmly oppose the Chávez government (López Maya, 
2003/Gott, 2001)152.
The Chávez family not only had connections with the left through brother 
Adán Chávez153 but also the family province of Barinas, was situated in the 
llanos, or plains of the Orinoco basin, a long time centre of popular revolt of 
pardo egalitarianism against the hispanicised elites of Caracas and the coast. 
Chávez's grandfather was Maisanta or General Pedro Peréz Delgado (1881- 
1924), a colourful guerrilla leader and local caudillo. Maisanta, Ezequiel Zamora
149 On the same day Betancourt effected the new Constitution, the government suspended its 
guarantees (Francia,2000 p73). Carlos Andrés Peréz, then Interior Minister, and against whom 
Chávez would effect a coup in 1992 during his second presidential term (1989-1993), warned: 
"Any insurrectional action, street disturbance, illegal strike will be repressed with severity" 
(Rodriguez, A, 2001pl03-104).
150 It was said that during the entire Betancourt presidency there were 22 coups against him 
(Rodriguez, A, 2001:104). The two principal coups were known as the Campanazo and the 
Porteñazo during the period May-June 1962 (ibid:see pp.103-123 for details on both coups).
151 President of PDVSA, Minister of Energy and Mines, President of OPEC on different occasions.
152 By the turn of the 1980s the following leftist intellectuals were contacted all of whom would at 
some time or other would occupy positions in Chávez's government after 1998: Luis Miquilena, 
Manuel Quijada, Lino Martínez, José Vincente Rangel, and Omar Mezza as well as university 
figures such as Luis Fuenmayor, Héctor Navarro, Jorge Giordani, Trino Alcides Diaz, and Adina 
Bastidas (López Maya, 2003 p76).
153 Interview with Magarita López Maya, conducted in Caracas, April 2002.
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(see below), leader of the federalist side in the Federal War (1859-1863) and 
President General Velasco Alvarado of Peru (1968-1973), all military men and 
mestizos like himself, are central to the identity and beliefs of Chávez (López 
Maya, 2003/Gott, 2001).
The military in Venezuela were particularly well placed to sympathise with 
the problems facing the poorer sectors of society. Firstly the Venezuelan military 
had a long history of involvement in Venezuelan politics until Punto Fijo. 
Secondly the Venezuelan military had a stronger egalitarian tradition than many 
other Armed Forces in Latin America (Müller Rojas, 2001 pl7). This was partly 
due to it's strong tradition of social mobility for young men from poorer sectors, 
further added to by liberal educational programmes, such as the Andrés Bello 
Plan, introduced in 1971 allowing future officers the opportunity to take civilian 
degrees in Venezuela's universities (López Maya, 2003 p76). Chávez himself was 
one of the first graduates of this plan and went on to take a Masters degree in 
Political Science at the Simon Bolivar University in Caracas. Such educational 
plans facilitated a greater awareness of social situations of the poorer sectors 
amongst army personnel, especially in a context of crisis, and greater association 
with civilians (ibid.).
In 1982 Chávez began to organise the MBR-200 with fellow officers, such 
as Jesús Urdaneta Hernández and Felipe Acosta Carles, swearing under a 
symbolic tree to uphold the values of the Motherland and the military and to 
fight against corruption (López Maya, 2003 p75)154. The Caracazo of February 
1989 (see previous chapter), especially the experience of having participated in 
the massacre of civilians, encouraged many more soldiers to seek out and join 
the MBR-200. In the words of Chávez: "Young soldiers (...) were not disposed to
154 The oath was taken from a quote by Bolivar: "We will not allow our arms to relax, nor our 
souls to rest, until we have broken the chains that oppress our people because of the will of the 
powerful..." (Chávez Frías, 1993 p. 15). The Movement was originally called EB-200 or Ejercito 
Bolivariano-200 (Bolivarian Army-200) "with objectives strictly limited to the military area". One 
of the original founders, Felipe Acosta died in the caracazo. As a result of the caracazo the name 
was changed to MBR-200 and the nature to a "civic-military movement with political objectives 
sketched within the insurrectional strategy"(ibid p.6).
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endure the opprobrious role of a praetorian guard for an illegal and illegitimate 
order. Even less were we prepared to permit that we be converted into an 
occupation force in our own territory" (Chávez Frías, 1993 p. 16). Contacts with 
civilian groups, as described above, intensified as disenchantment with the Punto 
Fijo regime amongst all sectors grew in the wake of the Caracazo, and these 
groups sought solutions and alternatives more urgently, to the economic decline 
of Venezuela and the neoliberal programmes being put in place by Carlos Andrés 
Pérez (Gott, 2001 pp62-63). The MBR-200 therefore grew within a general 
context of dissatisfaction with the existing regime and an active seeking of 
alternatives by most sectors of Venezuelan society155.
In the end the coup of February 4, 1992, failed in achieving its objectives 
in Caracas, led by Chávez, but the actions in Maracaibo (led by Arias Cardenas), 
Aragua and Valencia succeeded, prompting Chávez to request a short television 
appearance to advise his colleagues to lay down their arms. This brief, instantly 
famous television appearance by Chávez created a new hero amongst the 
popular classes. In the speech Chávez advised his colleagues that:
"Unfortunately, for the moment, the objectives we had set ourselves have not been 
achieved in the capital...new possibilities will arise again and the country will be able to 
move definitively to a better future... I thank you for your loyalty, I thank you for your 
courage, your selfless generosity: before the country and you, I alone shoulder the 
responsibility for this Bolivarian military uprising" (Chávez cited in Gott, 2001 p70-71) 
(my italics).
The phrase, "for the moment" {por ahora) and its promise of change and 
Chávez's preparedness to accept responsibility for something that had gone 
wrong, an unusual occurrence in a country accustomed to politicians evading 
blame, particularly impressed Venezuelans (ibid. p71). The phrase por ahora and 
the red beret of the parachute uniform worn by Chávez during the television 
speech became powerful symbols in his growing constituency of supporters
155 Müller Rojas (2001) identifies four movements orientated to the taking of power in Venezuela 
at this time: one originating in the upper elite, another in marginalised pardo sectors, a third
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amongst the popular classes in the months after the coup, and remain so to this 
day156. A further failed coup in November of the same year, this time amongst 
the upper ranks of the Air Force and Navy led by Admiral Hernán Grüber, would 
mortally wound the Peréz government, leading to the president's eventual 
impeachment and further encouraging pressure for change.
4.4.3 Bolivarian ideology and discourse
But what sort of changes were Chávez and his colleagues looking for
when they conspired to capture the Venezuelan State? The military personnel
participating in the February 1992 coup justified their action by pointing to the
lack of democratic accountability and inclusion in the Republic, and of territorial
and economic sovereignty. Furthermore they accused the political class of being
more concerned with personal gain, through corruption, than the welfare of the
people or the Republic. The people meanwhile were being placed deeper in
poverty, facing increasing crime and related violence, and, as evidenced in the
caracazo, State perpetrated violence aimed at eliminating protest (MBR-200,
1992). The military were demoralised and delegitimised due to this situation, and
corruption and nepotism within its ranks. The insurgents called for a Constituent
National Assembly, providing a new Constitution and a new model of society in
which the "ultimate purpose of the State is the achievement of collective social
welfare of the Nation and the guarantee of respect for the human dignity of all
and every one of the members of that Nation" (ibid. p.2). Those who
participated in the looting of the State, however, would not be free to participate
in this new societal model, and they warn that if this change does not come
about "nothing or nobody can stop the continuation of expansive conflicts, which
(...) could lead to civil war (...)" (ibid. p 10).
amongst the middle sectors, and the last a Marxist inspired movement originating in labour 
(p27).
155 Francia (2000) reports that in the Carnivals of that year immediately after the coup many of 
the "sons of the people came down [from the barrios] disguised as Chavez" and graffiti 
supporting Chavez began to appear spontaneously (p83).
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Over the following years the MBR-200, and in particular Chavez, refined 
their thinking and ideology in countless pamphlets and writings, despite their 
being in prison until 1994, when the government of Rafael Caldera (1994-1999) 
pardoned them. The MBR-200's ideology was formed in order to provide a 
system of thinking specifically Venezuelan and Latin American, rather than one 
based on imported ideologies. Spurning the diagnostic of the time purported by 
Fukuyama and others of the end of history and ideologies, but conscious of the 
failure of communism and the inapplicability of neoliberalism in Venezuela and 
Latin America, Chavez and the MBR-200 turned to the thinking and teachings of 
three major figures from Venezuelan history to form the concept of the "three 
rooted tree": Ezequiel Zamora (see above), and Simon Rodriguez, educator, 
friend and mentor to the final member of the trinity, the Liberator, Simon Bolivar. 
Each figure provided a specific element to the new ideology: Zamora the element 
of rebellion, popular protest and protagonism, summed up in the slogan 
attributed to him: "Land and free men! Popular elections! Horror to the 
oligarchy!"; Rodriguez the requirement for autochthonous ideological originality 
when he warned that "either we invent or we commit errors (...) America should 
not servilely imitate, but be original"; and Bolivar, the Liberator, the symbol of 
equilibrium between the dualism of rebellion and ideology, force and consent 
(MBR-200/Pirela Romero, 1994).
Central and crucial to this ideology is the concept of 'el pueblo', the 
people. Chavez qualified "popular protagonism as the fuel of history" (Chavez 
Frias, 1994 p.3) and only when this protagonism exists is a people truly el 
pueblo. "A people exist when they share customs and an effective process of 
communication exists between them (...) a collective spirit and a consciousness 
of the social, or the common existence" (ibid., p4). However, "[there] isn't a 
people in all eras [because to be a people they] must have and share glories in 
their past [and](...) they must have a common will that unites them" (Chavez,
1999 cited in Francia 2000 p72). The Venezuelan people specifically are a true 
people, a people who have shown, and are capable once again of greatness:
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"(...) we are one of the liberating peoples of the world, we are a people of creators, of 
poets, of fighters, of warriors, of workers, there's history to prove it, let's honour it, let's 
honour the spirit of our aborigines, of our liberators, or our women, of our youth [...], all 
of that we have in our veins and in the clay from which we were made, let us show it, it 
is the moment to show it" (Chavez Frias, 2000 p21).
Leadership is vital to achieve the necessary protagonism lying dormant in the 
people, so that the people become a people actively struggling. Chavez rejects 
the notion of the caudillo, the leader/masses model put forward by many of his 
critics157. Leadership must be provided in order to galvanise the collective into 
action, but the leader is but a conduit. The people are an "unleashed force, 
equal to the rivers" being channelled by leaders such as Chavez because either 
"we provide a course for that force, or that force will pass over us" (ibid. p. 17). 
Chavez is "not a cause, but a consequence" (ibid. p 18), "an instrument of the 
collective" (ibid. p.23). Leadership is multiple and is part of a greater movement, 
in which "there is a leadership which has been extending on a number of levels, 
there is a popular force, there are some very strong parties, there are 
institutions; it would be a sad revolutionary or political process which depended 
on one man (...)" (Chavez interviewed in Rojas, 2004).
4.4.4 Structure and organisation
Organisation therefore is essential if the Bolivarian movement is to be an
agent for radical change. The movement must be an "articulatory organisation
with the masses, a mobilising and unifying force" (MBR-200, no date, p5).
Alliances should be built with heterogeneous social forces, such as workers,
resident and neighbourhood communities, students, ethnic minorities, peasants,
small and medium business enterprises, sectors of the Armed Forces, progressive
churches, nationalist business sectors, and organised popular forces (ibid.). "The
vanguard should be internal and of the masses, it must emerge from their
interior (...). It is (...) an organisation which must stimulate the diverse
157 See for example Carrasquera and Welsch (2001); Kaplan (2001); Koeneke (2000)
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autonomous forms of expression of society (...) it (...) must stimulate autonomy, 
discussion, and political and ideological creativity" (ibid. p6). The MBR-200 thus 
developed an organisational structure with four levels; beginning with grassroots 
groupings called 'Bolivarian Circles' which are essentially self-selected discussion 
and activity groups, similar to cells. These groups then elect municipal and in 
turn regional directorates, which in turn answer to a five-member National 
Directorate, again self-selected and led by Chavez, supported by secretariats for 
each policy area. Assemblies are held on a regional and national level to arrive 
at consensus on major policy issues; it was in this way that the MBR-200 
decided, in 1997, to abandon abstentionism and participate in the 1998 elections 
(Lopez Maya, 2003).
The MVR was created originally as a parallel organisation with purely 
electoral aims allowing for wider membership based on support for Chavez's 
candidacy. Nonetheless the resounding success of the MVR in winning several 
electoral contests from 1998 onwards "led to the MBR-200 not having a role and 
its eventual disappearance" (Lopez Maya, 2003 p83). Structurally the MVR 
retained the essential features of the pyramidical organisation of the MBR-200, 
starting at the bases with Patriotic Circles, rather than Bolivarian Circles, which 
continued to exist and remained under the control of the President, and 
consisting of four entities on each of the four levels, parochial or local, municipal, 
regional and national. On each level there is an executive directorate with 
secretariats on each policy area158, patriotic councils which meet once a year, an 
extended directorate which meets every three months, and a patriotic assembly 
meeting every three years (MVR, 2000). The purpose of the MVR besides being 
an electoral vehicle is to act "as a cultural organisation capable of diffusing and 
ideologically legitimising its project in the whole society; a space for political 
participation and orientation (...) and a pedagogic institution directed at training
158 Secretariats are in the following areas: organisation, finance, mobilisation, media, 
propaganda, alliances, training, international affairs, electoral policy, planning and projects, 
women, youth, parliamentary policy (ibid).
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political and social leaders (...)"(ibid. p.8) providing study circles and courses on 
all levels. The MVR therefore is a nationally organised institution with ideological, 
political and pedagogical aims, with communication channels going both from the 
top down and vice versa.
In this it differs little from classic party organisation rather than the 
original conception of political organisation as it claimed, building on previous 
efforts of popular organisation in the country. The MVR for the purposes of the
1998 elections onwards formed the Patriotic Pole with other political parties, such 
as MAS (Movimiento ai Socialismo/ Movement to Socialism), the PPT (Patria Para 
7"0otos/Motherland for All), the PCV (Partido Comunista l/e e^zo/ o^/Venezuelan 
Communist Party) etc as "a wide alliance of alternative forces" (López Maya, 
2003 p 84).
Past and present are indisolubly linked in the struggles of the people to 
gain their liberation. Chávez sees the present struggle as but a continuation of 
previous historical popular struggles.
"(We) are in a battleground (...) where an historical conflict has broken out with fury. Or 
to be more exact, it has broken out once again after many years of apparent calm, 
between the forces of domination which have attached themselves to the national body 
since the conquest, and the liberating forces which have always existed in the bosom of 
the exploited and deceived majorities for 500 years" (Chávez Frías, 1993 pi).
But the past is also a resource for the present, and Venezuelans today are like 
Janus, having to "look to the past in order to disentangle the mysteries of the 
future, to create the formulae to solve the great Venezuelan dream of today" 
(Chávez Frías, 2000 p 8).
Punto Fijismo was but another version of the same old model based "on 
imposition, on domination, on exploitation, and on extermination" (Chávez in 
MBR-200, 1996 p4). The most recent incarnations of the model, in the 
presidencies of Pérez and Caldera
"are inscribed within a transnational political project which, in alliance with powerful 
national sectors, is increasing its offensive throughout the continent with a fetishistic
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discourse of the free market, individualist liberty and competition, behind which is hiding 
the desire to recuperate and consolidate (...) the hegemony of a model of accumulation, 
threatened for various decades now with a declining rate of utilisation and benefit" (ibid. 
P 5).
In its stead the MVR and the Chávez government offers an alternative which is 
fundamentally political and which places the social above the economic, and 
which is Venezuelan and Latin American in its ideology and practice. The 
Bolivarian doctrine is a doctrine in construction, a heterogeneous amalgam of 
thoughts and ideologies, from universal thought, capitalism, Marxism, but 
rejecting the neoliberal models currently being imposed in Latin America and the 
discredited socialist and communist models of the old Soviet Bloc (Blanco Muñoz, 
1998). However, the model being proposed is firmly capitalist, not "savage 
neoliberal capitalism" but a "capitalism with another face, with other mechanisms 
(which)(...) is equitable and gets to all Venezuelans, rather than what has 
occurred in those years (...) causing poverty, and the great squalor that exists in 
Venezuela" (Chávez in Croes, 1999).
4.4.5 'La Constituyente'
The process, however, as stated above, is essentially political rather than
economic or social, and the central mechanism is the refounding of the Republic
through a National Constituent Assembly (ANC)(Constituyente), in order to
demolish the "putrid bases" of the old order, the republic of "bankers, of
oligarchs and a people hungry and massacred"(Chávez in Croes, 1997 plO). On
assuming the presidency Chávez's first act was to declare a referendum,
announced in his inaugural speech in February 1999,and having won that, install
a Constituyente which was elected on a first past the post system and
overwhelmingly dominated by the PP, with 125 seats as opposed to 6 for the
opposition. The Constitution was drafted in three months, after an intense
period of public consultation and discussion, dominated by tensions and
opposition from many sectors. Much of this opposition was, like in Peru, based
on the negation of the legitimacy of people's motivations in voting for Chávez,
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that the vote was the product of an emotionalism uninformed by rational 
thought. This betrays a marked classism and therefore racism in opposition logic, 
considering that the majority of those who support Chávez are from the popular
sectors and therefore of darker skin, not to mention a disregard for 
democracy159.
Nonetheless, Tanaka (2001 pl55) notes that the ANC was constituted 
with over 50 per cent abstention, while López Maya (2003 p85) states that "(the) 
haste in dealing with such complex and delicate concerns [in the Constituyente?] 
generated ambiguities in the final text and resulted in dissatisfaction and 
tensions", both factors wresting some legitimacy from the final document. 
Furthermore, despite declaring the previous 1961 Constitution 'moribund' much 
of the 1999 Constitution built on its precepts (Viciano Pastor and Martinez 
Dalmau, 2001 pl74). The 1999 Constitution, however, was approved in a 
referendum by 71 % of the vote but once again with abstention of over 50 %.
The purpose of the Constituyente was as an "alternative route to power" 
for the movement, providing the context in which the movement could grow and 
consolidate itself, and "for the great qualitative and quantitative transformations 
that Venezuela needs"(MBR-200, no page no; no date 1995?). The process 
would provide the stimulus necessary for popular participation and political 
organisation. Through this process the necessary solutions for the social, 
economic and cultural difficulties of Venezuela would flow. Chávez in his 
inaugural speech qualified the existing 1961 Constitution as "moribund" and 
Punto Fijismo an "ill-fated political model" which will "die"(Chávez Frías, 2000
159 Carmona Estanga (1998) wrote for example, that "people don't understand the Constituyente 
but simply emotionally follow the candidate that is promoting it". Francia (2000 pp 109-111) 
gives further examples of this, where the vote for Chávez is considered an 'emotional' vote, while 
votes against him are considered 'rational'. Similarly Julio Borges, leader of political party Primero 
Justicia (Justice First), qualifies those who vote for Chávez as people who are 'inhabitants' not 
'citizens' implying that they acted without thinking (Gomez, E, 2002). With regard to Chávez's 
social base, one poll found that in the 2000 elections 50.5 % of socioeconomic sector E voted for 
Chávez as opposed to 24 % for Arias Cardenas, his principal opponent and ex-co-conspirator in 
the 1992 coup, while 66.7 % of socioeconomic groups A/B voted for the latter (Subero, C. 2000). 
For the connection between race and class In Venezuela see previous chapter.
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p20). The new Constitution would instead place the people of Venezuela as the 
true sovereign of the Nation "a universal and elemental principle" (ibid.). An 
Enabling Law and the Constituent Assembly rather than being a panacea, 
however, has "a fundamental objective which is the transformation of the State 
and the creation of a new Republic, the refounding of the Republic, the 
relegitimation of democracy [...] It's political, it's macropolitical but it is not 
economic nor social in the immediate term" which will take time to solve as the 
problems inherited are "terrible"(ibid. p24). However, in the end the process of 
the Constituyente would lead to the return of the "collective mentality", to a 
"return (of) the idea of utopia to the national mind, that is to say, of a country 
which begins to exist in the collective imagination" (Chávez Frías, 1993 pli).
The Constituyente was therefore to be a product of popular participation 
which would further that participation to make it protagonistic, to create the 
"active people" discussed above. In the event, Gaudilla Marquéz (2003) finds 
that the process did have a high level of popular participation from civil society. 
Furthermore, within the text there were many clauses which furthered the ideal 
of "participation and protagonism", through direct democracy mechanisms such 
as popular assemblies, referendums, revocatory elections etc. As López Maya 
(2003) observes the 1999 Constitution provides a different focus on democracy 
and inclusion than that found in the past in Venezuela, and went against the 
grain of neoliberalism which emphasises the reduction of the political in favour of 
the economic and procedural (Title I, Chapter VIII). Furthermore human rights 
were brought up to date and widened (Title III) including for the first time those 
of the indigenous minorities (Title I, Chapter VIII). Again running against 
neoliberal thinking, the universal character of social rights were preserved and 
extended (Chapter V, arts. 86, 87 and 88). The Constitution prohibits the sale of 
actions in the State oil company PDVSA and guarantees State control of the 
social security system. New institutions were introduced in the form of the
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Electoral and Citizen Powers160, as well as the more traditional Executive, 
Legislative and Judicial powers. Yet a number of Constitutional clauses 
strengthened executive power similar to the Peruvian 1993 Constitution. The 
presidential period was extended from five to six years, with the possibility of re- 
election being introduced for one more period. There is increased centralisation 
with less autonomy for regional and municipal powers, and a one chamber 
Congress (Lander and Lopez Maya, 2000). Alvarez (2003) points out that while 
the innovatory direct democracy mechanisms "opened channels for direct 
participation [of the people] at the same time [the Constitution] enhanced the 
power of the national executive" at the expense of the other branches of 
government and the political parties (pl55)161. Indeeed Norden (1993) qualified 
the process which led to the Constitution of 1999 and the new powers in the 
Constitution as a coup in all but name, albeit a legaleoup (p93).
4.4.6 Hegemony nearly secured...
Fresh general elections, the so-called Megaelections were held in July
2000 under the new Constitution, resulting once again in a victory for Chavez 
and the PP, with the President now being elected until 2006162. Opposition up 
until now had been strong but reasonably contained, complaints centring mainly 
on procedural aspects of the implementation of the Constitution, in particular the 
appointments to the Moral Power offices, which contradicted the central 
Constitutional principle of popular participation (See PROVEA, 2001). However, it 
was the passing of the 49 Enabling Laws in November 2001, which introduced
160 The Electoral Power is comprised of the National Electoral Power (CNE) as regulating entity, 
under which is the National Electoral Junta (JNE), the Commission of Civil and Electoral Registry, 
and the Commission for Political Participation and Financing. The Moral Power is integrated by 
the Republican Moral Council, comprising the Defender of the People (Ombudsman), the Public 
Prosecutor, and Comptroller General (Viciano Pastor and Martinez Dalmau, 2001pp 199-203).
161 Indeed political parties are not mentioned in the Constitution and are only referred to once as 
"associations with political ends" (Alvarez, 2003). Furthermore state funding for parties was 
abolished (Lander and Lopez Maya, 2000).
162 Chavez won the vote with 59.76% against that of Arias Cardenas with 37.52%. There was a 
43.69% abstention. The MVR was the largest party in the National Assembly with 44.38% of the 
vote and 92 seats, followed by AD with 16.11% and 33 seats (CNE, 2004).
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presidential decrees in education, finance and public administration163, 
galvanising opposition protest and leading to a mobilisation of the increasingly 
estranged middle and upper classes against the government by the trade union, 
business and media leadership, with the active participation of the Catholic 
Church hierarchy, 'civil society' and old-order political parties. A series of one 
day stoppages took place, and accompanying massive demonstrations, 
culminating in a 'general strike' being called in early April, leading to the almost 
total paralisation of the all-important oil industry, the brief overthrow of the 
Chavez regime and the installation as President of the Republic, of Pedro 
Carmona Estanga, the heretofore leader of the business association 
Fedecamaras.
During his 48 hours in power (April 11-13, 2002), Carmona abolished the
1999 Constitution and all the public powers, appointing a small governing 
committee, most of whom were unelected. However, spontaneous popular 
demonstrations in support of Chavez gained force leading to the restitution of 
the President and his government to power by the morning of the 14 April (for 
more information see Chapter 4). A further attempt by the opposition to unseat 
Chavez took place in December 2002/January 2003 during a crippling 
strike/lockout which once again closed down most of the oil industry for 63 days, 
leading to a projected 10.4 % contraction of the economy for 2003 (Reuters, 
Panorama, RNV,2003). The strike, however, was eventually defeated by the 
government, and the State, as Chavez put it, managed to reimpose its authority 
(Rojas, 2004). However, the opposition continues in its efforts to oust him from 
power, the latest attempt being a failed revocatory referendum against Chavez 
held on 15 August 2004.
163 Enabling Laws are laws made under decree powers given to the President in cases of 
emergency. Many of these particular laws, such as the Land Law, which could lead to 
confiscation of non-utilized lands in extreme cases, were sources of grievances for the opposition, 
due to their having been passed without consultation as well as due to the content of some of 
some of them, in particular the Land Law.
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United States support for the April 2002 coup (See Aharonian, 2002; 
Dissent Voice News Service, 2002) and more recent pronouncements of various 
US officials against Chavez have fuelled calls amongst some sectors in Venezuela 
for a military invasion of the country (See Venezuelanalysis.com, 2004). 
Nonetheless, Chavez has maintained a consistently strong core of support. One 
poll, held before the 2004 Referendum, suggested that in a revocatory election 
33.6 % would vote in favour of Chavez staying in power, and in an open 
presidential election with various candidates, 29.4 % would vote for the 
president (García Otero, 2003). At present Venezuela is gripped by a virulent 
political polarisation which is symptomatic on the one hand of the success of 
Chavez's hegemonic strategies, and on the other hand, the difficulties of 
including the variety of sectoral demands within the MVR/PP project, and the 
strength of the opposition counteroffensive to form a new hegemony. Chavez's 
total negativising of the Punto Fijo period, ignored the many social, political and 
economic advances for the popular classes then (Lopez Maya, 1996 pl49). 
Furthermore his attempts to constitute the 'Other' around the concept of the 
political classes/oligarchy, created two blocs characterised by economic and 
social position rather than rejection of the old order, alienating, probably for 
ever, much of the middle sectors.
4.4.7 Conclusion
To sum up, through a skilful blend of War of Manoeuvre tactics, such as a 
coup, a successful series of electoral processes, and a new Constitution and War 
of Position tactics, such as a highly effective antagonistic counter-hegemonic 
discourse, flawed but effective alliance building and popular organisation and 
mobilisation, and the use of symbols of power (the red beret and army 
uniforms), hope (por ahora; Bolivar; utopia) and popular historical struggle 
(Zamora), Chavez has successfully placed himself and his movement in a position 
of insecure but effective hegemony. The following section will draw from both 
these accounts to summarise and evaluate both Presidents' hegemonic strategies
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and isolate their salient similarities and differences in the light of the theoretical 
discussion developed at the beginning of this chapter.
4.5 Comparative analysis: Hegemony, Neoliberalism and Democracy
Overall it can be said that each President provides vivid, and successful,
examples of the use of antagonistic hegemonic strategies, using a variety of both 
'war of manoeuvre' and 'war of position' tactics. Firstly in terms of 'war of 
manoeuvre' tactics, Fujimori and Chávez both used coups in their long-term 
strategies to achieve hegemony. In the case of Fujimori, however, the Peruvian 
president launched his coup from the Presidency itself, after having won 
elections and established himself in power in order to eliminate opposition and 
from there design and foster a new political context more favourable to 
establishing hegemony. Chávez, however, attempted a coup first which, as 
Francia (2000) points out, was "a military defeat, but a political victory", 
weakening the Peréz government, establishing Chávez as a popular leader, and 
clearing the way for his ascent to power (pl45). Despite a long period of 
advocating abstentionism, the MBR-200 eventually decided to use elections as a 
means to achieve power, Chávez winning the Presidential elections in 1998 with 
51.8 % of valid votes cast (CNE, 2004).
Both presidents used Constitutional Assemblies to draft new Constitutions 
which strengthened the power of the executive with regard to other State 
powers, while at the same time introducing elements which allowed more 
popular involvement in decision making processes. Fujimori, however, introduced 
this mechanism for change after having taken over all the State powers through 
his self-coup and establishing coercive hegemony; the CCD was installed only 
under pressure from the international community, and few of its more popular 
elements were implemented promptly, if at all. The Constituyente in Venezuela 
was the fulfilment of the main plank of the MVR election campaign discourse. 
There was greater popular involvement in the process than in the Peruvian case, 
despite its legitimacy being compromised to an extent by the speed in which it
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was implemented and the high rates of abstention in the referendum securing its 
popular approval. Nonetheless, the Venezuelan Constitution achieved a much 
higher approval vote than its Peruvian counterpart which barely scraped by 
under charges of fraud164. Furthermore the 1999 Bolivarian Constitution was 
more innovative in terms of popular direct democracy and participation and 
provided much greater social guarantees than its 1993 Peruvian counterpart, 
despite sharing similar measures to strengthen the executive and its control over 
the Armed Forces.
In Venezuela all public powers were immediately put in place, albeit not 
adhering strictly to Constitutional requirements, thus providing the country with 
an entire set of functioning, although imperfect, institutions. While both national 
processes achieved the comprehensive control of the State, the 'primary sources 
of coercive domination' (Ransome, 1992 pl39) required by both presidents to 
achieve hegemony, it can be said that the Venezuelan process was much more 
transparent, inclusive, and progressive, and therefore legitimate, than that of 
Peru, despite the reservations alluded to above. Furthermore, while opposition 
sectors had little input into both processes, the Peruvian government was more 
willing to use repression, coercion and clientelism to achieve its hegemonic aims, 
than its Venezuelan counterpart, which throughout the process remained 
predominantly within the law (Norden, 2003 p93). Opposition freedom of 
expression was not limited, and despite centralisation tendencies explicit in both 
Constitutions, the regions remained important power bases for a variety of 
opposition figures of national stature165.
164 In Peru the the 1993 Constitution was approved by 52.25% in favour to 47.75% against. In 
Venezuela the Yes vote won with 71% of the votes (Tanaka, 2001). Furthermore dissemination 
of the Constitutional text is widespread in Venezuela, openly on sale with street vendors at 
popular prices, frequently referred to by the President, the government and the opposition, and a 
central symbol in itself of the Bolivarian project; this is definitively not the case in Peru (own 
observations)
165 For example Enrique Salas Römer (ex-governor Carabobo), Enrique Mendoza (Miranda), 
Manuel Rosales (Zulia) and the Metropolitan Mayor of Caracas (and ex-chavista) Alfredo Pena. 
This was not thë case in Peru, where only the mayorship of Lima provided a platform for national 
challenges to Fujimori's authority, and in the person of Alberto Andrade, a tepid challenge at 
that.
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While these 'war of manoeuvre' tactics achieved the necessary control of 
the State, hegemony can only be achieved by consent, by 'war of position' tactics 
as Gramsci advises. Chief among these tactics was the use of discourse to 
achieve this consent. In this area there were also a number of similarities in both 
presidents' approaches. Fujimori and Chavez both used discourses that were 
antagonistic to the status quo, railing against the traditional parties, condemning 
their corruption and their self-serving policies. Both men not only condemned the 
parties but the entire systems of which these parties were such an important 
part, indeed the parties were, in the Presidents' view, the virus that infected 
those systems, as they were anti-democratic and incapable of reflecting the 
popular will. Central to this discourse was the need to start afresh, to refound 
and rebuild these systems so that they functioned as 'true' democracies, with 
honest dedicated men such as themselves leading these reconstitutive projects, 
who were genuinely with the people and their interests.
Fujimori and Chavez therefore built on the 'common sense' of the people, 
and the inherent resentment they held for the parties, their rulers and State 
institutions. Only Chavez, however, has attempted to take this 'common sense' of 
the popular classes and, as Gramsci recommends, give them a "'theoretical' 
consciousness of being creators of historical and institutional values, of being 
founders of a State" (Gramsci, 1977 pl98). The MVR and Chavez therefore, 
however, imperfectly, are attempting to genuinely engender and foster "mass 
politics" unlike Fujimori who, it could be said, to paraphrase Gramsci, is merely 
an adventurer claiming to represent the masses (ibid.).
Fujimori and Chavez both directed their discourse at the informal sectors 
of the popular classes primarily, although they both referred to the 'people' - el 
pueblo -thus rhetorically at least, embracing the totality of the population. Both 
used tradition and history, or as Laclau (1977) put it 'popular traditions' to link 
leader and people in the construction of the alternative society envisaged by 
both leaders. However, the concept of the 'people' in Fujimori's discourse
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remained essentially undeveloped. The 'people' and President were one and 
indivisible, but the people remained passive as the President executed their will 
in their name. In Chávez's discourse on the other hand the 'people' have an 
essential role. The 'people' are sovereign; the 'people' are fighters struggling for 
their liberation whose spirit must be encouraged by their leaders; the 'people' are 
historical subjects who realise their own liberation. The people are not the 
privileged but the downtrodden, economically, socially, culturally and spiritually. 
Liberation, revolution is an historical force akin to nature which leaders must 
simply channel and bow down to. Furthermore the leaders must be of the 
'people', from the 'people', like 'a fish in the water', as Chávez himself claims to 
be, unlike Fujimori who was with, but not of the people, in the ethno-cultural 
and socio-economic sense (Ellner, 2003, p20). In the Chávez discourse the 
'people' are active protagonists in the realisation of their own future, not the 
passive supporters of the Fujimori weltanschung. This could be seen in the 
massive mobilisations in support of the government in Venezuela throughout the 
period 2001-2004. Under Fujimori popular mobilisations were rare, were carefully 
stage-managed and media-oriented, and were held to acclaim rather than 
reclaim and affirm rights previously denied (ibid. 25).
This phenomenon of the active/passive nature of the people can also be 
seen in the forms of leadership and organisation found in both regimes. The 
Fujimorista movements had practically no local organisation or leadership, nor 
grassroots militants, but rather relied entirely on the State, controlled by the 
President and his government for its organisational needs. There was an absence 
of alliances with other electoral or social groupings and most State and popular 
movements were under Presidential control or neutered, such as the Soup 
Kitchen movements (comdedores populares) or the unions. 'Independent' 
regional movements were in effect clients of the State, dependent on resources 
from central government. On the other hand, the MBR-200/MVR has an 
organised national structure, with militants and local and regional leaderships. 
Ideological training and discussion takes place, encouraging degrees of critical
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thought and evaluation. Associated social movements, such as the Fuerza 
BoHvariano de Trabajadores/FBT (Bolivarian Workers Force) - keep a certain 
critical distance from the MVR (Ellner, 2003b). The Patriotic Pole is an alliance of 
various political parties which have their own independent historical trajectories 
and maintain their own internal decision making structures and militants. 
Furthermore there are various factions with different ideological strains within 
the overall MVR structure (Ellner, 2003 p28).
Certain institutions have delivered judgements which are independent of 
government, such as the TSJ (TribunalSupremo de Jiysf/aa/Supreme Tribunal of 
Justice) and the CNE (Consejo Nacionai £/ecfr?/a//National Electoral Council). 
Government policy promotes self-organisation of local communities to solve local 
problems, such as the co-operative movement166. Overall in the case of the 
chavista movement the evidence points to an organisation based on ideological 
loyalty and autonomy, of which the leader and his charisma is a crucial but not 
overdetermined part, whereas the Fujimori movement such as it was, was based 
almost exclusively on the personal charisma of the leader and the personalisation 
of power. This difference can be seen for example in the vociferous defence of 
the Chavez government by the Venezuelan people during the April coup, 
compared with the collapse in support for the fujimorista party in the 2001 
Peruvian elections, in the absence of Fujimori, which only gained 1.3% of the 
vote (Ellner, 2003 pl3).
As mentioned previously the concept of the refounding of society, or the 
redesigning of politics, was central to the discursive vision of both men. Yet 
Fujimori offers a vision not based on the construction of a new radically different 
society, but one where the old ills will simply be eradicated. Thus terrorism will 
end, corruption will end, hyperinflation will end and their opposites will become 
the 'new society'. There is talk of social justice and equality, of democracy, but 
not within an ideological context aimed at eradicating exploitation; social justice
156 Provea (2003) reports that by July 2003 there were 10,032 co-operatives registered with the 
government with around 659,354 members.
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and equality will be achieved through the rapid insertion of Peru into the global 
economy without safeguards for the social gains made during the previous 
decades. The Fujimori vision is one of modernisation at all costs, with the only 
guarantee being the President himself, and the relationship between him and the 
'people'.
In the Chávez discourse as we have seen, the leader/people relationship is 
based on activity and struggle on both parts, and not just on the part of the 
president, to achieve a common goal - a "concrete utopia" of social justice, 
fairness and equality. Thus the discourse is delivered within the context of a 
rejection of neoliberalism and with Constitutional guarantees of universal social, 
economic and human rights. People and leaders are thus linked in a common 
struggle to create a future, a utopia, which is radically different to that which 
came before, and not just its opposite. This discursive construction goes against 
neoliberal precepts as it negates 'the end of ideology' and its replacement by 
'common sense' usually conveyed through technocratic assertions and policies, 
as was the case with Fujimori. It places politics, not economics, at the centre of 
its discourse, thus instilling in the people a long-term perspective of struggle to 
achieve radical structural change. This return of utopia to Latin American political 
discourse acts against the widespread anomie encouraged by the current 
neoliberal reality being imposed on the region (and the world).
The lack of tangible progress felt in the last decade by the popular classes 
in Latin America, indeed the economic and social losses experienced by those 
classes as resources are transferred to the middle and upper sectors, has, 
initially at least, encouraged a "lack of confidence in the future (a rupture of 
utopia) [leading to the] disappearance of utopia itself as a source of construction 
of collective identities, and in this disappearance of utopia, confidence and 
solidarity also undo themselves" (Paris Pombo, 1990 pl39-140). Chávez by 
identifying neoliberalism as the source of that disappearance of confidence and 
solidarity, by reintroducing the concept of utopia to the popular imagination, and 
furthermore by enlisting the active participation of the Venezuelan people in the
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construction of that utopia, has thus gone someway to dispel that feeling of 
stagnation and return a sense of self and history and collective identity to that 
part of the Venezuelan people who accompany him in the Bolivarian socio­
political project.
Furthermore, while both presidents included a nationalist element in their 
discourse, this element in the Fujimori discourse was reduced to cultural and 
ethnic concepts, but not sovereignty, which the Chávez government places at the 
centre of its nationalism, once again contradicting neoliberal globalisation 
discourse. Both men used powerful national symbols to reinforce this link 
between people, national and cultural identity, and themselves. Fujimori used 
traditional symbols such as clothing, vernacular language, and religion. Chávez 
too used clothing, such as the red beret to convey concepts of power and 
ideology, and vernacular language, using baseball terminology (the national 
sport), national cuisine, and religion to convey a sense of identification between 
leader and people. However, Chávez went beyond Fujimori to discuss national 
metathemes of historical magnitude (nationalism, war, rebellion, social justice), 
reinforced by the micro-themes mentioned above, with the symbolism of Bolivar 
constantly accompanying them in word and often in image.
Fujimori was willing to compromise national sovereignty in the pursuit of 
the neoliberal model of modernity. This can be seen clearly in his willingness, at 
least initially, to implement IMF/World Bank economic and social 
recommendations wholesale, and his adoption of measures demanded by the US 
in the 'war on drugs', including overflights and crop eradication. Chávez on the 
other hand centred his nationalist discourse on the cultural, on venezolanidad, 
but aligned with a policy of zealously guarding national prerogatives. Thus the 
Venezuelan government has all but abandoned privatisation, has rejected 
'savage neoliberalism' and emphasises ownership of strategic industries, 
constitutionally guaranteeing State ownership of the national oil industry. It has 
pursued an independent foreign policy, cultivating close relations with Cuba, 
China, Russia, encouraging Latin American unity, with Brazil and Argentina,
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against the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), as well as leading the 
development of an oil policy with its OPEC associates, based on output 
restrictions to maintain 'fair' price levels. Furthermore it has refused US aircraft 
permission to overfly its territory in the so-called 'war on drugs'.
Chávez adheres much more closely than Fujimori to the model put 
forward by Gramsci, and Laclau and Mouffe (2001). The Chávez government is 
using force, through its control of the State, but not to the same degree as the 
Fujimori government, thus also giving, in its emphasis on ideology, a pivotal role 
to persuasion and consent. It's willingness to seek out alternative responses to 
the complexities and demands of globalisation which go beyond textbook 
IMF/World Bank prescriptions and instead look to national tradition and leftist 
ideologies, as well as social-democratic capitalism, shows an autonomy of 
thought and action outside the current global neoliberal hegemony. Fujimori's 
antagonistic discourse, however, while innovative on a the level of symbolism 
and discourse, showed little ideological or programmatic originality or autonomy, 
and reinforced inequality and the enrichment of the main economic power blocs 
rather than contesting it. Consequently there was little real opposition amongst 
the political class and the elites to the Fujimori government, and much of it was 
around issues of institutionality, issues which gained little currency amongst the 
popular classes. While much of the Chávez government's programme has not 
seriously affected the main power groups interests, bar its wresting control of 
the oil industry from its technocratic, middle class management elite, it has 
shown itself to be a major block to the implementation of those interests' 
projects, which one can surmise would be much more in tune with neoliberal 
prescriptions.
More dangerously still, from the elite's point of view, Chávez's mobilisation 
of the popular classes has provided large sectors of those classes with an 
'experience of participation' which has empowered and emboldened them to 
seek greater social, economic and political participation. It is, however, precisely 
on this terrain that the Chávez movement has ran into trouble in achieving
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hegemony. While much of the anti-neoliberal and nationalistic discourse has 
achieved resonance amongst Venezuelan middle sectors, it has lost much of the 
support in those sectors. This has been, on the one hand, due to powerful 
economic logics where the Bolivarian project has delivered little benefit to those 
sectors.167 On the other hand, however, much of that rejection is based on 
equally powerful anti-logical emotions based on race- and class-based fears, 
fears that have been quite successfully whipped up by much of the private 
media. Opposition therefore is much more active against Chavez, than it was 
against Fujimori, and concentrates on all fronts. The boundaries are not nearly 
as clearly drawn as Laclau and Mouffe maintain in this particular developing 
country: many of the middle sectors, and some parts of the popular sectors, 
identify much more closely with the Opposition than with Chavez, due to cultural 
identification with capitalist and liberal values seen threatened by the Chavez 
project.
How can a government, dedicated to the achievement of equality, counter 
that irrational fear mentioned above without contradicting the 'logic of 
democracy' as Laclau and Mouffe maintain? Sectors of the Venezuelan 
opposition, and sectors of the Bolivarian movement have gone beyond reason 
and dialogue, much of this inspired by their respective leaders, but built upon a 
very solid but volatile visceral prejudice against their compatriots from opposing 
classes/races, made worse by consistent denials of this prejudice by many in the 
opposition camp. It is difficult in such a context to ensure that the 'logic of 
democracy' is scrupulously followed where such prejudice, added to naked 
economic self-interest, is translated into sedition and violence. Dialogue is further 
made difficult by maximalist demands being made by the opposition 
concentrating on the resignation of the president, the annulment of the entire 
Bolivarian project, and the eradication of its movements, as evidenced in the ten-
167 See for example Wilpert, 2003a.
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point decree issued by Pedro Carmona in the April 2002 coup (Carmona, 2002), 
and during the later lockout/strike.
Indeed, Chavez himself had made maximalist declarations by refusing to 
dialogue with many of those sectors linked to the Fourth Republic.168 In such a 
tightly polarised situation, where 'antagonism' goes from the ideological, to the 
visceral, to violence, it may often be impossible to follow the 'logic of democracy' 
without resorting to the tactics of 'totalitarianism'. Laclau and Mouffe therefore 
demonstrate to an extent a loose grasp on the complexities of power in favour of 
idealistic theoretical recommendations. There is an inherent contradiction 
between the 'logic of democracy' and the logic of 'antagonism', as once the 
interests of powerful sectors are threatened, democracy in its liberal form at 
least, as we've seen in the case of Fujimori and in the case of many of the 
opposition strategies against Chavez, becomes a secondary consideration to the 
'logic of hegemony'. In this context Chavez, Fujimori and sectors of the 
Venezuelan opposition have displayed 'totalitarian' tendencies, but only Chavez 
has balanced them with a determinate programme aimed at democratic inclusion 
and participation of the popular classes. In this Chavez has shown himself much 
closer to the 'classic' populist model of a Peron, with its complex structures of 
popular organisation and participation in furtherance of démocratisation, than 
that of Fujimori which is a model of 'neopopulism', of a more stricter 
leader/masses model (See Roberts 1995 and Kay, 1996).
Nevertheless, personalisation around the leader, to a greater or lesser 
degree has led to an increasing reliance on the State as a tool for achieving 
'sutture' as Laclau and Mouffe term it. In the case of Fujimori, as his second term 
in office (1995-2000) developed there was an increasing reliance on force to 
ensure the regime's continued survival. In the case of Chavez, his refusal to treat 
with the opposition and many of the sectors which now support them, such as 
large parts of the middle sectors, has led to a failure to ensure the inclusion
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necessary to achieve true hegemony in the Gramscian sense of consent. Due to 
this situation of acute polarisation there is for the moment anyway, little 
possibility of regaining those sectors to the government. Thus the Chavez regime 
sometimes goes against the 'logic of democracy', as Laclau and Mouffe (2001) 
term it, but rarely becomes entirely dominated by the 'logic of totalitarianism'.
To an extent with Fujimori this was not that surprising, given that he 
came to power in the midst of a national crisis whose magnitude was not seen in 
Peru for many years, with a cruel terrorist war and seemingly uncontrollable 
hyperinflation. Nonetheless, having dealt with those problems effectively, the 
authoritarian dynamic accelerated rather than diminished. In the case of 
Venezuela, it could be said that it is equally unsurprising that the Chavez 
government should display certain authoritarian tendencies, given the 
entrenchment of the Fourth Republic apparatus and the activities of more radical 
sectors of the opposition. However, whilst there is now a visceral rejection of the 
President in opposition sectors, there is also an increasing emphasis on 'poverty' 
and exclusion in it's discourse, both in its criticisms of Chavez and in its albeit 
undeveloped programmatic pronouncements.169 This shows that Chavez has to 
an extent succeeded in moving the discursive 'frontier' to embrace the 
fundamental social and economic inequalities that any possible future opposition 
government will have to be seen to address; that in effect a form of 'consent' is 
being achieved even amongst those sectors. Furthermore Chavez's discursive 
and programmatic emphasis against neoliberalism continues to make it difficult 
for opposition parties to declare their intentions in this regard without risking 
losing votes, forcing them to continually emphasise (and exaggerate) the 'evils' 
of Chavez and the failures of his government rather than providing concrete
168 This discourse however has been qualified (Chávez 2004)
169 See for example Coordinadora Democrática, 2002
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programmatic alternatives, thus provoking mistrust or at the very least caution 
amongst many sectors of the population.170
The different sectors of the Venezuelan opposition will find it difficult to 
achieve hegemony in the Gramscian sense unless it clarifies this ambivalence to 
neoliberalism. In the present conjuncture, however, unlike in the early 1990's it 
is much more difficult to construct a coherent, plausible, articulated discourse 
around neoliberalism due to the increasing weight of evidence being 
accumulated against its effectiveness as an economic model for Latin American 
countries, which can also attend to issues of social justice and equality. This is 
especially so in Venezuela which has had a historically fraught relationship with 
neoliberalism since the very beginning of its application in Latin America. This is 
one of the principal reasons why sectors of the Venezuelan opposition, most of 
whom would refer to themselves as democratic, have resorted to patently 
undemocratic tactics to achieve hegemony.
Yet even here Venezuela's Opposition sectors have encountered 
difficulties due to the regional consensus rejecting extra-legal means to achieve 
power, as evidenced by the division in support in the hemisphere for the April 
2002 coup. Any future opposition government will therefore have to carefully 
navigate between the demands of the increasingly uncertain waters of 
neoliberalism and globalisation and a wary, impoverished Venezuelan electorate 
mistrustful of their intentions. Within this context, the MVR as an organisation 
ideologically and programmatically opposed to neoliberalism will in all likelihood 
continue to find a space in Venezuelan politics, with or without Chávez.
4.6 Conclusion
The present chapter has charted and analysed the means by which both 
presidents gained power in their respective countries. It has particularly pointed
170 In a poll conducted in January 2004, the largest percentage of those surveyed 38.7 %, 
described themselves as non-aligned politically, the so-called 'ni-ni's' while 25 % described 
themselves as pro-Chávez and 33 % anti-Chávez (El Universal, 2004)
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to the dangers of authoritarianism which can emerge as groups attempt to 
achieve hegemony. The following chapter will examine more closely this tension 
between the authoritarian and democratic tendencies in each government. 
Specifically it will focus on elements of participation within democratic theory, 
such as elections, freedom of expression and information, human rights, 
amongst others, and investigate how these policy areas have fared under each 
government, and how they aided each regime gain legitimacy, if at all.
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5 CHAPTER 5: Democrats or authoritarians? Human rights, 
institutional autonomy and popular participation under the 
governments of Alberto Fujimori of Peru and Hugo Chavez of 
Venezuela
5.1 Introduction
According to Habermas, democratic legitimacy must be sought in every 
sphere of national life: the economic, the social, the political and the cultural. 
Populist presidents seek to achieve legitimacy in these spheres, increasing 
popular participation and therefore helping them secure hegemony. However, 
such populist attempts at achieving hegemony can lead, to forms of 
'totalitarianism' which negate the 'logic of democracy'. Nonetheless, in the 
context of globalisation such 'totalitarianism' or 'authoritarianism' is increasingly 
unnacceptable. Can populist leaders achieve legitimacy and stay within 
internationally accepted democratic norms?
In the cases of Fujimori and Chavez both have been accused of 
authoritarianism even though both presidents were elected democratically not 
just once but twice. In this chapter, I examine more fully this dichotomy between 
democracy and authoritarianism in the governments of Chavez and Fujimori. The 
chapter attempts to answer two questions: (i) to what extent are these 
presidencies democratic; and (ii) to what extent both achieved legitimacy. I 
answer these questions, first by examining concepts of democracy and 
authoritarianism in writings on the two presidents and within the context of 
populism. I then develop a comparative framework from the writings on 
democracy by Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) and Dahl (1989). This framework is 
used to assess the relative democratic or authoritarian nature of both presidents 
within a number of key policy areas associated with popular participation: 
electoral law and practice, presidential authority and institutional autonomy, 
human rights, media freedom and the right to information, and associational 
autonomy. The chapter ends by enumerating a number of important similarities 
and distinctions between the Chavez and Fujimori governments, using
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O'Donnell's (1994) 'delegative democracy' model as a guide. From these analyses 
the extent of the presidencies legitimacy within the Habermasian political and 
social spheres can be ascertained.
5.2 Fujimori and Chavez as Democraduras
There is a substantial literature referring to the democratic/authoritarian
hybridity of the Fujimori government.171 Sinesio Lopez (Quehacer 82, 1993) 
wrote of the Fujimori government as a "formal dictatorship in constitutional 
democracy" in other words a "democradur^ '172{pJ7). Mauceri (1997) wrote of it 
as an "autocratic democracy" (p909). Conaghan (1996) refers to 'fujimorismd as 
a hybrid that combines "some of the formalities of a democratic system with 
non-democratic practices" (p3). Similar ambivalence is found in discussions on 
the Chavez government173. Cameron (2001) states that comparisons with fascism 
in Italy or the French Revolution do not provide sufficient comparative 
perspectives on Chavez, and recommends comparison with "Juan Peron in 
Argentina or Alberto Fujimori in Peru" (p265). Ellner and Hellinger (2003) write 
that the "pigeonholing" of Chavez as an authoritarian is over-simplistic and 
lacking in nuance (p216). They claim that the "Chavez phenomenon is complex, 
that its direction remains to be defined", and that such charges are instead 
symptomatic of a highly polarised political situation (ibid.). Freedom House rated 
Peru as 'partially free' with a rating of 5.4 in the years 1999-2000, while for the 
same years they rated Venezuela 'partially free' with a rating of 4.4 (Freedom 
House, 2003).
171 Conaghan goes on to point out that while democratic form is observed, democratic substance 
is not developed: "Dissent and debate do take place, but often with no discernible impact on 
institutional behaviour" she states (ibid. p3).
172 This is an amalgam of the Spanish words democracia (democracy) and dictadura 
(dictatorship).
173 Raul Diez Canseco, once Vice President of Peru made mostly negative comparisons between 
both presidents, but pointed to the freedom of the media in Venezuela, as opposed to its near 
total colonisation in Peru by Fujimori (Alvarez, 2002), contradicting several claims made by the 
Inter American Press Association (AFP-AP, 2002). MVR member, Omar Mezza Ramirez pointed to 
the solid support of Chavez by a number of parties, as opposed to Fujimori's almost total disdain 
for programmes and political parties and even his own movement (Televen, 2002).
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Most comparisons made between Fujimori and Chávez, however, 
emphasise their shared authoritarianism. Tanaka (2002a pi) states, for example, 
that: "Fujimori as much as Chávez [took] advantage of institutional reforms 
which, while they were formally democratic, constitute authoritarian 
governments in practice". More specifically, these accusations centre on two 
areas: human rights and institutions. Attacks on the media are emphasised, and 
the use of threatening and insulting language against the press and the 
opposition. The "colonising, substituting, closing and eliminating" of institutions, 
the minimal role given to parties, and the use of the Armed Forces for support 
have all been cited as dangers to the independence of institutions (Televen,
2002). Grompone (cited in Cotier and Grompone, 2000 p80) and Me Clintock 
(cited in Diamond et al, 1999 p311) both regard the Fujimori regime as 
authoritarian, while Naim (2001 p69) and Caballero (2000 pl62) regard Chávez 
similarly. In both cases the norm amongst opponents of these presidents is to 
refer to them in language pertinent to authoritarianism: "dictator", "tyrant" etc.
Yet, both governments also displayed traits that can only be identified as 
democratic; both presidents were elected in relatively fair and free elections with 
large majorities, both introduced new Constitutions which were approved by the 
people in referendums, both went on to be re-elected with large majorities under 
the new Constitutions. Peru and Venezuela under both presidents had 
institutions normally associated with democracies; courts, elected assemblies, full 
universal suffrage, parties, a "free" media. Surely under such circumstances 
these rulers could not be judged "dictators" or "tyrants" as the above mentioned 
critics charge?
A useful model to explain both presidencies is Guillermo O' Donnell's 
(1994) 'delegative democracy'. Delegative democracies (DDs), have, according to 
O'Donnell, an elected president who can rule as "he or she sees fit, constrained 
only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited 
term of office" (p59). DDs are "strongly majoritarian" with little popular activism, 
supporters being "a passive but cheering audience of what the president does"
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(ibid. p60). The president becomes the "alpha and omega of politics", using 
politically and popularly insulated técnicos to implement the necessary measures 
needed to restore the country to the desired state of proficiency. Resistance, 
from the opposition, congress, interests groups or crowds in the streets, must be 
ignored (ibid. p61). Yet parties, congress and the press are free to criticise, as 
are important social sectors. In a DD, there is little or no 'horizontal 
accountability' and institutions are 'hampered' by the executive (ibid. p62). Policy 
making is swift, "but at the expense of a higher likelihood of gross mistakes, of 
hazardous implementation, and of concentrating responsibility for the outcomes 
on the president" (ibid.). Often the 'success' of their policies leads presidents in 
DDs to seek further electoral terms and arrange for this in constitutional reform 
(ibid. p67).
5.3 Populism, authoritarianism and democracy
The authoritarian/democracy dichotomy has been central to debates on
populism for many years. Dix (1985) touched on this dichotomy, but failed to 
satisfactorily explain why some populist governments were democratic and 
others authoritarian, nor the motivations of the popular classes to support 
authoritarian populist governments which, one would suppose, should by their 
very nature contradict the democratic aspirations of the popular classes. Germani 
(1965), however, provides us with clearer answers to these questions (pl57). 
For him the distinct historical contexts and ideological climates of Latin America 
caused the emergence of movements which in various ways combined opposing 
ideological and political traditions. "Leftist authoritarianism, leftist nationalism, 
right wing socialism and a multitude of hybrid even paradoxical formulas, from 
the perspective of the dichotomy (or continuum) left-right" were combined in 
"national-popular" movements (ibid.). These hybrid regimes were undoubtedly 
authoritarian but they differed crucially from fascism, for example, in the 
"effective though limited participation of [their] human base" (ibid. pl59).
229
National-popular movements, as he termed them, provided their supporters with 
a certain degree of effective liberty: "...for the first time these are people 
conscious of the possibility of taking decisions in a variety of spheres which 
previously were fixed for ever. Participate in a strike, elect a union leader (...), 
discuss on an equal footing with their boss, alter the level of individual behaviour 
in 'master-servant' relations in an egalitarian sense..." (ibid. pl60). Furthermore, 
this sense of liberty conveyed a greater meaning of democracy to the popular 
classes than that of liberal democracy, which was debased by the repeated use 
of its language by autocratic unrepresentative rulers.174
Democracy goes beyond the vote or other influences that the popular 
classes might have over their government, or indeed economic benefits that 
might accrue to them as a reward for their support. The real base of this 
support, Germani insists, is in that "experience of participation". Limiting 
democratic liberties, such as "liberty of expression" affects intellectuals primarily 
-  for the popular classes these limitations can co-exist with significant 
experiences of concrete liberty for them in their individual lives (ibid. pl61). 
Germani thus introduces to the debate the different conceptions of democracy 
that exist amongst different classes in Latin American society, and the different 
ideological and practical meanings that it can have for these classes.
More recent analysis has updated the concept of populism, creating a new 
hybrid of populism, authoritarianism and neoliberalism within a democratic 
structure. Roberts (1995), Kay (1995) and Weyland (1996 plO) typified Fujimori 
as a "neopopulist", a new breed of authoritarian populist congruent with 
neoliberalism.175 Cammack (2000) and Tanaka (2002a/2002b), amongst others,
174 "For most of the countries of Latin America (...) the symbols of democracy have lost -  or 
better still, neverhad -  a positive meaning . On the contrary, due to the political tradition of 
these nations, they usually tend to have a negative value. There hasn't been a dictator, an 
absolute and arbitrary autocrat, who has not immeasurably employed the symbols and 
terminology of democracy" (ibid.).
175 These affinities were a constituency drawn mostly from the poor informal sector against 
organised groups in the middle and working classes and the political class; a strong executive 
strengthening the apex of the state and using a top-down approach; costs being paid by the
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have placed Chavez within the neopopulist category, along with Fujimori. 
Therefore in populism, democracy and authoritarianism have repeatedly blended, 
often in order to further démocratisation, bringing in larger sections of the 
popular classes into national life. The following section will therefore look more 
closely at concepts of democracy and participation, in order to construct a 
framework from which the merits of such classifications can be further teased 
out.
5.4 Democracy and participation
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) conceived of democracy as
based on three principles: (i) regular, free and fair elections of representatives 
with universal and equal suffrage; (ii) responsibility of the state apparatus to the 
elected parliament; and (iii) freedom of expression and association as well as the 
protection of individual rights against arbitrary state action (p43). If a regime 
ranked near zero in the first two dimensions it was, according to the authors, an 
authoritarian regime, if in all three, totalitarian. A democracy would be 
considered restrictive if the stipulated conditions are met to a large extent but:
(i) significant sectors of the population are excluded though suffrage restrictions;
(ii) responsiveness of government is significantly reduced, through say military 
interventions or political pacts; and/or (iii) limitations of the freedom of 
expression and association significantly narrow the range of articulated political 
parties, for example, though the prescription of political parties (ibid. p44). 
Furthermore, Reuschemeyer et al. lay emphasis on the centrality of the need for 
participation of the marginalised and excluded in the political process as a 
fundamental part of the démocratisation process (ibid. p46). Dahl (1989) also 
considered that the following "institutions" must be present to establish effective 
participation in a democracy which will be incorporated into the overall 
framework: (i) elected officials; (ii) inclusive suffrage; (iii) right to run for office;
above-mentioned organised groups in civil society and benefits accruing to the poorer sections
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(iv) freedom of expression; (v) alternative information; and (vi) associational 
autonomy (p222).
It is my intention to analyse a number of key policy areas of both 
governments mostly during the 1990-1995 period for Fujimori and between 
1998-2003 for Chavez, using the following framework:
Table V: Democracy and participation
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992)/Dahl (1989) Policy area
1. Free and fair elections of representatives 
with universal and equal suffrage
a. Electoral law and practice
2. Responsibility of the state apparatus to the 
elected parliament
b. Presidential authority and institutional 
autonomy
3. Freedom of expression and association as 
well as the protection of individual rights 
against arbitrary state action
c. Human rights
d. Media freedom and the right to information
e. Associational autonomy
5.5 Authoritarianism and democracy in the governments of Fujimori and 
Chavez
5.5.1 Electoral law and practice
A number of elections and referenda were held during both presidencies,
however, due to space considerations this section will concentrate on the general
elections held in Venezuela in 2000 and in Peru in 1995. In both cases these
were the first major elections for each president under new constitutions
compiled largely as a result of presidential initiatives (see following section). In
both cases also there were accusations of electoral fraud. However, these
accusations were much more acute and sustained in the case of the 1995
elections in Peru. Furthermore, the Peruvian elections were held as part of a
process of change which was initiated under the auspices of a self-coup
(autogolpe) (see Chapter 3) and in the aftermath of a prolonged guerrilla war.
(Weyland, 1996 plO).
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As Fujimori had narrowly missed losing the referendum for the approval of 
the 1993 Constitution he was not going to run any risks with the 1995 
elections.176 Montoya (1995) observed that Fujimori used his position as head of 
state to recruit state officials, political authorities and, above all, sectors of the 
Armed Forces, as his campaigning agents (p47). These agents were particularly 
effective in the many emergency zones created due to the war with Sendero and 
under the almost "absolute" control of the Armed Forces. According to Montoya, 
47% of the Peruvian population lived (in 1995) in emergency zones, almost 21% 
of the electorate, and 15% of that in rural areas (ibid.). This situation allowed 
the government to 'discourage' opposition party militants from campaigning in 
these areas as well as using peasants organised under military controlled 
vigilante groups ('rondas campesinas') to campaign for the government (ibid. 
p48). The position of the Army as distributors of the food and construction aid, 
on which many peasants in these areas relied, enabled them to put pressure on 
locals to vote for Fujimori.
Schady (1999) develops this last point further. In years previous to the 
elections, responsibility for the administration of numerous social and basic 
infrastructure programmes had been transferred from local governments and line 
ministries to the Ministry of the Presidency. "By 1995, this Ministry controlled 
more than 20% of the central government budget, and oversaw thirteen 
programs involved in, amongst other things, nutrition, education, health, water, 
sanitation, and housing" (ibid. citing World Bank p4). Local government, 
meanwhile, had been starved of funds as its tax raising abilities had been taken 
from it, making it directly dependent on central government (ibid. p3). 
Furthermore, Ministry of the Presidency funding was often channelled through 
the FONCODES programme in particular, and Schady found that FONCODES 
projects were specifically targeted at provinces that had supported Fujimori in
176 52.25% voted in favour of the Constitution, while 47.75% voted against it. Me Clintock reports 
irregularities in 1992 Constituent Assembly elections and in the Referendum, many of them 
similar to those reported here (see Me Clintock, 1996 pp.68-73).
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1990, but had abandoned him in the 1993 Constitutional referendum. 
"Expenditures were boosted before national elections; community based projects 
were channelled to provinces where the political returns were expected to be 
large" (ibid. p25). Such expenditure was directly attributable to the President 
according to polls and the President spent large amounts of times opening 
projects funded by such expenditure (Montoya, 1995).
Planas (2000 p352) noted severe discrepancies in the voting pattern for 
Congressional seats in the 1995 elections. Almost 40.80% of votes cast in the 
Congressional elections were cast as spoiled votes, as opposed to 8.72% spoiled 
in the concurrent Presidential vote. The spoiling of these votes was never 
satisfactorily explained, having been attributed to technical problems by the 
Electoral Board, and subsequently pursued little by the opposition (OAS, 1995 
p2 9 ) 177 pianas notes, like Montoya, that the root of the problem lay in "the 
management of institutions and state concerns to guarantee the continuity in 
power of Fujimori leaving very little room for pluralism and political liberty for 
those sectors opposing the regime" (op. cit. p354). In other words these 
elections, instead of marking the beginning of a new democratic era, marked a 
continuation and deepening of the authoritarian dynamic which had started with 
the autogolpeofi 1992 (Tanaka, 2002 p51).
Nevertheless the OAS in the executive report of its electoral observers 
mission, while acknowledging most of these complaints, and the particular 
conditions under which the elections were held, voiced little criticism of the 
process (OAS, 1995). In general, the OAS felt that complaints were dealt with 
adequately, and that many of the other problems noted such as delays in the 
setting up of polls and getting the vote started were normal problems and "were 
not a widespread factor that could have compromised the outcome" (p28). 
Furthermore, the vote for the government was impressive with 62.4% of votes
177 Conaghan (1996) notes that there was a failure on the part of the press to follow up on this 
due to newspaper reliance on official sources: "...when the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones and the 
Attorney General's Office went silent on the matter, news coverage of the matter virtually 
ceased"(pl6).
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for Fujimori and 52.10% of votes to the president's movement Cambio-90-Nueva 
Mayoria. Few questioned the clear support given to the President by the 
electorate and the unquestioned legitimacy that this entailed. The 1995 elections 
were the final test of the full return to democracy in elections that were "more or 
less clean" (Tanaka, 2002 p51).
The Venezuelan 2000 elections were also held in an atmosphere of 
considerable mistrust. Kornblith (2001) reports a situation of "judicial, 
institutional and organisational advantage in favour of government candidates, 
and insecurity for the rest of the participants" (pl36). Many of the institutions 
designed to guarantee fairness and equity, including the Supreme Tribunal of 
Justice (TSJ), the Attorney General, the Defender of the People, and the National 
Election Council (CNE), were chosen by Congressional committee rather than 
with the popular participation that the Constitution required, creating an 
atmosphere of insecurity with regard to legal guarantees (PROVEA, 2001 pl7). 
Furthermore, a number of serious technical and electoral roll problems were 
detected before the elections scheduled for the 28 May, heightening the tension 
and mistrust already palpable since the installation of Chavez in 1998.178 
However, the Chavez government accepted a court ruling brought by a number 
of NGOs to postpone the elections to 30 July, and took advantage of the 
intervening time to change the composition of the CNE and correct the technical 
problems. The OAS (2000a) noted that the deficiencies and difficulties were 
rectified "creating credibility and confidence in the new electoral authorities" and 
that actions on the part of NGOs, the Public Defender and the Attorney General 
inspired "a climate of transparency and confidence in the electoral process, 
which in the Mission's opinion, is an indication of the strong democratic political 
culture that prevails in Venezuela"(pp. 15-16).
178 The OAS (2000a) observation mission identified four problematic aspects in the voter register: 
fraudulent changes of address, relocation of polling stations, deceased voters and double 
registration (p53).
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Kornblith (2001) claims, however, that the use of premarked voting tickets 
in the Presidential elections was a ploy to "favour the government candidates" 
(pl59). She detected a higher than average incidence of spoiled votes,179 which 
were augmented by premarked voting tickets which caused "serious distortions 
in the electoral results" (ibid. pl46). The OAS, however, believed that this 
practice was the "exception rather than the rule" and that such irregularities 
were not "attributable to any deliberate attempt to alter the popular will" (op. cit. 
p65; ibid. p83). Kornblith also contradicts the OAS when she states that the 
treatment by the CNE of some of the post-election Opposition appeals for a 
recount were marked by "partiality, inequity and disdain for legality, (...) further 
reinforcing the negative perception of the electoral institutions of the country" 
(ibid. pl60) as opposed to the OAS finding that they were fairly treated (op. cit. 
p83). In sum, Kornblith's assessment of the elections are mostly negative and 
contradict the OAS's main conclusion that the "electoral process culminating in 
the July 30 vote must be considered valid overall, despite the difficulties and 
complaints indicated..." (OAS, 2000a p84).
Therefore, we have a similar situation in both elections in that critics of 
the government contradict the OAS1 findings. The evidence suggests that in Peru, 
however, the elections were held in an atmosphere where the full power and 
weight of the State was used much more comprehensively to ensure the re- 
election of Fujimori. In Venezuela, there may have been an attempt to skew the 
election results in favour of the government, as Kornblith maintains, but this 
does not seem as systematic as in the Peruvian campaign. Furthermore, a robust 
and vigilant opposition, media and civil society campaign and the vigilance of the 
international observation organisations mitigated against any attempt there may 
have been to ensure a fraudulent outcome on behalf of the Venezuelan 
government. Media coverage was "critical of the government and the election 
authorities" and broad freedom of expression and assembly were found (OAS,
179 In 78.39% of automated voting booths spoiled votes were above the 5% considered normal 
and most of them in the presidential vote (Kornblith, 2001 pp. 146-148).
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2000 pp.51-60), as opposed to Peru where much of the media was 
"unambiguously aligned with the [Fujimori] administration" (Conaghan, 1996 
pl7). In 2000, Chavez did not yet have the full weight of the state behind him as 
he did not have the time advantages of Fujimori to establish himself as 
completely in power, nor had he crushed the opposition to the same degree as 
Fujimori had done in the 1992 autocoup.180
Fujimori's greater grip on power is reflected in the greater scale of the 
reported fraud in Peru 1995, and the effective disenfranchisement of large 
sectors of the population in the emergency areas due to the coercion of poorer 
sectors by the military. In Venezuela, on the other hand, reports indicate that 
there was little or no intimidation of electors to vote in favour of the governing 
party, allowing people to effectively vote freely, indeed the OAS reports that 
"military personnel demonstrated (...) a generally co-operative and friendly 
attitude towards voters and other players in the process" (ibid. p58). 
Nonetheless, abstention rates in Venezuela have been exceptionally high for 
most of the 1990s, virtually disenfranchising large proportions of the 
population.181 Moreover, manipulation of electoral rules to favour governing 
parties was commonplace during the Punto Fijo era and has been availed of 
equally by the Chavez government according to Buxton (2001 p30).
180 Fujimori had been in power for five years as opposed to Chavez being in power less that two. 
The main opposition leader in Peru, Alan García was in exile while all the major opposition 
candidates to Chavez were still in the country, and the parties still maintained substantial support 
in the National Assembly and in local government.
181 Abstention has increased by 40% in Venezuelan presidential elections between 1973 and 2000 
(Ryan, 2001 pl7). Almost 50% abstained in the elections of 1998; 62% in the referendum 
convoking a constituent assembly (April 1999); 54% in Constituent Assembly election (July 1999) 
56% in referendum approving the new Constitution (December, 1999) (Buxton, 2000 p29); 43% 
in the 2000 Presidential elections (Fleischer, 2000); 76.50% in Trade Union leadership 
referendum Dec, 2000 (CNE, 2003). Peréz Baralt (2001) identified three reasons for electoral 
abstention: "progressive loss of credibility of the obligatory vote, erosion of party loyalties and a 
negative attitude to the political system" (pl25). Buxton concurs and adds that in relation to the 
Chavez government, its radical institutional reform was carried out without the expressed support 
of a majority of Venezuelans (ibid.). Despite this however Coppedge (2002) shows that: "The size 
of Chavez's base of electoral support [...] remains solid in comparative perspective [with previous 
Venezuelan presidents and other Latin American leaders]" (pp.4-5).
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In sum, while there is disquiet about the manner in which both elections 
were held, there is little doubt that the results were a reflection of the will of the 
people. Both presidents were extremely popular before the respective elections 
and had high levels of legitimacy with the population. However, comparatively 
speaking the evidence suggests that there were greater levels of political 
pluralism and electoral fairness in the 2000 elections in Venezuela than in Peru
1995.
5.5.2 Presidential authority and institutional autonomy
One of the principal points of comparison between Fujimori and Chavez,
according to critics, is in their dominance of institutions in order to use them for 
the perpetuation of power. Both presidents pursued similar policies of 
centralisation of power in the hands of the executive at the expense of other 
branches of government. The Fujimori government, according to Grompone 
(2000 p80), sought from the beginning to establish an authoritarian regime 
based on social control, restrictions on mobilisation and limited pluralism. 
Fujimori introduced a raft of legislative decrees granting the president and the 
Armed Forces wide powers in the anti-subversive war, thus paving the way for 
the autocoup of April 1992.182 Through the autocoup, Fujimori centralised power 
further, clarified his authoritarian intentions, and received the apparent support 
of the public in doing so.183 It was international, not national pressure, which 
forced Fujimori to hold elections for a Constituent Assembly (CCD) that 
eventually resulted in the Constitution of 1993.
The CCD was strongly pro-Fujimori, the majority of opposition parties 
having boycotted the elections. It gave increased power to the executive, by 
establishing the possibility of re-election, and making Congress a unicameral 
legislature with a reduced number of representatives (from 240 to 120). Tanaka
182 See CNDDHH (2003 plO) for a list of laws passed that centralised power into the hands of 
Fujimori and Montesinos.
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(2001) notes, however, that the 1993 Constitution is not exactly a tool "made to 
measure for an authoritarian government" (p51).184 The CCD also put forward 
mechanisms encouraging popular participation and "direct democracy". Tanaka 
states that this was why the 1993 Constitution allowed only one immediate re- 
election and established mechanisms of citizen consultation such as a 
referendum, or public protection such as a Public Defender or ombudsman, as 
well as a Constitutional Court. "[T]hese things turned against the government 
when it tried to perpetuate itself in power", prompting the government to 
destroy "the same institutional order created under its hegemony" (ibid. p52). 
Thus, Grompone can argue correctly that Fujimori's "authoritarian project did not 
lose its unity of purpose and its direction" (op. cit. pl07). Fujimori never had, nor 
developed, a constitutional, democratic conviction and the Constitution was 
treated as an obstacle to the perpetuation of the regime's power, rather than 
fundamental to its survival.185 The autocoup of April 1992, not the Constitution of 
1993, was the true measure of Fujimori's commitment to democratic institutions.
In the case of Venezuela, a similar situation seemingly developed at first 
sight, prompting Tanaka to maintain that "in both cases we have authoritarian 
and anti-party leaders who impose Constitutions strongly marked by participative 
and modernising mechanisms, which finally resulted in being counterproductive 
for them" (op. cit. p52). The Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 was written up by a 
Constituent Congress strongly dominated by members elected on the 
government's ticket, but many of whom have since passed into the opposition.186 
Public participation in its deliberations was very high and quite successful (Garcia 
Guadilla, 2003). It strengthened areas such as human rights, justice, and citizen
183 Public support for the coup reached more than 80% of the population according to opinion 
polls (Tanaka, 2001; p48)
184 Furthermore Me Clintock points out the consistencies in the centralising tendencies of the 
1979 and 1993 Constitutions (1999 p344).
185 See note 4, above.
185 A number of notable examples are the political analyst Miriam Kornblith, the constitutionalists 
Richard Combellas and Alan Brewer Carias, the writer Angela Zago, journalist and former 
Metropolitan mayor, Alfredo Peña to name but a few who have become powerful critics of the 
government.
239
control of public life. New regulatory bodies such as the Defender of the People 
to protect human rights and represent citizen concerns to the State were 
created, and democracy was extended through the establishment of 
referendums, revocatory referendums, and constituent assemblies amongst other 
innovations.187
Yet a number of Constitutional clauses strengthened executive power 
similar to the Peruvian 1993 Constitution. The presidential period was extended 
from five to six years, with the possibility of re-election being introduced for one 
more period. There is increased centralisation with less autonomy for regional 
and municipal powers, and a one chamber Congress (Lander and López Maya, 
2000). Alvarez (2003) points out that while the innovatory direct democracy 
mechanisms "opened channels for direct participation [of the people] at the 
same time [the Constitution] enhanced the power of the national executive" at 
the expense of the other branches of government and the political parties 
(pl55).188 In both situations the end result was the sweeping away of the old 
order and the installation of a new one. Yet the crucial difference in the approach 
of the two presidents is that Fujimori achieved his new order through a coup, 
which then was copper-fastened and legalised by the Constitutional process, 
while Chávez effected his new order through legal means. Norden (2003), 
therefore, can justifiably state that Chávez achieved radical change "through the 
rules and procedures of Venezuela's existing constitutional democracy..." (p93). 
This was certainly not the case with Fujimori.
The strengthening of the executives through the Constitution in itself was 
not unusual in a Latin American or global context, and the innovative provisions 
provided a balance to those favouring the executive. Difficulties arose, however,
187 Referendums allow citizens to propose new legislation; revocatory referendums allow citizens 
to attempt to cut short the mandate of elected and public officials half way through their terms, 
constituent assemblies can be proposed by the citizen, legislative and executive branches to 
propose new laws. Few of these mechanisms have been tested so far, except for the revocatory 
referendum against President Chávez's mandate held in August 2004.
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in the implementation of these provisions and, in the Peruvian case especially, 
with the passing of legislation which contradicted the spirit and sometimes the 
letter of the Carta Magna. Fujimori on executing the autocoup, sacked 13 
Supreme Court judges, the Attorney General, and hundreds of lower level judges 
and prosecutors. The judges were replaced by provisional judges; by early 
2000, 70% of judges and prosecutors remained provisional (Youngers, 2000 
p34). This situation affects the security of the judges and thus the quality of their 
work, as they are aware that they can be removed at any time for whatever 
reason. A similar situation exists in Venezuela; judicial personnel were to be 
renovated by a new appointments procedure, but progress is slow. Provea 
(2003; Derecho a la Justicia) reports that of 1,772 judges in office 1,331 or 
75.1% remain provisional with little progress on régularisation of their posts.
Other sections of the justice system fared little better in Peru. The 
Constitutional Court was dissolved in the autocoup and was not replaced until
1996, despite a requirement to do so in the 1993 Constitution. It lasted only one 
year, as three of its magistrates voted against Fujimori's second re-election, were 
sacked and never replaced (Youngers, 2000). Blanca Nélida Colan, the new 
Attorney General was seen to be extremely partial to the government, dropping 
or actively blocking human rights and corruption cases brought against the 
government (Conaghan, 1996 pp.9-11). In Venezuela, on the other hand, 
Supreme Court judges were immediately appointed but, along with the Public 
Powers (the Attorney General, Chief Comptroller, and the Public Defender), by 
committee instead of with the public involvement as required by the new 
Constitution. However, these appointments were ratified by the National 
Assembly as the Constitution requires. Nonetheless, these appointments were 
seen to favour the government due to the perceived use of clientelism in their 
appointment and have little public confidence (Provea, 2003; Derecho a la
188 Indeed political parties are not mentioned in the Constitution and are only referred to once as 
"associations with political ends" (Alvarez, 2003). Furthermore state funding for parties was 
abolished (Lopez Maya and Lander, 2000).
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Justicia). In Peru, in contrast, the Public Defender's appointment was delayed 
until 1996, but enjoyed high public confidence (Youngers, 2000 p26). In both 
cases the reduction of Congress to one chamber and in numbers was seen as 
being a reduction in democratic accountability (Youngers, 2000; Buxton 2001).
Finally, with regard to the Armed Forces, as we have seen Fujimori 
became the only public representative with power of appointment over the 
military, allowing him and Montesinos to monopolise that institution. Similarly in 
Venezuela, the President became responsible for all promotions from colonel or 
naval officer upwards, and thus the only elected representative with power over 
the Armed Forces, as well as being Commander in Chief. Promotions, therefore, 
rested exclusively in the hands of a party leader and thus a single political group, 
promoting alliances between that grouping and the Armed Forces (Alvarez, 
2003).
Furthermore, in Peru the military participated to an "unprecedented 
degree in government decision making...accompanied by a weakening in the 
institutional prerogatives of the military" (Mauceri in Youngers, 2000 p46). 
Corruption became notorious, especially in narcotics and arms running, and most 
of it controlled by Montesinos (Obando, 2002). The military maintained their 
control of the so-called emergency zones throughout most of the nineties 
(Youngers, 2000 p48).189 In Venezuela under Chávez, on the other hand, 
ordinary soldiers have been given the vote and take part in highly publicised 
developmental schemes, such as Plan Bolivar, and the running of popular 
markets. Higher-ranking officers are put in charge of important ministries or 
state agencies, such as the Economy Ministry and the national oil company, 
PDVSA (Manrique, 2001). In both countries there has been increased influence 
and politicisation of the military, but in the Venezuelan case the Armed Forces 
are involved primarily in developmental roles, while in Peru the emphasis was on 
policing and security. The Venezuelan model, therefore, emphasises peacetime
189 See note 6 above for more information on the nature and extent of these zones.
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uses of military skills and experience and de-emphasises differences between the 
military and civilians.
Military corruption exists in both countries, but in Venezuela corruption is 
mostly in the public sector, and therefore given the political will, could more 
easily be made accountable, while in Peru it was in the illegal economy of drugs 
and gun running. Another important difference is that Chavez acts as the chief 
link between the civil and military establishments, whilst in Peru, Montesinos, an 
unelected person with no official state capacity and therefore with no public 
accountability, acted as that nexus. Nonetheless, in both cases according to 
many analysts there is extreme politicisation of the Armed Forces and evidence 
of schisms, endangering institutionality (Obando, 2001; Manrique, 2001: Norden,
2003).
Tanaka (2001) expresses the opinion that the authoritarian dynamic 
pursued by Fujimori after 1995 was likely to be repeated by Chavez after his 
election triumph in 2000 (p52). Whilst there are some similarities in the 
authoritarian dynamic of both presidencies, in the Venezuelan case there was a 
clear will on the part of the government to have existing institutions replaced by 
new ones, however imperfect they may be (Buxton, 2003). In Peru, in contrast, 
much legislation encouraging deinstitutionalistion was by presidential decree and 
there was a marked reluctance to install many of the institutions required by the 
1993 Constitution. The impartiality and effectiveness of institutions in Venezuela 
is questioned, but they do not act as blatantly in favour of the government as 
Peruvian institutions did for Fujimori. The Peruvian Congress, after April 1992, 
rarely rejected a presidential decree, whereas the Venezuelan government has 
repeatedly seen proposed legislation hotly contested in the National Assembly, 
and rarely put through by decree.
There are a number of reasons for this. First, there is a higher degree of 
institutionality in Venezuela, and its democracy has longer and deeper roots than 
that of Peru. Second, there is now less tolerance of authoritarian regimes, 
particularly those founded on coups, giving local opposition to authoritarianism
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greater international support. Finally, the Venezuelan opposition is much 
stronger and persistent than that which faced Fujimori. The dire emergency 
which Peru found itself in when Fujimori came to power, with terrorism, 
hyperinflation, and economic collapse threatening the very viability of the State 
itself, gave Fujimori much leeway with the Opposition, the Peruvian people and 
the international community. Venezuela too faced severe crisis when Chavez 
came to power, but not to the same degree as Peru did in the 1980s and 1990s, 
particularly with regard to the Sendero war, thus the President has not had carte 
blanche to do as he pleases.
The Venezuelan opposition has shown a clear ability to keep checks on 
the government and impede its ability to fully implement its agenda, and 
therefore has a crucial role to play in advocating the impartiality of public 
institutions. One example from each country will illustrate this case: In Peru in 
June 1995 an Amnesty Law was passed exonerating from prosecution all 
officials, military and civilian, involved in the fight against terrorism. However, a 
judge decided that those accused of the Barrios Altos massacre (see below) 
could be tried because this crime infringed international human rights treaties. 
The government therefore promulgated a new law in Congress a few days later 
overturning the judges decision. Those accused were released immediately (de 
Belaunde, in Crabtree and Thomas, 1998 pl86). What is remarkable is the 
speed and ease with which the government solved the problem from their point 
of view. In Venezuela on the other hand, in August 2002 the TSJ (Supreme 
Court) handed down a judgement stating that the military officers involved in the 
April 2002 coup were not liable for prosecution (antejuicio de merito). There 
was consternation amongst pro-government supporters and in the government. 
Chavez declared that the decision was an "insult to the Venezuelan people" and 
government deputies in the National Assembly (AN) announced a special 
commission to investigate the "quality and quantity" of work of the TSJ. 
However, due to opposition pressure the commission's work was delayed and 
until now no changes were introduced to the TSJ until 2004 nor were these
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military officers re-arrested (Provea, 2002; Derecho a la justicia). While both are 
examples of interference in the work of the judiciary, the ease with which 
Fujimori got the decision changed shows the much stronger position he found 
himself in vis a vis other institutions. The difficulties due to opposition pressure 
for the Chavez government in changing a decision in favour of officers who had 
briefly overthrown it, illustrates the strength of the opposition in Venezuela, and 
the reluctance of important institutions to work totally in favour of the 
government
The difficulty, however, is that by using a zero-sum strategy in insisting on 
the removal of Chavez from office as the only remedy to Venezuela's difficulties, 
and promoting and using unconstitutional means to achieve that aim, further 
polarisation and politicisation of these institutions has been created, making it 
even more difficult to ensure their impartiality. For the Fujimori government, the 
difficulty in providing impartial institutions, from its position of almost 
unassailable strength, was the danger in revealing the criminal nature of many of 
its actions, such as its involvement, through Montesinos, in gun-running, drug 
trafficking and money laundering. For the Venezuelan government, involved in a 
hegemonic struggle against powerful adversaries, ensuring impartiality would be 
tantamount to surrendering power. However, various actors on both sides in 
Venezuela accuse institutions of partiality simply when they do not act in their 
favour; and an example of this is the TSJ (Supreme Court) and the CNE 
(Electoral Council) which have issued judgements in favour of or against both 
government and opposition. Finally, the position of the Armed Forces in 
Venezuela indicates an attempt on the part of the government to construct an 
innovative and more open approach to the perennial Latin American problem: 
Armed Forces involvement in politics. This involvement, however, is to a great 
extent dependent on the office of the president, thus providing that office with 
greater centralising powers, and it is said, encouraging further politicisation of 
the Armed Forces.
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5.5.3 Human Rights
Human rights in Peru and Venezuela during the presidencies of Fujimori
and Chavez are similar in an important way in that both developed in a context
of conflict and struggle; however, the natures of these conflicts are radically
different. On the one hand, the conflict in Peru was between a leftist subversive
guerrilla organisation, Sendero Luminoso, working from outside the State, with
no institutional or sectoral support (although with initial popular support in some
areas), to undermine and destroy the State as it stood.190 In Venezuela, on the
other hand, the conflict is between the national government, controlled by
Chavez and his political movement and allies, and the opposition, composed of
most of the business, trade union, media, cultural, religious and academic
sectors, elements of the Armed Forces, and an ideologically diverse group of
political parties and movements, some of them in control of a number of
regional, metropolitan and municipal government apparatuses, including their
police forces.191 The threat to the central government in Venezuela consequently
comes from both within and outside the State and seeks to take control of the
State and its structures, mostly through peaceful, though not always legal,
means. Therefore, human rights in the Peruvian case developed in a context of
violent struggle, indeed war, especially during the earlier Fujimori years, and
were consistently abused by both sides. In Venezuela, however, human rights
have developed under Chavez in a context of mostly peaceful hegemonic
struggle between two nearly matched opponents, both of whom use the concept
as an essential but contradictory element in their discourse.
190 Sendero Luminso (Shining Path) are a Maoist splinter group of the Communist Party of Peru 
who took up arms against the Peruvian State in 1980,The guevarista Movimiento Revolucionario 
Tupuc Amaru (MRTA) also launched a war against the Peruvian state, but they were not as 
effective or as active as Sendero.
191 Venezuelan police forces are organised on a regional, metropolitan and district basis, while 
national security is handled by the central government-controlled National Guard and other 
specialist police forces such as the political police DISIP and the CICPC, the forensic police.
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Human rights violations in Venezuela as a result have not been as severe 
as those in Peru, although this does not signify their absence.192 In Peru, during 
the war against Sendero Luminoso, Peruvian citizens, especially those living in 
the poorest areas of the country, suffered drastic curtailments of their human 
rights. Draconian anti-terrorist laws were passed by all of the democratically 
elected governments since the restoration of democracy in 1980. Fujimori 
intensified the draconian tendencies of the State, especially after the autocoup of 
April 1992, providing the security services, especially the Armed Forces with the 
legal means that they had always demanded to deal with the insurgency as they 
saw fit, with little regard for formal legal proceedings and minimum 
guarantees.193 In 1992 alone, the year of the autocoup, 3,101 people died in 
violence of which 42% were the responsibility of the Armed Forces; there were 
286 reports of forced disappearances and 114 extra-judicial executions.194 The 
Fujimori government has been accused of involvement in a number of notorious 
massacres of innocent civilians, and of torture. Chief among these are the 
kidnappings, torture and assassinations of 10 students and a professor of the 
University "La Cantuta" on the 12 September 1992 and the massacre of 15
192 The most notorious human rights violations in recent Venezuelan history was the repression of 
the Caracazo on 27/28 February 1989 leading to the deaths of anything from 400 to 3,000 
people (see below). For information on these events and other cases of human rights violations 
in Venezuela see Cofavic website http://www.cofavie.ora.ve/
193 According to ANIL (2002) Fujimori installed the "tribunates sin rostra" (faceless tribunals) 
authorised sentencing in absence, defined criminal conducts which were unclear and open to 
interpretation, establishing a secretive and summary procedure to judge these crimes etc. As 
noted in the previous section, large areas of the country were put under the rule of the security 
forces, led by the Army (see note 7 above) (pp. 1-2). It has been estimated that total deaths 
during the conflict (1980-1995) at the hands of both Sendero and the Security Forces amounted 
to 30,000 people, with 4,236 people forcibly "disappeared" by security forces, 600,000 displaced 
and around 2000 innocent people incarcerated of which 546 have been liberated 
(http://www.cverdad.orQ.pe/: Cuya, 1999; ANIL, 2002). Obando (2001) points out that violations 
of human rights were greater during the Belaunde and García administrations than under 
Fujimori, however it appeared otherwise as sections in the military opposed to the Fujimori 
government made these violations more visible (p294). For information on human rights 
violations under Fujimori See httD://www.derechos.ora/nizkor/peru/informes.html and 
www.wola.org/andes
194 See Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos/ CNDDHH (no date) Action Memo: Fujimori 
Extraditable at http://www.wola.ora/andes/Peru/backQround memo.pdf downloaded 25/06/03.
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people at a dinner in Barrios Altos in November 1992.195 Impunity for state 
agents was assured by a systematic passing of a series of laws, which resulted in 
the colonisation of the judicial system and the exclusion of the security forces 
from any possible court action.196 Chief among these was Law 26479, passed in 
June, 1995 which explicitly excluded from prosecution for human rights abuses 
those who were involved in "the struggle against terrorism" from 1980 onwards.
Linder Chavez, flagrant violations of human rights of a violent nature, 
specifically due to the actions of national security agencies under the control of 
the central government are not as numerous, nor as co-ordinated, as in Peru 
under Fujimori. Provea (2003; Derecho a la vida) reports that 23 cases or 13.1% 
of deaths due to security forces were the responsibility of central government 
security agencies. Cofavic and Provea, for example, highlight the long-standing 
problem of extra-judicial killings by mostly regional police forces, many of them 
under opposition control.197 Liliana Ortega of Cofavic (Socorro, 2003) asserts that 
there were 55 deaths and 300 injured due to political violence between April 
2002 and April 2003 "which is without precedent in Venezuela". While many of 
these deaths may not be the direct responsibility of the central government, she 
maintains that it obviously has a responsibility to ensure prosecution of those 
responsible and to devise strategies to prevent such deaths recurring. For 
Ortega, it is this impunity which is the chief obstacle to human rights and justice 
in Venezuela: "There is great impunity in Venezuela because there is an
195 See Coordiandora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDDHH) (no date). Many of those who 
suffered at both the hands of the state and Sendero were working in community organisations 
spawned by the once vibrant Peruvian left. The best known and most emblematic community 
leader assassinated by Sendero was Villa El Salvador mayoress Maria Elena Moyano. She was 
shot by Sendero at a community function on the 15 February 1992. Sometimes, however, deaths 
attributed to Sendero have since been blamed on the SIN, such as the assassination of the then 
Secretary General of the CGTP, Pedro Huilca Tecse on the 18 December 1992.
196 See CNDDHH (no date A) "Las leyes que destruyeron el Estado de Derecho" p. 10.
197 Police forces alleged to have been involved in shootings of demonstrators were the 
opposition-controlled Metropolitan, Baruta and Chacao police forces, and the government- 
controlled Libertador police force (Policaracas). Provea (2002;Derecho a la vida) identified 175 
cases of extra-udicial killings in the period October 2001 to September 2002, a decrease of 
27.4% from the 241 registered in the previous year.
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institutionality which permits it, which tolerates it, which promotes it. It is for this 
reason that investigations into crimes do not bring results" (Socorro, 2003).
One of the most notable cases of deaths blamed on the central 
government, and specifically on Chavez were those which took place during the 
large opposition march on April 11 2002, when 19 people lost their lives and over 
100 were injured (Provea, 2003; Las muertes de abril). In the following days, 73 
more people lost their lives before the restoration of Chavez to the government 
(ibid.). The Opposition presently claims that those who died were "their deaths", 
and that these in their totality were due to President Chavez.198 There is 
evidence and allegations, however, that shooting came from both sides and the 
government has so far failed to find those responsible for the deaths (ibid.).199 
Provea also points to incoherence on the part of the opposition in its discourse 
on human rights. During the 48 hours in which the opposition was in power, 
under Pedro Carmona, between 11-14 April, the de facto government committed 
various human rights abuses, including extra-judicial killing, unauthorised 
detentions and torture.200 Clearly, both government and elements of the 
opposition use human rights for discourse purposes, but contradict this discourse 
in practice.
198 For an opposition account of the coup and its aftermath see Tablant, C (2002). For the 
government perspective see Assamblea Nacional (2002). For a theoretical discussion on the 
nature of the coup see Rey (2002).
199 Control of the National Guard was unclear at that moment, as some senior officers of that 
force were involved with or sympathetic to the coup. Armed civilians from both sides were also 
alleged to have been shooting at demonstrators, and those who died were from both the 
opposition and the government sides (Provea, 2003). Venevision TV repeatedly showed a video 
clip of government supporters, among them MVR councillor Richard Penalver, allegedly shooting 
at demonstrators. However, a documentary by O'Briain and Bartley (2002) showed that there 
were no demonstrators within range of their guns, suggesting rather that they were shooting 
defensively as the accused claim. See also Lemoine (2002a). See El Nacional, pp.s. C/6 and C/7, 
13 April, 2002 "Mai numero, 14 fallecidos" for political affiliation of some of the victims on 11 
April.
200 The Carmona government according to Provea (2003 Las muertes de abril) used "classical 
practices of dictatorships: political persecution and torture for political reasons, prisoners of 
conscience, closing of media outlets and a repression of a number of demonstrations which 
exceeded the daily average of the last eight years (...) It is a paradox that a large part of those 
who organised, facilitated and elaborated the coup, had formulated legitimate criticisms of the 
Chavez government, for the same rights and principles that the government of Carmona ended 
up violating in a most radical manner".
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In Peru, the central government of Fujimori had an almost total control of 
the resources of the State, with a centralised police force and the Armed Forces 
firmly under its control, operating a systematic policy of human rights violations, 
and institutionalising impunity for those responsible. In Chavez's Venezuela, on 
the other hand, the government has not managed to achieve full control of State 
resources, particularly the monopoly of force, which is dispersed among a 
divided Armed Forces, government-controlled centralised security corps and 
many opposition-controlled police forces, and paramilitary groups which may 
exist on both sides of the conflict. Human rights violations in Venezuela are 
characterised by two fundamental contextual points: (i) a hegemonic struggle 
between a central government and an elected and non-elected opposition with 
its own popular and structural power base; and (ii) the use of human rights as a 
central discursive pillar of that hegemonic struggle which neither side fully 
translates into effective policy. Both sides of the conflict have been responsible 
for human rights violations, though ultimately it is the government's 
responsibility to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. Impunity is 
a result of government inaction and a historically defective institutional system, 
and both sides of the conflict have benefited from it. The opposition, with many 
allies in the international community is constantly and actively vigilant in 
identifying, publicising and repudiating any human rights violations on the part of 
the national government. The opposition, however, does not highlight those 
cases that have been the responsibility of anti-government elements, and 
immediately blames the government for all victims without hesitation.201
The Venezuelan government has grave responsibilities with regard to 
human rights violations, but it has not violated human rights, nor is it currently 
capable of doing so, to the same degree nor with the same consistency or 
purpose as the Fujimori government. There are structural commonalties, such as 
the tendency to impunity, which were exacerbated by actions and/or inaction of
201 See Villegas Poljak, 2003.
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both governments. Nonetheless, the degree to which human rights abuses took 
place in Peru must be put in the context of the magnitude of the security 
emergency which faced the Fujimori government on coming to power, not to 
mention the human rights abuses of previous democratic regimes. Chavez did 
not face the challenge of a vicious guerrilla war, thus it is difficult to measure the 
extent of human rights abuse between both governments equitably. However, it 
is debatable if the human rights abuses Chavez has been accused of are any 
greater than those perpetrated by previous Venezuelan governments and indeed 
sections of the Opposition.
5.5.4 Media freedom and the right to information
Freedom of expression and the freedom of the press are often placed
together as synonymous, yet as Lichtenberg (2002) argues they can sometimes
be contradictory. Free speech entails that people are able to communicate
without interference and that there are many people communicating, or at least
many ideas and points of view being communicated (ibid. pl76). The autonomy
of editors, publishers and media owners, however, is often in reality a property
claim disguised as a claim for free speech (ibid. pl81). What is important for
freedom of speech is the "multiplicity of ideas and sources of information", while
other considerations such as non-interference are secondary (ibid.). Habermas
(2000) describes an ideal type "public sphere" as a realm of social life where the
exchange of information and views on questions of common concern can take
place freely so that public opinion can be formed, and consequently policy and
society as a whole can be developed. In other words, free expression and a
diversity of voices are necessary to allow the public to inform itself freely and
thus take an active part in public debate and policy formation. Yet in Fujimori's
Peru and in Chavez's Venezuela the situation according to many critics is far from
this paradigm and much closer to the "propaganda model" of Herman and
Chomsky (1994 p2). This model contains the following "...essential ingredients
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[...] or set of news 'filters' [...]: (i) the size, concentrated ownership, owner 
wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; (ii) advertising 
as the primary income source of the mass media; (iii) the reliance of the media 
on information provided by government, business, and 'experts' funded and 
approved by these primary sources and agents of power; (iv) 'flak' as a means of 
disciplining the media; and (v) 'anticommunism' as a national religion and control 
mechanism. These elements interact with and reinforce one another" (ibid.). The 
Venezuelan and Peruvian media broadly follow these "ingredients" with some 
modifications to reflect local conditions.
It is not uncommon for Fujimori and Chavez to be compared in terms of 
attacking freedom of expression and freedom of the press.202 However, while 
many of these reports provide quite accurate information, they often do not 
provide a broader context from which to judge the behaviour of the media. The 
main point of comparison between Peru and Venezuela is the media's 
colonisation by sectors dominated by or sympathetic to a specific political 
identity. In both cases there has been collusion between media sectors and 
business sectors. A crucial difference, however, is that in Peru the coloniser was 
the Fujimori government, and its particular brand of neoliberalism, while in 
Venezuela it is mainly sectors opposed to the Chavez government, many of 
which promulgate a pro-US, market-reform, liberal democratic agenda.
A second difference was the more autonomous role of the media in 
opposition campaigns in Venezuela, as opposed to the direct interference of state
202 The Inter American Press Association has been critical of both the Fujimori and Chavez 
governments with respect to freedom of expression. Concluding a visit to Peru in February, 1999 
the IAPA reported that there were "serious threats to the liberty of the press in Peru" from the 
Peruvian government (IAPA, 1999) Daniel Arbilla of the AIPA, concluding a visit to Venezuela, 
compared Fujimori and Chavez in the way both used "subtle dubious legalities to Intimidate the 
media and limit freedom of expression" (AFP-AP; 2002). The IAPA (2003) similarly states that 
there is "no press freedom [in Venezuela]" and emphasises "the impunity that protects attacks 
against journalists and the media". See also Human Rights Watch (1999) and (2000) for Peru 
and Vivanco, 2003 for Venezuela. See Reporters Without Frontiers (2000) for Peruvian General 
Election and Venezuela Annual Report (2003). See also Bourgeat (2003).
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agents in media output in Peru.203 In both cases, however, collusion results in a 
willing ideological colonisation, characterised by five strategies used mostly in 
favour of the coloniser, but sometimes against it by some sections of the media:
1. discrediting the adversary by using disqualifying, insulting language 
and/or inaccurate and misleading information;
2. distorting or withholding of information;
3. the use of abundant cascades of propaganda;
4. international campaigns in supranational organisations; and
5. economic pressures and physical intimidation.204
Shortly into Fujimori's first term, the media in Peru got a reminder of old-style 
authoritarian control strategies. During the April 1992 self-coup the Armed 
Forces raided and occupied newspapers, newsmagazines, television and radio 
stations as well as foreign press agencies, detaining journalists and influencing 
and censoring content (Wood, 2000). After the autocoup the Fujimori 
government withdrew such tactics and instead began a campaign of "economic 
harassment" of the media using the tax agency (SUNAT), import duties on paper 
and government advertising as implements to ensure conformity with 
government policy (ibid.). Fujimori therefore "combined neo-liberal economics 
and close relations with the military to bring about the management of 
information" (ibid. p32). Conaghan (1996) reports that in general the Fujimori
203 This difference is attributable in part to the greater experience of the Peruvian press of 
authoritarian management of the media under Odria and Velasco (Wood, 2000). The Venezuelan 
media had relative autonomy during the Punto Fijo period, played an important role in the 
democratic game, and was fiercely critical of the political system during much of the 
time.previous to the Chavez presidency. Punto Fijo Venezuelan politics was essentially mass 
media politics and the media was little accustomed to Peruvian style authoritarianism (Alvarez, 
2001 p88).
204 As we shall see in the case of Peru the government used the first, second and third strategies 
against the opposition. In Venezuela both opposition and government use these strategies, but 
as the opposition has greater presence in the media its use of them has been much more 
effective. The opposition in both Peru and Venezuela has used the fourth strategy to discredit the 
government. And finally the fifth strategy has been used by the government in Peru and 
Venezuela against the opposition and, to an extent by the Venezuelan media against the 
government.
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government ignored the little investigative reporting that took place against its 
policies. "Political scandals are revealed by the press, abuses are denounced by 
the opposition, and policies are challenged. But much of this political discussion 
is either ignored by authorities or 'processed' by institutions in ways that do not 
fundamentally resolve or clarify issues..." (ibid. p3). The end result of these 
strategies was a climate of self-censorship becoming predominant throughout 
the media, with only a few exceptions showing independence.205 Most of the 
television channels were actively or predominantly pro-government, especially 
América Television, Frecuencia Latina and Panamericana, as well as the state- 
owned Channel Seven.206
The Peruvian media during the Fujimori period displayed most of the 
"filters" of Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model. The emergence of the so- 
called vladivideos at the end of the Fujimori regime revealed the personal and 
financial connections between media proprietors and people in or involved with 
the government, especially Montesinos (filter l).207 The Peruvian media, as seen 
above, were receivers of 'flak' (filter 4), and were dependent on government 
advertising and wary of losing private advertising due to government pressure 
(filter 2).208 Furthermore Conaghan (1996) reports that 42% of television news 
content consisted of pronouncements and activities of government officials (filter
3) (pp. 16-17). Sustained campaigns of vilification of prominent media or
205 Such as left of centre tabloid La República and popular tabloid E! Popular. "Quality" 
newspaper El Comercio was also known for its professional ethics and a certain editorial 
independence (see Fowks, 2000 p ill) .
206 Frecuencia Latina belonged to Israeli/Peruvian businessman Baruch Ivcher, who allowed some 
challenging investigative journalism during his management, until the government stripped him 
of his Peruvian nationality and transferred ownership of the channel to the Winter family in 1997. 
Fowks (2000: 50-59) shows that many of those in control of media were linked financially and 
ideologically to the government, such as the Winter brothers.
207 Vladivideos are a library of thousands of video tapes recorded secretly by the president's 
"assessor" and de facto head of the SIN, Vladimiro Montesinos, showing prominent politicians, 
media owners, business people and even entertainers receiving bribes in exchange for favours. 
When the first of these videos came to light, showing prominent opposition congressman Alex 
Kouri receiving a bribe to pass to the government benches after the 2000 elections, this led to 
Fujimori's flight to Japan and subsequent removal from office by Congress.
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opposition personalities, or in favour of particular government policies, were 
often developed. The intention of these campaigns was to instil a fear of a return 
to terrorism and hyperinflation in effect the Peruvian equivalent of Herman and 
Chomsky's (1994) fifth filter, the use of anti-communism as a control mechanism 
(pp.29-31).
Lugo and Romero (2003) argue that during the Punto Fijo era in 
Venezuela there was a media-state pact of "symbiotic dependence", and the 
1998 election was fought under its rules.209 That pact fulfilled to a large degree 
Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, and the Venezuelan media still 
operates under its parameters. Media outlets are owned by "wealthy families 
with serious financial stakes in defeating Chávez" (Klein, 2003).210 Furthermore, 
these families owe their wealth and its continuance to a system that closely 
interlocks them into business and political circles through reliance on government 
subsidies and advertising, and private sector advertising from companies who 
often are equally reliant on the State for support (filter 1; filter 2). During the 
Punto Fijo era the media was the stage on which political discourse was played 
out, giving it a crucial role in the political process, but one particularly dependent 
on political and state actors for news (filter 3). Furthermore, there were few 
actors of any weight who were not involved with the pacts which constituted that 
political arrangement. 'Flak' was sometimes used by the government to keep the 
media in line: Presidents Carlos Andrés Peréz, Rafael Caldera, and Jaime Lusinchi 
all used State instruments or outright censorship to discipline the media (filter
208 23.18% of all advertising revenue came from the government and the government made 
attempts to dissuade private companies to advertise with opposition media (Youngers, 2000 
P65).
209 The pact gave preference to non-national economic groups and non-traditional players where 
each change of regime would mean a restructuring of media ownership to reflect the interests of 
each regime. Under Punto Fijo both agents of power -  state and media -  would recognise their 
influence and limitations in a symbiotic relationship that established undeclared but very tangible 
rules and boundaries that would reflect the relation that the political parties had with the 
economic elites, thus maintaining stability (Lugo and Romero, 2003 pp.20-21).
210 The Cisneros Group has important business in beer, bread and telecommunications and is one 
of the wealthiest companies in Latin America. Klein (2003) notes that the Cisneros Group are 
deeply involved in franchise agreements with important US companies such as AOL, Coca-Cola 
and Pizza Hut, and is fully committed to free trade and globalisation.
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4).211 Finally, anti-communism was a trademark of the Punto Fijo pact and this 
was reflected, and still is reflected, in the media (filter 5).212
The relationship between the media and President Chavez of Venezuela 
initially was ambivalent. Buxton (2001) claims that in the run up to the 1998 
elections "the large and oligopolistic Venezuelan media groups had transferred 
their allegiances to Chavez" (p31); however, Lugo and Romero (2003) state that 
the media "maintained the appearance of objectivity and rarely manifested 
openly its partisanship" during this period (p6) and Villamediana (2000) shows 
that much of the coverage was very hostile to Chavez.213 Chavez on assuming 
power broke the "symbiotic" pact referred to in Lugo and Romero (2003) and 
quickly tried to implement his own agenda. Chavez's confrontational discourse 
with the main organisations of entrepreneurs and business, such as 
Fedecameras, and against the media itself, as well as government inability to 
supply advertising and subsidies as traditionally done, led the media to abandon 
any attempt to find compromise with the government and eventually seek its 
downfall. As there was no unified approach from opposition sectors on how to 
overthrow Chavez, nor on whom or with what model to replace him, the media 
became a space for consensus seeking amongst the opposition, and not between 
government and opposition as it had hitherto acted. Confrontation, rather than 
consensus, has become the political language of the day, and the media has 
placed itself in the front line of that battle against the Chavez government. The
211 See Lugo and Romero (2003) p40 notes 56 and 57.
717 Betancourt was particularly unsympathetic to the Castro government of Cuba.
213 Villamediana (2001) in his study of the 1998 election media coverage states that "the most 
attacked candidate throughout the campaign was without doubt Comandante Chavez, who was 
the centre of harsh criticisms on the part of his detractors, amongst which the most repeated 
were: authoritarian, dictator, antidemocratic, bloody, incapable, amongst others" (p84). 
Broadsheet Ei Nacional, television channel Venevision and to an extent Televen supported Chavez 
however. Broadsheet El Universal, and television channels RCTVand Globovision supported the 
opposition. Chavez became quite close to El Nacional proprietor Miguel Henrique Otero, and his 
wife and co-owner of the newspaper, Carmen Ramia, who briefly became head of the Central 
Office of Information in the first Chavez government. Venevision owner Gustavo Cisneros, also 
became quite close to Chavez, and the introduction of the telecommunications law benefited 
Cisneros as his business owned the biggest mobile phone company in the country, Telcel (Lugo
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media indeed has become "a counter revolutionary element" in the process of 
the hegemonic power struggle of Chavismo against the establishment (ibid. p30).
The Venezuelan media therefore have gone through three stages in its 
relationship with Chavez: (i) balance; (ii) hostility; and (iii) seditious rebellion. In 
the final stage the media have twice played key parts in combined business, 
opposition and trade union efforts to overthrow the Chavez government. During 
the April coup the media created a climate of intolerance and instability through 
non-stop broadcasts of opposition mobilisation and incessant negative 
commentaries on the behaviour and personality of President Chavez and his 
government with sometimes little regard for veracity or fact.214 It took an 
overwhelmingly partisan role in the coup, obstructing the government and its 
supporters from making its case and blacking out news of the governments 
return to power.215 The de facto government of Carmona meanwhile closed 
community radio stations, arresting and torturing some of their workers. "The 
Venezuelan population saw their right to receive information violated [...] and the 
spokespeople of the constitutional government and sectors which demanded the 
restitution of the rule of law saw their right to express themselves broken"
and Romero, 2003 p7-8) In both cases, however, these friendships were to turn to deep-seated 
antagonism.
214 On the non-stop coverage of opposition marches during the coup see Provea (2002). On the 
lack of rigour of the media examination of role of media in coup see Lemoine, 2002. For insults to 
the president see BPV (2003); this organisation represents most media owners in Venezuela, and 
has compared the government of President Chávez to the "sordid Cuban tyranny" and "well 
known pseudo-popular tyrannies - Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini - which have bloodied our hemisphere 
[s/c]" see (BPV 2003)
215 A press conference called by Attorney General, Isaias Rodriguez was hastily taken of the air 
when he began to denounce the action as a coup (González Plessmann, 2002 pl9). The de facto 
government of Carmona closed down the state television station VTV, community radio stations 
such as Radio Catia, and many of their workers were arrested and some tortured. Provea (2002) 
reports that apart from the closing of VTV, five community stations were raided, three journalists 
detained and one of them tortured. There was a blackout on news of pro-government 
demonstrations resulting in demonstrations outside some television stations demanding that the 
truth be shown, and.the resignation of some media staff. See González Plessmann (2002 p20). 
For example Andrés Izarra, Chief of Information at RCTV. See Bourgeat (2003 p5) and Provea 
(2003) and O'Briain and Bartley (2003). A satellite relayer DirecTV (owned by the Cisneros 
company) stopped the signal of Colombian satellite station Caracol as it began to broadcast the 
return of Chávez live from the Presidential palace (Provea, 2003). Newspapers, excepting Ultimas 
Noticias, did not publish on Sunday 14 April, after Chávez's return to power, continuing the news 
blackout (fieldwork observation).
257
(González Plessmann, 2002). Such strategies continued or were amplified during 
the so-called paro cívico or lockout/strike led by Fedcamaras and the CTV from 
December 2002 to early February 2003.216
The government and/or its supporters, however, have also done their part 
to limit freedom of expression and the right to information. Attacks on 
journalists, leading sometimes to death, bombings of newspaper offices, verbal 
attacks on the media by the President, accusations of criminal misdeeds of 
individual journalists by state media agencies, and an abusive use of mandatory 
state broadcasts, are among the strategies used by the government or pro­
government factions to limit freedom of expression.217 Like in Peru, little notice is 
taken of public concern on major issues. Nonetheless these justified complaints 
must be put into the broader context of contemporary Venezuelan society to be 
understood properly. Between 30 to 38% of Venezuelans support Chávez, 
according to a privately owned polling company, Consultores 21 (ibid.) yet this 
statistically important group of people do not see their views being reflected in
216 Bourgeat (2003) reports on the private media operating as a cartel and exchanging footage, 
providing non-stop reports of opposition protests (pp.5-7). Simultaneous live transmission was 
provided every evening of strike leaders and opposition press conferences. Commercial 
advertising was replaced entirely by pro-opposition spots urging the population to take part in 
demonstrations and protests, including non-payment of taxes. According to government 
estimates the television stations broadcast an average of 700 pro-opposition advertisements 
every day during the strike (Klein, 2003). Even when some normal programming was resumed, 
split-second subliminal pro-opposition messages were inserted into films and children's 
entertainment (Villegas Poljak, 2003).
217 Provea (2002) registered 115 cases affecting the liberty of expression during the period 
October 2001 to September 2002, including the death of journalist Jorge Tortoza killed on an 
opposition demonstration on the 11 April; five explosions outside media building; verbal threats 
including on numerous occasions on the media and opposition by the President himself such as 
"enemies of the people" "traitors", "coup-supporters", "saboteurs" "fascists" and "terrorists" 
(Bourgeat, 2003 p9). During the weekly broadcasts of A/d Presidente on state television and 
radio Chavez attacked the press in 133 out of 136 of these broadcasts (Provea, 2003). 
Government news agency accused four well-known anti-government journalists, Patricia Poleo, 
Marta Colomina, Jose Domingo Blanco and the above-mentioned Pacheco of being "narco­
journalists" (op. cit. plO). Between 1999 and February 2002 there were 357 cadenas, 
(government broadcasts enforced on private broadcasters) according to AGB Panamericana de 
Venezuela, a television ratings company (ibid. p9). The government also provides in VTV, a 
television service entirely dedicated to reporting favouring the government (ibid.).
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the media, and are indeed regularly insulted by it.218 Some of the journalists, 
who have been particularly targeted with attacks, are also suspected of having 
participated in the coup, and in general of conducting a sustained and legally 
questionable campaign against the government.219 Nevertheless, most 
journalists are caught in the crossfire between media owners and government, 
although some of the more prominent anti-government journalists are in reality 
political actors, such as Patricia Poleo.
Yet, despite frequent calls to the military to intervene, seditious activities, 
suspected violent activities, and campaigns of misinformation no journalist or 
media worker has been put in prison, nor has the government until recently used 
any of its considerable power over the media to give it 'flak'.220 While many 
journalists have suffered attacks, these have been on both sides and could be 
seen as victims of the profound political polarisation found in the country, which 
has been contributed to substantially by the government, especially Chavez, but 
also by the media and opposition. Furthermore it has been demonstrated that 
the opposition too is capable of subterfuge and violence. It is not beyond 
speculation that opposition sympathisers intent on discrediting the government
218 Supporters of Chávez are regularly referred to as "hordes" and the pro-government Bolivarian 
Circles as "terror circles" (RSF, 2003 pl5, quoting government Minister Nora Uribe).
219 For Pacheco's role in coup see Lemoine (2002) Pacheco reporting false information against the 
government (Ali Rodriguez, head of PDVSA) see O'Donoghue, P (2003). On Poleo's role in the 
coup see Poleo (2002) and on making false paramilitary videos see Villegas, (2002). Colomina 
broadcast the location of government officials and those linked to the government as she 
celebrated the coup against Chávez along with fellow broadcaster Cesar Miguel Rondón on Union 
Radio (fieldwork observation). Colomina also has described the ruling party parliamentarians as 
"ridiculous", the government as "farcical" and its political programme as a "third rate revolution" 
(RSF, 2003 pl6, quoting government Minister Nora Uribe). The Bloque de Prensa Venezolana 
(BPV) regularly refers to the Chávez government as "castro-communist". See for example BPV 
(2003, 2003a and 2003b)
220 Reporters Without Frontiers pointed out, referring to the coup, that the private media 
"paradoxically [endorsed] a government which in just 48 hours carried out a more draconian 
crackdown on the pro-Chávez press than anything Chávez had ever done to the privately-owned 
press" (RSF, 2003;5). On recent Government measures against media see (González Plessmann, 
2003 p5). Law of Contents and Social Responsibility See Vivanco, 2003 for criticism; Asamblea 
Nacional, (2003) for text.
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could have perpetrated some of the more prominent attacks on journalists and 
media outlets.221
As pointed out above, the use of the media in both Peru and Venezuela is 
much closer to Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model than Habermas' 
concept of the public sphere. However, this section also shows that the 
propaganda model can be utilised just as effectively against a government as it 
can in its favour, as can be clearly seen in the case of Venezuela. Both cases also 
show us that media proprietors may in some instances prioritise their own 
interests, both financial and power-based, before any considerations of media 
independence or concepts of truth, and can ally themselves with whichever 
power sectors best serve those interests. In both these cases the media has 
shown considerable autonomy of movement, despite a certain dependence on 
external powers, and is not, therefore, as helplessly subject to omnipotent 
authoritarian rulers as is sometimes supposed. The media in Venezuela has taken 
an autonomous decision to participate in opposition campaigns against the 
government, and in Peru media owners entered freely into negotiations with 
Montesinos for their own financial benefit, but also because of the close 
ideological and personal relations between business and government. In this 
context the repeated protests of the Venezuelan media over threats to freedom 
of expression are indeed, as Lichtenberg (2002) states, examples of calls for the 
protection of property and privilege.
However, judging by many of its actions, the Chávez government would 
perhaps, given the opportunity, take advantage of the propaganda model. 
Nevertheless, this is not, nor can it be, the case in Venezuela at the moment, as
221 The coup itself is evidence of opposition subterfuge with media co-operation, as is Poleo's 
involvement in the coup and in the Comacate video. Large caches of arms were found in the 
house of prominent business man and coup supporter Issac Perez Recao (see Palacios 2002a). 
Police investigations have revealed that the shooting of three demonstrators at a pro-opposition 
rally in support of dissident military officers occupying a public square in Caracas was organised 
by persons linked to those officers. Bombs outside the Spanish and Colombian embassies and the 
deaths of three soldiers linked to these officers were also suspected to be the work of this group. 
All these crimes were prominently blamed on the government by the media and few covered the 
results of police detective work. See Villegas Poljak, (2003) and Últimas Noticias (2003).
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the conditions do not exist. If anything, what is illustrated here is not the 
perniciousness of government, but the inherent characteristics of the 
propaganda model, which in the end serve the interests of the powerful against 
those of the public. The ultimate effect of the strategies outlined above, is the 
relativisation of truth, creating a situation of confusion, mistrust and even 
ungovernability, and thus effectively compromising the public's right to accurate 
and reliable information, and the quality of democracy operating in each country 
(Ramonet, 2002).
5.5.5 Associational autonomy
The arrival of Fujimori, and especially the implementation of his shock
economic programme, deepened the crisis in social movements already gravely
weakened by the cumulative effect of years of economic crisis, the Sendero war,
and the decline of the left (Roberts, 1998).222 Popular organisational energies
were diverted from public demands for incorporation to private strategies for
survival. Formal employment, especially industrial and mining employment, once
the stronghold of the union movement, reduced sharply during the Garcia and
Fujimori presidencies. The April 1992 autocoup, the high legitimacy of the
Fujimori government, and the weakness of the opposition added to the pressures
which quelled any possible popular unrest. Fujimori and Montesinos developed
sophisticated and effective mechanisms to identify and stop opposition
developing amongst social movements.223 Authoritarianism, clientelism, inclusion,
222 According to Gonzalez de Olarte (1998) 37.9% of Peruvians were in poverty and 14.9% in 
extreme poverty in 1986. As a result of hyperinflation (1988-1991) and the effects of the 
fujishockof August 1990, 55.3% of Peruvians passed into poverty and 24.2% into extreme 
poverty (p83). Most of the new poor were in cities, especially Lima, and many among the middle 
classes and public sector workers (ibid. p85). Fujimori's restructuration policy managed to reduce 
poverty in the following years, but never to the level of 1986.
223 Government agents, such as Absalon Vasquez, an ex-Aprista with strong connections at the 
grassroots, was said to have identified possible foci of popular opposition and neutralised it 
though clientelism, co-optation, corruption and/or threats (Interview Rosa Maria Alfaro, 
Calandria). The Armed Forces, the police and surveillance by the national intelligence service 
(SIN), backed such measures up with force. By such means a form of social peace was achieved 
which worked against the emergence of popular protest despite the very real reverses in social
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recognition and meritocracy were all strategies used by the government to 
weave local needs together w ith government aims (Degregori et al., 1998 p261).
The political parties could not provide an effective response to fujimorismo 
and remained powerless politically. APRA polled only 8% in the 1995 elections, 
and AP, PPC and Izquierda Unida individually polled less than 5% (Conaghan, 
1996 p l9 ). The tigh t control of state resources exercised by Fujimori ensured 
that most leaders of community and social organisations remained neutral or 
aligned themselves with the government.224 These movements in any case were 
not loci o f ideological resistance but o f pragmatic survival and thus did not 
present a serious autonomous challenge to the Fujimori regime, although they 
were not uncritical.225 In sum "...[t]he  relationship between popular sectors and 
the state under Fujimori was characterised by a strong pragmatism, arising from 
the weakness of collective identities, a crisis o f the state and o f the various 
support groups, in a context of high levels of violence and a crisis of 
governability" (Tanaka, 1998 p235). Popular sectors became demobilised 
according to  Tanaka, and emphasis was placed on private initiative and public 
opinion, w ith the media rather than popular organisations acting as mediator. 
Low levels of collective collaboration were evident amongst the public 
(Conaghan, 1996).
Venezuela, on the other hand, had not experienced the massive 
mobilisations o f popular sectors seen in Peru during and after the military regime 
up until the late 1980s. From the caracazo of 1989, however, mobilisation
and economic well-being felt by the popular classes in the earlier Fujimori years. The first 
attempt at organised resistance did not come until a one-day trade union organised work 
stoppage was held on April 1999, the first such stoppage in nine years of government under 
Fujimori (Cuya, 1999). From then on, popular protest became an important instrument in the 
opposition strategy to remove Fujimori, culminating in the grand Marcha de los Cuatro Suyos 
held on 28 July 2000, the day of Fujimori's inauguration for a third presidential term and Peru's 
independence day.
224 Over 20% of the national budget was apportioned to the Ministry of the Presidency in 1995 
(Schady, 1999 pp.3-4).
225 Tanaka (1998) points to the near defeat of Fujimori in the referendum of 1993 and defeats in 
the municipal elections of the same year. He refers to Balbi's (1996) phrase "delegación vigilada" 
(vigilant delegation) to describe this wariness on the part of the electorate.
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became a favoured method o f voicing dissent among all sectors of Venezuelan 
society, especially during the Chavez years (Lopez Maya, 2002; Provea, 2001 and 
2002).226 Similarly, social organisations and movements became more prominent 
after the caracazo, particularly as a result of decentralisation policies pursued by 
the state from the late eighties (Garcia-Guadilla, p l79 ). When the Chavez 
government installed the ANC (National Constituent Assembly) in 1999, the 
participation of civil society was "dynamic and successful" due to mutual 
coincidences in some of theirs and the ruling coalition's aims (ibid. p l8 6 ).227 
Social organisations saw the Bolivarian Constitution as a satisfactory framework 
from which to fashion new relations between state and society. They became 
dissatisfied, however, as they perceived an increasing breach developing 
between the precepts o f the Constitution and official discourse on the one hand, 
and the President's divisive discourse and partisan governmental practice on the 
other. Polarisation developed and mobilisation increased, with class cleavages 
becoming more apparent as the middle and upper classes demonstrated against 
the government and the popular classes in support o f it. Chavez responded to 
increased middle-upper class mobilisation with co-optation and direct
225 The caracazo was a popular revolt against a neoliberal inspired economic packet implemented 
by Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989-1993) at the beginning of his second presidency. López Maya 
(2002) identifies collective action protests such as street blockades, occupations of buildings and 
land, violent "disturbances" and looting; stopp.ages or unofficial strikes, marches, and pot 
banging (cacerolazos). According to López Maya there were a total of 8,355 protests in the
country from October 1989 to September 2000, not including "stopp.ages" or unofficial strikes 
(ibid). She notes that protest rose in 1999 and 2000, the first two years of the Chávez 
administration. This tendency seems to be continuing as Provea (2001 and 2002; Chapter 2 
Derechos Civiles y Politicos/Derecho a la Manifestación Pacífica) identified 1,169 demonstrations 
between October 2000 and September 2001, and 1,262 demonstrations during the same period 
the following year. Police repression of the public's right to protest is however a relatively rare 
occurrence in Venezuela and Provea (2003 ibid) notes that during most of the years of the 
Chávez administration there has been a fall in the number of protests repressed despite the high 
numbers of those years. Of the demonstrations recorded 42 (3.6 %) were repressed or 
obstructed by the security forces in the first period, and 45 (3.9 %) in the following period.
227 Many of these groups were some of the strongest advocates for the calling of a Constituent 
Assembly from early on in the nineties, according to Garcia Gaudilla. She records that 624 
proposals were formulated to the ANC by civil society of which 50 % were accepted, albeit with 
modifications to some of them.
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propagation of popular organisations.228 Participation for the government, Garcia- 
Gaudilla concludes, means "winning legitimacy w ithout losing power" (ibid. 
p l94 ).
Associational autonomy is prejudiced too by tendencies of personalisation 
and weakening o f party politics as noted in Peru, and a centralisation of state 
resources and power, making party lists more dependent on loyalty to party 
leaders (Molina, 2001). While the 1999 Constitution requires parties to hold 
elections to decide on candidates, this provision is rarely observed by these more 
personalist parties or movements, including the governing party, the MVR 
(Ellner, 2001 p l8 ) .229 Political discourse, however, is increasingly being 
dominated by left-right ideological identities in Venezuelan party politics thus 
providing greater programmatic and ideological variety in party discourse, unlike 
in Peru where is currently dominated by liberalism.
Unlike in Fujimori's Peru, where trades unions became largely irrelevant, 
unions in Venezuela have been one o f the centres of ideological and hegemonic 
struggle. The CTV led a number o f strikes against the Chavez government, albeit 
in concert with the business association Fedecamaras. Despite traditionally 
being dominated by AD, the CTV has successfully avoided being co-opted by the 
Chavez government while at the same time asserting its autonomy from its 
erstwhile sponsors. Although its powers of mobilisation have been weakened 
considerably, it has presented a convincing challenge to  the government on a 
number o f occasions (Ellner 2003b in Ellner and Hellinger, 2003).
228 Parts of the women's movement and the indigenous movement were co-opted, and 
government sponsored Bolivarian Circles, groups of government supporters organised into small 
cells in workplaces, schools, neighbourhoods etc were promoted and financed, and Chávez's old 
clandestine movement the MBR-200 was revived (ibid. pp. 193-194).
229 Nevertheless moves are being made by the MVR to institutionalise itself. The movement Is 
organised on a local, regional and national level, with a national co-ordinating body the Comando 
Táctico de la Nación being responsible for organisational and ideological strategy (Alvarez, 2003 
pp. 159-160; personal interview Aurora Morales, Ideological Director MVR). Recently internal 
lections have been held within the MVR movement (See Delgado and Poliak 
www.ultimasnoticias.com.ve 1 July, 2003).
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Even labour unions regarded as sympathetic to the government have shown 
noteworthy discrepancies with government strategies on union policy (ibid. 
P176).
In sum, there are more differences than similarities in the autonomy of 
social organisations in Fujmori's Peru and in Venezuela under Chavez. 
Fujimorismo was characterised by a lack o f autonomy, both ideological and 
practical, o f social organisations during most o f Fujimori's rule. This was achieved 
through a decline in the left, and a combination o f authoritarianism and 
successful co-optation. Social organisations in Venezuela under Chavez on the 
other hand have shown a marked autonomy in some cases or at the very least a 
qualified co-operation with the government, along with high levels o f mobilisation 
and idéologisation. Although, like in Peru there have been attempts at co­
optation this has met with varying success. The progressive inclinations of the 
government and its partners and supporters encourages an atmosphere 
conducive to autonomous popular mobilisation in its support, especially 
necessary in a context o f hegemonic struggle. Authoritarian practice to assert 
political control over civil society groupings has met with little success, as was 
the case with the union referendum of 2001, which resulted in defeat for the 
government and had beneficial though unintended effects fo r the autonomy of 
trade unions (Ellner, 2003b).
5.6 Comparative analysis
Returning to O'Donnell's (1994) 'delegative democracy' model let us review the 
above under the following headings:
■ Strong executive
■ Majoritarian
■ Passive population
■ Interest groups, media, opposition critical but ignored
■ Institutionally unaccountable except to president (no 'horizontal 
accountability')
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■ Swift policy making
■ ' Continuismd through Constitutional reform
Fujimori and Chavez obviously share many o f the characteristics of this model. 
Both presidents instituted extensive constitutional reform which concentrated 
power in the hands o f the executive and provided them with the possibility of 
another term, in other words 'continuismd. The new constitutions limited 
'horizontal accountability' by centralising institutional power in the executive. 
Fujimori and Chavez relied on the 'people' as a fundamental justification for their 
actions; in other words in O'Donnell's terminology they were strongly 
majoritarian. They also acted swiftly on the policy level using decree powers and 
arrogating decision making to the President and a handful of advisers. Other 
sectors, such as the media, the opposition and certain business sectors were 
allowed to  voice their opinions, but were not involved in policy making or policy 
revision.
However, there are also substantial differences between the two 
presidents w ith regard to this model. While both presidents instituted 
constitutional reform, Chavez did this within constitutional limits, while Fujimori 
used an autogotpe to destroy the previous constitution and only showed an 
interest in creating a new constitutional order under international pressure. 
Chavez showed more interest in the creation of new institutions than Fujimori, 
however imperfect they may be, and some of these institutions have shown a 
marked independence o f government and opposition, unlike in Peru where 
institutions were colonised and dominated by government. Decision-making 
capabilities certainly rested in the hands o f both presidents to an extraordinary 
degree, yet Chavez is more subject to the demands o f coalition partners and his 
supporters, limiting his power. In Venezuela the opposition is much more 
vociferous in its demands and has had much more success in retarding or 
blocking policy decisions, unlike in Peru where new decrees were issued, and 
implemented, w ith often lightening speed and little debate. Furthermore
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populations in Venezuela have remained fa r from passive, whereas in Peru under 
Fujimori popular mobilisation was a rarity. In sum Fujimori adheres much more 
closely to the authoritarian element o f the model than does Chavez.
Furthermore these differences become more apparent in the context of 
the framework derived from theory on participation in the literature on 
democracy. Greater electoral pluralism was found under Chavez than under 
Fujimori. Authoritarian tendencies and presidential control were found to be 
weaker in the Chavez presidency than with Fujimori. Human rights have not 
been violated, nor are they likely to  be, as much under Chavez as under 
Fujimori. While the media was a key actor in Fujimori's Peru in support o f the 
government, it primarily supports the opposition sectors in Venezuela. There was 
a greater lack of autonomy under fujimorismo, while in Chavez's Venezuela social 
organisations have a more marked autonomy or at least a qualified co-operation 
with the government, with higher levels o f mobilisation and idéologisation.
There are a number o f reasons for these differences. First, Peruvian 
democracy was weaker than Venezuelan democracy before Fujimori came to 
power, due to  the shorter time span it had to develop (1980-1992) and acute 
difficulties in terms o f economic development and the war with Sendero. In 
Venezuela, on the other hand there was the time (1958-1998), the means (oil) 
and the context (peace) to facilitate democracy taking root. Consequently, in the 
Peruvian context it was easier for Fujimori to refashion institutions to his own 
advantage with the aid o f many powerful allies.230 Between them, these groups 
possessed sufficient knowledge, training and expertise to remodel many o f these 
institutions efficiently, and/or provide the necessary legitimacy to permit those
230 These associates and allies consisted of, according to Ballon (2002) "...the cúpula of the 
Armed Forces, Fujimori's closest [political] associates, the SIN, the principal business groups 
(mining companies, chief exporters, and the financial system) and transnational capital, whose 
presence grew notably as a result of the privatisation process, with the blessing of the IMF and 
multilateral organisations, sectors of the Catholic Church and the subordination of some of the 
media" (pl7).
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who had previous experience to continue working in them. In Venezuela, on the 
other hand, the much firmer roots o f democratic institutions, under the tutelage 
o f his avowed political enemies, made it more difficult for Chávez to remodel this 
polity entirely to his own advantage. This ultimately serves as a brake on the 
'authoritarian dynamic' o f the Chávez administration.
Second, the principal political parties, AD and Copei, monopolised almost 
the entire institutional and popular structure o f Venezuelan society, dividing it 
between them according to the rules o f the Punto Fijo pact (Rey 1989;Buxton, 
2001). As these opposed Chávez from the outset, it was more difficult for the 
government to gain complete control o f the State apparatus. Furthermore the 
Chávez administration lacked the high powered alliances that the Fujimori regime 
had, relying on the popular classes in the barrios, led by left-wing community 
activists, a number o f small left-wing parties, associated academics, and the 
Armed Forces. Although many knowledgeable people are found within these 
groups, many lacked the expertise o f government administration (González 
Plessmann, 2003 p3). Extensive resistance on the part o f the opposition sectors 
contributed to a continuous struggle between sectors of the bureaucracy and the 
government, especially in sensitive areas such as health and education, and an 
intense vigilance of the behaviour o f democratic institutions for signs of bias. 
Chávez faced a continual series o f small and large scale strikes in the health and 
education sectors, and education was one o f the great battlegrounds during the 
December 2002 strike/lockout. Fujimori faced little such opposition, as he 
reduced the bureaucracy numbers, and due to his business and international 
legitimacy secured the co-operation o f trained technocrats. Unions were 
extremely weak and in general, as we've seen above, the government developed 
efficient mechanisms to deal w ith opposition if and when it did arise.
Third, the nature o f the alliances upon which both Presidents built their 
power is radically different. While Fujimori's alliance consisted o f an extremely 
powerful array o f both national and transnational actors, resting on an electoral 
base o f mostly the extremely poor, Chávez's alliance is almost entirely national,
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with weak economic and technical weight, but resting on the same social 
base.231 The Venezuelan social base of the Chávez coalition, however, unlike 
Fujimori's, is mobilised in support of what they believe, rightly or wrongly as their 
project, that is the inclusion o f the heretofore excluded marginalised classes into 
the social, economic and political life of the country. While Chávez is a crucial 
part and symbol of that project, he is not the sum of it, and he is dependent on 
their mobilisation, and not just their vote, to  ensure his survival. The repeated 
and well-attended marches in support of Chávez and his government, and more 
localised grassroots activity not only show the support o f the popular classes for 
the President, but the presence of an organisational infrastructure o f militants 
and activists w ith convocatory power in the barrios.232 This support has remained 
consistent despite a failure on the part o f Chávez to make a substantial 
difference to the living standards o f poor Venezuelans, indicating a strong 
identificatory link in programmatic and ideological aims.233 I t  is doubtful that 
these groups will allow an authoritarian project solely benefiting the President 
and his closest associates over the development of the participative and 
protaganistic model set out in the 1999 Constitution.
This situation contrasts sharply w ith Fujimori; under him the popular 
classes were entirely demoralised and demobilised as a result of the different 
crises which afflicted Peru in the 1980s and early 1990s and did not participate in 
an active sense in the government nor the governing movement. Fujimori did not 
have, nor did he want, a grassroots network of militants and party faithful 
despite, or perhaps because of, having high levels o f legitimacy due to the defeat 
o f hyperinflation and terrorism. Mobilisation was therefore dependent almost
231 Barring solidarity with other some leftist governments in Latin America, such as that of Lula in 
Brazil, Cuba and international left wing organisations.
232 "In organisational terms, pro-Chávez forces can count on a series of small parties, but above 
all on a multipllcty of small popular organisations dispersed throughout the country" (González 
Plessmann, 2003 p3).
233 According to the 2003 Report on Human Development of the United Nations, there was only a 
small improvement of 0.005 In Venezuela's Human Development Index from the previous year. 
Venezuela remains in 69th position in the world, the same spot it has occupied since 2000, yet 
support for Chávez remains around 30-38% (Provea, 2003 and see note 11, above)
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solely on the media, the Armed Forces and the SIN and not on ideological or 
programmatic considerations. Furthermore Fujimori did deliver economically to 
his poor electoral base, and quite blatantly used that economic power over them 
for electoral ends.
Fourth, the Venezuelan opposition is much stronger and more active in 
opposing the Chavez government that its counterpart in Peru ever was. In Peru, 
congressional opposition was muted and broadly supportive in many respects, 
despite expressing reservations at the more draconian measures being proposed 
(See Me Clintock, 1996 pp.60-66). The media initially took a critical but broadly 
supportive stance and latterly became almost entirely subject to the government 
(see Fowks, 2001). Popular movements as we have seen, were gravely 
weakened, as were the political parties. This is not entirely the case in 
Venezuela; political opposition may have been weakened electorally, but it still 
has considerable organisational structure, and alliances and penetration of 
important social movements. Furthermore, opposition allies such as the Church, 
the business community and the media, as well as the parties themselves, have 
considerable power and, like Fujimori, powerful international allies who view 
Chavez with distrust if not outright distaste.234 The opposition is equally as 
mobilised as the Chavez coalition and has, in turn, managed to mobilise the 
international community to take part in a vigilant observation of the process.
Fujimori, on the other hand, was intimately involved with the international 
community, which saw him as a stabilising factor in an extremely unstable and 
precarious country. I t  was in the interests o f the international community to 
preserve Fujimori in power, a factor which considerably weakened the 
opposition.235 Only near the end o f his second term, when unrest became 
common and electoral fraudulence all too apparent, did the OEA become
234 International reaction to the coup, particularly from the US and Spain was favourable to the 
rebels and it is accepted by a number of political analysts that the US was involved in the 
preparations for the coup. See Lander (2002) for the US role in the coup. See also Aharonian 
(2002).
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involved as interlocutor and even then Fujimori continued in power. Fujimori thus 
had little or no internal or external opposition o f weight to inhibit the installation 
of his authoritarian regime. In the case o f Chávez the situation is almost the 
obverse o f the Peruvian situation and augurs against his achieving an 
authoritarian government like that of Fujimori, if indeed that is his intention.
Finally, it is often asserted that both presidents are anti-institutional and 
anti-party, although this is not entirely true of President Chávez. Chávez went 
into government as part o f a broad alliance o f parties many o f them with strong 
left-wing backgrounds. Whilst in government that alliance has seriously 
weakened and the President must be mindful o f keeping what remains of these 
parties within the project due to their organisational and technical capacities as 
well as their voting allegiance in the National Assembly.236 Fujimori as Grompone 
correctly indicates, was entirely free o f alliances and had no such considerations. 
He could afford to act freely, paying little heed to other parties including his very 
own movement. In Venezuela the National Assembly has become the scene of 
intense debate as the Chávez coalition attempts to  maintain its slender majority 
in the face o f consistent opposition attempts to  stall legislation and capture 
waverers.
The 1999 Constitution put in place new mechanisms to oversee 
government action; the People's Defender's Office, the Comptroller General, the 
Electoral Council (CNE), and innovative mechanisms to further popular 
participation such as revocatory elections and referendums. The Electoral Council 
(CNE) and the Supreme Court (TSJ) have issued controversial judgements both 
fo r and against the government, showing a degree o f independence. Institutions, 
whether due to the president, or despite him, are central to the Chávez 
government and the Bolivarian process. These factors and those outlined above 
act as checks and balances against the more authoritarian centralising dynamics
235 See, for example, Fienstein and Youngers (2002) for opinions on US knowledge of Fujimori's 
activities.
236 See note 70 above.
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of the Chavez government. They may help institutions to maintain or regain their 
own autonomous dynamics, or at the very least block the realisation of an 
authoritarian domination o f institutions in Venezuela as achieved by Fujimori in 
Peru.
The Fujimori regime was democratic until 1992, when as a result of the 
autogolpe it became autocratic. Yet even then it had high levels o f legitimacy 
and this and its electoral origins prompted many to look on it as a hybrid regime. 
In 1995, it regained democratic legitimacy when Fujimori was re-elected in what 
were considered to be questionable but generally speaking legitimate elections. 
I t  was not until the late nineties that the Fujimori regime became primarily 
authoritarian as Grompone maintains. The picture in Chavez's Venezuela, while 
similarly betraying signs of hybridism, is, however, much more complex, as 
Hellinger and Ellner (2003) assert. Most certainly there are some indications of 
authoritarianism, such as a degree o f government dominance o f institutions; 
continued impunity in the case of human rights violations; and threats to the 
freedom o f the press and the right to information. These, however, do not 
constitute authoritarianism as defined by Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), though 
undoubtedly it could be a "restricted democracy" according to this analyst's 
terminology.
Nonetheless, as we have seen there are strong countervailing factors 
which act as important checks against those tendencies. The difficulty for 
Venezuelans, however, is tha t many o f those sectors in the opposition which act 
as guardians against authoritarianism, have themselves shown similar 
authoritarian tendencies. The danger, therefore, is not simply the authoritarian 
tendencies shown by Chavez, although these must be guarded against w ithout 
doubt, nor the authoritarian tendencies o f sectors o f the opposition, which must 
be equally guarded against. Rather, the danger lies in a substratum of 
authoritarianism, a lack o f commitment and ambivalence to democracy, which 
runs through Venezuelan public life in general. This seam of authoritarianism, 
this autocratic faultline in Venezuelan public life, is barely acknowledged by the
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principal actors in the Venezuelan drama, who instead mutually accuse each 
other of sins which they themselves can be guilty of. There is a ready willingness 
to use the concept o f democracy for discursive ends in the government and the 
opposition, but few programmatic proposals emerge from the opposition as to 
how to ensure the undoubted participation that the popular sectors enjoy under 
Chavez. And it is this "experience o f participation", as Germani termed it, which 
ultimately makes Chavez different from Fujimori, and provides him with much 
deeper legitmacy. Any alternative to Chavez which denies this experience of 
participation, and the opportunity to develop and deepen it, will destroy the 
possibilities o f genuine democracy for Venezuela. As Rueschemeyer, Stephens 
and Stephens (1992) baldly state, "democracy means nothing if not a share of 
political power controlled by the many" (p44). Unfortunately for Venezuela and 
Venezuelans, few of the alternative political actors to Chavez seem to be offering 
that opportunity.
5.7 Conclusion
To conclude, there is some evidence to support a comparison o f Fujimori 
and Chavez as hybrid democrats. Nonetheless, while degrees of authoritarianism 
are a notable factor in both presidents' regimes, it was much more evident in 
that o f Fujimori due primarily to his use o f a coup to establish his supremacy and 
the increasing authoritarianism that developed in the latter part o f his second 
term.
Furthermore, this chapter has shown that participation is an essential 
defining aspect o f populism, as Germani maintains, an aspect which clearly 
differentiates the Chavez regime from the Fujimori regime. Ellner (2001), Buxton 
(2001) and Roberts (2003) see Chavez closer to a "classic" populist model such 
as Peron, rather than as a neopopulist. While Chavez bases his support, rhetoric 
and policies on the marginalised poor and shows some authoritarian tendencies, 
the emphasis on the participation and mobilisation o f the popular classes, his 
links with grassroots leftist organisations, and his opposition to "savage"
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neoliberalism, amongst other characteristics, clearly differentiates him from the 
neopopulist model.
I t  is precisely the absence o f policies extending participation, which leads 
Sanborn and Panfichi (1996) to qualify Fujimori as neopopulist, and for Lynch 
(2000) to reject the term altogether as a debasement o f the fundamentally 
democratising character o f populism. For these analysts, like Germani, 
participation of the popular classes is a fundamental characteristic of populism. 
Moreover, participation is not only essential to populism, but it is central to 
concepts o f democracy as discussed by Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) and Dahl, 
reinforcing the link between participation, populism and démocratisation.
Despite this emphasis on participation, most analysts of populism contend 
that the impact of populism is harmful to democracy and its institutions. Indeed 
one o f the principal claims o f the Opposition to both Chavez and Fujimori was 
that each government harmed democracy, and the 'institutionality' which 
democracy depends on. The next chapter will look at these claims in more detail.
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6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined some key political elements in order to 
assess the relative democratic and authoritarian balance o f both presidencies. 
The chapter underlined the fact that fo r democracy to develop, popular 
participation is important in achieving legitimacy. I t  is not, however, sufficient in 
itself as participation must also be present in the economic and social spheres, as 
shown in Chapter 3. This chapter will expand on these ideas by examining in 
more detail the political consequences and impact of populism, and their relation 
to the economic and social spheres, for the societies which experience it.
The main arguments are as follows. Two main consequences of populism 
emerge from the literature: (i) increased popular participation; and (ii) 
diminished institutionalisation. In the chapter it will be argued, however, that this 
analysis has a number of important problems. First, the literature does not 
sufficiently take into account the influence o f ideology on the extent o f popular 
participation in specific populist experiences. Second, analysts fail to place Latin 
American populism, and specific populist governments, within a global and 
regional context.
In order to deal w ith these issues, the chapter will cover three main areas. 
The first section will examine the literature in more detail, focusing particularly 
on Roberts (2000). The second section will identify the failings in this analysis, 
and instead place populism within a global and regional context. The third 
section will analyse the Fujimori and Chavez presidencies in the light of these 
arguments, pointing to  the seriousness o f their claims to democratic legitmacy'. 
The chapter will then end w ith a number o f concluding observations.
6.2 The consequences and impact of populism
6 CHAPTER 6: The Consequences and Impact of Populism
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6.2.1 Introduction: general findings
As explained in Chapter 1, the literature identifies two main consequences
of populism in Latin America, one positive and one negative. On the positive side 
there is, according to some analysts, increased popular participation, and greater 
assertiveness and organisation of the popular and middle classes (Germani, 
1965; Lynch, 2000; Stein 1980 p l4 ; Torres Ballesteros, 1987 p l77 ). As a result, 
many in those classes experience higher living standards through tighter 
regulation o f working conditions and more access to welfare (Drake, 1982 p241). 
Furthermore, this contributes to a greater feeling o f national consciousness, 
often expressed culturally through an interest in national customs, music and art 
(Conniff, 1982 p20).
On the negative side, however, which is the one more emphasised in the 
literature, this participation is not seen as genuine or thorough, but rather as a 
pseudo-participation which does not lead to  real structural change and ultimately 
perpetuates the inequality and exploitation characteristic o f the region. 
Moreover, representative institutions are weakened, as the centre, usually the 
executive, exerts most control over popular participation, discouraging group 
autonomy and reinforcing the political context which can lead to a re-emergence 
o f new populist movements and regimes, (ibid. pp. 14-15; Crabtree, 2000 p l76).
Brasser Pereira et al. (1993, cited in Philip, 1998 p94) claim that 
institutional weakening personalises politics and generates a political culture of 
short-termism. As a result, politicians are expected to  deliver quick-fix solutions 
to complex problems. Populism, therefore, damages the chances fo r democratic 
development and long-term economic improvement. Ultimately, however, as Kay 
points out, electorates will tire  o f personalistic politics, and populists will be 
unable to deliver on social equity needs, causing demands to resurface for the 
rule o f law and social equality (1996 p21).
In essence analysts argue that populism is bad fo r democracy, that it 
inhibits democratic development and damages democratic institutions. However, 
there are a number o f problems w ith this analysis, principally the failure to pay
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sufficient attention to the context and causes o f the emergence of populism, and 
the inherent weaknesses o f liberal democracy, both regionally and in the broader 
international context.
6.2.2 Populism and Democracy
Roberts (2000) illustrates these shortcomings particularly well, as his is
one o f the most thorough and well-balanced accounts o f this viewpoint, and also 
one o f the most contradictory. Roberts accepts the positive role populism has 
played in the integration o f subaltern classes into the political process. He 
recognises that it is inequality that threatens democracy and its institutions, and 
is therefore one of the principal causes o f populism. However, he then places all 
his hopes in these very institutions to reform themselves, despite their weakness 
and lack o f legitimacy. Furthermore, he recommends such reform w ithout 
acknowledging that it could threaten the primacy of neoliberalism in the region, 
which in the current global context would most probably be strongly resisted by 
the international powers. In other words, Roberts' analysis fails to adequately 
take into account the current global and regional realities of neoliberal hegemony 
and imperilled democracy. Instead it shows an unrealistic belief in the power of 
institutions and a concomitant loose grasp o f the realities of Latin American 
politics and society.
Roberts argues that populism has "...an inherently ambiguous relationship 
with political democracy" (ibid. p2). Populist leaders helped to incorporate the 
working and lower classes into the political process, expanding the ranks of 
democratic citizenship and broadening the social base o f democratic regimes 
(ibid. p9). They also shepherded the tumultuous transition from oligarchic politics 
to mass democracy, providing a new sense o f dignity and self-respect for 
subaltern sectors o f society, who were encouraged to recognise that they 
possessed social and political rights (ibid.). Populists, however, often use 
undemocratic methods to achieve this, sometimes showing little respect for the
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rule o f law, political pluralism and democratic checks and balances (ibid.). As a 
result, they polarise the political arena in ways that make democratic co­
habitation all but impossible (ibid. plO). Furthermore, they have conflicts with 
democratic institutions, especially legislatures, frequently using decree powers or 
altering institutional rules. And they use plebiscitary tactics to strengthen their 
power base, rely on the military, and so weaken institutional checks and 
balances (ibid.). This erodes the transparency of the public administration, 
Roberts argues, and undermines the capacity of democratic regimes to monitor 
and control corrupt or incompetent behaviour (ibid. p l2 ). Moreover, populists 
degrade democratic citizenship by not honouring electoral promises, denying 
citizens the right to  establish policy mandates. Instead, they develop clientelistic 
relationships to  ensure their permanence in power (ibid.).
Roberts then goes on to make a number o f suggestions to lim it these 
populist challenges to democracy. He points out tha t there is a need to recognise 
that populism is a confluence o f specific social and political conditions: "...the 
political marginalisation and alienation o f the working and lower classes, the 
fragility or delegitimation o f party systems, and the weakness o f autonomous 
forms o f political expression in civil society" (ibid. p l4 ). Recognising this, Roberts 
recommends the following reforms to strengthen democracy and thus avoid 
populism.
First, he recommends that parties need to be strengthened and re­
legitimised, through reform of their financing, balanced media coverage, and 
internal démocratisation (ibid. pp. 14-16). He further suggests a change in 
electoral systems to a mixed proportional representation/plurality system, and 
political decentralisation to strengthen parties at the local level. Debate should be 
encouraged on varying models of capitalism and parties shouldn't be pressured 
by international actors to adhere to a "...'Washington Consensus' that 
undermines their programmatic functions by artificially narrowing the range of 
responsible development alternatives" (ibid. p l6 ).
278
The role o f civil society should be strengthened, w ith greater input into 
policy making, and the running o f institutions, and the fostering o f greater 
transnational linkages. The civil service, judiciary, and legislature should also be 
strengthened with greater professionalistion and the development o f more 
transparent procedures (ibid. pp. 18-19). The international community should 
provide greater safeguards for democratic procedures (ibid. p l9 ). Finally, 
Roberts adds that in terms o f policies the "progress" made in macroeconomic 
stability should allow attention to shift to  policies which reduce social inequalities 
and integrate society better, thus eradicating the essential causes o f populism 
and strengthening the basis o f democracy (ibid. p20). He concludes that 
"...populism feeds off the frailties o f democracy, while often exacerbating them. 
Populism then, is both a cause o f democratic instability and a reflection of it. Its 
future will largely depend on the course of democratic development in the 
region" (ibid.).
Roberts then establishes a strong link between democracy and populism, 
and contends that the development o f democracy in the region will dictate 
whether populism will continue to emerge there or not. However, his analysis 
fails to take into account the perilous nature in which democracy finds itself 
globally and within the region. Consequently, let us first o f all have a very brief 
look at the genesis and current state o f democracy globally to provide a context 
for its situation in Latin America, before going on to examine Roberts' analysis in 
more detail.
6.3 Democracy in peril
6.3.1 The genesis and decline of 'Western' democracy
Nabulsi (2004) points out tha t it is struggle, not institutions, which creates
democracy: " It  is not only after one possesses democratic institutions that one 
practices democracy, nor is democracy merely a set o f institutions or 
mechanisms such as elections. Democracy only holds if it emerges by customary 
practice in the public sphere, and in the case of Europe this custom developed
279
through organised resistance to unrepresentative rule over generations". 
Furthermore, Jacques (2004) points out tha t democracy is relatively recent as 
the accepted political system in Europe, and that it is dependent (like populism 
according to  Roberts) on distinct historical conjunctures and specific conditions 
for its existence; in other words, it is not permanent. He also draws attention to 
the fact tha t democracy as a universal prescription fo r the developing world is 
unsuitable, particularly as it has usually been authoritarian, rather than 
democratic, regimes which have achieved economic development for the 
countries o f the West, and the newly industrialised countries (NICs) o f East Asia.
Jacques (2004) goes on to itemise the different malaise affecting Western 
democracy which have a familiar ring in the context o f democracy's problems in 
Latin America, as will be discussed below. Jacques reports that Western 
democracy is suffering due to "...the decline of parties, the fall in turnout, a 
growing disregard fo r politicians, the displacement o f politics from the centre- 
stage o f society" (ibid.). The reasons for this are "...the decline o f traditional 
social-democratic parties [...] [leading to ] the erosion of choice [...] voting has 
become less meaningful. Politics has moved on to singular ground: that of the 
market". Jacques points out that it is the market, money, which now moves 
party politics, turning democracies such as that o f the US, into plutocracies. The 
media now determines political choice and electoral results, and is concentrated 
into the hands o f powerful tycoons. Democracy, however, argues Jacques, 
traditionally acted as a constraint on the market, which evolved, as Nabulsi 
(2004) also points out, through the struggles of working people. Now that the 
market has superseded it: "[d]emocracy comes under siege".
Thus we can surmise from this brief discussion the following points. First, 
democracy is not simply the sum o f its institutions, but evolves through practice 
which is often established through struggle, much of that outside the established 
laws and institutions o f the existing regime. Second, democracy has evolved 
specifically, according to Jacques, through the organised struggles o f the working 
classes to  put checks on the market and so protect their positions. The global
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decline of democracy is due to  that structure o f checks on the market ceding to 
the market's supremacy, and neoliberal policies are the means by which this 
process is taking place. The rise of the market, therefore, is democracy's 
nemesis, and not, as is often claimed, it's corollary.
6.3.2 Democracy in Latin America under neoliberalism
Some who have analysed Latin American politics have also noted
neoliberalism's negative effect on the quality and effectiveness o f democracy.
Ryan (2001), for example, has argued that neoliberal reform in Latin America is
probably one o f the principal reasons for the high levels of electoral abstention
observed there in the 1990s. Ellner (2002) shows quite graphically the role of
neoliberalism and globalisation in undermining democratic institutions in Latin
America. He points, like Roberts, to the use o f deceit by politicians, in promising
centrist policies then implementing ferocious pro-market programmes (i.e.
Fujimori). He also points to  the poor record o f democratic politicians and
institutions in defending the hard-won gains o f Latin American working people,
such as welfare and favourable labour policies, from the neoliberal onslaught.
Institutions such as Congress in particular are perceived as irrelevant as a result
o f these tendencies, and those who introduce and defend the reforms within
institutions are seen as being beholden to  foreign interests.
This decline o f democracy is most graphically illustrated in a report on 
democracy published by the UNDP (2004). The Report informs us that while 
democracy is the preferred system of government in Latin America, that support 
is highly qualified. Latin Americans have little faith in democracy's ability to 
improve living standards or in the institutions o f democracy, particularly political 
parties (ibid. pp.24-25). The report emphasises that to achieve full democracy a 
citizen must be a "full participant" in society -  that is each citizen should have 
political, civil and social citizenship (ibid. p30). Political citizenship is high in the 
region, the report notes, but occasional coups, such as that o f Fujimori in 1992,
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and a series o f deep institutional crises, such as in Argentina in 2001, are 
worrying trends. Furthermore, in polls conducted by Latinobarometro, used 
extensively throughout the report, confidence in political parties is low, at only 
11% in 2003.
Civil citizenship is deeply prejudiced by the low level of faith placed by 
Latin Americans in their systems o f justice. According to Latinobarometro's 
findings, in 2002 "...most people believe(d) that the rich always, or nearly always 
succeed in exercising their rights [while] the poor, immigrants, and indigenous 
groups suffer serious legal disadvantages" (ibid. p45). When one considers that 
in 2003, according to the report, 225 million people in the region, or 43.9% of 
the population, received a level of income below the poverty line (ibid. p73), this 
implies that almost half the population has little access to justice. The low levels 
of civil citizenship are o f course intimately linked with low levels o f social 
citizenship, as expressed in the high rates o f poverty in the region. Furthermore 
increased economic reform in the last two decades, has led to  low growth, 
increased poverty, increased inequality, and increased unemployment and 
underemployment (ibid. Table, Reforms and Realities, 50), a fact not highlighted 
in the report.
As a result, citizen's perceptions o f democracy have become increasingly 
negative. Most Latin Americans (57% in 2002) express support for democracy, 
but o f those that do so, almost half (48.1% ) value economic development more 
highly, and would support an authoritarian government if it solved the country's 
problems (44.9% ) (ibid. p52). Furthermore, those who show the least faith in 
democracy are those who live in countries w ith higher levels of inequality, 
illustrating graphically the link between lack o f confidence in democracy as it 
currently exists, 'actually existing democracy' and inequality (ibid. p58).
The report then goes on to analyse the results o f a survey carried out 
amongst 231 leaders in the region, many o f them serving presidents or former 
presidents, which also presents a number o f interesting findings in relation to the 
present analysis. Those surveyed identified two major problems with democracy
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in Latin America: "...the role o f political parties, and the tension between 
institutional powers, and what they refer to as de facto power centres" (ibid. 
p62). Parties, survey respondents claim, have "...abandoned their ideologies and 
programmes" (ibid.). Instead they act in accordance with "...the interests of 
individuals, and are under immense pressure from legal and illegal power 
groups" (ibid.). While illegal power groups are mostly identified w ith drug cartels, 
the legal groups are the business and financial sectors, which were seen as the 
most powerful by 80% o f respondents, together with the communications media, 
the second most powerful at 65.2% (ibid.). These groups, it was felt, frequently 
act in concert, and the media in particular is thought to be largely 
unaccountable. The Executive trailed a poor third at 36.4% and interestingly 
enough the USA/US Embassy was seen as slightly more powerful than the Armed 
Forces (22.9% against 21.4%), while multilateral agencies were recognised as 
being more powerful than national legislatures (16.6% against 12.8%). Thus, 
current de facto powers in Latin America are perceived by political leaders as 
business and financial sectors, the media, the USA/US Embassy, and the 
multilateral agencies, tha t is, the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), as opposed to the traditional de facto powers of Army, 
Oligarchy and Church. The most powerful institutions in Latin America are 
therefore mostly unelected, unaccountable to the electorate, and are mostly 
based outside the national borders, indeed outside the region. Those interviewed 
viewed these extra-territorial powers as very negative for sovereignty, as well as 
pointing to their lack o f responsibility in assuming the political consequences of 
the policies they insist on being implemented (ibid. p65).
What then does the report recommend to resolve the problems of weak 
institutions and the little trust Latin Americans have in them, as well as the 
power o f de facto, often extra-territorial, actors? How does it propose that Latin 
Americans move from "electoral democracy to a democracy of citizens"? (ibid. 
p68). In effect, the report's recommendation are similar to those o f Roberts 
(2004). I t  proposes an "expanded agenda o f democratic reform" involving four
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major items: (i) reform of political parties and new initiatives to make democracy 
more participative "...in which civil society organisations can expand their 
involvement in the democratic process" (ibid.); (ii) the formation o f "...a new 
statehood", including debate on the role o f the State, its size and capacity to 
expand democracy; (iii) the return of economic issues to the "content o f politics" 
highlighting diverse economic policies, and recognising poverty and inequality as 
"a challenge to democracy"; and (iv) an assessment of Latin American 
democracy's place in globalisation encompassing a recognition o f the limits and 
restrictions placed by it on democratic governments' freedom of manoeuvre to 
enact policies which maintain social cohesion (ibid. pp.67-70).
Finally, and most tellingly, the report explicitly links democratic reform 
with economic (neoliberal) reform -  therefore implying that both are mutually 
dependent on each other -  and lauds 'progress' made. Yet, paradoxically most 
Latin Americans do not support the neoliberal model, with 70.3% o f those polled 
expressing support for State intervention in the economy, and only 26.4% 
preferring that the market find its own equilibrium (ibid. p75). In other words, 
political reform would also entail economic reform, specifically a rejection of 
neoliberalism as the economic model for the region, if they were truly to reflect 
the people's will, something which the report, and Roberts, fall short of 
recommending.
6.3.3 The limitations of institutional reform
In general, both analyses have much to recommend them. Their focussing
on inequality as a source o f the instability o f democracy and Roberts' 
identification o f this as a cause o f populism is very much in line with the main 
arguments in the present study. The proposals both studies make in terms o f 
institutional reform are comprehensive and attractive. However, there are a 
number o f problems with Roberts' and the UNDP's recommendations which need
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to be highlighted if we are to  understand properly the impact o f populism on 
Latin America.
First, both concentrate on institutional reform as a 'solution' to the 
'problem' o f democracy's decline, and in Roberts' case the rise of populism, 
overly stressing the symptoms of the problem rather than the problem itself. A 
central argument in the present chapter is that the weakness o f democracy and 
democratic institutions are primarily caused by inequality; in other words, that 
they are symptoms o f this underlying socio-economic malaise in Latin American 
society. By emphasising institutional reform as a solution, both studies give 
primacy to institutions, when in fact it is inequality which must be defeated in 
order that democracy take root and institutions prosper. I t  is paradoxical to 
recommend that democratic institutions reform themselves in order to 
strengthen democracy and restore peoples faith in it, given the profound and 
deep-set lack of confidence Latin Americans have in those institutions. Neither 
explain how these institutions will find the will, the capacity or the resources to 
enact such complex changes, nor why, given people's lack of faith in them, Latin 
Americans should trust them to do so.
Second, a major flaw in Roberts' and the UNDP's analyses is their refusal 
to recognise that democracy is failing in the region precisely because the 
neoliberal model is damaging to democracy. While it is true that both analyses 
recognise that neoliberlism is increasing inequality, and that neoliberal policies 
need to be debated, neither tru ly questions the viability o f the model or its 
supposed role as a "companion to democracy". Gibbs (2004), in his criticism of 
the UNDP's Report, points to  its supposition that progress towards democracy 
and towards clear and legitimate macroeconomic norms are mutually reinforcing. 
Roberts too lauds the achievements o f macroeconomic reforms as a necessary 
step, which must be preserved, towards increased démocratisation (2000 p20). 
The idea therefore as Gibbs (op. cit.) pithily puts it, is "to make neoliberalism a 
little friendlier".
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Therefore, there is a paradox a t the heart o f both the UNDP's and 
Robert's arguments. As Gibbs asks: "How can the agenda of neoliberal reform -  
macroeconomic stability and liberalising markets -  be up for discussion when the 
outcome o f that discussion must be that neoliberal reforms are essential?" By 
emphasising institutional reform, both studies place the emphasis on what Latin 
Americans need to do "to get it right" within the current context, 
underemphasising the need for international actors to  examine their part in the 
increasing instability o f Latin American democracy. Given that, as pointed out 
earlier, the decline in democracy is a world-wide trend linked to the rise of 
neoliberalism, it is quite reasonable to surmise that these recommendations 
should be at least more equally balanced.
Moreover, both underestimate the real difficulties for Latin American 
countries in contesting the centralising tendencies o f the neoliberal model, which 
lead to reductions in policy-making autonomy for national governments, and the 
unwillingness o f core countries, multilateral agencies and the business and 
financial sectors, in other words the de facto powers, to modify those tendencies. 
In other words, both emphasise agency over structure as a 'solution' to the 
problem. Both Roberts and the UNDP are suggesting, in a nutshell, tha t Latin 
American governments implement far-reaching, and no doubt very expensive, 
institutional reforms, which in tandem with a more 'caring' neoliberal model 
would suffice to revive democracy and thus prevent authoritarianism or populism 
from emerging in the region. This proposal seems to be well intentioned, but it is 
essentially insufficient, and most probably unrealistic, to achieve that end.
A third important issue here is the apparent reification o f democracy (and by 
this it is meant liberal democracy) and its institutions as panaceas to Latin 
America's political instability, which I would argue is misplaced given the region's 
historical experience o f democracy and the current geopolitical context. Liberal 
democracy within a market context has not delivered to ordinary people what 
they consistently express as their main priorities; work, education and a decent 
life, or in the UNDP's words, full citizenship. Indeed the question must be asked
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if "actually existing democracy" can solve the problems of development at all for 
Latin America. Analysts often complain of inadequacies in Latin American 
democracies or governments, w ith an implicit assumption that democracies do 
function perfectly in some other unspecified place. Yet many of these analysts 
are from industrialised countries in the north, or are Latin Americans strongly 
linked to the elites o f those countries, whose democracies are far from perfect -  
and who have shown little inclination to effect reforms to improve them. As we 
have seen, democracy is imperilled not jus t in Latin America but all over the 
world, including the West, it's supposed "natural" home, and that neoliberalism is 
among its gravest threats. I t  is, therefore, somewhat disingenuous, if not a touch 
arrogant, for some analysts to  be recommending complex, expensive reforms to 
improve democracy in Latin America when its decline is indeed a global 
phenomenon, and governments o f the West show even less inclination to save it 
than the Latin Americans they so readily lecture.
Attempts by Latin American governments at reform, guided no doubt by 
agencies such as the UNDP and other members o f the 'international community', 
rest on the assumption that 'we' have it 'right'. Western nations are not required 
to implement similar reforms, thus putting in doubt their commitment to 
supporting them in Latin America.237 Furthermore, in all likelihood they would not 
be permitted to touch on the real reasons for the failure o f democracy in the 
region, namely the continuation o f the neoliberal model, despite Latin Americans' 
rejection of it. This is not to say that reform is not crucial to the improvement of 
democracy, nor that it is not possible, but rather that structural reform must be 
effected in tandem with institutional reform, a situation unlikely to be permitted 
by the de facto powers, (the international institutions, the US and other powerful
237 An example of this was the insistence by the US that Venezuela accept intense international 
monitoring of the Revocatory Referendum against President Chavez in August 2004, whilst later 
refusing to accept such monitoring during its upcoming presidential elections in November 2004, 
despite the hotly contested outcome of the 2000 US Presidential elections. Furthermore as ex-US 
President Jimmy Carter pointed out, the US has failed to rectify the difficulties that led to that 
outcome being repeated in 2004. (See Jimmy Carter 'Still Seeking a Fair Florida Vote' in the 
Washington Post, 27 September 2004; pA19).
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countries, the media, local and international business sectors etc). However, 
governments who attempt such reforms are conversely charged with being 
'undemocratic' and 'anti-institutional' by those same de facto powers, who then 
sometimes participate in thoroughly undemocratic measures to remove such 
governments, as vividly illustrated by the repeated attempts to overthrow the 
democratically elected government o f Venezuela (see below).
6.3.4 Implications for theory on populism
Going back to Roberts' criticisms of populism in the light o f the above
discussion we can, therefore, draw the following conclusions. Roberts on the one 
hand accepts that populists have contributed to démocratisation, but argues that 
in doing so through 'undemocratic' (i.e. non-institutional) means, this prejudiced 
democracy and is as a result anti-democratic. However, as Nabulsi (2004) points 
out, democracy is often advanced by challenging accepted practices through 
what are often perceived as 'undemocratic' means. I t  is feasible, therefore, to 
suggest that the great populist leaders such as Peron, Vargas, and Cardenas, 
and their millions o f supporters in Latin America, were that region's form of 
struggle against the unrepresentative rule o f the so-called democracies which 
existed there up until the 1930s. In effect these so-called undemocratic means 
can be responses to the anti-democratic tendencies o f 'really exiting 
democracies', which reinforce inequality and stifle popular participation.
Roberts argues that populists are personalist and authoritarian. Yet liberal 
democratic governments are becoming increasingly authoritarian and insulated 
from public opinion, as well as contemptuous o f the rule o f law, as the war on 
Iraq in 2003 amply demonstrates.238 Such strong personalist leadership, 
therefore, is not unusual now, nor was it unusual in the past, nor is it confined to 
populism. Furthermore, Roberts' belief in civil society as a prime mover of
238 See, for example, Global Issues on Media, Propaganda, and Iraq  at 
http://www.globalissues.org/HumanRights/Media/Propaganda/Iraq.asp
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change is slightly misplaced. 'Civil society' often in effect refers to the most 
organised sectors of society, which are usually the most well-off. There is no 
guarantee that these groups will work to eradicate inequality for the less well-off 
sections o f society, especially if that means touching their own privileges. The 
most vocal sectors of civil society are often composed o f elite members who can 
sometimes work to block change.
Another important point is concerned with polarisation. While it is true that 
the leadership style o f some populist leaders can deepen polarisation, Roberts 
does not draw our attention to the fact that these leaders are products o f the 
class/race polarisation in many Latin American societies, and not its cause. While 
they capitalise on this polarisation, they cannot be blamed for it.
Populists, Roberts also claims, disdain institutions, yet as Jacques (2004) 
explains above this is a world-wide trend, and again not exclusive to populism or 
Latin America. In short, the problem of democratic deinsitutionalisation is only a 
small, indeed a very small, part o f a much greater picture for which populism 
cannot be blamed. Furthermore, if anything, 'classic' populism made some of the 
greatest contributions to institutionalisation in the region, w ith some of its most 
enduring parties, such as APRA in Peru, and the Justicialista party in Argentina, 
being formed by populist leaders, and trade unions, and other enduring popular 
organisation being nurtured by populist governments. Latin Americans saw some 
of their highest standards o f living for the greatest numbers o f people, much of 
that agreed through corporatist institutions, during tha t period also, advancing a 
more holistic citizenship and a more complete form of democracy in the region.
Indeed, there is confusion at the heart o f Roberts' argument in that he 
distinguishes between two types o f populism, 'classic' and 'contemporary' 
populism, or 'state-corporatist' and 'liberal-pluralist' subtypes o f populism (2000 
p4). As we have seen, 'classic' populism resulted in the creation o f strong and 
durable institutions in a number o f countries in Latin America. Yet 'populism' as a 
unified concept, according to Roberts, is responsible for deinstitutionalisation and 
damaging democracy.
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In answer to this paradox, it can be argued, following Laclau (1977), that 
populism is not inherently anti-institutional, but rather that the emphasis in 
neoliberalism on regulation, instead o f democratic accountability, reduces the 
ability o f democratic institutions to fulfil their historic role o f checking the 
excesses of the market. This would explain this apparent dichotomy, as a 
number o f previous populist governments were articulated with social- 
democratic, nationalist ideologies, which prioritised nation-building, state-led 
development and institution building. As we have seen, neoliberalism has 
undone much o f this work through increased inequality, privatisation, and the 
diminution of State sovereignty through globalisation and the enhanced power of 
the de facto powers identified above.
For example, Roberts complains that populists degrade democratic citizenship 
by not honouring electoral promises, yet most o f the populist governments who 
failed to honour their electoral promises were those who went on to enact 
swingeing neoliberal SAPs, precisely because they knew that the electorates then 
(as now) would reject neoliberalism at the ballot box. Furthermore, not all 
contemporary populists renege on their promises, as Chávez illustrates, and such 
behaviour can be linked once again to the ideology w ith which populism is 
articulated. Roberts also argues that populist presidencies use decree powers 
excessively. Yet, those that have done so recently are those most deeply 
associated with implanting a neoliberal model, such as Fujimori. Chávez has only 
enacted one packet o f 49 decrees in five years o f power, as opposed to Fujimori 
implementing 923 decree laws between February 1991 and December 1992 
alone!
Finally, Roberts reifies liberal democracy by seemingly forgetting how 
ineffective and weak it has been in Latin America throughout the twentieth 
century and the present one. For example, he complains that populist 
governments erode transparency and the ability o f democratic regimes to control 
corruption, yet by doing so he seems to imply that democratic regimes were 
more transparent and less corrupt than populist regimes. A cursory glance at the
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situation in Peru and Venezuela prior to the emergence of Fujimori and Chavez 
(see Chapter 2) will show tha t one of the main reasons the people of these 
countries rejected their existing democracies was because they believed them to 
be corrupt. Roberts once again is blaming populism for democracy's own failings.
Roberts recommends as a solution to the 'problem' o f populism the 
strengthening o f democracy, yet it could be said that essentially Roberts is 
putting the proverbial cart before the horse. Institutional change will most 
probably not come about, despite efforts to the contrary, unless democratic 
governments lead in implementing the policies needed to  end inequality. This 
would entail a commitment from the de facto powers identified in the UNDP 
report to cooperate with these governments in implementing the necessary 
reforms. This is probably unlikely in the current geopolitical context of neoliberal 
hegemony and US geopolitical domination. Consequently, this increases the 
likelihood o f more populism in the region, as liberal democracy fails and people 
link themselves to strong, centralist and nationalist leaders to struggle against 
these de facto powers in order to  achieve equality, justice and democracy. 
Liberal-pluralist populist leaders may also emerge as a counter response to such 
tendencies, but even these may prioritise these themes in their discourse and 
rhetoric.
The following section will briefly illustrate these arguments in two specific 
cases, Peru and Venezuela, drawing on findings already presented in the present 
study. I t  will show firs, that both governments emerged out o f the lack of 
legitimacy o f each country's democracy, illustrating the point made above that 
populism arises as a response to democracy's weaknesses. Second, it will show 
that this lack o f legitimacy was caused essentially by the profound class/race 
cleavages existing in both societies. Third, in order to enact change, and lessen 
inequality, it is often important to challenge existing institutional structures and 
so be accused of being 'anti-democratic', as happened in both cases. However, 
the section will show that what is judged as being 'undemocratic' is often based 
more on how closely that populist government is articulated to  the prevailing
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ideology rather than concrete 'undemocratic1 behaviour, illustrating the 
connection between the decline o f democracy and neoliberalism, rather than 
with populism.
6.4 The impact of populism in Peru and Venezuela
6.4.1 Democracy's lack of legitimacy
Let us consider the first point mentioned above: the role o f the lack of
legitimacy o f liberal democratic regimes in the rise o f populism. The emergence 
o f Fujimori and Chavez was primarily due, it was argued in Chapter 2, to the 
weakness o f the existing liberal democratic regimes in both countries in 
responding adequately to the demands o f their citizens for more equality and 
participation. As discussed in that chapter, Habermas (1976) shows us that 
developed societies achieve legitimacy through a combination o f formal 
democracy and spreading o f economic and social benefits through a class 
compromise. Democracies in developing countries, however, are often unable to 
provide the second part o f the bargain to the majority o f their citizens, thus 
rendering some of their institutions almost redundant fo r these groups, and so 
endangering the legitimacy of the democratic state. I t  was for this reason that in 
the midst o f profound crises both the Peruvian and Venezuelan liberal democratic 
systems collapsed, clearing the way for Fujimori and Chavez to gain power and 
profoundly restructure the State. Furthermore, it is important to note that these 
democratic regimes had already been reformed in Peru as part o f the transition 
to democracy after the Armed Forces dictatorship (1968-1979), resulting in a 
new Constitution, and in Venezuela under COPRE in the late 1980s (see Chapter 
2). Both these reforms singularly failed to provide a State more responsive to 
the demands of its citizens.
In short, democratic institutions had already proven themselves to be 
thoroughly weak and incapable o f satisfying popular demands for greater equity 
and participation, failing to heal the profound cleavages along class/race lines in
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each respective society, and as a result failing to achieve legitimacy and 
effectiveness. Another important point to  stress is that this failure to achieve 
social and economic integration o f the popular classes in both societies led to a 
situation o f polarisation along class/race lines which pre-dated Fujimori and 
Chavez. Both presidents were products o f class/race polarisation, not causes of 
it, though both politicians did capitalise on this polarisation in their discourse and 
policies. Therefore, it is fallacious o f Roberts to claim that populist presidents, 
such as these, cause polarisation in their respective countries, although it could 
be argued perhaps that their actions do exacerbate it.
6.4.2 The myth of 'deinstitutionalisation'
Furthermore, Gramsci ([1947]1971) and Laclau and Mouffe (2001) underline
the importance o f antagonism in efforts to achieve hegemony. In other words 
change is d ifficult to achieve w ithout an antagonistic challenge to the status quo. 
Fujimori and Chavez both successfully challenged the existing delegitimised 
systems in an antagonistic fashion, offering radical alternatives. I t  is difficult to 
achieve change w ithout going against existing democratic structures, especially 
when such structures and institutions have proven themselves to act against the 
interests o f the majority. Charismatic leadership is central to this as it brings 
together the different groups that are dissatisfied with the existing system into a 
critical mass, which can carry forward radical change.
Both Fujimori and Chavez received widespread support from the popular 
sectors to implement change -  as such they were acting according to the 
popular will. However, Fujimori showed much less respect for democratic 
procedure, as evidenced by his use o f the 1992 self-coup to sweep away the old 
system, and implement a ra ft o f mostly economic reforms by decree, before 
erecting a new Constitutional system. There is a consensus opinion amongst 
analysts tha t Fujimori's new system was primarily based on coercion, 
intimidation, corruption and clientelism, rather than the rule o f law. Fujimori, as
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previously pointed out above, governed through decree rule to a much greater 
extent than Chávez.
However, it is important to  remember that the changes achieved by Fujimori 
were done with the support o f large sectors o f the democratic establishment and 
with broad popular support. Many political parties supported him, or at least 
many o f his mostly economic policies, some passively, some more actively. Many 
o f the de facto powers identified in the previous section, the business classes, 
the media, international financial organisations, and also more traditional ones, 
such as the Armed Forces, also provided crucial support. Furthermore, even after 
the 1992 self-coup, resistance was muted and ineffective, the rare times it 
manifested itself.
Fujimori achieved power, therefore, due to an inability on the part of 
democratic institutions, most notably the political parties, to defend themselves, 
and an unwillingness o f the de facto powers to defend those democratic 
institutions sufficiently. Apart from the inherent weaknesses o f these institutions, 
one of the principal reasons opposition was muted was the existence of a broad, 
tacit agreement on the part o f the national and international establishment to 
support the neoliberal reforms and anti-terrorist measures being instituted by 
Fujimori. I t  could be argued, therefore, that it was not jus t Fujimori who 
deinstitutionalised Peruvian democracy, but the democratic institutions of Peru 
themselves, and the international community, which proved itself unwilling or 
unable to defend these institutions.
The case o f Chávez is much less clear cut. Cameron (2003) has no doubt that 
Chávez is anti-institutional. He accuses the Chávez government o f implementing 
a "slow motion constitutional coup" in the following manner (ibid. pp.1-2):
■ Arbitrarily terminating Venezuela's Congress through a referendum of 
"dubious legality", convening elections for a Constituent Assembly, and 
organising the elections for this Assembly in such a manner as to ensure his 
party's domination o f it, and thus ensuring the writing of a "partisan
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Constitution rather than a statement o f broad agreement on Constitutional 
essentials" (ibid. p2);
■ Arbitrarily or illegally appointing officials and judges by using an "...executive
dominated and appointed legislation [...] to stack the courts, thus degrading 
constitutional checks and balances" (ibid.);
■ Using the Armed Forces to intervene in the Metropolitan Police o f Caracas,
and placing it under their controls, in spite o f a ruling by the courts (ibid.); 
and
■ Stimulating the organisation o f 'Bolivarian Circles' which have "harassed and
intimidated members o f the opposition and journalists" (ibid.).
Cameron, however, ignores a number o f important points in his assessment. 
Chavez's referendum of "dubious legality", for example, was allowed by 
Venezuela's pre-Chavez Supreme Court, whose imprecision in its judgement 
allowed fo r legal uncertainties to  creep in, but not to the extent that it could be 
called legally dubious. Furthermore as Wilpert points out (W ilpert and Boyd, 
2003; no page no.), Chavez had a clear mandate for change, transition periods 
can lead to legal uncertainties, the existing Congress "caved in all too easily" to 
the demands o f the Constituent Assembly, and all the officials and judges 
appointed were ratified with a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. 
Finally, Wilpert continues, while there is a problem of checks and balances in the 
Venezuelan government, w ith most branches having some level o f sympathy 
towards the government, this is "a problem typical for democracies, which 
democracies have not resolved particularly well". W ilpert goes on to cite, for 
example, the three branches o f the US government, which at that time 
(December 2003) were controlled by sympathisers o f the Republican Party. In 
this situation "...one would have to say, at the very least, that Venezuela is no 
less democratic than the US, given the parallel". The transition period and its 
results were far from perfect, but it is incorrect to claim that it amounted to a 
"slow motion coup".
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While it is true that the Constituent Assembly (ANC) was dominated by the 
Chávez led Partiotic Pole (PP), Cameron ignores the fact tha t the PP at that time 
was a very broad church indeed. Many o f the most prominent members of the 
ANC, such as the well-known constitutionalist Alan Brewer-Carias, and prominent 
political scientist, Miriam Kornblith, are now equally prominent members o f the 
opposition. Furthermore, Cameron also ignores the high level of public 
participation in its deliberations, as Garcia Gaudilla (2003) vividly recounts (see 
Chapter 4). Far from being a "partisan constitution" as Cameron claims, 
Venezuela's Constitution is regarded by many Venezuelans as a fa ir and balanced 
document that seeks to protect and preserve many fundamental social and 
political rights fo r all Venezuelan citizens.
Finally, Cameron almost completely glosses over the frequent assaults on 
the rule o f law perpetrated by the opposition in their repeated attempts to 
overthrow the constitutional government o f Venezuela. López Maya (2004, no 
page no.) enumerates these as follows:
The coup of 11 April, 2002, the indefinite general strike with a sabotage-stoppage of the oil 
industry, petitions for consultative referendums which falsely tried to constitute themselves 
as revocatory referendums against the President, guarimbazos (violent protests), 
paramilitary operations, military disobedience, calls to tax disobedience, liberated territories, 
insurrectional marches, institutional crises seeking to provoke ungovernability (no page 
no.).
Instead, Cameron focuses on one isolated instance, the occupation o f the 
Metropolitan Police by the National Guard, again ignoring the fact tha t the former 
force, controlled by vehemently anti-Chávez Metropolitan Mayor, Alfredo Peña, 
(incidentally voted in on a PP ticket), has been implicated in many o f the illegal 
or insurrectional activities described above, including suspected involvement in 
assassinations o f demonstrators. His blanket accusation against the 'Bolivarian 
Circles', also ignores their predominantly peaceful nature as discussion and 
community-activist groups, and the leading role played by the media and the 
opposition in creating the atmosphere and logistics to  carry out many o f the acts
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mentioned above. In effect, it is the opposition, grouped in the so-called 
Democratic Coordinator, who have been most responsible for the assault on 
Venezuela's democratic institutions.
The Chavez government's commitment to institutionality is not perfect by 
any means, but neither can it be said to be anti-institutional. Separation of 
powers does exist in Venezuela to the extent that as Wilpert (2004) again points 
out "no other branch, such as the Executive, can remove another part at will". 
This is not greatly different to the situation existing in many other democracies, 
both in Latin America and North America. Nor is it greatly different from the 
situation in Venezuela which preceded Chavez. However, the situation in 
Fujimori's Peru was indeed very different: Fujimori, by means of the self-coup of 
April 1992, abolished Congress and removed most o f the Supreme Court judges, 
and scores of ordinary judges. He reneged and delayed on putting in place many 
o f the democratic institutions required by the 1993 Constitution, including the 
Public Defender and the Constitutional Court, effectively abolishing the latter in 
1996 when it voted against his being allowed to  stand fo r re-election. Chavez, 
therefore, used legal, although not always procedurally correct means to effect 
profound change in Venezuela, unlike Fujimori who repeatedly violated the 
Constitution and its institutions, to eventually abolish them.
Such legal discrepancies in the Chavez government, while important, do not 
amount to  a "slow motion coup" as Cameron maintains, or to a totalitarian 
dictatorship, as many o f the more hysterical parts o f the Venezuelan opposition 
protest. Moreover, they must be put into the context o f undoubted extension of 
participation and democracy to previously excluded sectors in Venezuela. In 
Chapter 3 we saw how the Chavez government has extended greater 
participation to  greater numbers o f Venezuelans, extending access to health, 
education, training, and land and home ownership. Other programmes have 
extended access to identity cards, and the August 2004 referendum saw a 
greater extension o f voting rights to  many more voters in the barrios. Ordinary 
citizens are much more deeply involved in politics on a local level, through
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neigbourhood committees, and on a national level, through referendums and the 
massive mobilisations which have become commonplace in Venezuela. The 
Constitution provides also fo r greater public involvement in the naming o f public 
powers, which has yet to be tested. Minorities, indigenous populations, and 
women have seen their rights extended under the Constitution, and by much of 
government policy.
6.4.3 Democracy is in the eye of the beholder
When we compare this record to the Fujimori government we find a greater
and graver disregard fo r the law and institutions, and a much lesser
corresponding extension and participation o f democracy fo r Peruvian citizens in
comparison to their Venezuelan counterparts. Fujimori, for example, promised a
centrist programme on the election trail, to implement one of the most radical
neoliberal SAPs seen in Latin America on achieving power, undermining
Peruvians' faith in democracy. The Fujimori government was riddled with human
rights abuses: numerous massacres, mass jailings o f innocents, summary justice
procedures, electoral fraud, domination of the media, harassment and
intimidation of the opposition. Many o f the gravest violations affected specific
ethnic groups disproportionately, those who were living in the poorest parts of
the country. Fujimori's economic and social policies saw millions thrown out of
work and into poverty, saw the removal o f many social rights, deliberate
destruction o f worker protections, increased unemployment, underemployment
and informality, the domination by the executive o f poverty programmes creating
direct clientelistic relations between the poor and Fujimori, and the wholesale
domination of much o f the economic and administrative apparatus of the country
by foreigners. And, as stated above, much o f this took place with the
acquiescence, and often the active support o f many o f the de facto powers; the
business and financial sectors, the media, the Armed Forces, and the
international community.
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Yet it was the Chavez government which faced the greatest international 
opprobrium and the most frequent destabilisation attempts. The international 
media by and large echoed uncritically the Venezuelan private media's 
consistently negative portrayal o f the Chavez government, and portrayed the 
opposition in an equally consistent positive light. Fujimori, in comparison, was 
portrayed, at least until the latter stages o f his second term as the 'saviour' of 
Peru. The inescapable conclusion that must be drawn is that this was not due to 
either president's perceived commitment to  democracy, but rather to the 
ideology with which each project articulated itself: Fujimori's consistent support 
for neoliberalism, and Chavez's vehement rejection o f neoliberalism, in favour of 
a more constrained capitalism with greater levels o f state interventionism and 
government control o f the economy.
The Opposition and the institutions controlled by them in Peru, as well as 
the de facto powers, failed or refused to lim it the excesses o f the Fujimori 
regime fo r the majority o f his two terms. In the case o f Venezuela, on the other 
hand, the Opposition and the de facto powers used a series o f mostly illegal 
strategies to overthrow Chavez, who instead managed to increase his popular 
support. The curious paradox appeared where the opposition in Peru, when it did 
decide to challenge Fujimori, used entirely institutional means to combat him, 
whereas in Venezuela the so-called democratic opposition used mostly non­
legitimate means, backed by and involving many o f the de facto powers to 
counter-attack the democratically elected Chavez. The distinction between the 
democratic and the non-democratic, therefore, is often more apparent than real, 
as it is power, linked to ideology, which ultimately dictates the outcome of these 
struggles.
Blame fo r deinstitutionalisation, therefore, cannot be laid entirely at the 
door o f both presidents, or populism. Democratic institutions, such as political 
parties, civil society (including trade unions) the media, the business classes, 
transnational corporations, democratic governments of developed countries 
(especially the US) and multilateral organisations, amongst others, all
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participated in the weakening of democracy in one or the other country, most 
often in pursuit o f the implantation of neoliberalism. Democracy, democratic 
institutions, and other factors like human rights, are often used as discursive 
smoke screens to maintain or challenge power by one o f the other side in often 
undemocratic and sometimes illegal ways.
6.4.4 Populist legitimacy
Both presidents, however, despite their sometimes glaring distinctions,
achieved high levels o f popular legitimacy. Fujimori brought peace to Peru after a 
cruel, bloody, guerilla war that most of the preceding democratic governments 
failed to control. He also brought macro-economic stability, which, while 
impoverishing many Peruvians, at least made life predictable again for the 
majority. Whether the sacrifices made in terms o f human life and institutionality 
justify these achievements is highly debatable, but what is undoubted is that for 
many Peruvians the president had high levels of legitimacy throughout his 
presidency and right up until today. In comparison with the current democratic 
government led by Alejandro Toledo, Fujimori provided a much greater level of 
socio-economic participation to ordinary Peruvians, giving him much greater 
levels o f legitimacy.
Furthermore while there is a greater regard for institutionality in the 
present government, this has not been translated into a more transparent 
government or a fairer society fo r the majority o f Peruvians. Peruvian democracy 
has returned to the endless inter-elite squabbles over the spoils o f office, which 
allowed it to be so easily discarded by Fujimori in the firs t place, rather than 
being directed in an intensive manner at the alleviation o f poverty and hardship 
needed to grant it legitimacy amongst the Peruvian population. I t  is little wonder 
then that Peruvians are reluctant to fully endorse democracy. Similarly, despite 
the best efforts o f the Opposition and its international allies, Chávez retains high 
levels o f legitimacy amongst large sections o f the Venezuelan population. He has
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won eight different electoral contests in six years, and can mobilise hundreds of 
thousands o f citizens to march in support of him when his position is threatened.
To sum up, both Chavez and Fujimori reflected popular disaffection with 
democracy and its institutions, and their inability to reform themselves. Peruvians 
and Venezuelans knew that reform within the existing context would be unable 
to deliver the increased socio-economic participation that they demanded, and 
thus both electorates opted for radical change promised by outsiders attacking 
the status quo. Both presidents delivered tha t radical change, although Fujimori 
did not deliver it in the form that he had originally promised. Both presidents 
bent the rules to achieve that change, but Fujimori much more radically, and 
illegally, than Chavez. Rightly or wrongly Peruvians and Venezuelans deemed 
that this rule breaking was acceptable as long as the presidents delivered the 
change they demanded.
An important point to  note, however, is that both electorates prioritised 
change over democratic institutions because those institutions had proved 
themselves incapable of delivering that change. Both electorates also proved, 
however, that they wished to remain within democracy by using their vote to 
elect candidates promising change. A lesson to  be learnt, therefore, is that 
popular interpretations o f democracy, in Peru and Venezuela at any rate, are not 
consonant with strictly institutionalist views of it, and the reasons for this are 
rooted in the profound inequalities to be found in both countries. Tackling these 
inequalities must be the firs t priority o f any government, and the form and 
nature of institutions which can deliver that change will flow from this. This 
requires leadership before reform, daring and a willingness to lead from the 
front, rather than cautious, expensive and slow institutional reform.
6.5 Conclusion
Analysts as we've noted have identified two main consequences of 
populism. On the positive side greater participation and démocratisation; on the
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negative side a disregard for institutions and a consequent lessening of 
institutionalisation, which ultimately damages democracy. In this chapter, 
however, the following main arguments have been made. First, democratic 
institutions in Latin American are inherently weak and have low levels of 
legitmacy due essentially to  the great social cleavages affecting the region. I t  is a 
central contention o f the present study that regardless o f the effects o f populism, 
this situation will be difficu lt to reverse if these social cleavages are not attended 
to. Second, I've argued in the present chapter, that institutions are not the 
summation o f democracy but a product o f démocratisation. For the majority of 
Latin Americans, institutions are perceived as perpetuating the very social 
cleavages which need to  be eradicated in order that democracy grow. 
Institutions, therefore, can be anti-democratic in their effects. I t  can be 
necessary, as many populists have done, to step outside the law, and act against 
institutions, in order to further social justice and citizenship. Populists, therefore, 
should be judged not just on their rule-breaking, but also on how far the rule- 
breaking goes, and how much it has contributed to the creation of a fairer, more 
equitable, and more tru ly democratic society. Analysts should, as Canovan 
(1999) warns, take seriously populist claims to  democracy.
Fujimori grossly violated institutional norms and human rights standards, 
to install a neoliberal economic and social model in Peru and to impose peace on 
the country. His lasting achievements were the defeat o f Sendero Luminoso, the 
defeat o f hyperinflation, and the extension o f the State into previously neglected 
areas, through infrastructural works. Fujimori, therefore, delivered somewhat on 
his electoral promises, but at a terrible price for many sectors who suffered 
impoverishment, imprisonment, or death, and with little gain in terms o f political 
or economic participation. History will judge if tha t sacrifice was worth the 
advances made.
Chavez has implanted a novel constitutional model, which is currently 
being implemented in the midst o f strong resistance from mostly privileged 
sectors. This has brought high levels of confrontation and heightened
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polarisation in an already divided society. I t  has also brought greater inclusion 
and participation to many sectors previously excluded from Venezuelan society. 
Again history will judge if the price paid will justify the gains made.
As analysts, however, we must be careful to accept that both presidents, 
as populists, responded to the demands o f their fellow citizens and believed 
rightly or wrongly that their actions reflected these demands. We must be careful 
not to judge them by too exacting a standard, but place them within their 
national, regional and international contexts in order to  assess them fairly. And 
we must not blame them for structures and imperfections which already existed, 
but rather question how much they achieved in changing them for the better in 
terms o f increased democratisation. We must also try  to look at the whole 
picture and avoid concentrating on one aspect, such as institutions, which we 
may see as paramount, but may not be popularly perceived as the most pressing 
problem facing a country at a particular time.
Populism, Canovan (1999) states is the shadow of democracy itself, and 
as such populists rather than being the destroyers o f democratic institutions, as 
portrayed by most analysts, in effect reflect the deep flaws inherent in 
democracy. As we have seen many o f the most famous Latin American populist 
governments were institutional builders rather than destroyers. 'Neopopulists1, 
that is populists associated w ith neoliberalism, have had a much more negative 
effect on institutions, destroying many o f those created by previous populist 
governments. As Laclau (1977) claims, the manner in which populism manifests 
itself is often dictated not by the nature of populism itself, but rather the 
ideology to which it is articulated. Indeed Roberts (2000 p4) implicitly recognises 
this w ith his useful division o f populism into "state-corporatist" and "liberal 
pluralist" subtypes. Populism, rather than being democracy's death knell, can 
instead be seen as an attem pt to preserve it at least figuratively, and solve its 
many contradictions and paradoxes -  institutions which serve the few, nominal 
political inclusion with crushing socio-economic exclusion. To paraphrase 
Castañeda (1993) populism is Latin America's great compromise between
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revolution and democracy, between the dream and reality, between Utopia and 
stagnation.
In his conclusion, Roberts maintains that "populism feeds o ff the frailties 
of democracy, while often exacerbating them. Populism, then, is both a cause of 
democratic instability and a reflection o f it" (2000 p20). In this chapter I've 
argued, however, that while populism does feed o ff democracy's frailties, it is 
class/race-based cleavages which cause these frailties and not populism. 
Populism, rather, is a reflection of democracy's inability to heal these deep 
divisions and thus legitimate and strengthen itself. Sometimes populism has 
strengthened democracy in its fullest sense by healing these divisions to some 
extent, and sometimes it has weakened it by destroying institutions and 
perpetuating these divisions. What supporters o f democracy, have to ask 
themselves, is whether democracy can heal these divisions and widen 
participation within its existing institutions, or whether it must reinvent itself into 
a more radical version in order to do so, which goes beyond mere 'reform'.
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7 CONCLUSION
7.1 Introduction
This thesis examines at a conceptual level the ability of populism as a 
theoretical framework to expliant the two presidencies o f our cases studies. The 
thesis, furthermore, goes beyond this frame to  Habermas' legitimacy crisis theory 
to help explain the re-emeregence o f populism presidencies in Latin America. In 
order to do this, I  designed a basic analytical framework, based on the literature 
on populism. Nonetheless I found that the literature on populism does not 
provide a sufficient theoretical framework to analyse our cases adequately. As a 
result I further added to the framework other literatures dealing specifically with 
legitimacy, ideology, hegemony and democracy. Using this fuller framework I 
investigated the origins, causes, characteristics, and consequences of both 
governments providing a comprehensive investigation of both presidencies within 
the context o f globalisation. As such, the study not only provides insight into 
both presidencies and their respective countries, but also provides food for 
thought on theory on populism, particularly the need to place it in a wider 
theoretical context, and the impact and possible evolution o f globalisation in 
Latin America. This conclusion will summarise the main findings o f the study.
7.2 The literature on populism and the Fujimori and Chavez presidencies
In the Introduction to  this thesis, the main pillars o f the study were
identified as the four C's, that is, the Context, Causes, Characteristics, and 
Consequences of both presidencies. Let us examine the findings o f the study 
under these headings in a comparative manner.
7.2.1 Context and Causes
In the literature on populism the immediate context and causes for
populist regimes are found in situations o f crises. Analysts usually identify such
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crises w ith immediate causes -  economic collapse, social and political 
emergencies such as war. Much o f these crises are identified specifically with the 
stresses and strains caused by modernisation. Germani (1965) and Di Telia 
(1965) amongst others particularly identify these stresses and strains as caused 
by industrialisation, migration and urbanisation. These processes create a 
disposable mass of people, still steeped in 'traditional' modes of thinking who are 
easily mobilised by strong charismatic leaders.
This 'functionalist' reading, however, leaves a number o f questions 
unanswered. I t  does not examine critically the underlying historical context of 
populism's emergence in Latin America, most specifically the profound class/race 
cleavages and economic dependence on metropolitan countries inherited from 
colonial and early republican times. Moreover, if anything these inheritances 
have been exacerbated by modernisation processes, which nonetheless 
simultaneously provided paths out o f poverty fo r many.
In order to investigate these more closely it is necessary to examine 
historical and sociological writings on the case countries. I t  is further necessary 
to seek answers in other sets o f theory, o f which one of the most useful iin this 
context is Habermas' (1976) theory on legitimation crisis. By examining in detail 
the reasons why liberal industrialised democracies maintain legitimacy we can 
find answers as to why Latin American democracies have not found such 
legitimacy.
In the case o f Venezuela and Peru, the structural weaknesses outlined 
above undermined both countries democratic regimes' ability to secure 
legitimacy from their respective populations. Democratic governments repeatedly 
failed to heal these breaches and find autonomous, sustainable economic 
growth, leaving the majorities outside the mainstream of national life in the 
economic, social, political and cultural spheres (Chapter 2). Despite notable 
advances in the post-World War I I  period, by the 1980s economic and social 
crises brought on by the debt crisis led to great gaps developing between
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government and people, allowing 'outsider' figures, in the persons of Fujimori 
and Chavez, to emerge.
Canovan (1999) points out that "...the sources o f populism lie not only in 
the social context that supplies the grievances o f any particular movement, but 
are to be found in tensions at the heart o f democracy" (p.2). Populism, thus, is a 
product o f the very weakness of democracy, and not simply a cause of its 
weakness, a theme that I return to in the thesis' last chapter, Chapter 6. While 
Peru and Venezuela have had markedly different historical experiences, resulting 
in quite different societies and cultures, they share these structural deficiencies 
leaving them in similarly fragile socio-political situations.
This is not to minimise those differences, however. Venezuela had a 
markedly different colonial experience to  that o f Peru, the latter country being 
the mineral rich centre o f the Spanish Empire, while Venezuela was rather 
peripheral. In Venezuela there was a great deal more racial mixing, with the 
majority o f the population being non-native, and much greater populations of 
Africans being imported to work the plantations. The result was a country with 
more relaxed racial barriers, a distinct Caribbean identity, and more horizontal 
social relations. Peru, on the other hand, had large subjugated indigenous 
populations and more hierarchical social structures, which resulted in a country 
with much more pronounced racial and cultural dualities than Venezuela.
These traits fed into the thoughts and aspirations which would result in 
Venezuela becoming the centre of the Republican liberation movements against 
the Spanish. These movements were native to Venezuela, the Liberator himself, 
Simon Bolivar, being Venezuelan, whereas in Peru there was little interest in 
severing the tie with Spain. Furthermore, ordinary Venezuelans played a much 
greater part in the liberation struggles than in Peru. The republican democratic 
tradition, therefore, is more widespread amongst the popular classes in that 
country.
These elements and the discovery and development of the oil industry in 
the twentieth century were amongst the principal influences in the long period of
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representative democracy known as the Punto Fijo period (1958-1999). This 
period saw great advances in terms o f education, health and employment for 
much o f the Venezuelan population. Peru did not have such a long period of 
democracy, nor the oil wealth to finance modernisation, although the 
authoritarian leftist military dictatorship o f the GRFA (1968-1979) did provide 
that country w ith a relatively similar experience o f modernisation.
The modernisation processes experienced by both countries did not, 
however, lead to a sufficient lessening o f inequality, despite major steps in that 
direction. Indeed they sharpened inequalities precisely because growth benefited 
particular sectors more than others, specifically the middle classes, the industrial 
working class, and national and international capital. This inequality was further 
sharpened by the economic crises of the 1980s and the beginnings o f economic 
liberalisation programmes. As a result, the Punto Fijo democratic regime in 
Venezuela and the new democratic regime inaugurated in Peru in 1980, entered 
into profound legitimation crises, losing credence with their respective peoples, 
leaving gaps through which 'outsiders', in the shape of Fujimori and Chavez 
emerged. In sum, it was democracy's very weakness, its inability to lessen 
race/class-based inequalities, which led the people of both countries to seek 
solutions outside their respective systems.
To sum up the literature on populism fails to provide an adequate 
framework from which to find the reasons for populism's emergence in Latin 
America. By using Habermas' theory o f legitimation crises in a comparative 
manner we can pinpoint more accurately the failings o f democracy in Latin 
America which prevented it gaining the legitimacy that advanced liberal 
democracies enjoy. Indeed Habermas provides this thesis with an over-reaching 
structure, in his identification o f the political, economic, social and cultural 
spheres, which is further explored in subsequent chapters.
308
7.2.2 Characteristics I: Populism and participation
In Chapter 4 we found that the Chávez government provides much
greater instances o f popular participation than the Fujimori government. As 
mentioned above, popular participation in the form of an extensive number of 
electoral processes and referenda were the principal mechanisms through which 
the new order was installed. Institutions were set up much more quickly in 
Venezuela under the 1999 Constitution and were more autonomous than in 
Fujimori's Peru. The process by which the 1999 Bolivarian Constitution was 
drawn up involved greater popular participation, and provided more participatory 
mechanisms than the CCD in Peru and its resulting 1993 Constitution. There was 
less infringement of human rights, and more associative autonomy in Venezuela. 
There were also greater levels of opposition, expressed through widespread, and 
often insurrectional, protest and a vehemently anti-government, privately owned 
media.
Yet the identification between leader and people rested not only on the 
charismatic power of the Venezuelan president, but on shared ideological and 
programmatic aims. In the words o f Jesuit priest and political analyst, José 
Virtuouso, "...the popular sectors do not simply regard Chávez as the promise of 
populist breadcrumbs. The president has become a symbol which reflects the 
hope of inclusion, recognition and political protagonism fo r the marginal 
populations o f the country" (cited in González Plessmann, 2003 p3). The greater 
levels o f participation found in Venezuela, therefore, are related to the 
articulation with a social democratising and participative ideology, which, in itself 
emerged out o f the stronger democratic republican traditions o f Venezuela, 
further emphasising the importance o f context.
In Peru, on the other hand, Fujimori's articulation o f his populist project 
with neoliberalism led to an increased use o f authoritarianism to impose that 
model on Peru, in the face o f the scepticism of the Peruvian people of the 
model's benefits. His power was maintained not through shared programmatic 
aims, but primarily by an intense relationship formed between people and
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president through the latter's personal control of the institutions o f the country, 
and most importantly its welfare programmes. Furthermore, Fujimori's power 
was also maintained by a supportive media, a compliant Opposition, and a 
favourable international context, all o f which aided and encouraged the 
government to install a neoliberal model. Both presidents, therefore, provided 
their constituencies with an "experience o f participation" as Germani (1965) 
would have it, but the quality of that experience, its breadth and depth, was 
dictated by the ideology to which each project was articulated.
Similarly we find, in Chapter 5, greater levels o f economic and social 
participation in Venezuela under Chávez. Chávez promoted a greater role for 
national capital, including State investment in national strategic industries and 
services. Privatisation processes were detained and micro-businesses, co­
operatives and other less orthodox, but more popular, forms o f business 
association were encouraged. Most importantly the government took fu ll control 
o f the national oil industry from its technocratic, transnationalised managers, 
allowing it to have fuller access to its revenues, in times o f bumper oil prices. 
This was the key financial imperative which allowed such a political and social 
experiment to flourish in Venezuela, as opposed to any other Latin American 
country. In Peru, on the other hand, privatisation was rapid and quite 
comprehensive and the rolé o f national capital and industry downgraded as 
foreign investment increased. Peru having less control o f its raw materials, which 
furthermore were in much less demand than Venezuela's oil, could not put up 
much resistance to the demands o f the international financial community.
In both cases, there was increased programming o f poverty reduction 
strategies, but in Peru this was much more centralised in the hands o f the 
President, and aimed at reducing poverty, particularly extreme poverty, rather 
than rectifying inequality. Workers in Venezuela kept most o f their rights in law 
and indeed had many of them codified into the 1999 Constitution, while in Peru 
workers' legal and Constitutional protections were mostly abolished resulting in 
increased casualisation o f employment. Efforts were also made by the
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Venezuelan government to rectify inequalities in education and health through 
the various Missions, unlike in Peru where charges were brought into health care 
and there was little investment in the quality o f education and health, although 
somewhat improved physical infrastructure.
To sum up, the Fujimori government implanted a fully-fledged neoliberal 
model in Peru, encouraged and aided by multilateral organisations such as the 
World Bank and the IMF, the US and transnational companies. The Chavez 
government attempted to construct a nationally based economy, based primarily 
on oil revenues, encouraging greater popular participation on every level o f the 
political economy, with little support from outside the region, and in the face of 
tenacious and sometimes crippling opposition at home. Chavez, therefore, uses 
populism to buck the trend of increasing neoliberal hegemony, while Fujimori 
used it to further that hegemony. Globalisation nonetheless frames both populist 
governments.
7.2.3 Characteristics II: Articulation and antagonism
Habermas' theory shows us why Latin American democracies failed to gain
legitimacy, thus leaving gaps through which populist leaders emerge. The 
question then is how these leaders capitalise on the gaps which form to gain and 
maintain power. Chapter 5 illustrates how both presidents formed similar 
hegemonic strategies to gain power. Both men, as we've seen, emerged on the 
political scene in times o f profound crises. Both men also formed powerful social 
bases amongst the popular classes and to an extent the middle classes, using 
radical anti-status-quo discourses giving a central role to  'the people'. Once 
gaining power, both men set about radically restructuring the state o f each 
country, using a variety o f both coercive and persuasive tactics to form new 
hegemonies.
However, the notable divergences in the content of both presidents' 
programmes gave weight to Laclau's (1977/2002) concept o f the "logic of 
articu/atiori' (see section on populist theory, below). Both men swept away the
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old system, yet Fujimori used force to a much greater extent than Chávez 
through the autocoup o f April 1992. Chávez, on the other hand, consistently 
used democratic mechanisms, principally through a series of popular votes and 
referenda to install the new model. Most tellingly, neoliberalism and globalisation 
played very different roles in both men's hegemonic strategies. Fujimori set 
about implanting a radical neoliberal model in Peru, copper-fastening it in the 
post -autocoup 1993 Constitution. Chávez, however, used neoliberalism as a 
central element o f his antagonistic discourse, placing resistance to it at the 
centre o f the Bolivarian project. Instead he placed social justice and the search 
for a 'concrete utopia' as an essential discursive and organising principle in the 
construction o f a new political culture, a concept at variance with neoliberal 'end 
of history' type concepts. Both men, therefore, used similar strategies to gain 
power -  the exaltation o f the people, the division o f the social space into 
antagonistic camps, the centrality o f the leader with a direct link to the people -  
but with fundamentally different ideological contents.
Consequently, the essential difficulty with the literature on populism as an 
adequate framework fo r examining the two case studies is its confusion over 
ideology. Populism is usually associated with ISI and state centred economic and 
social policies. Yet a central problem for analysis of populism is populism's 
ideolgical variety. This became most notable in the 1980s when analysts 
developed the theory o f neopopulism to  explain the rise o f leaders with populist 
style but neoliberal ideologies. This was futher complicated, however, by the 
emergence of Chávez who seemed to hark back to IS I/state centred policies but 
using similar tactics to so-called neopopulists.
This variety can only be adequately explained by Laclau's (1977) theory of 
ideological articulation, whereby populism can be articulated to any ideology or 
mix of ideologies, but is characterised organisationally by the relationship 
developed between the leader and the people. Populist programmes therefore 
are not uniform but are dictated by ideology rather than functionalism.
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7.2.4 Consequences: Democratic illegitimacy and populist legitimacy
I t  is the concern fo r inequality and its negative effects on the national
economy and national cohesion which fundamentally differentiates the Chávez 
government from that of Fujimori. In Chapter 4, I analyse the consequences of 
both presidencies on their respective countries. Most analysis on populism, while 
recognising that populism can have a social democratising effect on the countries 
that experience a populist government, nonetheless emphasise effects of 
deinstitutionalisation on those countries. In the case of Fujimori and Chávez 
however I argue that the Chávez government shows a stronger case of social 
démocratisation and the Fujimori government one o f deinstitutionalisation.
Fujimori, instead o f pursing a centrist, inclusive policy as promised by him 
in the 1990 election campaign, articulated his populist project to a neoliberal 
programme. Fujimori personalised social programmes into the Ministry of the 
Presidency, which consumed much o f the social spending o f the Peruvian State, 
and used this for blatant electoral purposes. Many ministries were sidelined, 
presidential decrees were the main means for law making and many of these 
were used either to further the neoliberal agenda and/or centralise power in the 
hands o f the President. Congress essentially acted as a rubber stamp for the 
President's decrees, and the media, the international community, and much of 
the Opposition, actively supported the President or acquiesced too easily to this 
concentration o f power. The result was severe deinstitutionalisation of the 
Peruvian state, w ith little autonomy of social actors including Peru's once vibrant 
social movements.
In Chávez's Venezuela, however, we find much greater levels o f political, 
social and economic participation, with greater respect for the new institutions 
formed under the 1999 Constitution, and greater levels o f autonomy amongst 
those institutions. Furthermore there is greater vigilance of the Chávez 
government by the Opposition, the international community and even groupings 
within the government coalition and the popular sectors that support it.
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In sum, Fujimori emerged with one of the most radical neoliberal 
restructuring programmes in the region, which led to lower levels of democracy 
and institutionalisation. Chavez has gone the opposite route with a quite radical 
(in the current geopolitical context) social democratising project. The impact of 
both projects on the political, social and economic contexts of their respective 
countries has left a profound impression on their respective societies. Indeed the 
ramifications of their impact are still evolving, despite the absence of Fujimori 
from Peru and the deep rejection o f Chavez by many important sectors in 
Venezuela.
7.2.5 Conclusion
To sum up, in relation to  the four C's there are substantial differences, but 
also important similarities, in both presidencies. Both presidents emerged out of 
similar contexts o f deep historical social cleavages based around race and class, 
and underpinned by systems o f economic dependence. These social cleavages 
led eventually to situations o f comprehensive economic and social crises, which 
then led to profound systems crises, causing the populations o f each country to 
abandon the democratic systems in both countries wresting from them any form 
of legitimacy. As Habermas (1976) puts it a regime loses legitmacy when the 
society it leads is engulfed in chaos and meaninglessness. This was exactly the 
situation faced by both peoples and therefore they sought alternative leaders, 
from outside those systems, offering radical solutions.
Yet, both presidents emerged using similar methods in terms of power 
strategies, but with radically different programmes. Both Fujimori and Chavez 
used powerful antagonistic discourses against the status quo, w ith the concept of 
the people as a central element in both. However, the Fujimori government used 
fundamentally antl-democratic methods to further a radical neoliberal policy, 
while the Chavez government used essentially democratic means to enact a 
progressive programme furthering economic and social inclusion o f the popular 
classes. The consequences o f both presidencies, therefore, have emerged with
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different emphases. The Fujimori government caused a much greater level of 
deinstitutionalisation, and a more clientelistic form of popular participation in 
Peru. I t  implanted a new neoliberal order into Peruvian society, codified into the 
1993 Constitution, which has remained relatively untouched ever since. The 
Chávez government in Venezuela, on the other hand, has remained primarily 
w ithin the democratic structures set up by the new Bolivarian Constitution of 
1999, and has furthered an agenda o f increased popular participation. 
Nonetheless both have emerged with high levels o f legitmacy and this is due to a 
large extent to their ability to provide an experience o f participation in each of 
Habermas' spheres, which went beyond that o f the democratic regimes which 
preceded them.
In the rest o f the conclusion I will examine, in the next section, what 
significance these findings have for theory on populism, and then go on, in the 
following section, to analyse what meaning they might have for the future of 
globalisation processes in the region.
7.3 Populist theory in the light of Fujimori and Chávez
One of the original aspects o f this thesis lies in its use o f populism as a
tool o f analysis, derived from a synthetic construction o f an analytical framework 
based on the literature. Nonetheless as mentioned above theory on populism is 
not sufficient to provide answers fully to the study's questions. These centre on 
the continued relevance o f populism in Latin American politics, its origins in the 
profound race/class cleavages found in the region, populism's ideological 
diversity, w ith, however, a programmatic emphasis on popular participation, and 
finally populist claims to legitimacy within a region w ith weak democratic 
institutions. Furthermore, the study also detected notable divergences between 
both presidencies within each o f these commonalties.
First, a central dispute which emerged out o f the theoretical literature on 
populism was that between what Roberts (1995) termed the
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"historical/sociological perspective" of Germani (1965) and others, and the 
"ideological perspective" o f Laclau (1977/2002). Central to  Germani's theories 
was the belief that modernisation processes formed the context in which 
populism emerged in Latin America. Furthermore, Germani argued that populism 
was essentially social democratising, in that it gives the popular classes an 
"experience o f participation" which is o f more value to them than liberal 
democratic freedoms of, for example, association and expression.
Laclau (2002), however, emphasises that populism's difference lies not in 
any relation to modernisation processes, but rather its "particular logic of 
articu/atiort' (p .2). Laclau shows us that there are not any actual contents 
identifiable as populist, but rather that populism arises out of a series of 
unsatisfied demands which translate themselves into antagonism and then into a 
populist rupture. He identifies a number o f stages in the constitution o f a populist 
moment. First, different social demands aggregate themselves into what he calls 
an equivalential chain, forming a 'popular subjectivity'. An 'empty signifier', in 
other words a 'leader', emerges to give coherence, to provide a 'totality', to these 
demands. Through various politico-discursive practices, the leader constructs a 
popular subject (the 'people') and divides the social space, forming an 'internal 
frontier', between the 'people' and the existing power bloc. Laclau therefore 
provides a more logical thesis as to why populism presents such programmatic 
variety.
In Chapter 2, the study shows that modernisation processes can have a 
bearing on the emergence o f populism, in that they can create the conditions in 
which crises emerge, leading to gaps between democratic governments and the 
people which can provide a space for populist leaders to emerge. Nonetheless, 
this explains more about democracy's weaknesses and the reasons fo r populism's 
emergence, rather than the nature o f populism itself. Functionalist theory does 
not delve deeply enough into the underlying causes for Latin American 
democracies recurrent weakesses.
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By examining Habermas' theory on legitimation in democratic regimes we 
can find answers to this question. I f  a democracy seeks legitimacy it must 
provide its people with a participative experience in every sphere o f national life. 
Most people must have jobs, the state must be able to provide education, health 
and housing to the broad mass o f the people; the majority must identify 
culturally w ith the prevailing ideology o f competition and privatism - education, 
careers, leisure must be shared and realisable goals for the majority. And of 
course, there must be political participation, through elections. On each of these 
levels, however, Latin American democracies have failed their peoples, thus they 
have been unable to gain legitimacy: most people do not have jobs, or are 
seriously underemployed; vast sections o f the population do not identify 
culturally w ith capitalist values, large groups do not have access to education 
and to health care, and its quality is poor fo r many that do. By looking further 
into the historical, economic and social context we find that the basis on which 
these exclusions are based are rooted in the inherited, and often 
interchangeable, cleavages o f race/ethnicity and class. Moreover, change is very 
difficult to achieve due to the entrenched ties the elites with elites in the 
developed world, a situation further exacerbated and entrenched by 
globalisation. In sum, investigation into why populism emerges in Latin America 
must go well beyond the literature on populism to other theoretical frameworks 
such as Habermas and dependency theory.
The characteristics o f populist regimes are neatly summed up in Laclau's 
'people/power bloc' equation, above. Further to that, however, our case studies 
show that the manner in which populists gain power are aptly explained by 
Gramsci's theory o f hegemony. Broadly speaking, both men's hegemonic 
strategies were similar, following Laclau's model. There was a centrality o f the 
concept o f the people, and the formation o f a direct relationship between the 
people and the leader, established through a discourse antagonistic to the status 
quo. However, a key finding o f this study is that ideology is the essential element 
which explains the major differences between Fujimori and Chavez. The Fujimori
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project was a radical implantation o f neoliberalism into what was once an 
essentially state interventionist political economy, emphasising the market, 
individualism and the minimal state. The Chavez government, on the other hand, 
is constructing, or more accurately reverting to, a state-interventionist economy 
but with a radical social democratising content, emphasising equality and 
participation. In this way, Laclau's theories have proven to  have greater 
analytical power than Germani's to explain the seeming dichotomy of the various 
similarities in both presidents power strategies and their quite different 
programmatic content. Laclau's theories nonetheless are indebted to Gramsci 
who provides us with a comprehensive theoretical framework in his 'war of 
manouevre' and 'war o f position' strategies. The combination o f legal, semi-legal 
and illegal strategies used by one or the other president is covered by gramscian 
hegemony theory. In Gramscian theory, however, the hegemonic strategy is 
independent o f ideology. Both presidencies can be termed 'populist' due to the 
similarities in their hegemonic strategies -  but their characteristic differences in 
terms o f programme are primarily dictated by the respective ideologies to which 
they have articulated their projects.
This central finding helps explain a number o f divergences found between 
the two presidencies throughout the study. In Chapter 3, economic and social 
participation is found to be limited in Peru to the provision o f goods and services 
to the client group, in a word clientelism, but in Venezuela that participation is 
much greater and found in many more areas of national life. In Chapter 4 we 
find that there are greater levels o f political participation in Venezuela than in 
Peru, with a more vibrant participatory culture in the areas of electoral contests, 
institutional and associational autonomy, human rights and the media. In Peru, 
on the other hand, politics is centred almost exclusively on the person o f Alberto 
Fujimori, and any form o f participation is primarily channelled through him. Thus, 
the study finds that the concept o f participation is crucial in both cases, but the 
extent o f participation depends on the ideology with which the specific populist 
project is articulated.
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Chapter 6 brings the tension between anti-democratic and democratic 
elements in the life o f both nations into focus. Here I point out that it is this 
historical context, further bolstered by the current international context of 
neoliberal hegemony, which wrests legitimacy from democracy, preventing it 
from fulfilling its potential. Populism, rather than being a cause of the 
deinstitutionalisaton o f States, as much o f the literature asserts, is instead a 
symptom of democratic regimes' and their institutions' inability to gain 
legitimacy. Fundamentally, this failure is due to  their inability to tru ly lessen the 
burden of inequality, based on race and class, in both countries. The existence of 
democratic institutions is not in itself evidence o f the existence o f democracy. 
Rather, it is the perceptible lessening o f inequality on the economic, social and 
political levels, which is a true sign of increasing democratisation. Democracy in 
this sense is, or should be, as Nef (1995) calls it, "a genuine participatory system 
of governance based on justice and equality" (p. 104).
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) assert that "...it is the contradictions of 
capitalism that advanced the cause o f democracy" (p7). Capitalism causes 
inequality providing the impetus to those affected most by that inequality, the 
working or popular classes, to  insist on greater participation, putting democratic 
curbs on capitalism. Often, as Nabulsi (2004) points out, tha t insistence must 
sometimes step outside the realm o f institutionality in order to further the 
agenda o f increased equality. Populism is one o f the major vehicles used by Latin 
Americans to attempt to achieve that, and both governments studied were 
accused o f stepping outside institutionality. Both presidents, moreover, came to 
power in situations where 'democratic' institutions in both Peru and Venezuela 
were perceived by the peoples o f both countries as fundamental in preserving 
inequality. In this way, therefore, they ceased to be democratic.
Indeed rather than populism being an opposite of democracy, as much of 
the literature seems to suggest, this study underlines populism's intimate 
relationship w ith democracy. As Canovan (1999) explains the hope that 
democracy gives in its promise o f equality, its redemptive side, can be
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compromised by its equally powerful pragmatic side that is "democracy [as] a 
way of coping peacefully with conflicting interests and views" (plO ). Yet "the 
power and legitimacy of democracy as a pragmatic system depend [...] on its 
redemptive elements. That always leaves room for the populism that 
accompanies democracy like a shadow" (p l6 ). Indeed, populism is, as Arditi 
(2004) clarifies, commenting on Canovan (1999), "a possibility embedded in the 
very practice o f democracy" (p l41 ).
Therefore, we must also, in accepting the "embeddedness" o f populism in 
democracy, accept the populist claim to democratic legitimacy (Canovan, 1999 
pp.6-7). Analysts in counterposing populism to democracy, and criticising it for 
"deinstitutionalising" it, forget the context and reasons why populists such as 
Fujimori and Chávez achieved power in the first place; the existence o f inequality 
and the failure of democracy's redemptive power in overcoming it. Even those 
analysts, such as Roberts (2000), who do recognise this suggest institutional 
reform as a means to prevent populism emerging. I  argue in Chapter 6, 
however, that only by being seen to tackle the root causes o f inequality can 
democracy gain legitimacy, a task much greater than mere institutional reform 
and, to an extent, dependent on global conditions, as the following section will 
explain.
7.3.1 Populism, globalisation and democracy
In the Introduction to this thesis, and in Chapter 3, we saw how neoliberal
globalisation has increased inequality in the region, and consistently undermined 
many democratic governments' effectiveness in tackling that inequality. 
Increasingly in Latin America, democratic regimes are seen not as the protectors 
o f the liberties of their peoples, all their peoples, but as agents o f neoliberalism. 
They have become as Nef (1995) terms them "receiver states", "highly 
transnationalised and weak [...] [acting] in partnership w ith foreign creditors and 
international financial institutions as manager, executor, and liquidator o f [their]
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own bankruptcy" (93). This role limits democratic governments' ability to tackle 
inequality, which should be the central role o f democratic institutions, making 
their task to gain legitimacy even more difficult still.
Yet it is not jus t in Latin America that inequality is increasing, I argue, but 
rather it is a worldwide phenomenon. Democracy is in peril as neoliberalism 
advances in the region, as the UNDP (2004) report on democracy attests, and, 
as Jacques (2004) maintains, throughout the globe. We have then the curious 
dichotomy whereby in Latin America there have never before been so many 
democratically elected governments in power, which nonetheless are powerfully 
constrained in meeting their electors wishes and furthering an agenda of 
equality. These constraints are primarily as a result o f the one-size-fits-all 
straitjacket o f neoliberal globalisation, which in the form of the Washington 
Consensus (see Introduction) has drastically reduced states' room for manoeuvre 
in formulating policy which can create a tru ly participatory political, social and 
economic environment (Chapter 3). In such a situation it is doubtful if 'actually 
existing' democracy in Latin America will be able to achieve the legitimacy it 
needs to survive. We see this situation clearly, for example, in the case of 
President Toledo of Peru (2001-present) who has been unwilling or unable to 
alter the fujimorista neoliberal model in any substantive way, and thus throwing 
Peruvian democracy into further crisis. In such a constrained atmosphere, it 
would not be surprising if populism continued to emerge further in the region, 
and break those constraints, (i.e. to go against 'institutionality', that is, 
neoliberalism), in order to lessen inequality and promote social justice, as Chavez 
has done.239
In this way, the present study underlines the importance o f placing 
populism firm ly within context on the local, regional and international level. 
Populism in Latin America is usually a local response to global structural 
conditions, which can manifest itself as a vehicle of those conditions or as a
239 Nonetheless, it should be recognised the 'exceptionalism' that Venezuelan oil gives to that 
country.
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reaction against them. I f  populism is to be prevented in the future, democracy 
must be radically improved to tru ly further an agenda of equality and justice. In 
the present context o f global neoliberal hegemony, this would, however, require 
profound structural change on all those levels. Failing that, populism will 
continue to emerge, sometimes enriching democracy, sometimes damaging it.
7.4 The study's originality and areas for future research
With these central arguments the present study provides a number o f original 
perspectives on the Fujimori and Chávez presidencies, and addresses many of 
the flaws identified in the literature on populism, particularly around the areas of 
context and consequences. This section will look at these more closely, while 
pointing to  possible future areas o f research.
7.4.1 The challenge of Chávez to neoliberalism
The thesis provides an increased understanding of both presidencies,
individually and in comparative perspective. Little work has been done comparing
Fujimori and Chávez, despite comparisons often being drawn between both
presidents, particularly in the media. The framework based on populism has
provided a very rich and comprehensive comparative structure, while also
providing the basis for a detailed enquiry into the nature o f each o f these
presidencies. By comparing these two specific presidents, the study places
accusations o f the authoritarianism and autocracy o f both presidents into sharp
focus. This is especially important in the case o f Chávez which is a relatively new
presidency, quite distinct from others currently in power in the region, and about
whom little work has been done. Chávez has been repeatedly described as a
'tyrant' and an 'autocrat' as well as a 'castro-communist'. This thesis has shown
quite forcefully that such accusations are groundless, and that the Chávez
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presidency is, as Ellner and Hellinger (2003) underline, much more complex than 
that.
Furthermore, the evolution o f the Chávez regime will provide fru itfu l areas 
fo r research, particularly on how the Chávez government is redefining 
Venezuela's relationship w ith globalisation processes, and the impact of that 
redefinition on other governments in the region. This thesis provides valuable 
material for future researchers who might take up that task.
7.4.2 The 'fujimorisation' of Peru
The present study raises questions too about analysis of the Fujimori
presidency, which could also provide possible future areas of research. Whilst 
this study accepts the analyses o f the regime to date, most o f these analyses are 
based on the negative impact of the Fujimori regime on the democratic 
institutions o f Peru. This indeed was one o f the central themes in the 
reestablishment o f democracy after Fujimori, and an important electoral plank of 
the government o f President Alejandro Toledo Manrique.
Yet little recognition is given to the fact, highlighted in this thesis, that 
Fujimori's central achievement was the erection o f a neoliberal economic, 
political and social edifice which today remains relatively untouched. Thus we 
have a case in Peru which is in some ways similar to that of Chile after Pinochet, 
where the essential system was in effect a continuance of pinochetismo w ithout 
Pinochet. In Peru, under Toledo, the economic system implanted by Fujimori 
remains more or less intact, and Fujimori's Constitution of 1993 still remains in 
place -  fujimorismo w ithout Fujimori.240 Inevitably the desire to see the return of 
the main architect o f this system, Fujimori, remains strong in Peru, as the 
profound centralisation of power in his hands has seemingly left the system with 
little direction. How is it that this has been the case, and what role did populism
240 There is however a Parliamentary Commission reviewing the 1993 Constitution, and some 
laws have been enacted dismantling fujim orista anti-terrorist practices, such as trying civilians in 
military courts.
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play in it? This question points to a further area of research which could be 
explored.
7.4.3 The global and the local: future populisms
One of the areas identified in which much analysis of populism fails is, as
pointed out earlier, the context in which populist governments emerge, and their 
consequences for the societies which experience them. This thesis addresses this 
failure by providing substantial chapters examining both these issues, and so 
contributing to an overall placing of these two presidents within an international 
context - that is globalisation. By doing so, it helps point to the centrality of the 
interaction between the local, the regional and the global in theorising on the 
emergence, characteristics and consequences of populist government.
Much writing on populism in Latin America concentrates primarily on the 
internal national and regional dynamics of populist governments, at the expense 
of the wider context. Yet Latin America and its individual countries do not live in 
a geopolitical vacuum. This influence of global structures on populism is an area 
worthy of further research, within the general theoretical literature and in 
individual case studies. This thesis' approach of placing both presidents within 
the context of globalisation goes some way to closing that gap.
Furthermore, the decision to use populism as a framework for the study of 
both presidents rather than as a concept -  a concept which, it could be argued, 
remains essentially contested -  nonetheless adds to the theory by giving it 
movement. Key findings, such as the central use of articulation to further 
essentially different populist projects, throws into sharp relief the inadequacy of 
the literature on populism to examine presidencies such as Chavez or Fujimori. 
The coining of the 'neopopulist' label to attempt to explain the re-emergence of 
populism in the 1980s is symptomatic of this failing. This thesis has advanced a 
new approach to the study of populism in Latin America by providing a 
theoretical framework to study it which is a synthesis of the literature on 
populism and frameworks derived from other theoretical frameworks: on
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democracy, democratic legitimacy, ideology, hegemony and globalisation itself. 
The exploration of both presidencies is therefore embedded In this new 
theoretical syntheis which provides a much broader framework to tease out and 
examine in detail the similarities and divergences of both.
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